Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Mr. Aqeel Farooq

University College Dublin

Representatives

N/A

Mr. Lorcan Maule, Mason Hayes & Curran LLP, instructing Mr. Barra Faughnan BL.

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00066994-001

28/10/2024

The Complainant was admitted as a full-time PhD student in October 2021 and alleges that he was constructively dismissed on 17 February 2023. The Complainant was in receipt of a scholarship grant of €18,000 per annum. The Complainant also held a demonstrator / tutor role which ceased in early 2023 and for which he was paid separately, receiving his final payment in 2024. The Complainant filed his WRC Complaint Form on 28 October 2024.

The Respondent denies the complaint in full. The Respondent raises a number of preliminary issues and submits that: the complaint is out of time; the Complainant was not an employee; the Complainant was not dismissed; and the Complainant has subsequently sought to amend the nature of his complaint.

For the reasons set out below, this matter was addressed by way of a preliminary decision regarding time limits.

Preliminary Issue – Time Limits:

The Complainant outlined that he was admitted as a full-time PhD student in October 2021. On 17 February 2023, the Complainant informed the Respondent by email that he had accepted a full-time role as an “embedded electronic engineer” and that he was “planning to switch [his] PhD to part-time”. The Complainant also submitted that he had his PhD “transfer assessment” on 9 February 2023 and that he was subsequently not permitted the “stage transfer”. In his WRC Complaint Form, the Complainant indicated that he was constructively dismissed on 17 February 2023.

In his WRC Complaint Form and his submissions, the Complainant refers to his subsequent correspondence with the Respondent regarding a number of matters, including the Respondent’s alleged defamatory comments and privacy violations. At the Hearing, the Complainant stated that he is looking for a way to continue his PhD and for an acknowledgement of how he was treated.

In terms of the preliminary issue concerning time-limits, the Complainant referred to, inter alia, his revenue record which showed that he received his final payment relating to his demonstrator / tutor role in 2024. The Complainant also referred to the dates in his “Programme Summary”. The Complainant denied that he was seeking to change the nature of his complaint. The Complainant submitted that any delay in bringing his complaint was attributable to his attempts to “follow every footstep”.

Finally, the Complainant provided further legal submissions in his filing dated 23 September 2025. He distinguished the facts of his complaint from: Ervia v. Deaglan Healy, PWD2020; Minister for Finance v. CPSU & Ors [2006] IEHC 14; Donegal Meat Processors t/a Foyle Donegal v. Donal Gillespie, UDD2114; Servecentric Ltd v. Eddie Lyons, UDD2271; Hanley v. PBR Restaurants Ltd t/a Fish Shack Café [2024] IEHC 662; and Revenue Commissioners v. Karshan Midlands Ltd t/a Domino’s Pizza [2023] IESC 24.

Preliminary Issue – Time Limits:

The Respondent submitted that the Complainant was admitted as a full-time PhD student in October 2021 and that he received a scholarship grant of €18,000 per annum. Additionally, the Respondent submitted that the Complainant held a demonstrator / tutor role, for which he was paid separately – most recently in December 2024.

The Respondent submitted that on 9 February 2023, the Complainant attended a “stage assessment meeting” for his PhD programme, which involved a review of his research project. On 17 February 2023, the Complainant emailed the Respondent, outlining that he was taking on a full-time position as an “embedded electronic engineer” and that he was “planning to switch [his] PhD to part-time”. On 20 March 2023, the Respondent issued a Recommendation, noting that the Complainant was now working in a full-time position and recommending that the Complainant re-submit for assessment within six months, as he had not, inter alia, demonstrated that he could complete the PhD in a reasonable timeframe. The Respondent denied that the Complainant was ever dismissed or discontinued from the PhD programme.

The Respondent submitted that in June 2023, the Complainant lodged student appeal forms. On 5 July 2023, the Respondent informed the Complainant that his appeal was unsuccessful. That same day, the Complainant emailed the Respondent, taking issue with the Respondent’s comments.

The Respondent submitted that the Complainant subsequently corresponded with the Respondent’s President’s office. On 3 May 2024, the Respondent replied, referring to the Recommendation dated 20 March 2023 and stating that the Complainant could resist the “Stage Transfer Assessment” once he was fee compliant. The Complainant subsequently made a complaint under the Respondent’s Dignity and Respect Policy.

The Respondent submitted that, notwithstanding its position that the Complainant was not an employee and / or that the Complainant had been dismissed, the complaint was out of time. The Respondent submitted that in the WRC Complaint Form filed on 28 October 2024, the Complainant indicated that his constructive dismissal had occurred on 17 February 2023. The Respondent submitted that the Complainant’s final demonstrator / tutor payments were made in 2024 because of issues relating to the Complainant’s permit status. The Respondent further submitted that in referring to the dates in his “Programme Summary”, the Complainant was seeking to change the nature of his complaint as set out in his WRC Complaint Form. The Respondent submitted that, pursuant to section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 and section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977-2015 as amended, the WRC does not have jurisdiction to extend time to consider a complaint beyond 12 months. The Respondent referred to, inter alia, Donegal Meat Processors v. Donal Gillespie t/a Foyle Donegal UDD2114; Hanley v PBR Restaurants [2024] IEHC 622; and Ervia v. Deaglan Healy PWD2020. While the Respondent raised further preliminary issues for consideration, the Respondent submitted that the time-limits issue must be considered in the first instance.

Preliminary Decisions:

Case Law:

In Donegal Meat Processors v. Donal Gillespie t/a Foyle Donegal UDD2114 (the “Donegal Meat Processors Case”), the Labour Court noted that, seeking for the substantive issue and the jurisdictional issue to be dealt with together, was:

“akin to asking the court to exercise its jurisdiction before it determines whether or not it has jurisdiction in the first instance. […] Only if the court determines that it has jurisdiction to do so can it go on to consider the fairness or otherwise of the dismissal itself”.

In Hanley v. PBR Restaurants [2024] IEHC 622 (the “Hanley Case”), Bolger J. held that jurisdictional issues such as time limits are appropriately addressed as preliminary issues:

“16. Where a party to an appeal does not agree to the court determining a preliminary issue (other than in relation to a jurisdictional issue such as time where there is a clear jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction as a preliminary issue) then no matter how efficient a preliminary determination might appear to be, the Labour Court is required to allow that party to be heard and to present its evidence including any new evidence it may wish to raise, in accordance with section 44.”

Preliminary Issue – Time Limits:

The Legislation:

Section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 (the “WRA”) provides:

“Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates.”

This six-month time period can be extended, where “reasonable cause” is demonstrated. To this end, section 41(8) of the WRA provides:

“An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause.”

Section 8(2) of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977-2015 as amended (the “UD Act”) provides:

“(2) A claim for redress under this Act shall be initiated by giving a notice in writing (containing such particulars (if any) as may be specified in regulations under subsection (17) of section 41 of the Act of 2015 to the Director General—

(a) within the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the relevant dismissal, or

(b) within such period not exceeding 12 months from the date of the relevant dismissal as the adjudication officer considers appropriate, in circumstances where the adjudication officer is satisfied that the giving of the notice within the period referred to in paragraph (a) was prevented due to reasonable cause,

and a copy of the notice shall be given by the Director General to the employer concerned as soon as may be after the receipt of the notice by the Director General.”

Case Law:

The established test for “reasonable cause” for the purpose of granting an extension of time is that set out by the Labour Court in Cementation Skanska v. Carroll, DWT0338 as follows:

“It is the Court’s view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.”

The onus is therefore on the Complainant to identify the reason for the delay and to establish that the reason relied upon amounts to “reasonable cause” for that delay.

I note that in Dr. Frank Whelton t/a Whelton Dental v. Elaine Corkery, TUD247, dated 8 May 2024 (the “Whelton Case”), the Labour Court held:

“It is well settled that an application for an extension of time must both explain the delay and provide a justifiable excuse for the delay. While the reasons submitted by the Complainant may explain the delay, the Court finds that they do not provide afford a justifiable excuse for the delay. The Complainant is to be commended for trying to resolve matters directly with her employer, however, this Court has consistently found that a decision to delay referring a statutory complaint for the purposes of exhausting an alternative means to resolve a dispute does not constitute reasonable cause for the delay.

[…]

The Labour Court is a creature of statute, and its powers and duties are derived solely from statute. The Court cannot assume a jurisdiction which is not conferred to it. In all the circumstances, the Court is of the view that a justifiable basis upon which an extension of time could be granted has not been put forward in this case.”

Finally, I note that in Ervia v. Deaglan Healy, PWD2020 (the “Ervia Case”), the Labour Court held that raising internal grievances would not, in law, stop the statutory clock concerning time limits. The Labour Court held that it did not accept that the:

“processing of an internal grievance can be considered as a cogent reason which prevented the lodging of a complaint under the Act in time. The Court is of the view that the Complainant cannot circumvent the time limit set out in the Act by seeking to rely on an internal procedure that did not prevent him from bringing his complaint within the statutory time limit. The Court addressed this issue in Brothers of Charity Services Galway v. Kieran O’Toole [EDA 177] where it held:-‘The Court cannot accept that deploying the Respondent’s internal procedures operated to prevent the Complainant from initiating the within complaints within the statutory time limit provided under the Acts.’”

Findings and Conclusion:

Pursuant to the Donegal Meat Processors Case and the Hanley Case, preliminary issues such as those pertaining to time limits, which go to the WRC’s jurisdiction to hear a complaint, should be determined in the first instance by way of preliminary decision.

It was common case that the Complainant was admitted as a full-time PhD student in October 2021. On 17 February 2023, the Complainant emailed the Respondent and stated that he was taking on a full-time employed position as an “embedded electronic engineer” and that he was “planning to switch [his] PhD to part-time”. The Complainant therefore ceased his full-time PhD position. He also ceased his demonstrator / tutor role in early 2023. I note also that, in his WRC Complaint Form dated 28 October 2024, the Complainant alleged that he was constructively dismissed on 17 February 2023.

On 13 June 2023 and 23 June 2023, the Complainant lodged student appeal forms. On 5 July 2023, the Respondent informed the Complainant that his appeal was not successful. That same day, the Complainant emailed the Respondent, taking issue with the Respondent’s comments. The Complainant filed his WRC Complaint Form on 28 October 2024 – approximately 15 months after the receipt of his appeal outcome and approximately 20 months after his alleged constructive dismissal. During that time, the Complainant also engaged in further correspondence with the Respondent and made a complaint pursuant to the Respondent’s Dignity and Respect Policy.

Pursuant to the WRA and the UD Act, even if “reasonable cause” were shown (which is not accepted here), I cannot entertain a complaint which is presented outside of 12 months from the date of the relevant dismissal. As per the Whelton Case, the Complainant’s attempts to resolve matters does not constitute “reasonable cause” for the delay. As per the Ervia Case, the Complainant’s complaint pursuant to the Respondent’s Dignity and Respect Policy does not stop the statutory clock. Moreover, for the purposes of this constructive dismissal complaint which allegedly occurred on 17 February 2023, the Complainant’s late payment in 2024 relating to his demonstrator / tutor role and the dates in his “Programme Summary” do not have any relevance.

On the facts before me, I find that this complaint is out of time and I cannot entertain it. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to make any findings regarding the other preliminary issues raised.

For the reasons set out above, I find that this complaint is out of time and I cannot entertain it. Therefore, I decide that the complaint is not well founded.

Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015, Preliminary Decision, Time Limits.