Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Gemma  Turner

Solis Gmc Children's Services Limited

Representatives

David Cowhey, Solicitor of David Cowhey Solicitors LLP

Liam O’Brien BL instructed by  Carter Anhold Solicitors & Co

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973

CA-00072132-001

05/06/2025

This case relates to a redundancy situation. The WRC complaint relates to the payment of statutory minimum notice pay; other matters have been resolved between the parties. The Complainant submits that she is owed two weeks’ statutory minimum notice pay based on her length of service, which she did not receive. She further submits that the monies owed were acknowledged by Mr. O’Keeffe, on behalf of the Respondent company and that she was directed to go home and told that she would receive her statutory entitlements.

There was a preliminary argument in relation to the ‘date of contravention’, and a potential requirement to extend the deadline beyond the initial six months, depending on when the Adjudication Officer determined the date of contravention to be.

Preliminary Argument, as per the Complainant’s written submissions

The Complainant submits in respect of the Statute of Limitations

s.41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 provides that:-

(6) Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates.

s.41(8) goes on to provide that:-

(8) An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause.

In relation to the above, the Complainant submits that the date of contravention here is 10th December 2024, at which point it was abundantly clear that the Respondent would not pay the Complainant’s notice. That being the position, the Complainant’s complaint alleging contravention of s.12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973 was acknowledged as received by the WRC on 5th June 2025, within the six month period of the date of contravention, being 10th December 2024.

Further, or in the alternative, if the date of contravention is determined to be earlier than 4th December 2024, the Complainant submits that the Adjudication Officer should exercise their discretion under s.41(8) on the basis of the following:-

1: The Complainant submits that she had been provided with draft submissions by her Solicitor required to file her complaint by email on 22nd April 2024.

2: She submits that she replied to her Solicitor by email on 4th June 2025 at 8.20pm after realising that her replying email had merely saved in her outbox and had not been sent at the time she believed it had been sent.

3: On receipt of instructions from the Complainant, the complaint was then filed the next day on 5th June 2025.

4: The Complainant submits that she was required to particularise her claim before filing same with the WRC, and accordingly, once outline submissions had been drafted by her solicitor on her behalf, it was necessary for her to formally approve same before instructing her solicitor to file the claim.

The Complainant therefore submits that, with reference to the criteria set out in Cementation Skanska (formerly Kvaerner Cementation Limited) and a Worker [DWT0425] (which concerned the interpretation of a similar provision by way of s.27(5) of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 concerning “reasonable cause”, the Labour Court set out that:-

(i): ...in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the Claimant to show that there are reasons, which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd.... there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.

(ii): The length of the delay should be taken into account.

(iii): The Court should consider if the respondent has suffered prejudice by the delay and should also consider if the claimant has a good arguable case.

With regard to paragraph (i) above, a reason for the delay has clearly been advanced, insofar as draft submissions, which were necessary to effectively particularise the Complainant’s claim, had been prepared by the Complainant’s solicitor, and required review and authorisation before same could be submitted to the WRC. Those submissions were ready as of 22nd April 2025, and indeed seen by the Complainant at that point. She believed she had replied to same, but was not aware the email not having been sent until 4th June 2025. It is therefore clear that had she been aware that the email had not been sent in or about 22nd April 2025, then same would have been re-sent, and the submissions filed alongside the complaint at that point.

With regard to the length of the delay, the Complainant presumes that the Respondent will argue that the date of contravention is, at the earliest, the 29th of November 2024. However, it is submitted the Complainant would not have been aware of the failure of her employer to pay her notice until either 10th December 2024, when her employment was terminated (as acknowledged by her employer), or the date of her final payslip on 19th December 2024.

Assuming that the Respondent places the date of contravention at 29th November 2024, then the 6 month time limit would have expired on 29th May 2025. This is a delay of a mere 7 days to when the claim was then filed.

With regard to any prejudice suffered by the Respondent, the Complainant’s Solicitors had made clear by letter dated 9th January 2025 that payment for the Complainant’s notice period would conclude all matters. It was also clear from that correspondence, the preceding correspondence between the parties, and the submissions accompanying the filing of the claim on 5th June 2025 that the Complainant did have a good arguable case.

In all the above circumstances, it is submitted that there is a reasonable cause for the time limit to be extended to allow for the filing of the Complainant’s complaint, should the Adjudication Officer be required to consider the matter under s.41(8).

The Respondent submits that the complaint was filed outside of the initial period of ‘within six months’ of the date of contravention.

Oral submissions were heard at the hearing on the preliminary matter from both representatives.

Mr. Cowhey, Solicitor for the Complainant submitted that the date of contravention for the purposes of the six months’ time-frame under s. 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 – ‘the first time we know that we are not going to be paid our notice is 10/12/24’, and the WRC complaint was therefore filed within the 6 month period, on 5/6/25. The Complainant was notified that there was going to be a redundancy prior to that date.

He further submitted that, in the alternative, if the date of contravention is found to be 29/11/2024 or earlier date than that, the Adjudication Officer has jurisdiction to extend the time. He cited Cementation Skanska, in that regard, a case which pertained to the terms of s. 27(5) of the OWTA. He outlined the facts to be potentially considered for a finding of ‘reasonable cause’ allowing an extension to the time, including the length of the delay, whether the Respondent has suffered prejudice etc. He submitted that he prefers to particularise his case at the outset, that he sent that particularised draft to the client on 22/4/25, that she saw it on the date, replied to his outline submissions, but the reply was saved to her outbox instead of going to her Solicitor. He said that the first time she realised it had not gone to the Solicitor was 4/6/2025. She replied sending it immediately, and he filed the complaint with the WRC the next day 5/6/2025. He said, at maximum, that would put it at a seven (7) day delay. He also outlined, with respect to the issue of prejudice, that there had been correspondence between the parties in relation to a number of matters, including the issue of notice pay, ‘where I say that the only issue we have now is the notice period.’

He submitted that, in those circumstances, that there was no prejudice the Respondent and that there is reasonable cause to extend the time-frame.

Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the ‘date of contravention’ was 29/11/2024, the ‘last day on which the Complainant actually worked.’ He submitted that she ‘was offered to work her notice period by her employer and declined’, that ‘she didn’t turn up to work any of those days.’ He submitted that the redundancy therefore did not take effect after the notice period. He submitted that ‘the notice period cannot possibly exceed the date upon which the redundancy took effect – that wouldn’t make any sense.’ The Adjudication Officer enquired as to whether there was any case law on this point. None was submitted.

Counsel for the Respondent submitted that ‘the date of contravention is not when the Complainant thinks it is – it is when it actually is’, and that it could not possibly be the case, that if the notice period was not availed of, that it exceeds the date upon which the redundancy took place. He submitted that the Complainant had expressly stated that she was not going to work in Killeagh when she had been directed to carry out her notice period there. [This is denied by the Complainant.]

He submitted that the six (6) months’ time limit is not a guideline, that it is a ‘pretty firm deadline’ which cannot be extended for any reason ‘whatsoever’. He submitted that the Complainant is essentially relying on ‘absentmindedness’, that she thought she may have sent the email but did not do so, that ‘mistake is not sufficient’ and it does not constitute ‘reasonable excuse.’ He submitted that ‘human error is not a good enough excuse.’

As per the Complainant’s written submissions

It is submitted that the Complainant, Ms. Gemma Turner, commenced employment with the Respondent, Solis GMC Children’s Services Limited, Gulladuff, Bredagh Glen, Moville, Lifford, Co. Donegal on 8th July 2022 as a Deputy Person in Charge of the Respondent’s facility at Roovesmore House. She was paid the sum of €1,150 net per week. She was given notice of termination of her employment by way of redundancy on 27th November 2024 and her employment terminated on 10th December 2024.

The Complainant was employed as Acting Person in Charge of Roovesmore House from 22nd July 2024 until 17th November 2024, as her manager was on sick leave recovering from surgery. It is submitted that there were a considerable amount of difficulties over the course of her employment at Roovesmore House whereby there was a considerable amount of staff turnover and resignations arising from an unsustainably high workload imposed by the Respondent.

The Complainant took annual leave and when she returned to work on 4th November 2024, she was informed that Roovesmore House would close at 5pm on 7th November 2024. Three out of the five staff at Roovesmore House had been told that they would have to move to another house. Those three staff handed in their resignations that week. The Complainant was then required to work from 4th November 2024 to 7th November 2024 without any other staff and one child whose care she was responsible for.

The Complainant took time off in lieu on Friday, 8th November 2024, presented for work on 10th November 2024 and had no communication from management or HR until 18th November 2024, when her manager returned to work. It was only on 19th November that the Complainant received correspondence from her employer notifying her of a risk of redundancy, and a consultation meeting in respect of a proposed redundancy did not take place until 21st November 2024.

On 21st November 2024, alternative terms of employment were offered to the Complainant, which involved redeployment to the Respondent’s premises at Killeagh House and a substantial cut in her salary. The Complainant rejected that proposal. A second proposal was then made to the Complainant on 26th November 2024, which was also unacceptable and which was rejected by the Complainant. The Complainant then received a two week notification of her redundancy on 27th November 2024.

The Complainant emailed the Respondent on 28th November 2024, requesting confirmation of what role she would be working in Killeagh House during her two week notice period.

On or about the 29th November 2024, the Complainant states that a Mr. O’Keeffe arrived at the Roovesmore House premises without warning, took the Complainant’s keys and work phone, and locked the premises to prevent the Complainant entering. It is submitted that Mr. O’Keeffe told the Complainant to go home and not to present to work at Killeagh House. It is submitted that Mr. O’Keeffe further stated that he had been directed to attend at Roovesmore House by Mr. Gary McCaul and that the Complainant would be paid her two weeks’ notice.

By letter dated 10th December 2024, the Respondent set out that the Complainant had been told on 26th November 2024 that her role was being made redundant and that her notice period would be served at Killeagh House. The Respondent further stated that as the Complainant had not worked her notice period, the redundancy had taken effect from 29th November 2024. The Complainant had been given an opportunity to appeal the redundancy by 3rd December 2024, but no appeal had been received and the redundancy was now confirmed.

The Complainant retained Solicitors, who wrote to the Respondent on 16th December 2024 setting out that the Respondent’s letter dated 10th December 2024 appeared to set out that the Complainant was not entitled to payment for her notice period on the basis that she did not work for that period. The Complainant’s Solicitors disputed this on the basis that the Complainant had been locked out of her place of work by her employer on 29th November 2024 and had clearly rejected the offers of redeployment to Killeagh. It was submitted that she remained at all times an employee of the Respondent until the expiration of the notice period, and payment for same was to be made immediately, in default of which the matter would be brought before the WRC.

By letter dated 20th December 2024, the Respondent’s Solicitors set out the position that the matter was a genuine redundancy, and invited the Complainant’s Solicitors to set out what the Complainant’s requirements were at that point, arising from the said redundancy. By letter dated 9th January 2025, the Complainant’s Solicitors set out that the Complainant was yet to receive payment of her two week notice period, in circumstances where a representation was made by a Mr. O’Keeffe on behalf of the Respondent that the Complainant would be paid same when he arrived at Roovesmore House on 29th November 2024 to lock that premises. The Complainant’s Solicitors set out that it was also suggested in the Respondent’s letter of 12th December 2024 that the Complainant was not entitled to payment for her notice period on the basis that she did not work for that period. The Complainant’s Solicitors submitted that the basis for this was unclear in circumstances where the Complainant was locked out of her place of work by her employer on 29th November 2024 and had clearly rejected the offers of redeployment to Killeagh. The Complainant’s Solicitors stated that the Complainant remained at all times an employee of the Respondent until the expiration of the notice period, and payment for same should now be made to conclude that issue.

The Complainant was provided two payslips towards the end of her employment. The first of these was dated 28th November 2024, and shows payment for her work during the month of November up to her pay date. It does not make any reference to a payment in respect of notice.

The Complainant’s final payslip is dated 19th December 2024, and contains separate amounts for €3,480.00, which the Complainant understood to be her redundancy payment, €1,661.44 by way of untaken annual leave, and €3,150.00 which was payment for time off in lieu. Again, there was no reference made to any payment in respect of the Complainant’s notice. The Complainant also generated her own calculation of her redundancy which roughly equates with the sum paid by her employer, but which shows that her notice payment did not form part of the redundancy payment itself.

Date of termination of employment

The Complainant is clear that her employment was terminated on 10th December 2024. In that regard, the Complainant submits:-

1.       There is a clear reference by her employer, via email dated 4th December 2024, that all necessary documentation was to be finalised and issued to the Complainant “by the conclusion of her redundancy notice period on the 10th December 2024.”

2.       A statement of employment issued by the Respondent, and dated 5th December 2024 confirms that the Complainant’s employment was to finish on 10th December 2024.

3.       While a letter dated 10th December 2024 from the Respondent to the Complainant did confuse the issue by initially setting out that the redundancy took effect on 29th November 2024, the same letter concedes that the redundancy was now “confirmed” as per 10th December 2024.

4.       The Complainant’s Solicitors, by letter dated 16th December 2024 again referred to the date of termination of employment as being 10th December 2024. There was no reference to that date being in dispute via the reply from the Respondent’s solicitors on 20th December 2024.

Loss

On termination, the Complainant was not paid for her notice, despite representations by her employer. Her claim therefore is for €2,300.00 by way of payment of her statutory notice entitlement.  [Adjudication Officer’s Note: It was accepted at hearing that the correct figure is very slightly less than this, taking into account the DPIC rate of pay, and allowing for the fact there is an on call allowance in that role.]

Ms. Gemma Turner, the Complainant took the oath and gave evidence on her own behalf.

She explained that she was a Waking Night Social Care Worker at Killeagh House from July 2022 onwards. She said that she earned €18 an hour which worked out at €580 per week. She said that she worked there for a year. She was then offered the Deputy Manager position elsewhere and submitted her resignation. She was told there was a managerial position in Roovesmore House in August 2023, a Deputy Person in Charge (DPIC) role. She interviewed for it and was successful. She was paid 850 euro per week. She held the role of DPIC from August 2023 until the PIC went out sick – approximately July 2024/start August 2024, and she then took over as Acting Person in Charge. She outlined that she was the only manager in the house now (DPIC was not replaced) and that they were provided care for residents who were very complex cases at the time. She said that she was supported by Mr. JJ O’Keeffe, that he was her direct line manager for the rest of her time in Solis.

The Complainant said that it became quite evident from September – without the staff being told – that the house was being closed. She said that staff left and were not being replaced, that the team got smaller. She explained that the service was open 24/7, so, she had to work extra hours to cover that. She explained that high staff turnover is a feature of social care work.

She said in October, there were emails in relation to the staffing crisis and other issues, that staff hours were exhausted, that people in other houses were looking for work in Roovesmore and being told that there were no hours.

The Respondent then hired an independent HR company to communicate that the staff that were left. She said: ‘Solis stopped communicating with us directly.’ At that point, the writing was on the wall.

She explained that there were talks that there may be house being opened in Youghal. She was working in Coachford.

At the first conversation with the HR Manager, an offer was made for her to go to Killeagh House. She said she asked the question: ‘In what capacity am I going to Killeagh?’ She said: ‘I never refused to go to Killeagh.’

She said, in mid-November, the staff were told that the House was going to close. (Email submitted)

The Complainant said that they got paid on the last Thursday of the month. She said that she got paid on 27/11/2025 - her first official day of her 14 day notice period. She said that she turned up for work in Roovesmore House on 28th and sent an email from Roovesmore House to Mr. JJ. O’Keeffe (regional manager) – she and another staff member. She said he turned up at the house saying: ‘I’m here to collect your phone and your laptop and your keys.’ She told him: ‘Sure, we’re supposed to work out our two-week notice.’ She said that he told her Mr. Gary McCaul sent him to collect them, and that they would be paid their redundancy.

She said what she expected was that someone was going to tell her where she was going to work, where and in what capacity. She emailed the HR company. She said she was very conscious that I was going to be made redundant two weeks before Christmas. She explained that she was working 9-5. By contrast, Killeagh was 13 hour day shifts, 13 hour night shifts. Her questions included: What was my pay going to be? Same title? How could I be deputy manager there when they was a deputy manager there? Was I going to be cutting grass? I just wanted to know in what capacity? She said: ‘I wasn’t looking to appeal my redundancy. I knew the game was up. I was looking to appeal the conditions of my redundancy.’

She said that she has correspondence from the Respondent company ‘for future employment, for registration for CORU – all signed and stamped by Solis to say that my employment ended on December 10th.’

She said that she ‘couldn’t go to Roovesmore, wasn’t allowed, was locked out.’ and that she ‘couldn’t go to Killeagh.’

Payslips were submitted - at page 9 of the booklet of documents, ‘a standard enough payslip’, monthly payslip; and at page 21 of the booklet of documents, her final payslip showing ‘no notice period.’

She said that she had sought to be paid in respect of

-          117 hours TOIL

-          64 hours outstanding annual leave

-          Statutory redundancy – 2.5 years

-          Educational Assistance Fund – both parties had signed a contract [2 years – studying a degree in Psychotherapy] – the employer ‘agreed to make that void because they had broken the contract and I didn’t.’

-          2 weeks’ notice

-          Statement of Employment ‘so that I could seek alternative employment’, and a

-          CORU Employer’s competency form ‘so that I could register with CORU’.

in writing on December 10th

She explained that she could not do anything until December 10th, that she got her documents on December 10th. She said that she got everything she asked for except the two weeks’ notice pay.

She explained that she was willing to work out her notice period. She sought information in relation to her title, rate of pay, shift pattern and role and responsibilities.

On cross-examination, by Mr. Liam O’Brien BL

She was asked in relation to the ‘archiving’.

She explained that everything had to be archived, cleaned, had to send the young person’s files.

It was put to her that as an employee you have to do what is asked by your employer (within the terms of your contract of employment). She said that she ‘turned up for work in Roovesmore’,  and ‘would have turned up every day’ but that she ‘couldn’t complete those [tasks]’, as she was ‘was locked out.’

It was put to her that she was instructed to do so. She disputed that. She said: ‘No. Where was I told to do that?’ The Respondent seeking to rely upon the Complainant’s contract of employment, put to her that she was ‘required to go back to Killeagh.’ The witness said: ‘Then I required the same contract, roles and responsibilities, same rate of pay etc.’

It was put to her that it was ‘not just for re-deployment, but for the remaining duration of your employment with a company.’ It was put to her that it would be Mr. JJ O’Keeffe’s evidence that there were positions available in Killeagh. The Complainant flatly disputed this, and asked: ‘So, why didn’t I go then?’ Before stating: ‘Because the conversation never happened.’

Point 7 of her contract of employment was put to her, where under the heading ‘Place of Work’, the word ‘required’ is used. The Complainant said ‘up until five (5) minutes before JJ [O’Keeffe] arrived in Roovesmore House, I had a list of duties that I had to carry out until December 10th.’  She pointed to her email of 28th November, and said that she had ‘no problem going down there [Killeagh]. She said that she was ‘locked out of my place of employment.’ It was put to her that her place of employment was now Killeagh.

She explained the requirements in terms of ‘archiving’, citing the risk of a GDPR breach and the sensitive nature of the records. She said: ‘We had been asked to archive for [a named records management company].’ She said that Roovesmore House had been ‘open for 14 years’

The witness flatly denied the suggestion that she had elected not to work out her notice period. She said: ‘I really object to what you are saying. There is no way I opted to go home 2 weeks before Christmas – with a mortgage, two children, and a mother after a [named medical event] at home.’

She said that she turned up for work on 28th November, prepared to work.

In relation to the possible delay in filing the WRC complaint, it was put to her that it was human error. She explained that she emailed her Solicitor but her email was in the Outbox and he had not even received her response. It was only when she had not heard back from him, and went to follow up, that she discovered what had happened.

It was put to her that the payslips she submitted pertained to a period when she had been Acting Manager (which is a different rate of pay). It was put to her that they did not reflect the wage slip for the work that she would have been doing as of July 2024 until November 2024. The Respondent’s calculation is €2,085 based on the salary of the Complainant in her role as DPIC (and taking into account that there is an on call allowance, in that role).

In his closing submissions:

The Solicitor for the Complainant submitted that the Complainant’s contract of employment contained ‘standard enough clauses’, that he did not think there was a requirement for the communication of updated terms in the instance which ‘relate to minor-ish aspects.’ He said, however, that the process in place for issuing updated Terms of Employment under s. 3 is if there is to be a wholesale revisiting of the terms of employment.

Mr. J.J. O’Keeffe took the oath and gave evidence on behalf of the Respondent.

He said that he was the Service Coordinator for the Respondent, that he was essentially the quality assurance manager, and a support to staff based in Cork, Galway and at the time Donegal. He said that his role is to supervise the manager.

He explained that Roovesmore House supplied care for ‘very complex young people’, and that there was a shortage of staff. He gave examples of the type of work being undertaken.

He said, in relation to the suggestion of archiving, that the staff had been instructed to complete the archiving for the former residents in the house, that the house was now vacant (at the relevant time period), that the insurance was up on the house, that it was not registered as a residential centre any more and that there was nothing left but cleaning to be done.

He explained the proposed project in Youghal, which pertained to separated children seeking international protection.

He outlined that Killeagh House was emergency response centre for young people who were seeking care. He outlined that they were providing care for young people with complex needs, that in Killeagh staffing levels were an issue, that staff retention in social care work is a problem.

He explained that when the Complainant was previously based in Killeagh, she certainly obliged by going over to Roovesmore House.

He said that in relation to archiving, the manager had confirmed it was completed – files taken away, then taking to archiving company in Dublin.

He said that he went to Roovesmore House on 28th November, that he was instructed to do so because the insurance was up on the centre. He spoke to both the Complainant and the other staff, explained that the centre was closing today, asked them to go to Killeagh House, left the laptop and keys, and drove away.

He was asked whether he had sent the Complainant home/told her to go home. He said: ‘Not on your life.’

He said that the witness and the acting manager had a conversation. He outlined there would be the need for a deputy and a manager in Youghal (if/when it opened), and a need for a deputy and a manager in Roovesmore if it reopened.

He was asked whether he had communicated to the Complainant, at the time what her pay would be in Killeagh? He said he understood at the time that the Complainant was negotiating with the HR company.

He said that when he arrived, the Complainant and the other worker were having a discussion, sitting on the couch.

He explained that the house was in a poor state of repair and cleanliness to allow the centre to reopen. He explained that there had been a certain amount of property damage done. He said that he had to order a skip, dump the bedclothes, fridge, freezer,  organise a deep clean. etc.

He was asked what the Complainant’s role on the date on which her employment ended? He said that her role was deputy manager because the manager she had been acting up for (while that person was out on sick leave) was back at work, by then.

On cross-examination, by Mr. Cowhey, Solicitor for the Complainant

It was put to the witness, that in respect of her notice period, that he did not tell the Complainant what her pay would be. He said that she had a contract, for the role of deputy manager. He outlined that it was ‘all up in the air at the time’, that he ‘thought she would go to Killeagh for a while’ and support the staff there. The possibility of a new house opening was the backdrop to this. He said that he thought the external HR company would do the final tot.

He was asked whether he told the Complainant to go [home]? The witness denied this. He said there was a need to close that centre because it was not operational as a children’s residential centre.

He was asked if he had told her not to present at work at Killeagh House? He denied this: ‘Absolutely not.’

He was asked whether he told her she would not be paid her two weeks’ notice? He said: ‘I don’t recall.’

He explained that he wanted to retain the two staff members in question, that under no circumstances would he have sent them home, that that was his function (to retain staff). He said he could not ‘recall specifically on the notice point.’

Closing submissions by Mr. Liam O’Brien BL

Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Respondent had hoped to retain the Complainant, that it was clear there was an intention to keep her had she been willing to go to Killeagh and keep working. He submitted that there was no need to change to terms of employment, where it is simply serving out a two week notice period, and where things are quite unclear as to the future of Roovesmore House, and there was a need for work to be done in Killeagh. He submitted that, based on the Complainant’s evidence, it was not communicated to her that the pay would not be the same, and that there was no reason to think that the pay would have been decreased had she gone to Killeagh. Her role as Acting Manager had ceased at the end of her employment. Counsel for the Respondent submitted that, by his calculation, Deputy Manager, the correct figure was €2085, not €2,300.

I find the date of contravention to be December 10th, 2024, for the purposes of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, that being the first possible date that the Complainant was on notice of the contravention herein, i.e. that she was not paid her notice pay.

I therefore find that the WRC complaint was filed ‘within six months’ of the date of contravention, having been filed on 4th June 2024.

I therefore do not have to consider the arguments put forward in relation to any possible extension of time, as I find the matter was filed within the initial six month window.

I find that this complaint is well founded. I found the Complainant to be a cogent, credible and consistent witness, and I am persuaded by her evidence. I find that she was available for work throughout her notice period. I accept that she was told by Mr. O’Keeffe on behalf of the Respondent to leave the premises, i.e. that she was ‘locked out’ by her employer. I further accept that she was told by him that she would be in receipt of her statutory entitlements, in this instance, in respect of minimum notice pay, i.e. that the Respondent (through its agents or servants) acknowledge the monies due and owing.

It was accepted, by the Solicitor for the Complainant, at hearing that the figure due was actually slightly less than the €2,300 initially submitted (which was based on his instructions at the time) - that the correct sum was based on the fact the Complainant had returned to the DPIC role, from the APIC role, prior to the redundancy occurring.

I find that the monies outstanding are as outlined - €2,085, calculated based on the salary of the Complainant’s payslip in the role of Deputy Person in Charge, for the basis of the calculation.

CA-00072132 – 001 - I find for the Complainant.  I find that this complaint is well founded. I find that she has not received her statutory minimum notice pay entitlements, as per the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973.  I direct the Respondent to pay the Complainant €2,085 within 42 days of the date of this decision.

Pay; Minimum notice; Redundancy situation;