Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Chris  Fitzgibbon

Martin Ryan Haulage Ltd.

Representatives

Self-represented 

Eilean Hynes,  Hynes HR

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00070206-001

12/03/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Regulation 15 of the European Communities (Organisation of Working Time) (Mobile Staff in Civil Aviation) Regulations 2006 - S.I. No. 507 of 2006

CA-00070206-002 WITHDRAWN

12/03/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00070206-003

12/03/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00070206-004

12/03/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00070206-005

12/03/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 45A of the Industrial Relations Act, 1946

CA-00070206-006 WITHDRAWN

12/03/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 23 of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 2015

CA-00070206-007 WITHDRAWN

12/03/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994.

CA-00070206-008

12/03/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00070206-009

12/03/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00070206-011

12/03/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00070206-012

12/03/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00070206-013

12/03/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00070206-014

12/03/2025

The Complainant commenced his employment with the Respondent on 4 May 2022.

On 12 March 2025, the Complainant submitted a manual complaint form to the Director General of the WRC. 

On 25 March 2025, the WRC wrote to the Complainant acknowledging his complaints and informing him that the complaint application has undergone validation checks and a number of issues have arisen. The complaint could not be further processed until these issues have been addressed/ clarified in writing.

·       Regarding specific complaint CA-00070206-009 – the Complainant was requested to furnish employment end date.

·       Regarding specific complaints CA-00070206-011, CA-00070206-012, CA-00070206-013, CA-00070206-014 – the Complainant was informed that he could only select one redress option. The Complainant was requested to select either referral to Adjudication Services or referral to Inspection Services.

The Complainant was requested to complete the details above and return to the WRC.

On 1 April 2025, the Complainant reverted stating that his employment with the Respondent terminated on 25 March 2025 and that he wished all his complaints to be referred for adjudication by an Adjudication Officer.

Evidence of sexually graphic nature

On 27 August 2025, the Complainant contacted the WRC by telephone regarding evidence that he wished to submit that, he said, was of an extremely sexually graphic nature, including child sexual abuse. The Complainant alleged that the material had been sent to him by a manager at the Respondent company.

The WRC wrote to the Complainant on 29 September 2025 in reply to his request to send graphic videos/images to support his claim. The Complainant was requested to address the matter with the Adjudication Officer at the outset of the hearing. The Complainant was informed that the Adjudication Officer would then consider his request and decide as to the relevance of the evidence referred to. The Complainant was informed that only evidence that is relevant to the case would be allowed to be introduced.

At the outset of the adjudication hearing, the Complainant was given an opportunity to address the matter. He suggested that material of a child sexual abuse nature was sent to him by a manager of the Respondent. The Complainant stated that he reported the matter to An Garda Siochána. However, he kept the material in question in his possession. The Complainant did not clarify why he believed that it was necessary for the hearing to view such material. Having considered the matter, I have decided that there was no requirement to view the material in question.

Post-hearing submissions

At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant was unable to present any evidence of his effort to mitigate the loss he claimed he suffered as a result of his dismissal. The Complainant was given an opportunity to furnish any such evidence by 25 September 2025. No other evidence and/or submissions were requested.

Post-hearing, on 25 September 2025, the Complainant delivered copies of Indeed records and copies of communication with potential employers regarding his applications showing his efforts to secure another employment from early February 2025 onwards. The received evidence was copied to the Respondent and a response was received on 13 October 2025.

The WRC also received an unsolicited submission from the Complainant where he asserted that

“Following up on your request at the hearing last Thursday September 18th I have reviewed a total off 41 timesheets out off a possible 150 time sheets and on those 41 time sheets there is 36 hours 15 minutes owed to me from Martin Ryan haulage as Martin Ryan has still refused to furnish me a data protection request I cannot review all time sheets and payslips do not confirm if it was me been sent home or me leaveing early. I cannot give an exact figure on outstanding monies”.

The Complainant was informed by the WRC that he was given an opportunity to furnish post-hearing, by 25 September 2025, any evidence he may have regarding his efforts to mitigate his loss. No other evidence and/or submissions were requested.

On 7 October 2025, the Complainant emailed the WRC suggesting that “the WRC are trying to bully me into provideing written submissions very unfair and discriminatory when ye are aware off my difficulties with reading and writing.”

For the avoidance of any doubt, the parties were given an opportunity to present their respective case at the adjudication hearing on 18 September 2025. The matter of redress under the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 was explained to the parties at the hearing. The Complainant sought compensation. It was explained to the parties that, without prejudice, if the Adjudication Officer finds that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed and she decides that compensation is the appropriate remedy, in line with the Act, the measures (if any) adopted by the Complainant or, as the case may be, his failure to adopt measures, to mitigate his loss attributable to the dismissal, must be considered.

At the hearing the Complainant submitted that he did attempt to mitigate his loss, albeit he had no documentary evidence available to support this assertion. Having considered the circumstances and cognisant that the Complainant was unrepresented, the Adjudication Officer gave the Complainant an opportunity to submit documentary evidence of his effort to mitigate his loss post-hearing, by 25 September 2025. It was clarified that any such evidence would be copied to the Respondent for its observations or comments. It was explained to both parties that no other submissions or evidence would be allowed.

The Complainant alleged that he did not receive his paid annual leave entitlements. He alleged that in 2023 he was owed 3.5 annual leave days.

The Complainant gave evidence that he took three days leave in the last week of March 2023 but was only paid for 2 days. He alleged that at that stage he was told that his leave was used up during the Christmas period in 2022. The following Friday, he was paid for two days only.

The Respondent elected not to cross-examine the Complainant’s evidence.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant received all his leave entitlements.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant’s records were reviewed and there was no evidence to suggest that there were any deductions or omissions regarding the Complainant’s annual leave. The Complainant’s payslips indicate that all payments were made in accordance with the terms of employment and statutory obligations.

For the purposes of accuracy and transparency, the Respondent offered to review any specific periods the Complainant believes were unpaid or incorrectly handled in relation to his annal leave.

The Respondent exhibited a copy of an email dated 5 April 2023 from a payroll department employee to the management of the Respondent bringing the Complainant’s queries regarding his leave to their attention. The employee noted that she spoke with the Complainant on the phone and he disputed his annual leave. She clarified that at Christmas 2022 period, the Complainant worked one day, two days were public holidays and two were holidays. The email went on to say that the Complainant claimed that the payment was a good will gesture from the company and not annual leave. The payroll employee further stated that the Complainant did not request a half day leave on a day he left at 12pm. She informed the Complainant that she could correct this and deduct the half day from his wages if he did not want to use it as holidays. She said that the Complainant was threatening to get into his car and go home. She forwarded copies of an email exchange with the Complainant which addressed the annual leave query.

On 3 April 2023 at 9:07am, the Complainant emailed the employee in the payroll department of the Respondent stating that

“I was in for holiday from 13,14,15,16 of march and I got paid for 3.5 days and the following week there was a note that all my holidays were used. I spoke to you in December and I was told that I had 7 days holidays left but I have only been paid for 3.5 and I was on holidays last Thursday march 30 and Friday the 31st. Just wondering what happened the other 3.5 days?”.

The payroll employee replied to the Complainant on the same day at 9:11am:

“Holidays were used in the following periods-

WK 1 – 2 days 28/30 Dec WK 7 - .5 10 Feb half day fri WK 10 – 1 day 3 Mar”

Correspondence ensued where the Complainant agreed that he took leave on 3 March. However, he argued that he did not request a day’s leave on 10 February 2023 he “just work[ed] at half day”.

Regarding the Christmas 2022 period, the Complainant argued that he did not get notice of these two days of leave and would not “be regarding those as holidays”. He further stated that if the matter was not rectified, he would be left with no option but to submits a complaint.

The matter was then followed up on 11 April 2023. The Complainant was informed that a medical cert was required to qualify for sick pay and once cert is received, sick pay would be processed. The Complainant reverted stating that he “won’t be providing any documentation for my sick day as I was not provided relevant documentation for my holidays that I didn’t apply for I didn’t receive 33 days notice. I’m following the example u started.”

The Complainant referred his claims to the Director General on 12 March 2025. He alleged that he was owed 3.5 days of annual leave, albeit at the hearing he asserted that his claim related to two days that were recorded as annual leave at the Christmas time of 2022 and a half-day on 10 February 2023.

The time limits for submitting claims to the Workplace Relations Commission pursuant to section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 are set out in section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 which provides that:

“Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates.”

Section 41(8) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 provides that an extension may be granted by an Adjudication Officer up to a maximum time limit of 12 months where, in the opinion of the Adjudication Officer, the Complainant has demonstrated reasonable cause for the delay in accordance with the provisions:

“An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause.”

The implications of the above were explained to the parties at the adjudication hearing. There was no application to extend the applicable time limits.

I have jurisdiction to investigate any complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 for a period of six months from the date of the referral of complaint. This complaint was presented to the WRC on 12 March 2025 and therefore the cognisable period that may be investigated is from 13 September 2024 to 12 March 2025. I note that Section 2(1) of the Act stipulates that “leave year” means a year beginning on any 1st day of April”. Therefore, I may consider annual leave entitlements for the period from the 1 April 2024 to 12 March 2025. The Complainant’s claim relates to annual leave allegedly not taken in the leave year from 1 April 2022 to 31 March 2023. Therefore, the Complainant’s complaint was referred to the Director General outside the prescribed time limits.

For completeness, even if the Complainant applied for and was granted the extension of the applicable time limits, which he did not, it would only allow me to extend the time limit to 13 March 2024. This, in turn, would encompass annual leave year from 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024 and would not encompass the days of annual leave that are subject of this claim.

I declare this complaint to be not well founded.

In the WRC complaint referral form, the Complainant alleged that he did not receive his paid holiday/annual leave entitlement in line with the Regulation 15 of the European Communities (Organisation of Working Time) (Mobile Staff in Civil Aviation) Regulations 2006 - S.I. No. 507 of 2006.

At the adjudication hearing the Complainant accepted that he was not a mobile worker in civil aviation. The Complainant withdrew his claim.

The Respondent rejects the claim.

There was no dispute at the adjudication hearing that the Complainant was not a mobile worker in civil aviation and, therefore, was not covered by the Regulations. The Complainant withdrew this claim.

This claim was withdrawn at the hearing.

The Complainant alleged that he was not notified of his starting and finishing times in advance.

At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant clarified that his claim was that he did not receive a notice of any overtime that he was required to work. He said that he would have to agree if he was told to work longer hours, particularly from October 2023 until 25 March 2025. He said that there has never been a set definition of working time.

The Complainant exhibited copies of two text messages as follows.

A message dated 3 November: “Well Chris, we r in for 7 in the morning, if it suits”.

The Complainant replied: “Well ya nobobber I can come in at 7 tomorrow”.

A message dated 8 December stating: “Well chris, we r in for 7 in the morning”.

The Complainant’s reply to this text message was not exhibited.

The Complainant confirmed at the hearing that both text messages were received in 2024.

The Complainant exhibited numerous copies of his weekly timesheets and a copy of his Statement of main terms of employment stipulating that “Your contracted hours are 40 hours per week. Your normal working week is Monday-Friday 08:00-16:30."

The Respondent rejects the claim.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant’s contract of employment clearly set out the working hours.

The Respondent submits that it ensures that employees are informed of their shifts in advance through a plan of work, current and next week’s work, on a notice board in the office where employees have access to. This has been consistently applied to all staff of the warehouse, including the Complainant.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant was issued with a written contract of employment upon commencement of work in 2022. There is further evidence that the Complainant received another copy of his contract in July 2023. This contract was provided in accordance with the Respondent’s policy and procedures. Despite repeated requests from the administrator to have it signed and returned, the Complainant failed to do so. However, the Complainant was fully aware of his contractual terms.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant’s allegation that he was unaware of his hours, entitlements, or conditions lacks credibility.

During his employment, the Complainant availed of sick pay, holiday pay and paternity leave, all of which indicate clear knowledge and acceptance of his terms and conditions. He also received a pay increase on 3 July 2023 and in May 2024.

Timesheets maintained over a three-year period consistently reflect his hours of work. The warehouse operated fixed opening hours from 7am to 6pm, and his timesheets align with these.

The Complainant has never raised any grievance with management during his employment regarding his work times.

The Respondent asserts that the Complainant was always aware of his working hours in line with contractual and statutory obligations.

Mr Ryan, Director gave evidence that extra work was an opportunity to earn extra income. It was offered to staff but they were entitled to decline the offer. When the Complainant stated in October 2024 that he would not be able to work overtime, it was accepted by the Respondent.

Mr Ryan said that he typically advises employees on the first day at work that, due to the nature of the business, overtime might be required.

In line with the time limits outlined above, I have jurisdiction to investigate any complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 for a period of six months from the date of the referral of complaint. This complaint was presented to the WRC on 12 March 2025 and, therefore, the cognisable period that may be investigated is from 13 September 2024 to 12 March 2025.

The Law

Section 17 Provision of information in relation to working time.

17.—(1) If neither the contract of employment of the employee concerned nor any employment regulation order, registered employment agreement or collective agreement that has effect in relation to the employee specifies the normal or regular starting and finishing times of work of an employee, the employee’s employer shall notify the employee, subject to subsection (3), at least 24 hours before the first day or, as the case may be, the day, in each week that he or she proposes to require the employee to work, of the times at which the employee will normally be required to start and finish work on each day, or, as the case may be, the day or days concerned, that week, and the employee’s employer shall ensure the work takes place within predetermined reference hours and days.

(1A) When the requirements of subsection (1) are not met by the employee’s employer, an employee shall have the right to refuse to work during the reference hours and days predetermined by the employer in accordance with that subsection without adverse consequences.

(2) If the hours for which an employee is required to work for his or her employer in a week include such hours as the employer may from time to time decide (in this subsection referred to as “additional hours”), the employer shall notify the employee, subject to subsection (3), at least 24 hours before the first day or, as the case may be, the day, in that week on which he or she proposes to require the employee to work all or, as the case may be, any of the additional hours, of the times at which the employee will be required to start and finish working the additional hours on each day, or, as the case may be, the day or days concerned, of that week

(3) If during the period of 24 hours before the first-mentioned or, as the case may be, the second-mentioned day in subsection (1) or (2), the employee has not been required to do work for the employer, the time at which the employee shall be notified of the matters referred to in subsection (1) or (2), as the case may be, shall be not later than before the last period of 24 hours, preceding the said first or second-mentioned day, in which he or she has been required to do work for the employer.

(4) A notification to an employee, in accordance with this section, of the matters referred to in subsection (1) or (2), as the case may be, shall not prejudice the right of the employer concerned, subject to the provisions of this Act, to require the employee to start or finish work or, as the case may be, to work the additional hours referred to in subsection (2) at times other than those specified in the notification if circumstances, which could not reasonably have been foreseen, arise that justify the employer in requiring the employee to start or finish work or, as the case may be, to work the said additional hours at those times.

(5) It shall be a sufficient notification to an employee of the matters referred to in subsection (1) or (2) for the employer concerned to post a notice of the matters in a conspicuous position in the place of the employee’s employment.

Section 27 Complaints to adjudication officer

A decision of an adjudication officer under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 in relation to a complaint of a contravention of a relevant provision shall do one or more of the following, namely—

(a)    declare that the complaint was or, as the case may be, was not well founded,

(b)    require the employer to comply with the relevant provision,

(c)     require the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount (if any) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances, but not exceeding 2 years remuneration in respect of the employee's employment.

The Complainant made generalised allegations that he was not notified of his starting and finishing times in advance. In his 282-page booklet with documentary evidence the Complainant exhibited copies of weekly timesheets for periods in 2022, 2023 and 2024. The most recent one appears to be from the week starting on 29 April 2024. These fall outside the cognisable period prescribed by the Act.

At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant referred more specifically to the requests from the Respondent to start work at 7am (instead of 8am) which he received via text messages on 3 November 2024 and 8 December 2024.

There was no dispute that the Complainant’s terms of employment provided for working hours from 8am to 4.30pm. 

I note that in the email of 18 October 2024, the Complainant made it clear that he had a difficulty with not being allowed to stay at work beyond his normal working hours on that evening. He then informed the Respondent that “As also stated on our call today due to family circumstances I will only be available for work between 8-4:30 if it arises that I can do overtime I will contact yourself via email.”

The Respondent replied on the same evening thanking the Complainant for his email and noting that going forward the Complainant would not be available for overtime due to family circumstances.

There was also no dispute that the Complainant on the two occasions in question was requested to commence work at 7am and he was not provided 24 hours’ notice of start time in compliance with the legislation set out above. However, from the exchange of text messages of 3 November 2024, it seems that the additional hour of work was subject to the Complainant’s agreement i.e. “if it suits”. I note that the Complainant’s reply was that he could come at 7am.

The Labour Court held in Musgrave Limited v Vasilijevs DWT1825 that a worker is entitled to 24 hours’ notice of their start and finish times to enable them to reconcile their work/life commitments.  In this case, the Complainant was asked and agreed to commence work an hour earlier than scheduled on two occasions. He did not receive the required notice. I find that a breach of section 17 of the 1997 Act has occurred. 

The matter of compensation where a complaint is well founded is addressed at section 27(3)(c) of the Act which sets out that an employer may be required to pay to an employee compensation of such amount (if any) as is just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, but not exceeding 2 years ’ remuneration in respect of the employee’s employment.

The Labour Court in DWT2240 Dublin Bus v Rhys Acton on the matter of compensation held as follows.

“In determining what (if any) compensation is just and equitable, an Adjudication Officer (and the Labour Court on appeal) must apply the principles of effectiveness, deterrence and proportionality as derived from European law and, in particular, the judgment of the European Court of Justice in Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Case C-14/83) [1984] E.C.R. 1891. That case addressed a question regarding equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment.

Commenting on the judgement of Von Colson in the case of DWT15125 C & F Tooling Limited and Jason Cunniffe the Labour Court took note of the CJEU’s statement that:-

‘Although Directive 76/207/EEC, for the purpose of imposing a sanction for the breach of the prohibition of discrimination, leaves the member-States free to choose between the different solutions suitable for achieving its objective, it nevertheless requires that if a member-State chooses to penalise breaches of that prohibition by the award of compensation, then in order to ensure that it is effective and that it has a deterrent effect, that compensation must in any event be adequate in relation to the damage sustained and must therefore amount to more than purely nominal compensation such as, for example, the reimbursement only of the expenses incurred in connection with the application. It is for the national court to interpret and apply the legislation adopted for the implementation of the directive in conformity with the requirements of Community law, in so far as it is given discretion to do so under national law.’

The Labour Court went to say that ‘Like every case, the decision in Von Colson is authority only for what it decided’.

Addressing breaches of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 in [2014] IEHC 263 – Piotr Bryszewski and Fitzpatrick and Hanleys Limited trading as Caterway and the Labour Court, Birmingham J noted :-

‘The circumstances in which breaches of the Act of 1997 occur are likely to vary very significantly. Some cases may involve breaches that are major and deliberate with serious consequences for the employees involved and could probably, in some cases, be described as egregious. On the other end of the spectrum, there may be breaches which were unintentional, minor, rectified and, in practice, were of little consequence (para 14).’

In all the circumstances, I find that the breach in this case was minor in nature where the Complainant suffered no loss or hardship. The Complainant was asked to commence work an hour earlier. The Complainant had previously indicated that he would work overtime only if suited him. The Respondent accepted his decision in this regard.  On the two occasions in question, the Complainant was asked, and he seemed to have no difficulty to agree an earlier start.

I declare this complaint to be well founded.

I require the Respondent to comply with the provisions of the Act and to put in place measures to remove the potential for further breaches arising under section 17.

In the circumstances, I decide that no compensation is warranted.

The Complainant alleged that the Respondent treated him adversely for refusing to work where he was given less than 24 hours’ notice of the work.

At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant asserted that in October 2024 he informed the Respondent that he would not be available to do any overtime. He said that after that he was asked but refused to do overtime. The Complainant did not provide any specifics regarding the occasions on which he was requested and refused to work overtime. He asserted that he was then called names and fingers were wagged at him. The Complainant did not dispute that he agreed to do overtime on the two occasions, as per the text messages exhibited.

The Complainant referred to his emails to Mr Ryan dated 9 December and 16 December 2024. He alleged that the emails show the abuse he suffered after he refused to do overtime.

The Respondent denies that the Complainant was treated adversely for refusing to work where less than 24 hours’ notice was given.

The Employee Handbook provides at page 12 that due to business demands employees may, from time to time, be required to work additional hours in excess of their contracted hours. Such hours may include overtime, weekend work, or travel away from home.

On one occasion, management notified all staff to work on a Saturday. The work was later cancelled, but one manager failed to notify staff of the cancellation. This was an administrative error, not an intentional act. Saturday work is always optional. On another occasion, the Complainant agreed to work on a Saturday but deliberately failed to attend, later admitting this was in retaliation for the previous error.

The Respondent submits that on 18 October 2024, the Complainant advised the Respondent in writing that he was not in a position to work overtime. In response, the Respondent respected this position and did not request that the Complainant work any additional hours thereafter.

The Respondent categorically denies that any adverse treatment arose as a result of the Complainant’s refusal. Rather, the Respondent’s approach was to accommodate the Complainant’s stated preference, while continuing to roster him in line with his contracted hours.

The Law

Section 26 of the Act provides as follows.

26. Protection against penalisation

(1) An employer shall not penalise an employee for having in good faith opposed by lawful means an act which is unlawful under this Act or the Activities of Doctors in Training Regulations.

(2) If a penalisation of an employee, in contravention of subsection (1), constitutes a dismissal of the employee within the meaning of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 to 2015, relief may not be granted to the employee in respect of that penalisation both under this Part and under those Acts.

(3) In proceedings under Part 4 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 in relation to a complaint of a failure to comply with subsection (1) it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved that the employee concerned has acted reasonably and in good faith in forming the opinion and making the communication concerned.

(4) If a penalisation of an employee, in contravention of subsection (1), constitutes a dismissal of the employee within the meaning of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 to 2015, relief may not be granted to the employee in respect of that penalisation both under this Act and under those Acts.

(5) In this section “penalisation” means any act or omission by an employer or a person acting on behalf of an employer that affects an employee to his or her detriment with respect to any term or condition of his or her employment, and, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes—

(a)    suspension, lay-off or dismissal (including a dismissal within the meaning of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 to 2015), or the threat of suspension, lay-off or dismissal,

(b)    demotion or loss of opportunity for promotion,

(c)     transfer of duties, change of location of place of work, reduction in wages or change in working hours,

(d)    imposition or the administering of any discipline, reprimand or other penalty (including a financial penalty), and

(e)    coercion or intimidation.

The Complainant alleged that the Respondent treated him adversely for refusing to work where he was given less than 24 hours’ notice of the work.

There was no dispute that on 18 October 2024, the Complainant informed the Respondent that he would not be available to do any overtime. The Complainant asserted that he was subsequently asked but refused to work overtime and as a result to was called names and fingers were wagged at him.

In University College Cork v Keohane DWT0147, the Labour Court held that:

“In order to make out her complaint of penalisation it is necessary for the complainant to establish a causal link between her activities in seeking to have section 19 of the Act applied by the respondent and some detriment which she suffered in her employment. Such a link can be established by reference to particular facts or by inference from all the surrounding circumstances.”

As the Labour Court pointed out in O’Neill v Toni and Guy Blackrock Limited E.L.R. 21, albeit under a different statute:

“It is clear from the language of this section that in order to make out a complaint of penalisation it is necessary for a claimant to establish that the detriment of which he or she complains was imposed “for” having committed one of the acts protected by subsection 3.Thus the detriment giving rise to the complaint must have been incurred because of, or in retaliation for, the Claimant having committed a protected act. This suggested that where there is more than one causal factor in the chain of events leading to the detriment complained of the commission of a protected act must be an operative cause in the sense that “but for” the Claimant having committed the protected act he or she would not have suffered the detriment. This involves a consideration of the motive or reasons which influenced the decision maker in imposing the impugned determent.”

The Complainant must, therefore, establish that he committed a protected act, within the meaning of section 26(1) of the Act, before the other elements in this test come into play. The protected acts upon which the Complainant relies in this case is his informing the Respondent that he would not be available to work any overtime unless it suited him, and his subsequent refusal to work overtime when he was asked to do so.

Section 26(1) provides that “An employer shall not penalise an employee for having in good faith opposed by lawful means an act which is unlawful under this Act or the Activities of Doctors in Training Regulations.”

There is nothing in the Act to suggest that it would be unlawful under the Act to request an employee to work additional hours (subject to certain requirements such as e.g. the maximum permissible working hours or notification of working times). For the avoidance of any doubt, in his communication to the Respondent of 18 October 2024, the Complainant made no reference whatsoever to the matter of 24 hours’ notice. Rather, he stated that “due to family circumstances I will only be available to work between 8-4:30 if it arises that I can do overtime I will contact yourself via email.” I am not satisfied that this is an act that meets the requirements of section 26.

In light of the foregoing, I find that the Complainant has failed to establish that he in good faith opposed by lawful means an act which is unlawful under this Act.

I declare this complaint to be not well founded.

The Complainant alleges that he did not receive a statement in writing of his terms of employment.

At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant asserted that he had a disability and issues with computers. No details of the alleged disability and/or medical evidence was provided. He said that he had told Mr Ryan that he was unable to access the contract that had been emailed to him and requested a paper copy. The Complainant conceded that he did not contact the payroll officer to inquire about a hard copy of the document. He said that it was not his role to follow up, it was the Respondent’s role to give the contract to him.

The Respondent denies the allegation that the Complainant did not receive a statement in writing of his terms of employment.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant was furnished with a contract which sets out the core and additional terms as required under the Act, including the Complainant’s job title, place of work, rate of pay, hours of work, commencement date, and other relevant particulars. The Respondent has fully complied with its statutory obligations.

The Respondent emphasised that the Complainant received a copy of the contract within the correct timeframe. At the relevant time, the payroll officer, who was responsible for the Safety & Quality Assessment System and BRC certification (both requiring significant attention to detail) was also managing the process of issuing contracts.

Several requests for the signed copy to be returned were made but the Complainant did not comply.

The Respondent acknowledges that, while the Complainant might not have returned a signed copy of his contract of employment, the Respondent did issue the written statement of terms and conditions. The emails sent on 18 and 30 July 2023 were a reminder to the Complainant to sign and return the original contract which had already been issued to him.

Mr Ryan gave evidence that the Complainant received and accessed his payslips every week via the same platform his contract would have been issued. All other employees got them in the same manner. Mr Ryan disputed that the Complainant informed him that he has a disability or that due to his disability he could not access the app and/or email with the contract. When the Complainant approached him to speak about his contract, Mr Ryan advised the Complainant to speak with the payroll officer as she would be the person dealing with contracts.

Mr Ryan said that the Complainant had never informed the Respondent of his anxiety and depression prior to December 2024. He said that the Respondent supports and accommodates employees when it is aware of circumstances. Mr Ryan said that the Complainant could have contacted the payroll officer, as directed, and ask for a PDF or a hard copy but he never did.

The Law

Section 3(1) & (1A) of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 provides:

“Written statement of terms of employment:

3(1) An employer shall, not later than one month after the commencement of an employee’s employment with the employer, give or cause to be given to the employee a statement in writing containing the following particulars of the terms of the employee’s employment, that is to say-…

(fa) a reference to any registered employment agreement or employment regulation order which applies to the employee and confirmation of where the employee may obtain a copy of such agreement or order,…

(ga) that the employee may, under section 23 of the National Minimum Wage Act, 2000, request from the employer a written statement of the employee’s average hourly rate of pay for any pay reference period as provided in that section,

(h) the length of the intervals between the times at which remuneration is paid, whether a week, a month or any other interval,…

(j) any terms or conditions relating to paid leave (other than paid sick leave),

(k) any terms or conditions relating to- (i) incapacity for work due to sickness or injury and paid sick leave, and (ii) pensions and pension schemes,

(l) the period of notice which the employee is required to give and entitled to receive (whether by or under statute or under the terms of the employee’s contract of employment) to determine the employee’s contract of employment or, where this cannot be indicated when the information is given, the method for determining such periods of notice,

(m) a reference to any collective agreements which directly affect the terms and conditions of the employee’s employment including, where the employer is not a party to such agreements, particulars of the bodies or institutions by whom they were made,

(n) the training entitlement, if any, provided by the employer,

(o) in the case of a temporary contract of employment, the identity of the user undertakings (within the meaning of Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 20085 on temporary agency work), when and as soon as known, and

(p) if the work pattern of an employee is entirely or mostly unpredictable, the statement shall inform the employee of - (i) the principle that the work schedule is variable, the number of guaranteed paid hours and the remuneration for work performed in addition to those guaranteed hours, (ii) the reference hours and days within which the employee may be required to work, and (iii) the minimum notice period to which the employee is entitled to before the start of a work assignment and, where applicable, the deadline for notification in accordance with section 17 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997, and

(q) where it is the responsibility of the employer, the identity of the social security institutions receiving the social insurance contributions attached to the contract of employment and any protection relating to social security provided by the employer;

(1A) Without prejudice to subsection (1), an employer shall, not later than 5 days after the commencement of an employee’s employment with the employer, give or cause to be given to the employee a statement in writing containing the following particulars of the terms of the employee’s employment, that is to say:

(a) the full names of the employer and the employee,

(b) the address of the employer in the State or, where appropriate, the address of the principal place of the relevant business of the employer in the State or the registered office (within the meaning of the Companies Act 2014),

(c) in the case of a temporary contract of employment, the expected duration thereof or, if the contract of employment is for a fixed term, the date on which the contract expires,

(d) the remuneration, including the initial basic amount, any other component elements, if applicable, indicated separately, the frequency and method of payment of the remuneration to which the employee is entitled and the pay reference period for the purposes of the National Minimum Wage Act 2000,

(e) the number of hours which the employer reasonably expects the employee to work- (i) per normal working day, and (ii) per normal working week,

(f) where sections 4B to 4E (in so far as they are in operation) of the Payment of Wages Act 1991 apply to the employer, the employer’s policy on the manner in which tips or gratuities and mandatory charges (within the meaning of section 1 of that Act) are treated,

(g) the place of work or, where there is no fixed or main place of work, a statement specifying that the employee is employed at various places or is free to determine his or her place of work or to work at various places,

(h) either- (i) the title, grade, nature or category of work for which the employee is employed, or (ii) a brief specification or description of the work,

(i) the date of commencement of the employee’s contract of employment,

(j) any terms or conditions relating to hours of work (including overtime),

(k) where a probationary period applies, its duration and conditions.”

Section 3A of the Act provides:

Form of statement to be provided

“A statement furnished by an employer under section 3, 4, 5, 6, 6E or 6F shall be—

(a) signed and dated by or on behalf of the employer,

(b) in writing, and

(c) transmitted on paper or, provided that the information is accessible to the employee, that it can be stored and printed, and that the employer retains proof of transmission or receipt, in electronic form.”

Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 Act, as detailed above, provides that an employee may present a complaint to the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission that their employer has contravened section 3 of the Act before the expiration of the six months period beginning on the date of contravention to which the complaint relates. The issue as to “the date of contravention” arose in An Animal Carer v A Charity ADJ-00009820 and An Employee v A Company ADJ-00012491. It was held that a contravention of section 3 was “a subsisting contravention that endures so long after the initial two month period the employee remains an employee not in possession of a statement”. Once a statement was provided, time started to run. If no statement was provided at any stage during the employment relationship, and this came to an end, the employee could refer a complaint within six months from the last day of their employment.

There was no dispute that on 18 July 2023, an email was sent by the Respondent’s payroll officer to the Complainant as follows.

“Good Morning All,

You will shortly receive an e-mail (check Inbox & Junk Mail) to digitally sign & date the following:-

1.       Contract of Employment

2.       Staff Handbook

Once completed/ received you will have access to the above via your Brightpay Employee App. This will assist in receiving Contracts/Documents securely, in a timely manner & achieving a paperless office in the future. Please see below/attached simple instruction on how to digitally sign & date…”

The instructions were both outlined in the body of the email and attached in a Word document.

On 30 August 2023, the payroll officer again emailed the Complainant stating:

“Your Contract & Staff Handbook has been sent to your email for digital signing & dating. Please see original email sent to you detailing the content & process to complete same (if you have any difficulty please let me know)”.

Copies of the Statement of Main Terms of Employment provided by both parties show that the document was signed on behalf of the Respondent by the Director and was dated 18 July 2023. 

The document was transmitted in electronic form, and the information was accessible to the Complaint via email, it could be downloaded and saved or printed. The Respondent exhibited retained proof of transmission of the document on two occasions.

I note that the Complainant, in his 282-page booklet of evidence included a copy of his terms of employment under the heading “handbook + Contract. Digital send contract. 18-7-23. Started May 2022.”

Having considered the above, I find that the Complainant was furnished with a written statement of his terms and conditions of employment which was signed on behalf of the Respondent on 18 July 2023.

The Complainant referred his complaint to the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission pursuant to the Act on 12 March 2025. By application of the time limit provided for at section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 the cognisable period for the purpose of this claim is confined to the six-month period ending on the date on which the complaint was presented to the WRC. Therefore, the cognisable period covered by the complaint is the six-month period from 13 September 2024 to 12 March 2025.

In circumstances where the Complainant was furnished with a written statement on 18 July 2023, I am satisfied that the twelve-month period commencing on this date ends on 17 January 2024. Therefore, as the complaint was referred to the Director General of the WRC on 12 March 2025, it is also clearly outside of the extended period of twelve months as provided for in section 41(8) of the Act. Therefore, even if the extension was sought by the Complainant and granted, his complaint would not have been lodged within the time limits imposed by section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, as amended.

I declare this complaint to be not well founded.

In his WRC complaint referral form, the Complainant asserted that he did not receive his terms and conditions as laid down by an Employment Regulation Order (ERO).

At the adjudication hearing the Complainant conceded that he was not covered by an ERO and he withdrew the claim.

The Respondent rejects the claim.

This complaint was withdrawn at the adjudication hearing.

The complaint was withdrawn at the adjudication hearing.

In his WRC complaint referral form, the Complainant asserted that he did not receive his terms and conditions as laid down by a Sectoral Employment Order (SEO).

At the adjudication hearing the Complainant conceded that he was not covered by a SEO and he withdrew the claim.

The Respondent rejects the claim.

This complaint was withdrawn at the adjudication hearing.

This complaint was withdrawn at the adjudication hearing.

In the WRC complaint referral form, the Complainant asserted that the Respondent has not provided him with a reasoned reply to his request for employment with more predictable and secure working conditions within one month of the request.

At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant asserted that on occasions he would have been sent home earlier. As his child was in crèche in another town, any changes would cause inconvenience. In March 2022 he asked that his hours remained the same, he was looking for more notice and set hours.

The Complainant asserted that his email of 18 October 2024 where he stated that he would not be available to do more overtime constitutes a formal request for more predictable and secure working conditions.

The Respondent submits that it was not aware of having received any request from the Complainant for more predictable and secure working conditions. No such request is recorded in the Respondent’s correspondence or HR records.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant’s contract of employment already provided for predictable and secure working conditions. The contract confirms that the Complainant was employed on a full-time basis, with forty contracted hours per week (Monday to Friday, 08:00-16:30). This arrangement is entirely consistent with the requirements of the EU Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions as transposed into Irish law,

The Law

Section 6F of the Act

“Transition to another form of employment

(1) Subject to subsection (2), an employee who has been in the continuous service of an employer for not less than 6 months and who has completed his or her probationary period, if any, may request a form of employment with more predictable and secure working conditions where available and receive a reasoned written reply from his or her employer.

(2) An employee may, once in any 12 month period, request a form of employment in accordance with subsection (1).

(3) An employer shall provide the reasoned written reply referred to in subsection (1) to an employee within one month of the request by the employee.

(4) An employer may provide an oral reply where a subsequent similar request is submitted by the same worker where the situation of the worker remains unchanged.

(5) This section shall not apply to seafarers or sea fishermen.”

The Complainant had the required service to request more predictable and secure working conditions.

The Complainant argued that his email of 18 October 2025 and specifically his informing the Respondent that he would not be available to work overtime a formal request for more predictable and secure working conditions under the Act.

By the Complainant’s own submission to the WRC of 18 April 2025, the email was “a written complaint” made on 18 October at 19:33 to the Director regarding alleged unfair treatment and intimidating behaviour. In the email, the Complainant describes his interactions with two named colleagues. In the last part of the email, the Complainant stated:

“There was work on the floor this evening I asked [named] was labels printed I was told ya but we’ll do it tomorrow so he can get his overtime. But why couldn’t we continue work tonight floor staff were often left on to do work even when he left at 4:00 or 4:30 what was different tonight? As also stated on our call today due to family circumstances I will only be available for work between 8-4:30 if it arises that I can do overtime I will contact yourself via email.”

The Respondent replied to the email on the same evening noting the Complainant’s unavailability to work additional hours.

While the Act does not prescribe the format in which a request for more predictable and secure working conditions is to be made, I find that the Complainant’s email of 18 October 2024 could not possibly be read as such.

I find that the Complainant had at no time requested a form of employment with more predictable and secure working conditions.

I declare this complaint to be not well founded.

The Complainant alleged that he had to leave his employment due to the conduct of his employer or others at work.

In the WRC complaint referral form the Complainant alleged that he was subjected to bullying, aggression, intimidation and violence at work. He stated that he brought it to the attention of the Director, Mr Ryan but it was dismissed by him. The Complainant said that he witnessed abuse of his work colleague on 9 December 2024 which was the last straw.

The Complainant stated that he raised complaints on 18 October 2024 and 9 December 2024. Some 20 minutes after his email of 18 October 2020, he received a reply that the matter was resolved. The complaint of 9 December 2024 is still under investigation. There were no warnings or suspension issued.

At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant gave evidence that on 18 October 2024, he emailed the Respondent with his official complaint regarding his two named work colleagues.  He received a reply from the Director, Mr Ryan some 20 minutes later stating that the matter had been dealt with.

The Complainant said that on 9 December 2024, he met with Mr Ryan, Director, the two coworkers he had complained of, Mr Matassa (at the time an employee of the respondent who attended the hearing with the Complainant) and another employee. The Complainant said that he was completely disregarded, and he then sent an email on 9 December 2024 at 10:49am.

In the email, the Complainant described the interaction he had that morning with a named colleague and the alleged bullying and intimidating behaviour. The Complainant said that he saw Mr Matassa being abused and he was afraid the same would happen to him. The Complainant further stated that he felt sick and had to leave work on the day.

Mr Ryan, Director replied to the Complainant at 11:26am. In the email he offered a meeting with HR to address the matter.

The Complainant reverted reiterating his complaints and stating the if the Respondent did not deal with it, he would involve a third party.

Mr Ryan replied at 12:11 that he disagreed with the Complainant’s assumptions and would revert.

On 11 December 2024, Mr Ryan emailed the Complainant acknowledging his compliant and forwarding the Respondent’s Dignity at Work Policy. Mr Ryan explained the informal and formal process and informed the Complainant that there would be no suspension or warnings until an allegation of bullying was proven. Mr Ryan asked the Complainant to confirm which way he would like to proceed. As the Complainant was on sick leave, Mr Ryan also asked him to confirm whether he was fit to engage in the process.

The Complainant said that he emailed Mr Ryan again on 16 December 2024. He emailed Mr Ryan again that afternoon asking how long the investigation would take and what sick leave would he be paid.

On 18 December 2024, Mr Ryan emailed him asking for clarification if his complaint was in relation to one named employee.

The Complainant emailed Mr Ryan on 19 December 2024 at 13:23. He referred to the staff handbook and questioned the Respondent’s decision to engage a third party to conduct the investigation and the time it was to take. The Complainant further stated that he did not consent to the third party recording the meetings and providing copies of minutes unless he was provided with a copy of the recording or permitted to record the meeting as well. He suggested that the decision not to suspend the coworker he had complained of was an insult.

The Complainant said in his evidence that his appointment with the company doctor was arranged for 4.30pm but he could not make it. While he did not request the appointment to be re-scheduled, there was no offer to reschedule it either.

The Complainant said that he did not engage with the investigation and decided to resign. He said that the coworker he had complained about should have been suspended. Furthermore, the Complainant said that the Respondent should not have engaged with him while he was out sick. He resigned with immediate effect on 25 March 2025.

Loss

The Complainant gave evidence that he secured new job from 2 April 2025 but is earning €40 gross less per week. The Complainant acknowledged that his sick certs were up to 19 April 2025. However, he stated that he obtained a GP cert confirming he was fit for work and he contacted the Department of Social Protection and cancelled his Illness Benefit on 2 April 2025. 

The Complainant said that initially he couldn’t do much due to his illness. In February 2025 he contacted the investigator regarding data protection. In March 2025, he made a complaint to the Data Protection Commission. There was ongoing correspondence.

The Complainant said that his new employer carried out some works in his neighbourhood. The Complainant chatted with a manager and got a job.

The Complainant said that he was paid for two days in February 2025 when he attended an induction with another company (while on Illness Benefit).

The Complainant also said that he is now paid €500 net per week. He is paid €15 gross per hour, and he was paid €15.50 gross with the Respondent.

The Respondent denies that the Complainant was forced to resign.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant submitted complaints on 18 October 2024 and 9 December 2024 which were acknowledged and responded to promptly by Mr Ryan, Director.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant asserted that Mr Ryan took 20 minutes to investigate. The 20 minutes referred only to the time taken to issue a reply. Mr Ryan had already met with staff and discussed the Complainant’s concerns before responding.

In the interest of maintaining a harmonious work environment, the Respondent addresses such situations promptly and seeks to resolve them efficiently, in line with its procedures. The Complainant subsequently thanked Mr Ryan for his prompt response by email of 18 October 2024.

With regard to the complaint of 9 December 2024, investigation procedures were initiated. However, the Complainant failed to engage with the investigation process. He failed to provide required medical certification or a “fit to engage” certificate. This prevented the Respondent from conducting a full and effective investigation.

Email correspondence between the Complainant and Mr Ryan on 7 January 2025, 6 February 2025, and 17 February 2025 demonstrates that the Respondent sought to progress the investigation and engage with the Complainant in good faith,

The Respondent asserts that it acted reasonably, in line with its policies and procedures and that the Complainant’s departure cannot be characterised as constructive dismissal.

The Respondent submits that statutory sick pay was applied in accordance with its policy and the relevant legislation. While the Complainant may perceive requests for updated medical certificates to be unnecessary, these requirements were consistent with the Respondent’s Sick Leave Policy and statutory obligations.

Communications from the Respondent during the Complainant’s certified absence were limited to essential HR and administrative matters, conducted in line with the company policy. Communications were made via email on 8 January 2025. The Complainant requested that emails come during work hours. Efforts were made to communicate via post to respect working hours. The last certificate the Respondent received from the Complainant was on 18 February 2025.

The Respondent submits that, in his WRC submission, the Complainant said, “I’m out sick anxiety, stress and depression since 09.12.24.” The Complainant submitted his complaint on 12 March 2025. On 11 March 2025, the Respondent received an email from BRC McMahon confirming that they had employed the Complainant, presumably some time between December 2024 and March 2025. This suggests that the Complainant commenced employment with BRC McMahon during the same period in which he reported being unfit for work.

The Respondent has not threatened the Complainant with disciplinary action for not adhering to certified sick leave. Any communication was consistent with the policy requirements.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant declined to engage with Insight HR, a third-party provider, despite repeated invitations to facilitate independent HR support. This non-engagement limited the Respondent’s ability to address his concerns fully.

At the adjudication hearing, the Respondent submitted that the 4.30pm doctor’s appointment could have been rearranged or a taxi could have been arranged for the Complainant had the Complainant communicated his difficulty with attending.

The Respondent asserted that the Complainant gave it no opportunity to address and rectify the matter and he failed to engage. The Respondent tried all in its power to resolve and investigate the matter.

The Respondent submitted that the matter was investigated in the Complainant’s absence and it found that there was no bullying. The report issued to the Complainant on 1 May 2025.

The Respondent submitted that dignity and respect at work and bullying & harassment prevention trainings were arranged for all employees after the Complainant’s complaint was raised.

The Respondent submitted that the only reason it contacted the Complainant while he was on sick leave was that, as per sick leave policy, the Complainant was required to deliver medical certs. When the certs expired and there was no contact from the Complainant, the Respondent emailed him to inquire.

Mr Ryan, Director gave evidence that he tried to engage with the Complainant. He said that the Complainant encouraged another employee to raise a complaint. The Complainant made complaints to the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine, Food Safety Authority, the Health and Safety Authority, the WRC Inspectorate and the Data Protection Commission. Mr Ryan said that the Respondent passed all the inspections and there were no negative findings but the cost in money and time, the amount of stress and damage to the Respondent were enormous. 

The Respondent cited the following in support of its case: Murray v Rockabill Shellfish Limited UD1832/2010, Beatty v Bayside Supermarkets UD 142/1987 and Conway v Ulster Bank Ltd UD 474/1981.

In response to the Complainant’s post-hearing evidence, the Respondent submitted on 13 October 2025, that that “the complainant has submitted evidence showing he was actively seeking alternative employment from February 2025 onwards. This indicates that he felt sufficiently well to explore new work opportunities during that period. However, he did not provide any further medical certification or engage with Martin Ryan Haulage about his continued absence after 18 February. This suggests that his decision to resign in March 2025 was a personal one, rather than a result of any action or omission by Martin Ryan Haulage.”

As the Complainant is claiming constructive dismissal, the burden of proof rests with the Complainant to establish facts to prove that the actions of the Respondent were such to justify terminating his employment.

The term “constructive” dismissal is not specifically provided for in the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977. However, it is a term commonly understood to refer to that part of the definition Section 1(b) of the Act which provides that:

“dismissal”, in relation to an employee, means—

(b) the termination by the employee of his contract of employment with his employer, whether prior notice of the termination was or was not given to the employer, in circumstances in which, because of the conduct of the employer, the employee was or would have been entitled, or it was or would have been reasonable for the employee, to terminate the contract of employment without giving prior notice of the termination to the employer.

Section 6(1) of the Act states:

“Subject to the provisions of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.”

The date of dismissal is defined as

“date of dismissal” means—

(a) where prior notice of the termination of the contract of employment is given and it complies with the provisions of that contract and of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973 to 2005, the date on which that notice expires,

(b) where either prior notice of such termination is not given or the notice given does not comply with the provisions of the contract of employment or the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973 to 2005, the date on which such a notice would have expired, if it had been given on the date of such termination and had been expressed to expire on the later of the following dates—

(i) the earliest date that would be in compliance with the provisions of the contract of employment,

(ii) the earliest date that would be in compliance with the provisions of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973 to 2005.

(c) where a contract of employment for a fixed term expires without its being renewed under the same contract or, in the case of a contract for a specific purpose (being a purpose of such a kind that duration of the contract was limited, but was, at the time of its making, incapable of precise ascertainment), there is a cesser of the purpose, the date of expiry or cesser;

The first issue to be decided is whether I have jurisdiction to adjudicate this claim. The complaint was submitted on 12 March 2025, before the effective date of dismissal, being 25 March 2025, the date when the Complainant handed in his notice to resign with immediate effect.   

Section 8(2) of the Unfair Dismissals Acts provides as follows:

“A claim for redress under this Act shall be initiated by giving a notice in writing (containing such particulars (if any) as may be specified in regulations under subsection (17) of section 41 of the Act of 2015) to the Director General—

(a)   within the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the relevant dismissal,…”

The effect of a premature lodgement of a claim with the Employment Appeals Tribunal was considered by the High Court in Brady v Employment Appeals Tribunal [2015] 26 ELR 1. In that case the employee was dismissed by reason of redundancy on 16 December 2011, and his claim was lodged with the Tribunal on 23 December 2011, which the respondent contended was prior to the statutory date of dismissal when the statutory notice period was taken into account, which in the particular circumstances was 30 December 2011. In finding that the lodgement of the claim on 23 December was not premature where it was lodged during the notice period where termination was imminent Barrett J. focused on a number of facts.

In paragraph 8 of his judgment, Barrett J stated:

“8. A number of issues come into play at this point. The first is that prescribed time periods are typically intended to thwart the tardy, not punish the prompt. The second, is the longstanding principle of equity, good since at least the time of Smith v. Clay (1761) 3 Bro CC 639n, that “Equity aids the vigilant, not the indolent”. The third is the practical issue of whether a person, here the Employment Appeals Tribunal, can be said not to have received notice within a prescribed period, if it had notice immediately prior to, at the commencement of, and throughout that period. It seems to the court that in the particular circumstances of this case it would be absurd to hold that where the Employment Appeals Tribunal had notice of the claim at the commencement of, and throughout, the six-month period, that Mr. Brady should be denied to opportunity to bring his claim because the Tribunal, through no fault of Mr. Brady, may also have had notice of the claim immediately prior to the applicable six-month period.”

“ Moreover, the court considers that in reaching this conclusion no violence is done to the language of the Act. Section 8(2) requires that notice be given within the period of six months from the date of dismissal. It appears to the court that in the circumstances of this case, giving notice to the Tribunal on one date such that it has notice on another date, is within the scope of the legislation.”

At paragraph 9 of Barrett J’s judgement, he stated:

“Of course there will be some boundary in time and some circumstances in which an ostensibly premature notice will be found in fact to have been premature and thus not duly lodged within the appropriate time period for the purposes of s.8(2).”

In Neeson v O’Rourke & O’Rourke Chartered Accountants UD2049/2011 it was held that the intention of section 8(2) of the Act “demonstrate[d] a manifest intention by the legislature to preclude claims being lodged before the dismissal date”.  The Tribunal in Neeson considered the decision of the High Court in Brady v Employment Appeals Tribunal [2015] 26 E.L.R. 1.  The Tribunal quoted paragraph 8 of the judgment of Barrett J, as above before going on to contrast the wording of section 8(2) with the previous wording and the insertion of the words “beginning on” in the amendment. The Tribunal noted that the complaint in the Neeson case had been lodged with the Tribunal twelve weeks before the date of dismissal whereas in the Brady case and in Matthews v Sandisk International Limited UD331/2010 (which Barrett J found supported his conclusions) the complaints were respectively lodged one week and two and a half weeks before the respective dates of dismissal.

The Tribunal found that the wording of section 8(2) “demonstrates a manifest intention by the legislature to preclude claims being lodged before the dismissal date.”  The Tribunal also went on to state, “if the Tribunal were to look with leniency on premature claims the system could well become clogged up with claims based on the expectation that a dismissal might occur sometime in the future which could later be withdrawn.”

It was decided that “[T]he Tribunal, noting that this is a constructive dismissal case, and having considered the facts of this case, finds that the boundary in time and circumstances referred to by Barrett J in Brady do not exist in the instant case.”

Examining the circumstances of this case, I note that the Complainant handed in his resignation on 25 March 2025. In his email the Complainants stated as follows.

“due to your ongoing behaviour refusal to acknowledge and investigate my complaints makeing needless demands, and now refuseing to engage and respond to emails along with failure to provide me my data protection request I’m left with no option but to resign with immediate effect due to health issues your company have created and aggravated over a period of time and refuse to acknowledge.”

Mr Ryan acknowledged the resignation and thanked the Complainant for his service. He noted that the Respondent has attempted to resolve the matter through proper channels with no success.

No question arises in this case of any confusion or ambiguity as to the date of the relevant dismissal arising owing to the addition of a notice period or some other such timeframe.  In this case, it is incontrovertible that the Complainant resigned with immediate effect on 25 March 2025.

I find that the Complainant did not have the legal standing to bring a claim for constructive dismissal against the Respondent. Accordingly, I find that I do not have jurisdiction to deal with this matter under the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 as amended.

For the reasons stated above, I find I do not have jurisdiction to hear this complaint. 

In the WRC complaint referral form, the Complainant alleged that the Respondent has made an unlawful deduction from his wages. The Complainant stated that “several time we didn’t receive pay for 40 hours”. He stated that the amount of deduction“varies”. He stated that he did not receive notice of intent to make deduction but then in a section that asks how much notice he received, he stated “varies”.

At the adjudication hearing the Complainant alleged that during his employment he was underpaid by €1,750.

The Complainant said that, if there was no work, he had no choice but to go home. He could have sat for 8 hours and be paid but decided to go home. The Complainant did not dispute that he was paid for all hours worked but he argued that he was contracted to work 8 hours per day and should be paid for contracted hours.

Post-hearing, on 25 September 2025, the WRC received unsolicited correspondence from the Complainant. In his email, the Complainant asserted that

“Following up on your request at the hearing last Thursday September 18th I have reviewed a total off 41 timesheets out off a possible 150 time sheets and on those 41 time sheets there is 36 hours 15 minutes owed to me from Martin Ryan haulage as Martin Ryan has still refused to furnish me a data protection request I cannot review all time sheets and payslips do not confirm if it was me been sent home or me leaveing early. I cannot give an exact figure on outstanding monies”

The Respondent denies the allegation that unlawful deductions were made from the Complainant’s wages. A full review of the Complainant’s payslips and payroll records (exhibited at the hearing) showed no evidence of any deductions or additions hat would constitute a breach of the Act or any other statutory provision.

All payments were made in accordance with the terms of the Complainant’s employment and statutory obligations.

At the adjudication hearing, the Respondent submitted that there are manual timesheets given to the employees to fill in and there is also a facial recognition clock in system in place. The timesheets completed by the employees go to the payroll department. Employees are paid weekly on Thursday for the previous week (Monday to Sunday).

The Respondent submitted that the Complainant had never raised any underpayment issue during his employment. In the event that, for some reason, an employee is owed something, it is rectified when it is brought to the Respondent’s attention.

The Respondent further submitted that there is always work in the warehouse. If an employee decides to go home, that’s an employee’s choice.

The Law

Section 5 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 provides as follows:

Regulation of certain deductions made and payments received by employers.

5.—(1) An employer shall not make a deduction from the wages of an employee (or receive any payment from an employee) unless—

(a) the deduction (or payment) is required or authorised to be made by virtue of any statute or any instrument made under statute,

(b) the deduction (or payment) is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a term of the employee's contract of employment included in the contract before, and in force at the time of, the deduction or payment, or

(c) in the case of a deduction, the employee has given his prior consent in writing to it.

Section 5(6) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 address the circumstances in which wages which are properly payable are not paid:

(6) Where—

(a) the total amount of any wages that are paid on any occasion by an employer to an employee is less than the total amount of wages that is properly payable by him to the employee on that occasion (after making any deductions therefrom that fall to be made and are in accordance with this Act), or

(b) none of the wages that are properly payable to an employee by an employer on any occasion (after making any such deductions as aforesaid) are paid to the employee,

then, except in so far as the deficiency or non-payment is attributable to an error of computation, the amount of the deficiency or non-payment shall be treated as a deduction made by the employer from the wages of the employee on the occasion.

In Sullivan v Department of Education PW 2/1997, the Employment Appeals Tribunal took the word “payable” to mean “properly payable”, consequently it was not simply a matter of what may have been paid from the outset but all sums to which an employee is properly entitled.

In Marek Balans v Tesco Ireland Limited [2020] IEHC 55 MacGrath J considered Section 5 of the Act as follows:

“36. The provisions of s. 5(6) of the Act of 1991 were considered by Finnegan P. in Dunnes Stores (Cornelscourt) Limited v. Lacey [2007] 1 I.R. 478. A Rights Commissioner had found in favour of the respondents holding that the cessation of service pay amounted to an unlawful deduction, which was upheld by the EAT. It was argued that the EAT should address the question of remuneration properly payable to an employee before considering the question of a deduction or whether a deduction was unlawful. Finnegan P. concluded at p. 482:-

“I am satisfied upon careful perusal of the documents relied upon by the respondents that the same cannot represent the agreement or an acknowledgement of the agreement contended for but rather contain a clear denial of the existence of any such agreement. No other evidence of an agreement was proffered. In these circumstances I am satisfied that the Employment Appeals Tribunal erred in law in failing to address the question of the remuneration properly payable to the respondents, such a determination being essential to the making by it of a determination. Insofar as a finding is implicit in the determination of the Employment Appeals Tribunal that the appellant agreed to pay to the respondents service pay and a long service increment, then such finding was made without evidence and indeed in the face of the evidence: I am satisfied that there has been no deduction of pay from the respondents within the terms of the Act of 1991 but rather their remuneration has been unilaterally increased by the appellant making a payment which recognises their long service in excess of that which was payable prior to the 18th September, 2002. In either case there has been an error or law. Accordingly I allow the appeal.”

The High Court made it clear that, when considering a complaint under the Act, an Adjudication Officer must first establish that wages were properly payable to the employee before considering whether a deduction had been made. If it is established that a deduction within the meaning of the Act had been made, the Adjudication Officer would then consider whether that deduction was lawful.

It is for the Complainant to make out that the wages payable to him during the period encompassed by the claim are properly payable to her under the Act.

The Labour Court in Hannigans Butchers Limited v Jerko Anders Hresik Bernak DWT 194 held as follows;-

“This Court in Melbury Developments Ltd v. Arturs Valpeters EDA0917, in a case under the Employment Equality Acts, put it clearly in stating, ‘Mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn’ and that ‘The Complainant must first establish facts from which discrimination may be inferred’. While these observations of the Court reference specific requirements under the relevant legislation, the sentiments are equally applicable to the exercise of rights under other Acts covering employment law. Indeed, it is a well-established general rule of evidence to quote Palles CB in Mahony v. Waterford, Limerick and Western Railway Co., (1900)2 IR 273, that ‘…it is a general rule of law that it lies upon the plaintiff to prove affirmatively all the facts entitling him to relief…’”

Time limits

Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 (as amended), as discussed above, prescribes the applicable time limits.

This complaint was referred to the Director General of the WRC on 12 March 2025 and, consequently, the cognisable period falls from 13 September 2024 to 12 March 2025.There was no dispute that from 9 December 2024 the Complainant was on sick absence and, therefore, not available for work.

The Complainant did not particularise the alleged deductions. It is not satisfactory to allege a contravention in the absence of any specifics such as dates and amounts allegedly owed. Without such details, the Respondent is prejudiced in its defence of these alleged complaints as it has been denied a reasonable opportunity to investigate.

It is up to the Complainant to present relevant information and evidence in a manner that is plausible and understandable. The Complainant did not do so at the adjudication hearing. Even if the Complainant’s unsolicited post-hearing correspondence was to be considered, it does not shed any light on the assertion the Complaints had made. He simply stated that he “reviewed a total off 41 timesheets out off a possible 150 time sheets and on those 41 time sheets there is 36 hours 15 minutes owed to me.”

It is also not a matter for the Adjudication Officer to identify the potential occurrences of breaches of legislation and unearth supporting documentary evidence. I find that the Complainant did not make out the facts entitling him to relief.

I declare this complaint to be not well founded.

In the WRC complaint referral form, the Complainant alleged that the Respondent has paid him less than the amount owed to him.

In the section that asks on what date should he had received the payment, the Complainant inserted “varies”. In the section that asks to state the monetary value of wages/pay not received, the Complainant inserted “varies”.

At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant confirmed that he relies on the same set of facts and evidence as in his claim bearing the reference number CA-00070206-011 under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 and that this claim is essentially a duplication of CA-00070206-011.

The Respondent denies any unlawful non-payment of wages.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant’s contract of employment provides for a standard 40-hour working week (Monday-Friday 08:00-16:30). Clause 4.5 of the contract explicitly permits the Respondent, in the event of reduced business requirements, to curtail working hours or implement layoffs. In such cases, employees are only paid for hours worked and notice of any layoff or reduction is given as reasonably practicable. Any variations in pay reflects this contractual provision.

At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant confirmed that this complaint is essentially a duplication of his complaint pursuant to section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 bearing the reference number CA-00070206-011 above.

No further details of the alleged breach of the Act were furnished. In the absence of any specific details, and based on my findings above, I conclude that it is not the role of the Adjudication Officer to identify possible breaches of legislation or to seek out supporting documentary evidence.

I declare this complaint to be not well founded.

In the WRC complaint referral form, the Complainant alleged that he was not notified in advance of any additional hours.

At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant confirmed that his claim is essentially a duplication of claim CA-00070206-003 under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 where he alleged that he was not notified of his starting and finishing times in advance.

The Respondent denies the allegation that the Complainant was not notified in advance of additional hours.

The Respondent submits that the Employee Handbook states that due to business demands, an employee may, from time to time, be required to work additional hours beyond their contracted hours. Such hours may include overtime, weekend work, or travel away from home.

On 18 October 2024, the Complainant advised the Respondent in writing that he was unavailable for overtime. The Respondent respected this position and did not schedule the Complainant for further overtime.

Accordingly, the Respondent submits that the Complainant was notified of the potential for additional hours in line with the contract and handbook, and his claim is without merit.

The Complainant alleged that he was not notified of any additional hours.

At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant confirmed that his claim is essentially a duplication of claim CA-00070206-003 pursuant to section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 where he alleged that he was not notified of his starting and finishing times in advance. Consequently, the matter was disposed of.

I declare this complaint to be not well founded.

In the WRC complaint referral form, the Complainant alleged that he was not paid for 25% of the time that he was required to be available for work that did not then arise (zero hours).

At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant gave evidence that he did not have the date but on one Saturday he was asked to come to work. However, when he turned up there was nobody there and the place was shut. He was not paid for that day.

The Respondent denies the allegation that the Complainant was owed payment for hours during which he was requited to be available but no work arose.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant’s contract of employment is for full-time permanent hours and is not a zero-hours contract. Clause 4.5 of the Complainant’s contract allows the Respondent to curtail working hours or implement layoffs where necessary due to business requirements. During such periods, employees are only paid for hours worked and notice of any layoff or reduction is provided as reasonably practicable.

Any periods when the Complainant was available, but no work arose fall within this contractual provision. All hours worked were fully remunerated in accordance with contract and statutory obligation.

At the hearing, Mr Ryan gave evidence that on one occasion the Complainant was due to work on a Saturday. The Complainant was off on the day before (Friday) and a named manager in error did not inform him that there was no requirement to work on Saturday. The manager apologised for the error. The manager offered the Complainant another Saturday instead which the Complainant agreed to. The Complainant then did not turn up for work on the Saturday in question. This was the only reason he was asked to do overtime after he said he would not do it. Mr Ryan said that the Complainant never brought it to the Respondent’s attention at that time.  He spoke with the Complainant, and it was clear that it was just tit for tat. Mr Ryan said that he was professional and tried to resolve the issues.

The Law

The Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 provides as follows: 

“Provision in relation to zero hours working practices.

18. (1) This section applies to an employee whose contract of employment operates to require the employee to make himself or herself available to work for the employer in a week—

(a)    a certain number of hours ("the contract hours"),

(b)    as and when the employer requires him or her to do so, or

(c)     both a certain number of hours and otherwise as and when the employer requires him or her to do so,

and the requirement is not one that is held to arise by virtue only of the fact, if such be the case, of the employer having engaged the employee to do work of a casual nature for him or her on occasions prior to that week (whether or not the number of those occasions or the circumstances otherwise touching the engagement of the employee are such as to give rise to a reasonable expectation on his or her part that he or she would be required by the employer to do work for the employer in that week).

(2) In a contract for a certain number of hours of work referred to in paragraphs (a) and (c) of subsection (1), the number of hours concerned shall be greater than zero.

(3) Notwithstanding subsection (1), subsection (2) shall not apply to—

(a)    work done in emergency circumstances, or

(b)    short-term relief work to cover routine absences for that employer.

(4) If an employer does not require an employee to whom this section applies to work for the employer in a week referred to in subsection (1)—

(a)    in a case falling within paragraph (a) of that subsection, at least 25 per cent of the contract hours, or

(b)    in a case falling within paragraph (b) or (c) of that subsection where work of the type which the employee is required to make himself or herself available to do has been done for the employer in that week, at least 25 per cent of the hours for which such work has been done in that week,

then the employee shall, subject to this section, be entitled—

(i) in a case where the employee has not been required to work for the employer at all in that week, to be paid by the employer the pay he or she would have received if he or she had worked for the employer in that week whichever of the following is less, namely—

(I) the percentage of hours referred to in paragraph (a) or (b), as the case may be,

or

(II) 15 hours,

(ii) in a case where the employee has been required to work for the employer in that week less than the percentage of hours referred to in paragraph (a) or (b), as the case may be (and that percentage of hours is less than 15 hours), to have his or her pay for that week calculated on the basis that he or she worked for the employer in that week the percentage of hours referred to in paragraph (a) or (b), as the case may be,

and the minimum payment shall be calculated as 3 times the national minimum hourly rate of pay within the meaning of the National Minimum Wage Acts 2000 and 2015 or 3 times the minimum hourly rate of remuneration established by an employment regulation order, for the time being in force, on each occasion that this occurs.

(5) Subsection (4) shall not apply—

(a)    if the fact that the employee concerned was not required to work in the week in question the percentage of hours referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection, as the case may be—

(i)      constituted a lay-off or a case of the employee being kept on short-time for that week, or

(ii)     was due to exceptional circumstances or an emergency (including an accident or the imminent risk of an accident), the consequences of which could not have been avoided despite the exercise of all due care, or otherwise to the occurrence of unusual and unforeseeable circumstances beyond the employer’s control, or

(b)    if the employee concerned would not have been available, due to illness or for any other reason, to work for the employer in that week the said percentage of hours. 

Zero hours working practices refer to practices where an employee is either asked to be available for work, without the guarantee of work, or where an employee is informed that there will be work available on a specified day or days.

There was no dispute that the Complainant was a full-time permanent employee of the Respondent and, therefore, I am not satisfied the Complainant comes within the scope of section 18 of the 1997 Act. 

I declare this complaint to be not well founded.

Constructive dismissal – payment of wages – organisation of working time -terms of employment