Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Stephen  Layzell

Value Van Rental

Representatives

  No Appearance by or on behalf of the Complainant

Paul Carroll, O'Mara Geraghty McCourt Solicitors

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00075081-001

02/09/2025

On 2 September 2025, the Complainant, A Service Assistant in the Motor Industry submitted a complaint of unfair dismissal against his former employer, Value Van Rentals.

On his complaint form, he had recorded his service record from 6 August 2024 to 1 August 2025.

On 7 October 2025, the WRC informed the complainant that his service record appeared in conflict with the obligatory one-year continuous service for progression of his complaint.

He was requested to furnish a response within 14 days. In the absence of a response the case would be referred to  Adjudication services .

On 23 October 2025, the Respondent was notified of the claim.

On 5 January 2026, the Parties were invited to an in person hearing in Dublin.

On 15 January 2026, Mr. Paul Carroll, O Mara, Geraghty Mc Court Solicitors came on record in the case. On that same day, the Respondent sought details on the complainant’s loss and mitigation.

On 20 January 2026, this case was pivoted to a remote hearing for operational reasons.

Both Parties were informed, no objections were raised.

On that same day, I was assigned this case. I was concerned about the dearth of details available to me in preparation for hearing. I wrote to both parties seeking written submissions which addressed.

1 First and last pay slip to assist in considering the statutory time limits permitted in the case.

2 details of any compromise agreement on leaving employment.

3 table of loss and mitigation.

I advised both parties that if they required a holy book on which to take a religious oath, they would be required to have that book adjacent on the remote hearing.

The Respondent promptly submitted a comprehensive written submission, which was shared with the Complainant for his consideration and response.

Both Parties were requested to submit their witnesses for the remote hearing. The Respondent confirmed their witnesses.

The Complainant did not engage on the preliminary issue of time limit or on the substantive aspect of the case.

Both Parties were furnished with a remote access link to hearing. The Respondent attended the hearing in the company of the Company CEO, Financial Controller and Site Manager.

 The Complainant did not attend the hearing or provide any reason for not availing of the opportunity to be heard.

As the Respondent party assembled at hearing. The Concierge to hearing  made a final attempt to secure the complainants presence by ringing him on the mobile number provided on his complaint form.

The Case Officer reported back there was “no pickup “by the Complainant and no provision to leave a message.

I have allowed 5 days of post hearing to provide for any extenuating reasons on what caused the complainant to miss the hearing in his own case.

I have not received any further contact from the Complainant side.

I have decided to press on to decision, clear in the knowledge that the complainant did not seek to register an objection to the remote hearing. He did not seek to postpone the hearing, and he has not engaged in my genuine attempt to obtain a written submission in his case in line with WRC procedures.

I am satisfied that the Complainant was on notice of the hearing and his decision not to attend the hearing in his own case was unreasonable.

The Complainant introduced himself as a Service Assistant on his complaint form dated 2 September 2025. He submitted that he had been unfairly dismissed and was in possession of 12-month service.

“I believe I was subjected to an unfair and constructive dismissal by Value Van Rentals. I respectfully submit this complaint to the WRC for investigation and adjudication “

He listed his service record as:

6 August 2024 to 1 August 2025

He wrote a chronology of a satisfactory probation period, followed by a period of unhappiness at work, which culminated in his resignation in April 2025, which he subsequently rescinded.

He detailed that the Respondent indicated that they intended to cause his employment to end on 24 July 2025. He wrote that he was managed out.

Discussions commenced on exploration of a mutually agreeable exit plan.

The Complainant outlined that he left the company through a “disguised “dismissal and sought investigation and adjudication.

He did not respond to the WRC observation that his claim fell outside the statutory time limits.

He did not compile a requested written chronology in his own case, nor respond to that of the Respondent.

The Complainant did not attend the hearing in his own case or afford any reason for that nonappearance.

I understand entirely that a complainant may wish to challenge a dismissal in their employment. However, I also understand that time marches on and people can change their minds or change direction.

If the Complainant made a conscious effort to change his mind in this case for any reason, it remained open to him to withdraw his case at any time pre hearing .

He did not do this, which means, I am bound to bring this case to decision and share with the Parties in accordance with the Provisions of Section 8 of the Act.

Section 8 (1) (c)

  An adjudication officer to whom a claim for redress is referred under this section shall—

(i) inquire into the claim,

(ii) give the parties to the claim an opportunity to be heard by the adjudication officer and to present to the adjudication officer any evidence relevant to the claim,

(iii) make a decision in relation to the claim consisting of an award of redress in accordance with section 7 or the dismissal of the claim, and

(iv) give the parties to the claim a copy of that decision in writing.

The Complainant has not addressed his absence at hearing in the intervening period from the hearing date of January 26, 2026, to the date of completion of this decision.

The Respondent operates a Motor Business and has rejected the claim made by the complainant.

It was common case that the complainant started work on 6 August 2024 and concluded officially on 1 August 2025, without attending for work on that day.

Mr Carroll clarified that the correct legal entity is in fact Value Van Rental ltd.

In the absence of the complainant, I have been unable to discuss this change with the complainant or seek consent to amend this title. It is of note that the pay slip exhibited by the Respondent is consistent with the title relied on by the Respondent.

The Respondent came to hearing to firstly dispute that the Complainant was dismissed and secondly to rely on a Compromise Agreement which both parties signed on his last day at work on 31 July 2025, which precluded his progressing a claim under the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977.

Mr Carroll submitted that the complainant had been provided with a contract of employment, job description, staff handbook and safety statement. A delay followed in securing the complainants signature to contract. This was provided on 23 January 2025.

Preliminary Issue 1:

The Respondent submitted that the Complainant is estopped from pursuing a complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Acts due to the pre-existence of a signed Compromise Agreement, which incorporated at Clause 4.1

“ The Employee agrees that the terms of this Agreement provide a full and final settlement and satisfaction of all or any claims that he has or may have against the Company or Group company , or any servants or agents , directors, members or employees thereof however arising including arising out of or in connection with the employment of the employee and / or the termination thereof , in either the Irish jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction and the Employee hereby fully and finally releases all of such entities from all or any such claims “ .

The Complainant was offered a supplementary payment to cover the cost of the his  taking legal advice.

The Respondent disclosed and exhibited the terms of the Agreement at hearing.

Preliminary Argument 2. Service to ground a claim for Statutory Unfair Dismissal.

Mr Carroll submitted that the complainant had tendered his resignation on 30 July 2025 and agreed that his final day would be 1 August 2025. He received one week’s salary in lieu of notice in accordance with his contract of employment.

Dismissal was disputed and the claim for unfair dismissal unsustainable for want of jurisdiction.

Mr Carroll made an extensive chronological submission on the background to this case. He outlined that the complainant had been restless in his role. Equally the Respondent had expressed concerns to him on his suitability for that role and had scoped out a proposal on an alternative posting within the business. This did not develop into a resolution.

Ultimately, on 30 July 2025, the complainant forwarded an email to the Respondent:

“As discussed yesterday and today, I wish to hand in my resignation ……….

He incorporated severance terms and thanked the Respondent.

The Respondent delegated the activation of the severance to Ms Noeleen O Grady, Financial Controller.

“As discussed, see attached compromise agreement. We advise that you seek independent advice before signing this and VVR will pay a contribution of €500.00 plus vat towards this. Any questions, don’t hesitate to contact me “

Mr Carroll confirmed that the Agreement was executed amicably, on signed consent and exhibited at hearing.

In relying on a broad bundle of case law , Mr Carroll drew from the jurisprudence in :

Hurley v Royal Yacht Club [1997] ELR 225, approved in Board of Management of Malahide Community School v Dawn Conaty IELJ 2019, 16(3) 85-87

A Customer Success Guru v an E Commerce Company ADJ 20068

Sunday Newspapers ltd v Stephen Kinsella and Luke Bradley [2009] 19 ELR 53

Customer Support Representative v A Technical Entertainment Company ADJ 19764

Evidence of Ms Noeleen O Grady by oath on e-bible

Ms O Grady works as financial controller at the business. On 30 July 2025 and Mr Curley, CEO delegated the completion of the compromise agreement to her.

She understood that the Complainant was keen to conclude matters due to a prebooked holiday and he was due to leave the Country the following Saturday. She shared her mobile with the complainant.

Ms O Grady confirmed the sequence of events surrounding the complainants’ participation in the eventual agreement. she relied on exhibited emails.

1 31 July 2025 at 11 am. Compromise Agreement issued to the complainant, whom she advised to seek independent advice before signing the document. Offer of €500.00 plus VAT.

2 31 July 2025 at 11.47 hrs, the complainant forwarded the signed Agreement, witnessed by a coworker mechanic in another adjacent aspect of the business.

3 31 July 2025 at 14.52 hrs, the agreement was signed and returned by the complainant. Ms O Grady sought to ascertain if he had read it thoroughly and if sought invoice for legal advice.

4 August 1, 2025, the complainant did not attend for work but sent an email to Ms O Grady at 12.42 hrs

That’s all grand to proceed. Thank you so much. I wish you all the best

Ms O Grady confirmed that she forwarded a copy of the tri partite signed agreement  to the complainant as part of this process.

The Complainant did not counter anything. He accepted payment.

On 25 August 2025, he sought clarification on his final date of work for Revenue.

Mr Carroll concluded that that the complainant was estopped on progressing his case.

He had not come to hearing. He signed a clearly worded compromise agreement without co-ercion He accepted the terms in full.

The Adjudicator lacked jurisdiction to proceed.

I have been requested to make a decision on the claim submitted for statutory dismissal

 (Constructive Dismissal) against the background of an exhibited compromise agreement and a contention that 12 months continuous service had not been served so as to ground that claim.

In reaching my decision, I have had regard for the papers of both parties, the oral submissions of the respondent and the evidence adduced by Ms O Grady, Financial Controller at hearing, particular to the circumstances of the Compromise Agreement.

It is a matter of disappointment that the complainant did not join the hearing or provide any reason for his absence. I have concluded that the complainant ought to have come to hearing to give his side of the story. I am satisfied that he was properly on notice of the hearing and chose to not attend.

 I find this outcome unreasonable.

It is visible on both parties’ papers that this was a fragile and tense employment, of some 11 months standing.

This is not unusual in the world of work. Neither is it unusual that parties might explore and execute a mutually acceptable “exit package ““severance ““compromise agreement “as a parting gesture.

However, this case seems to centre on whether the Compromise Agreement executed by the Respondent is enforceable as a waiver of statutory rights to pursue a claim for statutory unfair dismissal.

The Complainants narrative on his complaint form signalled a “buyer’s remorse “His query of his end date of employment some 3 weeks post his departure is significant for me.

I accept the Respondent uncontested evidence that the complainant was provided with a signed copy of the Agreement, a final payslip and credit note at 11.52 hrs and the complainant responded

“That’s all grand to proceed. Thank you so much. I wish you all the best “

For me, this is not the language of duress. Two of the signatures were on the complainant side. One for the Respondent. The termination date was entered as a first clause.

I heard the Respondent on the sequential execution of the Compromise Agreement in this case.

This amounts to uncontested evidence in the face of the complainant’s decision not to attend the hearing. Cross examination has not occurred.

What I was seeking to establish was whether the Compromise Agreement was properly constructed as decided in Sunday News papers Ltd v Kinsella and Bradley 2008 19 ELR 53?

This is a High Court case where Smyth J explored the parameters of full and final settlement. He held that statutory rights can be waived on a valid Agreement where the complainants had received union advice.

I found Hurley v Royal Yacht Club [1997] ELR 225 as relied on by the Respondent to be of assistance in my perusal of the facts of the case.

This was a Circuit Court case, on appeal from EAT which challenged a concluded Compromise Agreement.

Buckley J found the Agreement to be void

• 1) The doctrine of informed consent applies to the contracting out provisions and to section 13.
• 2) The appellant was entitled to be advised of his entitlements under the employment protection legislation. Any agreement or compromise should have listed the various acts which were applicable or at least made it clear that they have been taken into account by the appellant.
• (3) The appellant should have been advised in writing that he should take appropriate advice as to his rights

I found it relevant to capture the Judges plain language which followed in the Decision:

I am satisfied that the applicant was entitled to be advised of his entitlements under the employment protection legislation and that any agreement or compromise should have listed the various Acts which were applicable or at least made it clear that they had been taken into account by the applicant. I am also satisfied that the applicant should have been advised in writing that he should take appropriate advice as to his rights, which presumably in his case would have been legal advice. In the absence of such advice, I find the agreement to be void. My finding that the agreement was void, should not be taken as an indication that the officers of the club behaved improperly, or that they- unfairly pressurised the applicant. I am satisfied that they genuinely believed it was in the interests of the club, once a decision to dismiss the applicant had been taken, to ensure a speedy agreed settlement with the applicant.

As I have found the agreement to be void, it follows that the applicant will be obliged to return any monies paid to him by the club under the agreement. His substantive claim against the club can now be pursued in the Employment Appeals Tribunal.

The Respondent also relied on Customer Support Representative and A Technical Entertainment Company ADJ 19764 from 2020, an earlier decision of mine, where I found the complainant to be bound by the Agreement she signed on informed consent.

“ …. I was particularly struck by Ms as insistence that the complainant had been provided with a draft compromise agreement and her recall of her positive demeanour on October 2. It is of cardinal importance to me that the complainant Is not on record as asking any questions prior to signing the Compromise Agreement … “

I have also had regard for the Labour Court case of Keeling’s Retail unlimited Company UDD 2023 Wasim Haskiya, 2020.

This was an interesting case where the Court looked behind the Agreement concluded on exit and augmented by hand shake to be void in the face of a claim for unfair dismissal.

 In a careful application of the pertinent jurisprudence, the Court, having the benefit of both party attendance and participation found

The Court has concluded from the foregoing that no basis exists to conclude that the Appellant had an adequate opportunity to consider the document he signed on the 17thAugust which purported to waive his statutory rights under a range on legislation including the Act. In addition, there is no basis to conclude that the Appellant’s consent to waive his rights was based on a free and informed consent given by him with full knowledge of his legal rights.

The Court has also concluded that the Respondent did not take adequate steps to ensure that the Appellant was, on 17thAugust 2017, capable of giving an informed consent to waive his statutory rights and took no steps to inquire into that matter at all.

Having reached these conclusions, the Court cannot, having regard to the authorities adopted by this Court, find that

• the agreement of the Appellant to waive statutory rights was supported by adequate consideration.

• the waiver arose from an agreement reached as a result of meaningful negotiations and professional advice having been sought and given.

• the waiver was based on a free and informed consent given by the Appellant with full knowledge of his legal rights.

• the employer made adequate efforts to ensure that the Appellant was capable of giving an informed consent although the employer did, by letter dated 14thAugust, remark that the Appellant could obtain advice if he wished.

In those circumstances the Court does not find that the waiver document signed on the 17thAugust 2017 removes from the Court the jurisdiction to hear the within appeal. Having regard therefore to the fact that Respondent has placed sole reliance on the waiver document as a defence to the within complaint, the Court concludes that the dismissal of the Appellant was unfair.

In the instant case, I found a record of meaningful negotiation prefaced the circulation   of the draft Agreement. I found the draft Agreement was at one with the final Agreement.

I found the Respondent proved that the complainant was offered access to legal advice for which €500.00 was offered but not drawn down by the Complainant. In a distinguishing fact from Haskiya, I found that the Respondent followed up on the complainants’ access to legal advice.

I found a detailed listing at section 4.1 of the signed Agreement on   the waiver of statutory rights, with a primary listing of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977-2015.

I found a buoyancy in the papers in the run up to conclusion of the Compromise Agreement on the Complainant side. Perhaps this was informed by a planned trip home? I found no evidence of duress or compulsion at that material time.

I can appreciate a “buyer’s remorse “may have followed, but the complainant did not come and discuss this at hearing.

I conclude that the Agreement was concluded on informed consent which protects the Agreement from being declared void at this time.

I am satisfied that the Compromise Agreement was a participative process for both parties and while it may  have followed  a period of tense employment, it amounted to a legitimate closure on that fragility and tension. It was a supported goodbye.

I have one salutary note for the Respondent. I would have preferred a longer lead in period to this process. I appreciate that the complainants holiday booking was a target date, however, I preferred the lead in time demonstrated in Haskiya.

I also have one salutary note for the Complainant and request that he opens the Compromise Agreement at clause 3.1 and 3.2 and considers the undertaking he gave by his signature

 That before signing this Agreement he had obtained independent legal advice with regard to his legal rights and the consequences and legal effect of the Agreement from a Solicitor

I appreciate that the complainant may have experienced some regret that he may have settled for less than what he thought the fragile employment was worth. This is the narrative of his complaint. However, I must decide on the facts as presented in the absence of his oral evidence.

I find that the facts as proved have bound the parties to their concluded Compromise Agreement of 31 July 2025. I cannot untie that bond.

I find I lack the jurisdiction to consider this claim for Constructive Dismissal.

 The Complainant is estopped due to his pre-existent Compromise Agreement which contains a waiver, precluding this action on informed consent.

I cannot take the matter further.

The Complainant was not unfairly dismissed.

Second Preliminary Issue, Continuity of service:

The Respondent has submitted that the Complainant lacks the service record to ground a complaint for statutory unfair dismissal.

The law at Section 2 provides:

Exclusions.

2.— (1) Except in so far as any provision of this Act otherwise provides] this Act shall not apply in relation to any of the following persons:

(a) an employee (other than a person referred to in section 4 of this Act) who is dismissed, who, at the date of his dismissal, had less than one year’s continuous service with the employer who dismissed him .

The claim is for constructive dismissal. This places the burden of proof on the complainant to prove through the contract or reasonableness test that he was an involuntary leaver.

The Complainant has not demonstrated his service record in accordance with the prerequisite service. He has not made the requested submissions.

He is estopped from advancing this claim   through the Compromise Agreement.

On a secondary note, I have not established one year’s continuous service in this employment.

Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the unfair dismissal claim consisting of a grant of redress in accordance with section 7 of the 1977 Act.

I find that the facts as proved have bound the parties to their concluded Compromise Agreement of 31 July 2025. I cannot untie that bond.

I find I lack the jurisdiction to consider this claim for Constructive Dismissal. The Complainant is estopped due to his pre-existent Compromise Agreement which contains a waiver, precluding this action on informed consent, Hurley, applied.

The Complainant did not have one year’s continuous service to ground his claim.

I find that the Complainant was not unfairly dismissed.

Claim for Unfair Dismissal on conclusion of a Compromise Agreement. No Appearance at Hearing.