Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Stephen  Smyth

Phelan Woodcraft Limited trading as Phelan Woodcraft

Representatives

  Self-Represented

 No Appearance

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967

CA-00069702-001

03/03/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973

CA-00069702-003

03/03/2025

The Complainant worked for the Respondent as a Foreman from the 1 June 2018 until the 6 January 2025. He earned €715 gross per week. The Respondent’s business ceased trading and the Complainant did not receive his statutory redundancy payment or his four weeks’ notice pay.

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 1 June 2018 and was employed as a Foreman. He stated that he was informed during the course of a telephone conversation that the Respondent was ceasing trading. The Complainant’s employment ended on the 6 January 2025. He confirmed that his statutory redundancy payment and his four weeks’ notice pay remained outstanding as at the date of the hearing. The Complainant earned €715.00 gross per week.

The Respondent did not attend the scheduled hearing of this complaint. Notice of the hearing arrangements was sent to the Respondent on the 6 January 2026. On the 10 February 2026 the Respondent contacted the WRC indicating that the Respondent would not be attending the hearing as the business had closed. Having carefully reviewed the file I am satisfied that the Respondent was on notice of the claim against it. I waited a reasonable time before proceeding with the hearing in the absence of the Respondent.

In making these findings, I have considered the documentation submitted by the parties and the oral evidence adduced at the hearing summarised above.

Preliminary Issue

Before considering the substantive issues in this case, I first must address a preliminary issue regarding the jurisdiction of the WRC. The complaint was submitted on 3 March 2025 under the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 (as amended). In the space provided on the complaint form for complainants to expand on their complaints, the Complainant set out details of having been made redundant without notice. 

I note the finding of the High Court in County Louth VEC v. Equality Tribunal [2009] IEHC 370 that:

“I accept the submission on behalf of the respondent that the Form EE1 was only intended to set out, in broad outline, the nature of the complaint. If it is permissible in court proceedings to amend pleadings, where the justice of the case requires it, then a fortiori, it should be permissible to amend a claim as set out in a form such as the EE1, so long as the general nature of the complaint (in this case, discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation) remains the same.”

I also note the dicta of MacMenimin J. in the Supreme Court in Louth/Meath ETB v. Equality Tribunal [2016] IESC 40:

“It goes without saying, first, that the duty of the Equality Officer is both statutory, and, ultimately, delimited by constitutional considerations. As part of fair procedures, it is necessary that all parties be aware, in a timely way, of the case which they must meet. Consequently, it would be wrong, were a situation to evolve in this investigation, where one or other of the parties was under a misapprehension of precisely the range of legitimate inquiry. Second, it is hardly necessary to reiterate that it is not possible for any tribunal, upon which a particular jurisdiction has been conferred by statute, to extend or confine the boundaries of that jurisdiction by an erroneous determination of fact (see State (Attorney General) v. Durkan [1964] I.R. 279, approved in Killeen v. DPP [1998] ILRM 1). There may also be circumstances in which a tribunal, although holding jurisdiction to enter upon an investigation or inquiry, may render its decision a nullity by, for example, a denial of fair procedures.”

I further note the dicta of Charleton J. in Galway-Mayo Institute of Technology v. Employment Appeals Tribunal [2007] IEHC 210:

“It follows from the foregoing that a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal is not entitled to invoke a statutory remedy which no one has sought and in respect of which no one is on notice. For the purpose of fulfilling the requirements of natural justice, however, I would have thought that if any such tribunal does have jurisdiction to give a remedy under a particular Act, then if this remedy is sought in an originating document, for instance by ticking a box giving a choice of remedies, or if it is orally sought to in the course of the hearing, such a tribunal is entitled to make a choice in favour of it. If that happens, parties have to be taken as being aware that in the event that a decision goes a particular way the tribunal may look to a remedy claimed. In that regard, I would regard a written claim or an oral assertion seeking a particular remedy as being sufficient for the due administration of constitutional justice provided the tribunal has jurisdiction in respect of it. If remedies are complex, and a tribunal has rules as to notice in the form of simple originating documents, then it should abide by its own procedures or consider the grant of an adjournment to a genuinely surprised party.”

Applying these dicta, I note that the WRC complaint form is not a statutory form. It is intended to set out the outline of a complaint or complaints, so that, and in line with fair procedures, the Respondent knows the issues it faces. In this case, the issue a possible breach of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973 is raised in the complaint form. The complaint form was copied to the Respondent.  It is clear from the communication from the Respondent in advance of the hearing that he was on notice that the Complainant’s complaints. I find that I have jurisdiction to investigate the complaint in respect of notice under the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. The decision, therefore, reflects that in addition to seeking redress pursuant to the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 (as amended) the Complainant is also seeking redress pursuant to the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. 

CA-00069702-001

The Complainant presented as a credible witness. He provided evidence of his redundancy, evidence of his calculated entitlement and evidence in support of his contention that the statutory redundancy payment was never made to him. The Complainant was informed that the Respondent was ceasing trading and as a result he was made redundant effective from the 6 January 2025. On the 10 February 2026 the owner of the Respondent company advised the WRC that the business had closed down and that he would not be attending the hearing.

This complaint is for a statutory lump sum payment under section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 (as amended).  The Acts, related legislation and Regulations made thereunder require that in order to qualify for a statutory redundancy payment, an employee must -

(1)    have at least 2 years’ continuous service;

(2)    be in employment which is insurable under the Social Welfare Acts;

(3)    be over the age of 16;

(4)    have been made redundant as a result of a genuine redundancy situation and/or if on lay-off or short-time, have complied with any statutory notice requirements; and

(5)    not have received a lump sum payment.

Section 7(2) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 (as amended) states:

For the purposes of subsection (1), an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if for one or more reasons not related to the employee concerned the dismissal is attributable wholly or mainly to—

(a) the fact that his employer has ceased, or intends to cease, to carry on the business for the purposes of which the employee was employed by him, or has ceased or intends to cease, to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed, or

(b) the fact that the requirements of that business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where he was so employed have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish, or

(c) the fact that his employer has decided to carry on the business with fewer or no employees, whether by requiring the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) to be done by other employees or otherwise, or

(d) the fact that his employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforward be done in a different manner for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained, or

(e) the fact that his employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforward be done by a person who is also capable of doing other work for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained…

Having heard the evidence, I am satisfied the Complainant’s situation falls to be considered under 7(2)(a) above.  I am satisfied that the Complainant is entitled to a redundancy payment pursuant to the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 (as amended).  I am satisfied that the Respondent has not paid any monies to the Complainant in respect of his redundancy as at the date of hearing. The calculation of gross weekly pay is subject to a ceiling of €600.00.  The calculation of the lump sum is a matter for the relevant department.

CA-00069702-003

Section 4(2)(c) of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973 provides that minimum notice be given by an employer to terminate the contract of his employee -

(c) if the employee has been in the continuous service of his employer for five years or more, but less than ten years, four weeks,

The Complainant advised the hearing that he was employed by the Respondent from the 1 June 2018 to the 6 January 2025. I am satisfied that the Complainant in this case is entitled to 4 weeks’ notice pay. I am also satisfied from the evidence adduced that the Complainant did not receive his entitlement of 4 weeks’ notice or payment in lieu of notice. Accordingly, I find this complaint to be well founded.

CA-00069702-001

Having considered all the written and oral evidence presented in relation to this matter my decision is to allow the Complainant’s appeal against the failure of his employer to pay a redundancy payment.  I decide the within complaint is well-founded and I decide the Complainant is entitled to a redundancy lump sum payment pursuant to the Redundancy Payment Act 1967 (as amended) based on the following criteria:

Date of Commencement: 1 June 2018

Date Employment Ended: 6 January 2025

Gross Weekly Wage: €715.00. This figure is capped at the maximum figure of €600 as his weekly wage exceeded that sum.

This award is made subject to the Complainant having been in insurable employment under the Social Welfare Acts during the relevant period.

CA-00069702-003

I decide that this complaint is well-founded and I direct the Respondent to pay to the Complainant the sum of €2,860 representing 4 weeks’ wages.