Anonymising Protocol

A Client of The Revenue Commissioners

The Revenue Commissioners

Representatives

Represented himself

Cathal McGreal BL

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000

CA-00069230-001

12/02/2025

The complainant and his wife separated in 2016 and commenced divorce proceedings in August 2024.  The couple have three children, one of whom, B, has lived with the complainant since 2020. 

In accordance with s.465 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997, the parent or guardian of an incapacitated child is entitled to a tax credit.  The complainant is assessed for tax separately from his former wife and, in February 2024, he wrote to Revenue and asked for the incapacitated child tax credit (ICC) to be granted to him in respect of B.  On April 3rd 2024, he sent completed “ICC1” and “ICC2” forms to Revenue.  ICC1 is completed by the tax-payer and ICC2 is completed by the child’s doctor.  On the ICC1 form, the complainant ticked “NO” in response to the question, “Is any other person maintaining this child?”

The complainant and his wife have joint custody of their children and, when he applied for the ICC in April 2024, it was already assigned to his wife, who was in receipt of child benefit for the three children.  His claim was not granted.  The complainant wrote again to Revenue on April 9th and explained that his daughter, B, had been living with him since 2020 and he asked for the ICC to be applied to him.  In response, on April 18th, Revenue sent the complainant a form SPCC1 to complete.  This is a form to apply for the single person child carer credit.  The complainant didn’t submit this form, but he wrote again to Revenue on June 20th 2024 and asked for his application to be reviewed.  He re-sent the ICC1 and ICC2 forms that he had sent in April.

On August 7th 2024, the complainant wrote again to Revenue and asked for his application for the ICC to be reviewed.  In his email he said,

“The credit is unfortunately being applied to the correct* person and I cannot complete my taxes for 2023 unless it accurately reflects my situation.  Note the doctor’s official stamp and signature confirming B only resides with me.”

*I understand that “correct” is a typo which should read, “incorrect.”

On August 26th, a Revenue official wrote to the complainant and asked him to contact his ex-wife to ask her for written confirmation that B was living with him and from what date.  This wasn’t feasible for the complainant and he provided proof of B’s address in the form of an official bank letter and referred again to the ICC2 form signed by B’s doctor.   There was some exchange of correspondence between the complainant and Revenue and on November 6th 2024, in the context of their divorce proceedings, the complainant sent Revenue copies of his and his wife’s sworn affidavits that B lives with him.

On November 21st 2024, the complainant’s application for the tax credit was refused because he was not in receipt of child benefit for B and the ICC was being claimed by his wife.  To apply for a partial tax credit, the complainant was informed that Revenue required information from him and his former wife that showed how much they were each contributing to the care of B.

The complainant appealed against the decision not to grant him the tax credit.  He asserted that the “sole consideration is the domicile and permanent residence of the child” and he said that the decision to refuse his claim was egregious and that it was “unreasonable, capricious and flies in the face of common sense.”  On December 18th, he wrote again to Revenue and said that he intended “to refer the matter to the equality tribunal on the grounds of discrimination on gender, civil status, family status and disability.” 

On December 22nd, the complainant submitted an ES1 form to Revenue, claiming that, by refusing his application for ICC, he was discriminated against on the grounds of his gender, civil status and family status.  On February 12th 2025, Ms Debbie Hurley, the assistant principal officer who considered the complainant’s appeal, granted his application for the tax credit.  Also on February 12th, shortly after he received the decision on his appeal, he submitted this complaint to the WRC.

At the opening of the hearing, I asked the complainant what the basis of his complaint is, now that the tax credit has been granted.  He said that, for four years, since 2020, he was not treated equally compared to a woman.  He said that his rights as a single man were not taken seriously until he submitted a complaint to the WRC on February 12th 2025. 

The complainant referred to s.465(1)(b) of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997:

(1) Where a claimant proves that he or she has living at any time during a year of assessment any child who -

(a) (This subsection is not relevant to the complainant because his daughter is over the age of 16);

(b) if over the age of 16 years at the commencement of the year, is permanently incapacitated by reason of mental or physical infirmity from maintaining himself or herself and had become so permanently incapacitated before he or she had attained the age of 21 years or had become so permanently incapacitated after attaining the age of 21 years but while he or she had been in receipt of full-time instruction at any university, college, school or other educational establishment, the claimant shall, subject to this section, be entitled in respect of each such child to a deduction of £700.

For the tax year 2026, the deduction is €3,800.

The complainant claims that, in the outline of their regulatory functions at paragraph 16 of the submission provided to the WRC for this hearing, Revenue has not had regard to this s.465(1)(b).

In the email he sent to Revenue on November 6th 2024, the complainant said that he proved the point raised in s.465(1)(b) and that he demonstrated, through sworn affidavits from him and his wife, and confirmation from a doctor, that B lives with him.

In reply to the documents he sent to Revenue on November 6th 2024, on November 21st, the complainant was informed that, because he wasn’t in receipt of child benefit for B, and, because his wife was claiming the ICC, “we are unable to grant you the credit at this time.”

The complainant said that, on December 22nd 2024, in his ES1 form, he had to tell Revenue that his rights had been violated and that he was discriminated against.  He claims that the Revenue has a hidden bias in relation to him.

The emails sent to the complainant by Revenue in August 2024 referred to his PRSI contributions.  He said that this was “a red herring” and was intended to “muddy the waters” in relation to his claim for ICC.  He described this as “gas lighting” by Revenue and he claims that it was “like a shutter coming down.”

Referring to paragraph 17 of Revenue’s submission, the complainant noted the specific remarks about the need for scrutiny of claims:

“Failure of scrutiny can seriously damage the effectiveness and reputation of the organisation and can lead to serious consequences for the functionaries in that organisation who do not fully scrutinise a transaction.  The Respondent, in particular, cannot function without a certain rigidity and caution.  The Respondent has a duty of rigour in what it does.  If this means it is careful, and even sceptical, that is because it has to be.”

It is the complainant’s case that Revenue had a responsibility to contact his ex-wife to confirm where their child was living.

Between March 3rd and November 21st 2024, the complainant said that 16 emails were exchanged between him and Revenue, but no correspondence was sent to his ex-wife.  He claims that the failure of Revenue to write to his ex-wife demonstrates that he was not treated equally compared to her.

In a letter he submitted to the WRC on May 29th 2024, the complainant said that the advice he received from Revenue was that the person in receipt of the child benefit allowance for B was the person entitled to claim the ICC.  He said that it is irrelevant for Revenue which parent is in receipt of child benefit, because the ICC is a claim under the Taxes Consolidation Act and the simple criterion is the child’s place of residence.

The complainant claims that “Revenue placed a barrier between me and the law.”  He referred to paragraph 25 of their submission which states:

“For couples who have children, the ICC credit system must discriminate, but that is not unlawful.”

The complainant claims that Revenue may have had regard for guidelines, but that the law wasn’t applied in his case.  He said that Revenue is entitled to investigate, but they may not discriminate.

Paragraph 2 of Revenue’s submission refers to the complainant’s emotional state during his application for ICC:

“The complainant was clearly frustrated that his application was not immediately or more easily granted.  He was clearly unhappy that he was subject to a process that required him to appeal.  Whilst he never said as much, he may also have been unhappy with having to co-engage with his former spouse to the extent that he was asked by Revenue for her input in this application.  But this does not mean he suffered unlawful discrimination.”

The complainant said that this paragraph portrays him as “a disgruntled man with a bone to pick.”  He said that his emotional state has nothing to do with the law and he finds this paragraph distasteful.

The complainant referred to paragraph 9 of the respondent’s submission:

“It is notable that the 12 February 2025 communication of the outcome of the appeal was sent 3 hours and 15 minutes before the WRC received this complaint.  The receipt date and time show that the decision to grant the ICC was opened by the Complainant (and presumably read) just 1 hour and 24 minutes before the WRC complaint was received.  This strongly suggests that the Complainant intended (and was prepared) to appeal whether or not he received the ICC.”

The complainant argued that it is unfair and not factual for Revenue to presume that he read their response to his appeal on February 12th 2025 before he submitted his complaint to the WRC.  He said that it’s too good to be true that he only got justice when he submitted a complaint to the WRC.

The complainant repeated his point that the emails he received from Revenue should have been matched by correspondence to his ex-wife, and, in this regard, he claims that he was not treated equally.

Summing up his case that he was discriminated against, the complainant said that there is a hidden bias in the tone of the emails from Revenue.  He repeated his allegation of gas lighting, in the manner in which Revenue made the case into his problem.  He said that Revenue was “side-stepping and then stone-walling.”  Then, a red herring was introduced.  He said that the legal position is not included in Revenue’s submission.  He said, “I gave them the law.  They ignored this fact.”

In response to the position set out at the hearing by Mr McGreal, the complainant said, “The system before I was granted the ICC shows that it was discriminatory.  Because the application was granted, this must mean that there is a problem.  This is what I rest my case on.”

Main Points of the Written Submission

Ms Noreen Collins, solicitor for the Revenue Commissioners, sent a submission to the WRC and the complainant in advance of the hearing of this matter on September 19th 2025.  The submission contains a detailed timeline of the email correspondence between the complainant and Revenue officials from February 8th 2024 until his successful appeal against the decision to grant him the ICC was confirmed on February 12th 2025.

Ms Collins noted that, during 2024, in 11 months of correspondence with Revenue, the complainant made no mention of discrimination.  On page 3 of his submission to the WRC dated May 29th 2025, he said,

“Due to their lack of reasons and their failure to engage with me, I simply do not know why I was refused the tax credit.”

At paragraph 15 of her submission, Ms Collins wrote:

“Finally, the service which the Complainant criticises as having been discriminatory is a criticism that must fail on the basis that it relates to the inherently discriminating (not unlawfully discriminatory) nature of the statutory service the Respondent is obliged to carry out.  That is to say that it was due to the inextricable family and civil status content and context of that service.”

Ms Collins said that Revenue is charged with the regulatory, assessment and inspection function with respect to the ICC.  She referred to the guide for this tax credit which is available on Revenue’s website.  This guidance document shows that there are a variety of matters that should be scrutinised by Revenue to ensure that the ICC is granted to the correct person to the correct extent.  These criteria include medical certification and proof from both parents of the extent to which they have a respective entitlement.  Ms Collins’ position is the Revenue could not have expected the documents that the complainant provided to speak for themselves, and applications involving other parties could not be taken without question.

Revenue’s position is that the complainant’s appeal, with some delay, remedied his issues.  While the process was slow and may have been imperfect, the tax credits that were sought were granted.  Ms Collins remarked that “slow and imperfect administration is not discriminatory.”

Ms Collins referred to the decision of the Labour Court in ArtursValpeters v Melbury Developments Limited[1], which held that an inference of discrimination can only be drawn,

“…if there was evidence of some weight from which it could be concluded that persons of a different race or nationality were or would be treated more favourably.”

Also, in this case, the Court noted that the facts being relied upon had to be more than,

“…mere speculations or assertions unsupported by evidence.”

Revenue’s position is that, based on the facts of what occurred, the complainant has not shown that the reason he was not granted the ICC was due to discrimination. 

Submission at the Hearing

Mr McGreal put it to the complainant that Ms Hurley, who granted his appeal, is more experienced that the officials who dealt with his claim during 2024.  Ms Hurley found that there was sufficient documentation to grant him the ICC.  The decision not to grant the credit was made by clerical officers who have to make 30 or 40 decisions every day.    

Mr McGreal said that every tax-payer is entitled to confidentiality and it is not the role of Revenue to enquire into the affairs of another tax-payer.  In the end, the complainant produced a document from family law proceedings which Ms Hurley decided was sufficient to allow his claim.

Ms McGreal said that three issues had to be established:

1.      Medical evidence, about which there was no issue;

2.      Maintenance for B;

3.      Place of residence of B.

Mr McGreal said that child benefit might be relevant to the issue of maintenance.  On November 21st 2024, Revenue wrote to the complainant and said that because he was not in receipt of child benefit for B and, because the ICC credit was being claimed by his wife, “we are unable to grant you the credit at this time.”  Ms Hurley took a different view and her review of all the correspondence resulted in her decision that he was entitled to the ICC. 

Considering the issue of the delay in granting the claim, Mr McGreal said that a delay is not discriminatory. 

Mr McGreal said that discrimination as it relates to Revenue matters means that there is a differentiation between tax-payers.  The complainant complained that his wife “didn’t get one email.”  Mr McGreal said that the tax affairs of the complainant’s wife are hers and the Revenue officials who dealt with this matter in the first instance decided that the ICC claim had to be resolved with her participation.  When she considered the complainant’s appeal, Ms Hurley made a different decision.

Mr McGreal said that the complainant’s case suggests that anyone whose applications for tax credit are rejected could claim that they were discriminated against.  He argued that the complainant has not satisfied the requirement of s.38A of the Equal Status Act 2000 concerning the burden of proof.  He reminded me that the complainant did not raise the issue of discrimination until very late in his engagement with Revenue.  The complainant alleged that Revenue failed to follow a proper process, that there was an abuse of process, that they were stone-walling and side-stepping.  He complained about gas lighting.  Mr McGreal said that there was no mention of unequal treatment or discrimination.

The Legal Framework

Discrimination is defined at section 3 of the Equal Status Act (“the Act”) as follows:

(1) For the purposes of this Act discrimination shall be taken to occur -

(a) where a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) or, if appropriate, subsection (3B), (in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’) which -

(i) exists,

(ii) existed but no longer exists,

(iii) may exist in the future, or

(iv) is imputed to the person concerned,

(b) where a person who is associated with another person - 

(i) is treated, by virtue of that association, less favourably than a person who is not so associated is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and 

(ii) similar treatment of that other person on any of the discriminatory grounds would, by virtue of paragraph (a), constitute discrimination, or

(c) where an apparently neutral provision would put a person referred to in any paragraph of section 3(2) at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless the provision is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. 

Subsection (2) sets out the discriminatory grounds, which, at subsection (2)(a) is;

(a) that one is male and the other is female (the “gender ground”),

(b) that they are of different civil status (the “civil status ground”),

(c) that one has family status and the other does not or that one has a different family status from the other (the “family status ground”)[.]  

In accordance with the objectives of the Act, the public has a right to access the services of the Revenue Commissioners without being discriminated against on any ground.  Section 5(1) addresses this right:

A person shall not discriminate in the disposing of goods to the public generally or to a section of the public, or in providing a service, whether the disposal or provision is for a consideration or otherwise and whether the service can be availed of only by a section of the public.

My task here is to consider the complainant’s case that, because he is a man who was separated and the father of a child, he was treated less favourably that a woman, a married person and a person who has no children. 

Section 38A(1) of the Act provides that, in the first instance, there is an onus on the person making a complaint to set out the facts that lead to a presumption that discrimination has occurred:

(1) Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a person from which it may be presumed that prohibited conduct has occurred in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.

If I find that the facts show that discrimination is the likely cause of the failure to grant the complainant the tax credit, then the burden of proving that discrimination has not occurred transfers to Revenue.  In my consideration of the facts, I have identified that the cause of the complainant’s sense of being treated unfairly lies in an interpretation of the law that underpins the entitlement to the tax credit.

Section 465(1)(b) of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997

The complainant argues that, in their decision in 2024 not to grant him the ICC, Revenue did not apply the provisions of s.465(1)(b) of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997.  He claims his and his wife’s sworn affidavits that affirmed that B lives with him proved that he was entitled to the credit.  I have now had an opportunity to examine s.465 and particularly the wording at subsection (1):

Where a claimant proves that he or she has living at any time during a year of assessment any child…

I am satisfied that this is not a requirement to prove that a child is living with a claimant, but, to prove that a claimant has a living child, that is, that the child is alive during the year of assessment.  The key conditions attached to a claimant who satisfies this first requirement are in subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b):

(1)(a) the requirement to prove that the child is under 16 and permanently incapacitated; or,

(1)(b) the requirement to prove that the child is over 16 and permanently incapacitated. 

The phrasing at s.465(1) is not ordinary and requires careful reading.  Unfortunately, the phrase is repeated on the ICC2 form, a copy of which was signed by B’s doctor on April 2nd 2024, leading the complainant to the mistaken belief that the doctor provided confirmation that B lives with him.  It was not unreasonable for the complainant to maintain this belief because, in August 2024, a Revenue official asked him to contact his wife to ask her for written confirmation that B was living with him.  I am satisfied now that this was in the context of seeking to establish who was responsible for paying for B’s maintenance.

I regret to say that the correct meaning of s.465(1) wasn’t apparent to me at the hearing of this complaint; however, the provision is clear that a claimant is not required to prove that their child resides with them.  I am satisfied that I have reached the correct conclusion on this point because the ICC1 form asks the applicant to fill in his or her address and the address of the child, if it is different from the address of the parent.  It is apparent therefore, that a parent who is not living with their incapacitated child may be entitled to claim the tax credit.

For the complainant, the relevant subsection is (1)(b), the requirement to prove that B is over the age of 16 and permanently incapacitated.

The next important provisions are at subsection (7):

Where for any year of assessment 2 or more individuals are or would but for this subsection be entitled under this section to relief in respect of the same child, the following provisions shall apply:

(a) only one deduction under this section shall be allowed in respect of the child;

(b) where the child is maintained by one parent only, that parent only shall be entitled to claim such deduction;

(c) where the child is maintained jointly by both parents, each parent shall be entitled to claim such part of such deduction as is proportionate to the amount expended by him or her on the maintenance of the child;

(d) in ascertaining for the purposes of this subsection whether a parent maintains a child and, if so, to what extent, any payment made by the parent for or towards the maintenance of the child which the parent is entitled to deduct in computing his or her total income for the purposes of the Income Tax Acts shall be deemed not to be a payment for or towards the maintenance of the child.

On April 3rd 2024, the complainant sent a completed form ICC1 form to Revenue.  On the form, he ticked a box to indicate “No” in response to the question, “Is any other person also maintaining this child?”  On April 9th 2024, Revenue informed the complainant that he could not claim the ICC because it was already being claimed in full by his wife.  While this was clearly problematic for the complainant, subsection (7)(a) means that if the credit is claimed by one parent, it cannot be granted to the other. 

I note the provision at subsection (7)(c) above which allows for both parents to claim a partial credit, depending on the extent to which they each contribute to the maintenance of the child.  When the Revenue official wrote to the complainant on November 21st to ask him to send correspondence from him and his ex-wife “in regards to how much each person is contributing” to the care of B, this was in accordance with the provision for the sharing of the credit at subsection (7)(c).

The Basic Facts

The complainant commenced the process of making a claim for ICC on February 8th 2024.  When he completed the relevant application forms in April that year, his application was refused because his wife was claiming the credit.  In November 2024, when he submitted his and his wife’s sworn affidavits confirming that B lived with him, his application was refused because he was not in receipt of child benefit for B and his wife was claiming the credit.  He appealed this decision.  On February 12th 2025, the assistant principal officer who considered his appeal decided that the evidence he had submitted was adequate to prove his eligibility for the tax credit.

Findings

The complainant had a mistaken belief that, to be granted the ICC, the substantial legal requirement was proof that his daughter lived with him.  I am satisfied however, that the initial proof required is medical evidence of the incapacity of the child, about which there was no issue. 

When the complainant’s claim for the ICC was denied in April 2024 and again in November, the reason was because it was being claimed by his ex-wife.  In accordance with s.465(7) of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997, the credit can be granted to one parent, or it can be divided between the two, depending on the proportion of the cost of maintenance for which each parent is responsible.

The complainant’s ex-wife was in receipt of child benefit for B, and, as she was claiming the ICC in respect of B, this must have led Revenue to assume that she was, to a full or partial extent, contributing to B’s maintenance.  Although, on August 26th 2024, a Revenue official asked the complainant to contact his ex-wife and to ask her to confirm that B was living with him, difficulties in communicating between the complainant and his ex-wife resulted in a delay resolving this matter before he had to resort to an appeal in December 2024.  I find that nothing discriminatory arises from the request to the complainant from a Revenue official to ask his ex-wife for written confirmation that B was living with him.

It is the complainant’s case that he was not treated equally compared to a woman and that his rights as a single man and as a single parent were not taken seriously until he submitted this complaint to the WRC.  Concerning the allocation of the ICC, the complainant was refused the credit and his ex-wife was granted the credit.  I am satisfied however, that in their discrimination between the complainant and his ex-wife in this regard, Revenue acted in accordance with s.465(7) of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997, which permits the credit to be assigned to one parent or the other.  This discrimination was in accordance with the tax law and was not illegal.

The decision not to grant the complainant the credit (until the successful outcome of his appeal) was based on the fact that his ex-wife was in receipt of child benefit for B and that she was claiming the ICC.  It was reasonable, in my view, for these facts to lead Revenue officials to a conclusion that the complainant’s wife was responsible, in full or in part, for B’s maintenance.

We have no information regarding communications between Revenue and the complainant’s ex-wife concerning the ICC or maintenance for B.  It would not have been appropriate for Revenue to divulge information about the complainant’s ex-wife’s tax affairs in the context of his complaint to the WRC.  Even if it is correct and the complainant’s wife received no correspondence from Revenue on the matter, this is not evidence of discrimination.  Revenue sent him correspondence in response to his application for the tax credit and in the process of directing him on how the credit could have been granted to him.

Relatively early in the exchange of correspondence, on April 18th 2024, a Revenue official advised the complainant that he could amend his previously submitted tax returns and claim the Single Person’s Child Credit.  In this correspondence, the complainant was treated with respect as a single man with a child.  It is my view that, in their dealings with him, Revenue accepted his status as a separated parent and treated him fairly, guiding him where necessary, towards a resolution to his claim. 

I agree with the complainant that the attribution of certain emotions to him by Revenue is distasteful.  Assumptions about the emotional state of a client are subjective and risk causing offence.

Conclusion

I am satisfied that the reason for not granting the ICC to the complainant sooner than February 2025 is explained by the legal requirement for the full credit to be granted to one person only.  It is evident that the reason the complainant was not granted the ICC between April and November 2024 is because it was claimed by his wife.  In the circumstances in which the complainant’s wife was in receipt of child benefit and was claiming the ICC, it was reasonable for Revenue to assume that she was, to some extent, paying towards B’s maintenance.  I am satisfied that the complainant’s claim for the credit may have been granted sooner if he had been able to speak to his wife and to ask her to contact Revenue and to confirm that B lived with him and that he paid in full for her maintenance, but I accept that this wasn’t possible.

As set out by the Labour Court in its decision in Valpeters, to establish that discrimination has occurred, I must find that, in respect of how he was treated when his claim for the ICC was declined, “there was evidence of some weight from which it could be concluded” that the complainant was treated less favourably because he is a single man and the parent of a child.  As all the evidence points to a reason not connected to the complainant’s gender and his status as a single parent, I am satisfied that there is no basis to his complaint of discrimination.

I have concluded that the facts presented by the complainant are insufficient to show that he was discriminated against on the ground of his gender, civil status or family status and I decide therefore, that his complaint is not well founded.

Discrimination, gender, family status, civil status, burden of proof