Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Kieran  Collins

Ocs Management Services Ltd

Representatives

No Appearance by or on behalf of the Complainant. 

Aoife McGookin ,Ibec

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00068561-001

11/01/2025

On 11 January 2025, the Complainant submitted a complaint of unfair dismissal against the Respondent, OCS Management services ltd. He declared that the date of his dismissal was 11 July 2024.

On 14 January 2025, in the context of acknowledging the complaint, the WRC addressed the statutory timeline for the claim.

“The complaint appears to have been presented after the expiration of the statutory timeline of six months from the time of contravention “

The Complainant was permitted to show a window to explain his apparent delay within 14 days. The matter could then be addressed  as a preliminary issue at hearing.

The letter went on to say that:

Otherwise, the matter may be considered to be out of time and will not progress to an Adjudication hearing.

On that same day, the Respondent was placed on notice of the complaint and the potential time limit issue.

On 5 December 2025, both parties were invited to hearing scheduled for 6 February 2026 at 11.30 am in Cork.

Both Parties were invited to submit written submissions no later than fifteen working days prehearing.

In the absence of any documentation from either party, I wrote to both parties on 27 January 2026.

I have incorporated the Copy sent to the Complainant.

Dear Kieran Collins,

I am the Adjudicator assigned to hear your case on February 6 next at 11 am.

To date, I have not received any written submissions in this case, which you will appreciate makes it very difficult for me to prepare for hearing.

I would be grateful if both parties could file submissions and relevant documentary records in support of their case as soon as the time limit of 15 days prehearing has expired.

It is permitted to consult the WRC website for guidance on WRC hearings, witnesses etc.

Please forward your contract of employment and any disciplinary procedures or policy in your possession.

I will also require a statement of your loss and mitigation of that loss by evidence of your efforts to find new work.

The case will commence on the topic of time limits as previously advised by the WRC.

I look forward to meeting the parties at hearing.

Yours sincerely,

Adjudicator

On 28 January 2026, the Respondent notified of a change in Representative.

The Respondent submitted two written submissions; the latter addressed the respondent position on statutory time limits. These were copied to the complainant.

I did not receive anything from the Complainant in response.

On the evening of 5 February 2026, WRC Postponement section contacted me. They had received a call from the Complainant, who was not aware that the hearing was going ahead. He assumed he had been deemed out of time. I asked the postponement section to confirm that the hearing was going ahead as planned the next day and the complainant was invited to attend to explain his case.

On 6 February 2026, I delayed the commencement of the hearing just in case the complainant had any logistical difficulty. There was no appearance by or on behalf of the complainant and no reason provided for his nonappearance at hearing.

I waited for 5 days just in case the complainant submitted a compelling reason for his nonappearance. I have not heard from him.

I completed the hearing in the presence of the Respondent delegation.

My decision follows.

The Respondent is OCS One Complete Solution ltd and not the OCS Management services ltd, which the complainant relied on in his complaint form.

The claim for unfair dismissal was denied.

Ms Mc Gookin gave an overall introduction to the case by written submission.

I will summarise as The Respondent is a facilities management company in cleaning, security, aviation, and catering areas. The Complainant joined the company through TUPE in 2023, and it was common case that he was dismissed on 11 July 2024.

The background to this case arose from a client site complaint on 17 December 2023, where the complainant was accused of aggressive behaviour on site. The complainant was suspended from duty.

An investigation followed on 22 January 2024 which confirmed the allegations.  A Disciplinary meting followed on 2 February 2024.

The outcome of the disciplinary meeting was dismissal with 8 weeks pay in lieu of notice. This outcome was delayed by a parallel grievance by the complainant.

The Complainant lodged an appeal on 18 July 2024. This was heard on 11 September 2024 and the outcome on 16 October 2024 upheld the original decision to dismiss.

Concurrent efforts were made from 6 February 2024 to manage the complainant’s grievance in seeking his restoration at the client site. On July 10, 2024, the Grievance was not upheld.

The Respondent outlined that they were reliant on the defence of the complainants conduct in the workplace as the reason for his dismissal.

Looney and Co ltd v Looney UD 843/1984

O Riordan v Great Southern Hotels UD 1469-2003

The Respondent concluded that the dismissal was substantively and procedurally fair.

The Complainant was dismissed for gross misconduct

The Complainant had not complied with Sheehan Continental Administration Co Ltd on his responsibilities to mitigate his loss.

Preliminary argument: Statutory Time limit.

The Respondent argued that the claim was out of time. The employment ended on dismissal on 11 July 2024. The complainant submitted his complaint to the WRC on 11 January 2025, 6 months and one day later.

The Respondent argued that there is no facility to expand that time limit outside “reasonable cause “

Cementation Skanska v Carroll DWT 033 at the Labour Court as the test for reasonable cause must apply.

Sheehy v Most Reverend James Moriarty UD 1264/2008, no scope to hear a case outside of statutory time limits.

The Respondent sought a decision on the Preliminary issue, reliant on Bus Eireann v SIPTU PTD 048 /2004, where the Court

“Indicated that a preliminary point should be determined separately from other issues arising in a case where it could lead to considerable savings in both time and expense and where the point was a question of pure law where no evidence was needed and where no further information was required “

At hearing, Ms Mc Gookin outlined the background to the complainant’s employment.

She submitted that in the absence of the complainant to move an argument for a reasonable cause extension, the matter could be decided on the preliminary issue of statutory time limits.

Evidence of Eoin Power, Former Contract Manager, oath.

The letter confirming dismissal was emailed to the complainant on 11 July 2024.

The Complainant had admitted to the conduct on which the allegations were framed. He was offered representation but declined. He was provided with all material and minutes and this process concluded in his dismissal on 11 July 2024. Mr Power had no further involvement.

Ms Mc Gookin concluded that the claim fell on statutory time limits and was out of time.

The claim was received at WRC on the evening of 11 January 2025 at 6.32 pm.

The Adjudicator lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.

The Complainant submitted the following details on his complaint form of 11 July 2025.

He commenced work with ISS Facility Services and transferred to the Respondent employment on 15 October 2023. He worked as a supervisor on a 32-hour week.

He submitted that he had been unfairly dismissed on 11 July 2024 and sought the remedy of compensation.

In his brief narrative, he outlined that he had engaged in a disciplinary process, which commenced in January 2024 and concluded in his dismissal, which he found unfair.

It appears that the complainant was based at an Irish Rail site, where an interpersonal conflict occurred.

I was unable to illicit any further details from the Complainant.

I have been requested to reach a decision on whether the complainant was unfairly dismissed on 11 July 2024.?

In reaching my decision, I have considered the complainants complaint form, his call to the WRC on 5 February 2026 and the Respondent submissions. I have also reflected on the sworn evidence of Eoin Power on the date of dismissal.

I have been unable to resolve the legal entity to OCS One Complete Solution ltd, that relied on by the Respondent.

I found the non-attendance of the complainant in his own case to be unreasonable. I can appreciate that to open a case as a lay litigant might seem daunting. There was no indication anywhere that the complainant was ruled out on his case prior to hearing. The converse is the reality.

I was keen to hear both sides, and if necessary, consider an application for an extension of time under reasonable cause as permitted in Section 8 of the Act.

Reasonable cause is an equitable remedy permitted to an Adjudicator when a complainant submits explanations or excuses for not submitting  the complaint within the statutory time limits permitted in a case.

I would like to direct the following to the Complainant. He was invited to hearing and afforded time to make his case. I appreciate he may have had a change of heart in this case.

If that occurred for him, it was open to him to alert the WRC that he did not wish to progress his case and this would have been respected as a withdrawal, notified to the respondent and the case closed.

Instead, I had no alternative but to press on with the hearing on February 6, 2026, as I must reach a decision in a live case. I noted the lengths that the Respondent made to attend the case, inclusive of travel from Dublin.

I will now press on with my findings in the Preliminary Issue.

Preliminary Issue:

I have been requested by the Respondent to decide this case in the absence of the complainant at hearing on a Preliminary Issue of statutory time limits.

My jurisdiction in this case is drawn from section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as amended.

Determination of claims for unfair dismissal.

8.—(1) (a) A claim by an employee against an employer for redress under this Act for unfair dismissal may be referred by the employee to the Director General and, where such a claim is so referred, the Director General shall, subject to section 39 of the Act of 2015, refer the claim to an adjudication officer for adjudication by that officer.

(b) Section 39 of the Act of 2015 shall apply to a claim for redress referred to the Director General under paragraph (a) as it applies to a complaint presented or dispute referred to the Director General under section 41 of that Act, subject to the modification that references, in the said section 39, to a complaint or dispute shall be construed as references to a claim for redress so referred.

(c) An adjudication officer to whom a claim for redress is referred under this section shall—

(i) inquire into the claim,

(ii) give the parties to the claim an opportunity to be heard by the adjudication officer and to present to the adjudication officer any evidence relevant to the claim,

(iii) make a decision in relation to the claim consisting of an award of redress in accordance with section 7 or the dismissal of the claim, and

(iv) give the parties to the claim a copy of that decision in writing.

(1A) A decision of an adjudication officer under subsection (1) consisting of an award of redress in accordance with section 7 shall include a statement of the reasons for the award of such redress and the reasons for the adjudication officer’s deciding not to award other redress under that section.

(1B) Subsection (14) of section 41 of the Act of 2015 applies to a decision of an adjudication officer under subsection (1) as it applies to a decision of an adjudication officer under that section subject to the modification that the words "subsection (1) of section 8 of the Act of 1977" shall be substituted for the words "this section".

(2) A claim for redress under this Act shall be initiated by giving a notice in writing (containing such particulars (if any) as may be specified in regulations under subsection (17) of section 41 of the Act of 2015) to the Director General—

(a) within the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the relevant dismissal, or

(b) within such period not exceeding 12 months from the date of the relevant dismissal as the adjudication officer considers appropriate, in circumstances where the adjudication officer is satisfied that the giving of the notice within the period referred to in paragraph (a) was prevented due to reasonable cause,

and a copy of the notice shall be given by the Director General to the employer concerned as soon as may be after the receipt of the notice by the Director General.

Section 8(1) (b) applies here.

Section 8(2) (a) places an obligation on a complainant to write the particulars of the complaint, within the period of 6 months beginning on the date of dismissal.

I am satisfied on Mr Eoin Powers uncontested evidence that the dismissal occurred on July 11, 2024. I noted that the complainant had not signed the request for receipt of this email. It would have been helpful if he had done so, as certainty is vital in all such documents.

I reviewed the documenatation exhibited surrounding the subsequent appeal and found in the penultimate paragraph of the undated appeal.

This was attributed to July 18, 2024, at hearing.

“…. what then happened between this date and July 11 when I was informed that my actions added up to gross misconduct?”

This matches the date relied on by the Respondent.

I also noted that the complainant received his grievance outcome on July 10, 2024, one day previous to his dismissal. This concluded “we have been unable to find evidence to substantiate your claims “. Subsequent documentation exhibited point to a site ban. I would have liked to know   more about this interface from the complainant.

The WRC recorded receipt of the instant complaint at 6.32 pm on 11 January 2025.

For this claim to fit neatly within the scope of section 8(2) (a) of the Act. It ought to have been submitted on or before January 10, 2025.

At first glance, I do not hold the jurisdiction to make a decision in the claim for statutory unfair dismissal.

A careful consideration of the jurisprudence relied on by the respondent.

1 No application for extension of time was made by the complainant.

2 In UD 1264 / 2008 and RP 1080 /2008, the dismissal had occurred in 2002, and claims were not lodged until 2008. In addition, the claim was considered under Section 15(3) of the Act, the complainant having taken a wrongful dismissal at common law.

Those facts are distinguished in the instant case, where the complainant is one day out of time.

3 The Bus Eireann case exhibited is not at one with the submissions.

4 In Employee v Employer UD 969/2009, the then Vice Chair EAT, Niamh O Kelly considered whether a declaration of redundancy signed by the complainant on 9 April 2009 estopped his latter-day action for relief in unfair dismissal.

“… however, evidence was required by the Tribunal in this particular case so as to allow it to make a more informed and precise determination on the preliminary issue and its application “

The Tribunal found the complainant was estopped and “removes jurisdiction from this Tribunal to hear the matter “.

These are different and distinguishing facts as this case tested the standing of a  purported Compromise Agreement .

In the instant case, the complainant is one day out of time in making his claim to the WRC.

I have some sympathy with this very narrow timeline but must accept that the complainant did not come to hearing to move an application for reasonable cause. It is not a remedy that can be granted in abstentia.

Having heard uncontested evidence on the date of dismissal and cross matching that with the acknowledgement of the receipt of the complaint at 6.32pm on 11 January 2025, I must conclude that the complaint falls for want of jurisdiction.

The complaint arrived too late to fit the provisions of section 8(2) (a) of the Act on the prerequisite statutory time limit of 6 months from the date of the relevant dismissal.

I lack the jurisdiction to take this matter further than this Preliminary point.

I find the claim falls for want of jurisdiction to decide on the substantive case.

Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the unfair dismissal claim consisting of a grant of redress in accordance with section 7 of the 1977 Act.

In the absence of the complainant at hearing and in response to the Respondents Preliminary application on the shortfall of my jurisdiction, I must conclude that I lack the jurisdiction to take this matter further as the complainant has not satisfied the provisions on statutory time limits in Section 8(2) (a) of the Act.

 No application was moved towards the equitable remedy of reasonable cause as provided in Section 8 (2) (b) .

Statutory time limits in claim for unfair dismissal