Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Wayne  Murray

Greystar Ireland Limited

Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

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Representatives

Setanta Landers Setanta Solicitors

Mark Curran BL instructed by Mason Hayes and Curran

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00071180-001

30/04/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00071180-002

30/04/2025

The Complainant commenced employment with Greystar as a Regional Facilities Manager on 17 July 2023. He was paid a salary of €76,875 and received a bonus in 2024 of €11,436. He stated that he was constructively dismissed on 7 April 2025 when the Respondent presented him with a termination agreement purporting to end his employment. The Respondent conceded that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed.

On 28 February 2025, the Complainant attended a Teams catch-up call with his Line Manager. During the conversation, the Complainant informed his Line Manager that his wife was expecting a baby and advised that he intended to take paternity leave. He also requested the following Monday afternoon off work to attend a baby scan with his wife.

On 3 March 2025, the Complainant attended an in-office catch-up meeting. At this meeting, his Line Manager stated that the Complainant would be required to work on site more regularly. He further remarked that he was not satisfied with certain aspects of the Complainant’s work — despite having previously thanked him by email on 5 February 2025 for successfully completing that very work.

On 4 March 2025, the Complainant received an email from his Line Manager advising that he was expected to attend the office more frequently to support “collaboration.”

From 5 March 2025 to 7 April 2025, the Complainant was absent from work due to illness. He returned to work on 7 April 2025 and resumed his duties from home as usual.

At 2:46 p.m. that day, the Complainant received an invitation to attend a Teams meeting at 4:00 p.m. with the HR Business Partner. The Complainant attended the meeting as requested. During the meeting, he was informed that the Respondent had decided the best course of action would be to discuss the termination of his employment.

Following the meeting, the HR Business Partner emailed the Complainant a separation agreement, which he declined to sign. The Complainant did not return to work thereafter, stating that any meaningful employment had been rendered impossible from that point, and that he was entitled to treat the matter as a unilateral termination of his employment contract.

The Respondent conceded that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed.

As the Respondent conceded that the Complainant was constructively dismissed, I find that the Complainant’s claim under the Act succeeds.

CA-00071180-001:

I find that the Complainant’s claim of constructive dismissal succeeds for the reason set out above.

Redress:

Section 7 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, in relevant part, states that:

(1) Where an employee is dismissed and the dismissal is an unfair dismissal, the employee shall be entitled to redress consisting of whichever of the following the adjudication officer, considers appropriate having regard to all the circumstances:

(a) re-instatement by the employer of the employee in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal on the terms and conditions on which he was employed immediately before his dismissal together with a term that the re-instatement shall be deemed to have commenced on the day of the dismissal, or

(b) re-engagement by the employer of the employee either in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal or in a different position which would be reasonably suitable for him on such terms and conditions as are reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(c) (i) if the employee incurred any financial loss attributable to the dismissal, payment to him by the employer of such compensation in respect of the loss (not exceeding in amount 104 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of this Act) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances,

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining the amount of compensation payable under that subsection regard shall be had to—

(a) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that subsection was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employer,

(b) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that subsection was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employee,

(c) the measures (if any) adopted by the employee or, as the case may be, his failure to adopt measures, to mitigate the loss aforesaid,

(d) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the procedure referred to in subsection (1) of section 14 of this Act or with the provisions of any code of practice relating to procedures regarding dismissal approved of by the Minister,

(e) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the said section 14,

(f) the extent (if any) to which the conduct of the employee (whether by act or omission) contributed to the dismissal.

3) In this section—

“financial loss”, in relation to the dismissal of an employee, includes any actual loss and any estimated prospective loss of income attributable to the dismissal and the value of any loss or diminution, attributable to the dismissal, of the rights of the employee under the Redundancy Payments Acts, 1967 to 1973, or in relation to superannuation;

“remuneration” includes allowances in the nature of pay and benefits in lieu of or in addition to pay.

Findings:

Given that the Respondent conceded that the dismissal was unfair, I find that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed.

I must now examine the appropriate form of redress in accordance with section 7 (1) of the Act set out above. I note the Complainant’s preference for compensation as a remedy and find that this is appropriate in this instance given that he was constructively dismissed and has found employment elsewhere.

Prior to assessing the level of compensation to award, I must firstly examine the overall loss attributable to the dismissal.

In this regard, I note, based on the evidence presented at the hearing, that the Complainant’s employment ended on 7 April 2025 and that he commenced alternative employment on 7 October 2025. I have therefore calculated his financial loss to be six months’ remuneration namely €44,155, based on an annual salary of €76,875 and the bonus he received in the amount of €11,436.

Having assessed his financial loss, I must, in calculating the precise amount of compensation to award, have regard to the decision of the Adjudication Officer in ADJ 32667, where she stated, inter alia, that: 

“in considering compensation, regard must be had to all of the subsection of Section 7-and the tests are not confined to the efforts of the former employee-or the Complainant in this case. In circumstances where the Respondent is found not to have met the tests set out in subsections (c) and (d) …. and the Complainant made no contribution to the decision to dismiss her under (a) (b) or (f) It would be wholly unjustified to penalise the Complainant solely for a conclusion that she did not make a sufficient effort of mitigate her losses where the balance of unfairness and failure to comply with the terms of Section 7 as a whole lie squarely with the Respondent.” 

In analysing all of section 7 in respect of this case, I have regard firstly to subsection (a) and note that the Respondent accepted that the Complainant was constructively dismissed. Given that his employment ended in this way, I find that the provisions of subsections (b), (d) and (e) do not apply in this case.

While the Respondent highlighted that the Complainant was a director of his own business during his employment with them and presented evidence of what they said was work he did on his work laptop during his employment with them, I cannot consider this in my assessment of loss under subsection (f) as this was only uncovered after the Complainant left his employment and was therefore not a factor in his dismissal

Considering section 7(2)(c), the Complainant stated in his evidence that he received an offer of suitable alternative employment in early July 2025 but chose to defer taking up that position until 7 October 2025 because he had caring responsibilities during that time.

While I accept that the Complainant may have had such responsibilities, no evidence was presented to establish that he would have earned wages from the Respondent had he still been employed during the three-month period from early July 2025 to 7 October 2025, and that the Respondent would have continued to remunerate him while he attended to those personal duties. I therefore find that the financial loss associated with that period is not attributable to the dismissal, but rather to the Complainant’s personal choice to remain out of the workforce.

As stated above, the Respondent produced evidence to demonstrate that the Complainant was a director of his own business during his employment with them and that he continued to operate this business after his dismissal. The Complainant accepted in evidence that he performed work for this company both while employed by the Respondent and after he left their employment. He stated that although he was not paying himself a salary during this time, his wife was the only person drawing income from the company.

Having considered this evidence, I am satisfied that the Complainant continued to carry out work for his own company after leaving the Respondent’s employment. While he may not have drawn a personal salary during that period, his evidence indicates that the business was trading profitably and that he was performing a substantial part of the work himself. In those circumstances, the absence of personal remuneration was the result of his own decision not to pay himself, rather than an unavoidable loss caused by the dismissal. The purpose of compensation is to restore the Complainant to the financial position he would have been in had the dismissal not occurred, not to subsidise a voluntary decision to forego income.

Considering all of the foregoing points, I make an award of €14,718 in respect of the unfair dismissal.

CA-00071180-002: This complaint was withdrawn.