ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00058137
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Eman Chennit | Dillon Marshall Property Management Limited (amended on consent) |
| Complainant | Respondent |
Anonymised Parties | {text} | {text} |
Representatives |
| Adam Marshall |
Complaint:
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000 | CA-00070631-001 | 07/04/2025 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 08/01/2026 and09/02/2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Úna Glazier-Farmer
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 25 of the Equal Status Act, 2000, following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaint.
Background:
The Complainant swore an Affirmation at the outset of the hearing. Two witnesses appeared to support the Complainant’s evidence, Ms Esther Majabei and Mr Ashraf Saleh both giving evidence on Affirmation.
Mr Adam Marshall, Director of the Respondent appeared and gave evidence on Affirmation. The name of the Respondent was clarified at the outset of the hearing.
Written submissions were received and relied upon by the parties at the hearing.
The first hearing had to be adjourned due to the Respondent’s representative, Mr. Marshall, attending the remote hearing from a location that was not suitable for participation, namely an outdoor recreational setting. It is incumbent on all parties attending remote hearings before the Workplace Relations Commission to ensure that they are in an appropriate environment that allows them to fully engage with the proceedings. The circumstances on that date rendered effective participation impossible, and the hearing could not proceed. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
It was the Complainant’s evidence that she is an Iveagh Trust tenant residing at Castleview Apartments, Dublin. Since moving into her home approximately six months prior, she has been subjected to discriminatory treatment by the management company, Dillon Marshall Property Consultants, on the basis of her status as a social housing tenant. It was her evidence that the access fob provided to her does not permit entry to the communal gym or residents’ lounge, party area, parcel acceptance and cinema area despite these facilities being advertised as available to all residents, and that other social housing tenants similarly have their access restricted, while private tenants enjoy full use of the amenities. It was her evidence that security staff advised her that she was not permitted into these areas due to her social housing status. She further gave evidence that she notified the Respondent via email of the issue and its discriminatory nature but received no response. She also gave evidence that from December 2024 to February 2025 her emails were ignored, and that Iveagh Trust informed her that Respondent had confirmed that social housing tenants were prohibited from using the facilities. She submitted an ES1 form on 6 March 2025 but received no reply. It was the Complainant’s evidence that this conduct caused her significant emotional distress, a diminished sense of community, and negative impacts on her physical health due to exclusion from the gym. There was no questions in cross examination. Upon inquiry the Complainant was asked if the communal spaces were open to the public? She confirmed it was not. Mr Saleh gave evidence that he was a social housing tenant and was also denied access to the communal facilities. Ms Majebi also gave evidence that she was a social housing tenant and was refused access to the facilities on this basis. There was no cross examination of either witness. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
It was the Respondent’s evidence that it acts solely as property managers and agents at the Castleview development and does not own or lease any residential units. Its role was limited to managing services in accordance with the contractual instructions of the respective owners and management companies. The Respondent stated that the development comprises multiple blocks under different ownership structures, with Block 5 owned by the Iveagh Trust and operated as social housing, while Blocks 1–4 and 6–12 is owned by a private fund and consist of private rental units. It was the Respondent’s evidence that the amenities referred to in the complaint, including the gym, cinema room, and concierge services, are funded exclusively through the rents and service charges paid by residents of the private blocks. The Iveagh Trust tenants in Block 5 have never been contractually charged for or entitled to use these private amenities. The Respondent distinguished between general communal open spaces, which are accessible to all residents including those in Block 5, and private amenities, which are contractually tied to the private rental agreements and maintained solely by contributions from private residents. The Respondent stated that any entitlement to amenities for Block 5 residents is a matter between those residents and their landlord, the Iveagh Trust. Any concerns regarding access rights should properly be directed to the Iveagh Trust rather than to the Respondent. Cross examination The Respondent stated that no OMC resolution existed authorising amenity access for Block 5 residents before the complaint. They said they had recently emailed the OMC directors to put the issue on the agenda for the next AGM, which will be the first AGM held. When asked, they acknowledged that they had a copy of that email. The Respondent confirmed that only Block 5 lacks access to the private amenities, that the general public cannot access them, and that the matter could not have been raised at a previous AGM because none had taken place. Upon inquiry, the Respondent stated the communal areas were not open to the public where it was just the residents of the designated apartment blocks. |
Findings and Conclusions:
Discrimination is defined in Section 3 (1) of the Equal Status Act 2000 (the “Act”):- (1) For the purposes of this Act discrimination shall be taken to occur— (a) where a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) or, if appropriate, subsection (3B), (in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’) which— (i) exists, (ii) existed but no longer exists, (iii) may exist in the future, or (iv) is imputed to the person concerned, (b) where a person who is associated with another person— (i) is treated, by virtue of that association, less favourably than a person who is not so associated is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and (ii) similar treatment of that other person on any of the discriminatory grounds would, by virtue of paragraph (a), constitute discrimination, or (c) where an apparently neutral provision would put a person referred to in any paragraph of section 3(2) at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless the provision is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.” The housing assistance ground is defined in Section 3 (3B) of the Act:- “(3B) For the purposes of section 6(1)(c), the discriminatory grounds shall (in addition to the grounds specified in subsection (2)) include the ground that as between any two persons, that one is in receipt of rent supplement (within the meaning of section 6(8)), housing assistance (construed in accordance with Part 4 of the Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2014) or any payment under the Social Welfare Acts and the other is not (the “housing assistance ground”).” A requisite of the Act is in relation to access of facilities by the general public which is provided for in Section 5 (1) of the Act:- “(1) A person shall not discriminate in disposing of goods to the public generally or a section of the public or in providing a service, whether the disposal or provision is for consideration or otherwise and whether the service provided can be availed of only by a section of the public.” Both parties agreed that the communal area facilities at issue in this complaint were not open to the public. The facilities were for the exclusive use of residents who had the assigned access via a specific fob. For this reason, I find there is no jurisdiction to consider the complaint further under the Equal Status Act 2000. |
Decision:
Section 25 of the Equal Status Acts, 2000 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 27 of that Act.
For the reason set out above, I find the Complainant was not discriminated against by the Respondent. |
Dated: 27/02/2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Úna Glazier-Farmer
Key Words:
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