ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION

Adjudication Reference:  ADJ-00054235

Parties:

Complaint:

Date of Adjudication Hearing:  15/10/2025

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer:  Gaye Cunningham

Procedure:

In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 and/or Section 25 of the Equal Status Act, 2000,following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaint. A public hearing was held on 15 October 2025 in the Tower Hotel, Waterford.  The Complainant was represented by Mr Sean Beatty, BL.  The Respondent was represented by Ms Eve Bolster BL.  It was agreed at the beginning of the hearing that as there was no dispute about the facts, unsworn evidence could be given by all witnesses.

Background:

The Complainant is a blind person and the Respondent operates a car hire business.  The Complainant claims that she was the subject of less favourable treatment on grounds of her disability and that she was not provided with reasonable accommodation by the Respondent contrary to the Equal Status Act 2000, and that a purportedly neutral provision of the Respondent in dealing with a returned car hire discriminated against her as a disabled person who requires the assistance of a guide dog.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant has not established a prima facie case and that the treatment of her did not constitute wrongdoing or discrimination.

Summary of Complainant’s Case:

A written submission was given in support of the Complainant’s case, and oral evidence was given by the Complainant.

The detailed written submission including case law is summarised as follows:

The Complainant alleges discrimination on the ground of disability arising from the imposition by the Respondent of a service valet charge after her guide dog was present in its rental car. The Respondent contended that dog hair was present (which is accepted) as well as dog odour with the floor mats being wet (which is rejected).

The Complainant is registered as blind and has a mild physical disability. As a result of her blindness, she uses a guide dog. She must be accompanied by this dog to go about her day and to access any service. The guide dog is her sole mobility aid.

On 3 April 2024 the Complainant's husband, Anthony Murphy, entered into a contract and rented a car on his and the Complainant's behalf from the Respondent for a period of five days. The Complainant was at all times accompanied, as she must be, by her guide dog who sat primarily on a towel in the passenger seat footwell. The Respondent was not notified in advance of the presence of the service animal.

Mr Murphy returned the car to the Respondent on 8 April 20?4. The Respondent presented an lncident Report Form ("IRF”) which included a €150 valet charge described as "Damage". Mr Murphy informed the Respondent that the proposed charge related to the Complainant's guide dog, and therefore it was inappropriate to charge them for same. This was rejected. The Respondent has accepted that the dog in question was a service animal.

The Complainant sought a refund of the charge. On l0 April2024, she emailed the Respondent to lodge her complaint that the "Dublin airport branch have charged €150 for cleaning the car because I had my guide dog in it". By email dated 12 April 2024, the Respondent informed the Complainant that it could not discuss the matter with her further due to data protection concerns in circumstances where she was not the "main driver of the reservation". In writing to Mr Murphy on the same day, the Respondent said:

"a cleaning fee may apply in instances that the vehicle is returned to us requiring additional cleaning outside of our standard preparation procedures for the vehicle's next rental. In this instance, the vehicle was required to be sent for extensive cleaning and subsequently was removed from the fleet whilst this was performed. Please be assured that we understand your wife's needs for the dog to be in the vehicle and had the vehicle been returned to us in a satisfactory condition, no additional charge would have been levied in this instance. In this instance however, we believe that the condition that the vehicle was returned to us in justifies the charge applied in this instance..."

As appears from the foregoing, the charge was imposed because "additional cleaning outside of our standard preparation procedures" was required, with the vehicle not being returned "in a satisfactory condition"

By email to the Respondent dated 20 September 2024, the Complainant noted, inter alia, that she had used a hire car from the Respondent "several times before", and that "the dog had been in Hertz cars before without any issue".

She received no reply.

The Complainant filed a Form ES I in accordance with s.2l of the Equal Status Acts 2000-2018 ('the ESA") alleging that the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against her on the grounds of her disability. The Respondent filed a Form ES2 which denied same. It stated:

"While the rental of the vehicle was not in your name and neither you nor dog were present upon returning the car, upon inspection of the vehicle it was noted that the car was excessively dirty with dog hair, the floor mats were wet and there was a strong dog odour from the vehicle. Our return staff immediately notified the renter of the vehicle that the vehicle would have to be professionally cleaned to return the car into service and a valeting charge would be charged. It was only at the end of the conversation that the information was provided to Hertz that there was a guide/service dog in the vehicle during the rental. Pursuant to our Terms and Conditions Hertz prohibits the carriage of animals in their vehicles, with the exception of guide/service animals with prior notice. However, we maintain the right to charge a rectification charge if the vehicle is returned with the interior on (sic) an excessively dirty condition or a cleaning/valet charge of (sic) the vehicle is returned with excessive dirt/sand. The charge was applied due to the excessive dirt which required a professional valet to put the vehicle back into service. It was not charged simply because the claimant had a guide dog in the vehicle but due to the condition the car was returned in which would not be rented again until professionally cleaned. As stated above, we allow the carriage of service/guide animals. However, if the vehicle is returned in an excessively dirty condition, the charge is applied regardless of whomever rents the vehicle. The renter of the vehicle, presumably the complainant's husband, has since rented another car with us and returned same in an acceptable condition."

The said Terms and Conditions appear to be Y0724 available on the Respondent's website. They provide, in relevant part:

"l.l We will supply the vehicle to you in a good overall and operating condition...

1.2 You agree that you will return it to us in the same condition...

1 .9 It is your responsibility to fully inspect the vehicle prior to leaving the rental location. By accepting the vehicle, you confirm that the rental vehicle is in the condition indicated on the Pre-lnspection Form and you accept liability for any further damage to or loss of the vehicle, howsoever occurring.

5.4 Other charges that may apply are

5.4.7 A rectification charge where the vehicle is returned with the interior in an excessively dirty condition.

5.4.15 You are prohibited from carrying animals in the vehicle, with the exception of guide/service animals, providing that there has been prior notice before rental.

5.4.16 A Cleaning/Valet charge will apply if the vehicle is returned with excessive dirt/sand."

On 30 September 2024, a complaint was made to the Workplace Relations Commission.

Discrimination

The Complainant contends she was treated less favourably on the ground of disability by the Respondent when it imposed the valet charge. The Respondent's actions constitute prohibited conduct for the purposes of the ESA.

Reverse burden of proof

Section 38A of the ESA provides:

"Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a person from which it may be presumed that prohibited conduct has occurred in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary."

In Mitchell v Southern Health Board (Cork University Hospital) [2001] 12 ELR 201, the Labour Court said a claimant (p. 206):

“must establish facts from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them. This indicates that a claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination."

Further case law was cited in relation to the burden of proof.

It is submitted that the Complainant's evidence clearly establishes facts from which it can be presumed that prohibited conduct has occurred contrary to ss. 3 and 4 of the ESA. The burden therefore rests with the Respondent to demonstrate how its application of an apparently neutral provision was objectively justified (s.3(l)(c)), and how its refusal to provide reasonable accommodation by waiving the service charge either did not render it impossible or unduly difficult for the Complainant to avail of the service (s.4(l)) or is justified as it would give rise to a cost which could not be considered nominal (s.4(2)). The Respondent has thus far failed to do so.

Whether the Respondent Provided the Complainant with a Service

Section 2(l) of the ESA defines a "service" as "a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes... (b) facilities for... (iv) transport or travel... and (d) a professional or trade service".

Arguments in relation to the Complainant’s claim in the circumstances where her husband made the reservation, included the following:

Mr Murphy, rather than the Complainant, entered the contract with the Respondent. It is submitted that this does not preclude the Complainant's claim. By way of analogy, where a family enters a restaurant with one member making the booking and paying the bill, the other family members eating there are unquestionably in receipt of the service. Similarly, if a member of the settled community made a bed and breakfast booking for two with the entire fee paid by them in advance, and their partner who was a member of the Traveller Community was refused entry based on that membership, the latter would have been unlawfully discriminated against. Regardless of whom the Respondent entered into the contract with, in this case the driver, passengers within the car are service users. ln McKeogh v Kilkenny House Hotel (ADl-00027292) a hotel booking was made by the blind Complainant's husband, yet the Complainant was held to have been discriminated against when the booking was cancelled due to her being accompanied by a guide dog.

Case law was submitted in support of the Complainant’s case including Law of the United States.

Conclusion and Disposition

(a)The Complainant is blind, a recognised disability under the ESA, and relies on her guide dog to go about her day and to access any service. The guide dog is her sole mobility aid.

(b) When the rental car hired by Mr Murphy for his and the Complainant's use was returned, dog hair was present. The Respondent imposed a valet charge of €150 despite being informed that the hair came from the Complainant's guide dog.

(c) In the period following the imposition of the service charge, the Respondent rejected the Complainant's requests for a refund of same.

(d) This constitutes indirect discrimination under s.3(l)(c) of the ESA whereby the apparently neutral provision of imposing a valet charge where a car is returned in a "spoiled" condition placed the Complainant at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons. The means used by the Respondent are neither appropriate nor necessary. The blanket policy adopted by the Respondent is not objectively justified across all scenarios.

(e) By refusing to refrain from imposing the valet charge and/or by refusing to process a refund on that charge, the Respondent failed to provide the Complainant with reasonable accommodation.

(f) Prima facie evidence of the above has been demonstrated by the Complainant's evidence. The burden of proof rests with the Respondent to demonstrate that its actions were not discriminatory. This has not yet been done.

(g) The Respondent is vicariously liable for the actions of its servants or agents. For the above reasons, the Complainant invites the Adjudication Officer to conclude that prohibited conduct occurred and to order redress under s.27 of the ESA. Pursuant to s.27( I )(a), the Adjudication Officer may make an order for compensation. Given the effect that the incident had on the Complainant-going to the core of her dignity-it is respectfully submitted that any compensation be at the upper end of the available scale, particularly in light of the message sent to her that such fees should be imposed in every area of her life. Redress must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and serves the role of ensuring that such prohibited conduct is eliminated.

The Complainant also requests an order that the Respondent to take a course of action so specified under s.27(l)(b) to ensure these circumstances are not repeated. This is of personal importance to the Complainant who does not wish for anyone else to find themselves in this situation. This could include, but is not limited to:   

• (a) An apology by the Respondent for the prohibited conduct that occurred.
• (b) The Respondent immediately updating its policies and procedures in relation to its rental car service and making specific provision for persons with disabilities, including blind persons who require a guide dog.
• (c) The Respondent implementing said policies and procedures and ensuring that its staff are adequately trained in relation to ensuring that discrimination on the ground of disability are not repeated.

Evidence of the Complainant Mrs Kim Murphy

It was agreed by all parties, that unsworn evidence could be given.

The Complainant said her guide dog Django was a cross Labrador/Retriever who was with her for 8 years.  He was trained by the Irish Guide Dogs and she was aware of her contractual responsibilities in relation to care, cleanliness, safety etc.  When travelling in a car, the dog would sit in the passenger footwell as he did on the occasion of the rental.  It was a wet day when her husband was returning the car and the man receiving it did say to him that there was ‘superficial soiling’ on the inside of the car.  However, they did not accept that the charge of €150 was reasonable and she queried it in April 2024.  She stated that €150 is a significant amount as she has only a pension in respect of her disability. (the ‘blind pension’).

Summary of Respondent’s Case:

The Respondent made a detailed written submission and evidence was given by 2 staff members.

The written submission is summarised as follows:

The Complainant claims to have been discriminated against on the grounds of her disability.  While the Respondent disputes that she was subjected to any wrongful treatment of the kind alleged (whether amounting to discrimination or otherwise), it is submitted that the Complainant has failed to disclose facts from which it could properly be inferred that such treatment related to her disability.

The relevant cases quoted in support of the argument include:

Southern Health Board v Mitchell where the Labour Court held that

… a ‘claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which to rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination. It is only if these primary facts are established

to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient

significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the

respondent to prove that there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment.” 

In Melbury Developments v Arturs Valpeters, EDA0917, the Labour Court stated:

“Section 85A of the Act provides for the allocation of the probative burden in cases

within its ambit. This requires that the Complainant must first establish facts from which

discrimination may be inferred. What those facts are will vary from case to case and

there is no closed category of facts which can be relied upon. All that is required is that

they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination.

” Mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn.” 

In her complaint form the Complainant has alleged that upon returning the rental vehicle a cleaning charge was imposed due to the presence of the Complainant’s guide dog.  It is submitted that the allegations, which are firmly disputed, do not constitute discriminatory treatment within the meaning of the 2000 Act.

Background

On 4th April 2024, the Complainant’s husband entered into a contract for car rental to be returned on 8th April 2024.  The terms of conditions of the contract provide that “a rectification charge where the vehicle is returned with the interior in an excessively dirty condition”.

The terms and conditions also provide that animals are not allowed to be carried in the vehicle with the exception of guide/assistance animals and where prior notice is given.

On 8th April 2024 the vehicle was returned and on inspection was found to be excessively dirty with dog hair and the floor mats were wet and there was a strong odour inside the vehicle.  Service personnel advised Mr Murphy that a rectification charge would be applied.  It was only at that stage that Mr Murphy advised that a guide dog had been carried in the vehicle.

On 9th April 2024 Mr Murphy contacted the Respondent by telephone and stated that he believed the charge was applied for carrying a guide dog.  It was explained to him that the vehicle was returned in an unacceptable condition, with dog hair in the footwell passenger seat, door car, door pockets and dashboard and between the front seats.  There was an extremely strong odour which was difficult to eradicate.  He was notified that the car had to be taken out of service to be cleaned and that the rectification charge was as per the contract and was universally applied to anyone who returned a car in an unacceptable condition.  The call was terminated by the Respondent as the caller became abusive.

Legal principles

The Act prohibits discrimination in the provision of goods and services on any of the nine grounds.  Section 3 provides discrimination occurs where a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the protected grounds.

It is submitted that the Respondent is supportive of the carriage of service dogs/guide dogs in its vehicle.  The rectification fee is applied universally to any customer where the condition of the vehicle warrants it and is not a bar to accessibility.

Section 4 of the Act provides that discrimination includes a refusal or failure by the provider of a service to do all that is reasonable to accommodate the needs of a person with a disability by providing special treatment or facilities, if without such special treatment or facilities it would be impossible or unduly difficult for the person to avail himself or herself of the service and that a refusal or failure to provide the special treatment or facilities shall not be deemed reasonable unless such provision would give rise to a cost, other than a nominal cost, to the provider of the service ln question.

It is submitted that animals cannot be carried in the Respondent’s vehicles except if they are service animals or guide dogs which is specifically provided for.  The vehicle was removed from fleet which means it could not be rented until it underwent excessive cleaning to return it to standard necessary for rental.

The Complainant’s husband subsequently rented vehicles from the Respondent with no incident.

The Respondent repeats the grounds of preliminary objection that no prima facie case has been established and that allegations advanced by the Complainant are unsubstantiated and unsupported and the Complainant has failed to provide any proper basis for her assertion that the conduct alleged (which is denied) could amount to victimisation or discrimination.

Evidence of Mr B

Evidence was given by the staff member who received the returned car.

He stated that he worked at Dublin Airport taking back returned rental cars.  Hi job was to check for damage or problems.  In this case the inside of the car was soiled and there was an odour from the dog having been in the car. He took photographs and filled out an incident form.  He told the Complainant’s husband that there would be a valet charge.  When Mr Murphy told him a guide dog had been in the car, he advised him to raise the matter with the claims department.

Evidence of Mr G

The claims Manager (Mr G) gave evidence.  He said that in the event of a car being returned in a soiled and unacceptable condition, a levy applies.  There is no issue with guide dogs but additional cleaning which was required in this case meant that the car had to be removed from service and valeted. He stated that he was aware of the Respondent’s policy in relation to the carriage of guide dogs and the sole reason for the charge was the condition of the vehicle when it was returned.

Findings and Conclusions:

In this instant case, my investigation and findings herein examine the complaint under definition of discrimination, burden of proof and reasonable accommodation.

Definition

Section 3 of the Act provides:

3.—(1) For the purposes of this Act, discrimination shall be taken to occur—

(a) where a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) or, if appropriate subsection (3B) (in this Act referred to as “the discriminatory grounds”) which

(i) exists

(II)existed but no longer exists 

(III)may exist in the future, or

(iv)is imputed to the person concerned,

(b) …

(c) where an apparently neutral provision would put a person referred to in any paragraph of section 3(2) at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless the provision is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.

2) As between any two persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are:

(g) that one is a person with a disability and the other either is not or is a person with a different disability (the “disability ground”).

 In this instant case, the Complainant is a blind person whose disability is not in dispute. 

Burden of proof

Section 38A of the Equal Status Act, 2000 provides as follows:

38A (1) Where ln any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a person from which it may be presumed that prohibited conduct has occurred in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.

(2) This section is without prejudice to any other enactment or rule of law in relation to the burden of proof in any proceedings which may be more favourable to the person.

(3) Where, in any proceedings arising from a reference of a matter by the Authority to the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission under section 23(1), facts are established by or on behalf of the Authority from which it may be presumed that prohibited conduct or a contravention mentioned in that provision has occurred, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.

In the within complaint, the Complainant’s representative submitted that the Complainant's evidence clearly establishes facts from which it can be presumed that prohibited conduct has occurred contrary to ss.3 and 4 of the Act. It was argued that the burden therefore rests with the Respondent to demonstrate how its application of an apparently neutral provision was objectively justified.

The Respondent disputes that the Complainant was subjected to any wrongful treatment of the kind alleged (whether amounting to discrimination or otherwise) and that she failed to disclose facts from which it could properly be inferred that such treatment related to her disability.

From the evidence and submissions, I find that the Complainant has outlined the fact that a charge was imposed for the cleaning of a vehicle in circumstances where she required the assistance of a guide dog.   The question arises has the Complainant been discriminated against in circumstances where a person with a disability or a different disability would not have been subjected to the same treatment?  I note the submission of the Respondent that the rectification charge was as per the contract and was universally applied to any customer who returned a car in an unacceptable condition. 

Section 3 (1)(c) of the Act provides:

where an apparently neutral provision would put a person referred to in any paragraph of section 3(2) at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless the provision is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.

I find, in this instant case, the ‘apparently neutral provision’ of the Respondent imposing a charge, put the Complainant at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, i.e those persons not suffering a disability requiring the assistance of a guide dog.

Reasonable accommodation

Section 4 (1) of the Act, set out hereunder, provides that discrimination includes a refusal or failure by a service provider to provide reasonable accommodation for a person with a disability:-

“4.- (1) For the purposes of this Act discrimination includes a refusal or failure by the provider of a service to do all that is reasonable to accommodate the needs of a person with a disability by providing special treatment or facilities, if without such special treatment or facilities it would be impossible or unduly difficult for the person to avail himself or herself of the service.”

 (2) A refusal or failure to provide the special treatment or facilities which subsection (1) refers shall not be deemed reasonable unless such provision would give rise to a cost, other than a nominal cost, to the provider of the service ln question.

In this instant case, I find that the determination of the Respondent to stand by their decision to impose a charge was not reasonable and demonstrated their failure to do all that was reasonable to accommodate the needs of the person (the Complainant) with a disability.

In the within case, I find that by the evidence and submissions, and the application of the law to the facts, that the Respondent has discriminated against the Complainant by the imposition of the rectification charge, an apparently neutral provision which put the Complainant at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons.  I further find that the Respondent discriminated against the Complainant by failing to provide her with reasonable accommodation to accommodate her needs and that such provision would give rise to only a nominal cost.

I find the complaint to be well founded.

In accordance with the provisions of Section 27 of the Act I order the Respondent to pay to the Complainant the sum of €10,000 for the effects of the discrimination suffered.  I have taken into account the Von Colson principles (Von Colson and Kamann 1984) that sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.   I further order that the Respondent offer an apology to the Complainant for the prohibited conduct that occurred and update its policies and procedures in relation to its rental car service making specific provision for persons with disabilities, including blind persons who require the carriage of a guide dog in the vehicle.

Decision:

Section 25 of the Equal Status Acts, 2000 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 27 of that Act.

Based on the findings and conclusions above, I have decided that the complaint is well founded and  I order the Respondent to pay to the Complainant the sum of €10,000 for the effects of the discrimination suffered.     

I further order that the Respondent offer an apology to the Complainant for the prohibited conduct that occurred and update its policies and procedures in relation to its rental car service making specific provision for persons with disabilities, including blind persons who require the carriage of a guide dog in the vehicle.

Dated:   15-01-26

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer:  Gaye Cunningham

Key Words: