Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Matus  Buffa

Brian Lattin T/A Bag City

Representatives

Self-Represented

Aiden Lattin

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967

CA-00077691-001

18/11/2025

This matter was heard by way of remote hearing pursuant to the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2020 and S.I. No. 359/2020 which designates the WRC as a body empowered to hold remote hearings.

The complainant and two witnesses undertook to give their evidence under affirmation.  Cross examination was facilitated.

The complainant submitted that he was employed by the respondent from 21 November 2011 until 16 September 2025 when he was informed that the Dundalk retail outlet was closing and he was being transferred to a branch in Santry, Dublin.  He submitted that he immediately rejected the transfer and sought a redundancy from his employment.

He stated that his employer did not communicate any further with him regarding his request for redundancy.

In evidence the complainant submitted that the alternative location would have required a daily four-hour commute from him and accordingly was not a suitable alternative employment.

Under cross examination, he confirmed that the commute amounted to 4 hours according to Google Maps and that his existing commute was about 30 minutes.

The respondent submitted that it closed down a retail branch in Dundalk as it was not profitable and transferred all staff to alternative locations.  The complainant was transferred to its Santry branch but declined the alternative offered to him.  The respondent confirmed that the complainant was paid for the month of September 2025 and also noted that he was overpaid in relation to two days annual leave.

Under evidence a witness for the respondent confirmed that the complainant was offered an alternative location in Santry but challenged the length of the commute outlined by the complainant.  Cross examination was not availed of.

The complainant appealed the employers decision that he was not entitled to a redundancy payment. 

Section 7 of the Redundancy Payment Act, 1967 outlines the general right of an employee to a redundancy payment, Section 7(1) and (2) state as follows:

7.—(1) An employee, if he is dismissed by his employer by reason of redundancy or is laid off or kept on short-time for the minimum period, shall, subject to this Act, be entitled to the payment of moneys which shall be known (and are in this Act referred to) as redundancy payment provided—

(a) he has been employed for the requisite period, and

(b) he was an employed contributor in employment which was insurable for all benefits under the Social Welfare Acts, 1952 to 1966, immediately before the date of the termination of his employment, or had ceased to be ordinarily employed in employment which was so insurable in the period of four years ending on that date.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if for one or more reasons not related to the employee concerned the dismissal is attributable wholly or mainly to—

(a) the fact that his employer has ceased, or intends to cease, to carry on the business for the purposes of which the employee was employed by him, or has ceased or intends to cease, to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed, or

(b) the fact that the requirements of that business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where he was so employed have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish, or

(c) the fact that his employer has decided to carry on the business with fewer or no employees, whether by requiring the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) to be done by other employees or otherwise, or

(d) the fact that his employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforward be done in a different manner for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained, or

(e) the fact that his employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforward be done by a person who is also capable of doing other work for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained,

Section 8 of the Act qualifies that general right to a redundancy payment and states as follows:

8.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in section 7, where an employee who has been dismissed by reason of redundancy or laid off has, during the period of the four years immediately preceding the date of dismissal or the lay-off, been laid off for an average annual period of more than twelve weeks, the following provisions shall have effect:

(a) that employee shall not become entitled to redundancy payment by reason of dismissal or lay-off until a period equal to the average annual period of lay-off over the said four-year period in relation to that employee has elapsed after the date of dismissal or lay-off;

(b) if, before the termination of the period required to elapse under paragraph (a), that employee resumes work with the same employer, that employee shall not be entitled to redundancy payment in relation to that dismissal or lay-off;

(c) if, before the termination of the period required to elapse under paragraph (a), the employer offers to re-employ that employee and that employee unreasonably refuses the offer, he shall not be entitled to redundancy payment in relation to that dismissal or lay-off.

(2) In a case where this section applies, the period of four weeks first referred to in section 12 or the period of thirteen weeks referred to in that section shall not commence until theexpiration of the period (referred to in subsection (1) (a)) equal to the appropriate average annual period of lay-off.

The respondent submitted that the complainant was not entitled to a redundancy payment as the complainant was offered an alternative position within the respondent’s retail network.  The complainant submitted that he was entitled to reject the alternative offered as the commute made the offer unreasonable. 

The complainant initially worked in Dundalk and was offered an alternative position in Santry, Dublin.  He submitted that the commute was a 4-hour round trip, which would add 3.5 hours onto his existing commute.  The respondent disputed the timeframe submitted by the complainant was not correct but noted that it would amount to circa 2.5 hours daily.

Section 15 deals with an employee’s disentitlement to a redundancy payment.  Section 15(2) states as follows:

(2) An employee … shall not be entitled to a redundancy payment if —

(a) his employer has made to him in writing an offer to renew the employee’s contract of employment or to re-engage him under a new contract of employment,

(b) the provisions of the contract as renewed, or of the new contract, as to the capacity and place in which he would be employed and as to the other terms and conditions of his employment would differ wholly or in part from the corresponding provisions of his contract in force immediately before the termination of his contract,

(c) the offer constitutes an offer of suitable employment in relation to the employee,

(d) the renewal or re-engagement would take effect not later than four weeks after the date of the termination of his contract, and

(e) he has unreasonably refused the offer.

Although the complainant submitted that the lengthy commute made the alternative position an unreasonable option, the reality is that modern commute times of over one and a half hours have become the norm for many workers.  This is far from ideal.  However, in all the circumstances of the current labour market, a commute such as this does not render an alternative position unreasonable in the context of redundancy. 

Accordingly, I find that Section 15(2) disentitles the complainant to a redundancy payment.

Having regard to all the written and oral evidence presented in relation to this complaint, my decision is to disallow the complainant’s appeal.

Redundancy Payments Act – alternative employment – commute not unreasonable – disentitled to a redundancy payment