ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00055848
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Rebecca Bolton | UNIVMEDIA LIMITED |
Representatives | Self-Represented | The Respondent did not attend and was not represented at hearing. |
Complaints:
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 | CA-00068051-001 | 12/12/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 | CA-00068051-002 | 12/12/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973 | CA-00068051-003 | 12/12/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 | CA-00068051-004 | 12/12/2024 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 18/12/2025
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Eileen Campbell
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 and/or Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 - following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaint. In the instant case there was only one party as the Respondent did not attend. The hearing was conducted in person in Lansdowne House.
The Complainant attended the hearing and she presented as a litigant in person.
While the parties are named in the Decision, I will refer to Ms Rebecca Bolton as “the Complainant” and to UNIVMEDIA LIMITED as “the Respondent”.
I explained the procedural changes arising from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Zalewski v. An Adjudication Officer, Ireland and the Attorney General [2021] IESC 24 in April 2021. No application was made that the hearing be heard other than in public. The Complainant agreed to proceed in the knowledge that a decision issuing from the WRC would disclose her identity.
The Complainant gave her evidence on oath.
At the time the adjudication hearing was scheduled to commence, it became apparent that there was no appearance by or on behalf of the Respondent. The Respondent Company is registered on the CRO website. I am satisfied the Respondent had been properly served with notice of the time, date and venue of the adjudication hearing at the address to be found on the CRO website by ordinary post on 18/11/2025 followed by notification by registered post on 25/11/2025. I waited some time to accommodate a late arrival. I then proceeded with the hearing in the absence of the Respondent.
Where I deemed it necessary, I made my own inquiries so as to better understand the facts of the case and in fulfilment of my duties under statute. I can confirm I have fulfilled my obligation to make all relevant inquiries into this complaint.
No issues as to my jurisdiction to hear the complaint were raised at any stage of the proceedings.
The Complainant confirmed at close of hearing that she had received a fair hearing of her complaint.
As part of this process, and in the interests of fairness, I reserved my right to amend the Workplace Relations complaint form so as to include complaints under other statutes which were documented in the Complainant’s submissions, set out in the narrative of her WRC complaint form and which were canvassed at hearing but which had not been specifically particularised under the relevant statutes by this unpresented Complainant.
Background:
These matters came before the Workplace Relations Commission dated 12/12/2024. The cognisable period for this complaint is 13/06/2024 to 12/12/2024. The Complainant alleges unfair dismissal and contraventions by the Respondent of provisions of the above listed statutes in relation to her employment with the Respondent. The aforesaid complaints were referred to me for investigation. A hearing for that purpose was scheduled to take place initially on 07/04/2025.
The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 01/11/2021 and her employment ended by means of summary dismissal on 11/12/2024. The Complainant was paid an annual salary of €32064.00 on a fortnightly basis in the amount of €1233.00 gross approximately for which she worked 40 hours.
The first hearing of this matter was adjourned on 07/04/2025 because I was not satisfied the Respondent was properly on notice of the hearing. On review of documentation furnished by the Complainant post-hearing it came to my attention that the correct legal entity of the Respondent was not documented on the WRC complaint form. Accordingly, correspondence issued to the Complainant on 23/04/2025 as follows:
I write further to the hearing of your complaint on 07/04/2025. I acknowledge receipt of the post hearing submissions by way of documentation from Revenue as requested on the day. However, I note the aforesaid documentation identifies your former employer as UNIVMEDIA LIMITED. When you filed your complaint with the Workplace Relations Commission (hereafter WRC) you documented the name of your former employer as Universal Media. I have searched on the Companies Registration Office on the basis of that which is set out in your Revenue documents, and it appears that the correct name of your former employer is UNIVMEDIA LIMITED Registered number 629293 with a registered address at: 360 North Circular Road Dublin 7 DO7KX36 In order to progress your claim of unfair dismissal, I would be grateful if you could confirm that UNIVMEDIA LIMITED is the correct name of your former employer – the Respondent in this matter. On receipt of such confirmation the name will be amended accordingly. I can confirm this letter will be copied to the Respondent as I am no longer satisfied that proper notice of hearing has been served where the incorrect name was documented on the WRC complaint form and on all documentation that issued thereafter in regard to this matter. There will now be a requirement to set this matter down for hearing again in order to provide the Respondent with the opportunity to attend in line with fair procedures and in accordance with fairness to both parties. Correspondence issued to the Respondent on 16/06/2025 as follows: I write in my capacity as Adjudication Officer at the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC). I have been appointed by the Director General of the WRC to investigate a complaint filed by your former employee Ms Rebecca Bolton. Ms Bolton alleges unfair dismissal arising on her return from maternity leave. I note that Ms Bolton when filing her initial complaint with the WRC cited the name of her employer as Universal Media. I note this is the incorrect title of the legal entity which should be UNIVMEDIA LIMITED Registered number 629293. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that you have properly been served with the notification of hearings up to this time. It was not until after the hearing held on 07/04/2025 that I discovered the Respondent / Employer name was incorrectly cited when I had requested Ms Bolton to provide me with some documentation from Revenue and it was on receipt of those documents that I discovered she had incorrectly named her employer. Accordingly, there will be a requirement to set this matter down for re-hearing in the interests of fair procedures in order to provide you with an opportunity to attend at hearing here in the WRC. The WRC will contact you in due course with notification of a hearing date and in the meantime if you could kindly provide the WRC with your email address by emailing pru@workplacerelations.ie providing the reference number ADJ-00055848, the WRC will forward you all the relevant documentation to date provided by Ms Bolton in support of her claim of unfair dismissal. Having waited for a reasonable period of the time on the day of the second hearing of this matter, namely 18/12/2025 there was no appearance by or on behalf of the Respondent. I am satisfied the Respondent was notified of the date, time and venue of the hearing by correspondence from the WRC to the registered address of the Respondent as set out in the CRO website. There has been no communication from the Respondent to the WRC at any stage since the commencement of these proceedings.
I note a trading status as “normal” on the CRO website as of the date of issue of issue of this decision. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
CA-00068051-001 complaint pursuant to section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 (“the 1977 Act”) Complaint specific detail as set out in WRC complaint form. My boss called me out and asked out of the blue and said “I can’t afford you anymore” and let me go after not paying me properly nor on time and didn’t pay me up to the last day I worked I didn’t take no holidays this year he did not give me notice hasn’t paid my tax since 2024 ignoring my calls and text – I was out on maternity leave when I came back my job was no longer there he cut my pay 278 and then on the last pay day he cut it again without speaking to me first when I asked for a reason he let me go. Overview of written submission I worked at universal media for 3 years and one month my start date was November 1st 2021 my end date was December 11th 2024 I went on maternity leave on the 12th February 2024 and I returned back to work 12th August 2024 - this is when all the problems started I came back to work my job roll was not the same the owner of the company wasn’t getting in touch and the girl that looked after my work while I was out was looking afterwork for me to do my boss rang me here and there saying he had great ideas etc that I was moving on to something new he needed my help with and I was excited to get back to work but then I was ignored by him but I worked the basic job I was handed when I came back .. my salary didn’t go back to normal previous my maternity I was on 1,336 after tax and then 1,058 when I came back and then randomly paid €850 a week after pay day I was calling and texting for my wages as I have a 9 month old baby. I was ignored and then sent €850 and four days later my boss rang and said he could not afford me and let me go. He didn’t pay me even tho pay day was two days after this call it was after work hours. After saying he couldn’t afford me he followed with he had employed two more new sales people also the previous week had brought the office out for a pizza lunch. I never received a payslip even when I requested this I asked for him to put it in writing he was letting me go he has ignored me since but he was able to contact a work member to say he let me go as she then text me to apologise. I went to ask social welfare to help me with pay as I have a baby and they said he had removed me as an employee back in 2023 I was not down for working in 2024. I have had so much trouble with late payments payments been split in two or been cut I will attach payments and messages. The Complainant gave her evidence on affirmation at the first hearing of these matters and on oath at the hearing on 18/12/2025. The Complainant’s job search to which she referred to at hearing in April was confined to seeking a job in which she could work from home full time so that she could look after her baby. In the interim between first and second hearings the Complainant submits had a second baby in August. The Complainant exhibited text message traffic, one sided for the most part, that demonstrated the attempts she had made trying to get her wages and seeking clarification on various amounts from the Respondent.
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Summary of Respondent’s Case:
There was no appearance by or on behalf of the Respondent at the hearing. I note the Respondent has not engaged with the WRC or filed any written submissions or documentation. In the circumstances no evidence has been proffered on behalf of the Respondent. In circumstances where I am satisfied that the Respondent was properly served with notice of the date, time and venue of the adjudication hearing and having waited some time to accommodate a late arrival and where I formally opened and closed the adjudication hearing on 18/12/2025 I will proceed to set out hereunder my findings and conclusions. In the absence of any appearance or submission by the Respondent, I accepted the Complainant’s uncontested sworn evidence as cogent and credible. |
Findings and Conclusions:
At the outset I address the matter of amending the Respondent name in the within case. I am satisfied that all nine items of correspondence in relation to these matters has issued to the correct address of the Respondent company on 16/12/2024; 14/01/2025; 18/02/2025; 27/02/2025; 16/06/2025; 27/08/2025; 29/09/2025; 18/11/2025; and by registered post on 25/11/2025 respectively. None of the aforesaid correspondence has been returned to the WRC. I am unaware of any prejudice the Respondent could suffer and I am satisfied the WRC has gone above and beyond what is fair and reasonable in the efforts expended in notifying the Respondent including sending the notification of hearing by registered letter to the company address. I have carefully considered whether it is legally permissible for me to amend the Respondent name and in this I am guided by the Labour Court in the case of Auto Depot Limited v Vasile Mateiu[UDD1954] wherein the Court held as follows: “In arriving at this conclusion, the Court is also conscious of the High Court Judgment in O’Higgins -v- University College Dublin & Another (2013) 21 MCA wherein Mr Justice Hogan held: “Even if the wrong party was, in fact, so named, no prejudice whatever was caused by reason of that error (if, indeed, error it be)…. In these circumstances, for this Court to hold that the appeal was rendered void by reason of such a technical error would amount to a grossly disproportionate response and deprive the appellant of the substance of her constitutional right of access to the courts.” Declining jurisdiction in these circumstances would certainly amount to a “grossly disproportionate response” as envisaged in O’Higgins. The Court is further satisfied that this approach is in line with the generally accepted principle that statutory tribunals, such as this Court, should operate with the minimum degree of procedural formality consistent with the requirements of natural justice. On that point the decision of the Supreme Court in Halal Meat Packers (Ballyhaunis) Ltd v Employment Appeals Tribunal [1990] I.L.R.M 293 is relevant. Here Walsh J stated, albeit obiter, as follows: -
Accordingly, the Court considers the erroneous inclusion of ‘Auto Depot Tyres Ltd’ on the WRC complaint form to be no more than a technical error. The Court is fully satisfied that the Respondent’s name can simply be amended on the paperwork to reflect its correct legal title…” I am satisfied that similar circumstances apply in this case and the Respondent name on the complaint form is a technical error which can be amended. On that basis I amend the Respondent name to UNIVMEDIA LIMITED. For completeness, I have taken into account also the fact that the Complainant did not have a copy of her contract of employment and she had been provided with no payslips throughout her employment and such documents would, in normal circumstances, set out the correct name of her employer and would have assisted the Complainant in correctly identifying same. CA-00068051-001 complaint pursuant to section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 (“the 1977 Act”) In making these findings, I have considered the documentation submitted by the Complainant and the uncontested oral evidence adduced at hearing on oath. I have also considered the non-participation by the Respondent in these proceedings notwithstanding the stellar efforts exhausted by the WRC to provide the Respondent with the opportunity to attend. The Relevant Law The 1977 Act at Section 1 in relevant part defines dismissal as follows: “dismissal”, in relation to an employee, means— (a) the termination by his employer of the employee's contract of employment with the employer, whether prior notice of the termination was or was not given to the employee, (b) the termination by the employee of his contract of employment with his employer, whether prior notice of the termination was or was not given to the employer, in circumstances in which, because of the conduct of the employer, the employee was or would have been entitled, or it was or would have been reasonable for the employee, to terminate the contract of employment without giving prior notice of the termination to the employer, “ Section 6 of the 1977 Act states, in relevant part, as follows: 6.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal… (4) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, not to be an unfair dismissal, if it results wholly or mainly from one or more of the following: (a) the capability, competence or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do, (b) the conduct of the employee, (c) the redundancy of the employee, and (d) the employee being unable to work or continue to work in the position which he held without contravention (by him or by his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under any statute or instrument made under statute. It is settled law the burden of proof the burden of proof lies with the Respondent to demonstrate that the dismissal of an employee was fair. In circumstances where no submissions were filed by the Respondent and no evidence was provided by or on behalf of the Respondent the only legal conclusion I can come to is that the Respondent has failed to meet the burden of proof in the absence of any effort by the Respondent to justify or explain the reasons for dismissal which leads to a finding that the dismissal is deemed substantively unfair. There was no appearance by or on behalf of the Respondent at the hearing and no evidence was proffered in discharge of the burden/onus of proof on the Respondent to show that the dismissal was not unfair. Furthermore, the Complainant gave uncontested testimony of the circumstances of her dismissal. There was no process to outline the grounds of her dismissal other than the phone call which resulted in her immediate dismissal. There was no opportunity for the Complainant to understand the reasons for her dismissal nor any opportunity to appeal the decision. To say that the dismissal was procedurally unfair would be an understatement. I find the Respondent failed to employ even the most rudimentary modicum of fair procedures. I am cognisant of the case of Waterford Health Park Pharmacy ltd t/a Stratus Healthcare v Aoife Foley UDD [2025] 36 ELR 117 wherein it was found as follows: “ …. A key fact in this case, and one which has been conceded by the respondent, is that there was not a scintilla of procedural fairness in the manner in which the claimant was dismissed from her employment.” [emphasis added] On the evidence before me and for the reasons set out above I find that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed within the meaning of the Acts. Redress In terms of remedy in accordance with the provisions of section 7(1) of the Acts I am obliged to determine which of the three forms of redress open to me is most appropriate having regard to the circumstances of this case. The Complainant is seeking compensation and having considered the totality of the circumstances I take the view that compensation is the appropriate redress in this case. In awarding compensation, I am obliged to award a “just and equitable” amount of compensation in the full circumstances of the case. Section 7 of the Acts, in its relevant parts, provides: (1) Where an employee is dismissed and the dismissal is an unfair dismissal, the employee shall be entitled to redress consisting of whichever of the following the adjudication officer or the Labour Court, as the case may be, considers appropriate having regard to all the circumstances: …. (c) (i) if the employee incurred any financial loss attributable to the dismissal, payment to him by the employer of such compensation in respect of the loss (not exceeding in amount 104 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of this Act) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances, or (ii) if the employee incurred no such financial loss, payment to the employee by the employer of such compensation (if any, but not exceeding in amount 4 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated as aforesaid) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances, and the reference in the foregoing paragraphs to an employer shall be construed, in a case where the ownership of the business of the employer changes after the dismissal, as references to the person who, by virtue of the change, becomes entitled to such ownership. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining the amount of compensation payable under that subsection regard shall be had to— (a) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that subsection was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employer, (b) the extent (if any) to which the said financial loss was attributable to an action, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employee, (c) the measures (if any) adopted by the employee or, as the case may be, his failure to adopt measures, to mitigate the loss aforesaid, [(d) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the procedure referred to in subsection (1) of section 14 of this Act or with the provisions of any code of practice relating to procedures regarding dismissal approved of by the Minister, (e) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the said section 14, and (f) the extent (if any) to which the conduct of the employee (whether by act or omission) contributed to the dismissal. (2A) In calculating financial loss for the purposes of subsection (1), payments to the employee— (a) under the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005 in respect of any period following the dismissal concerned, or (b) under the Income Tax Acts arising by reason of the dismissal, shall be disregarded. …. (3) In this section— “financial loss”, in relation to the dismissal of an employee, includes any actual loss and any actual loss and any estimated prospective loss of income attributable to the dismissal and the value of any loss or diminution, attributable to the dismissal, of the rights of the employee under the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967 to [2014], or in relation to superannuation; “remuneration” includes allowances pay and benefits in lieu of or in addition to pay. In calculating the level of compensation, I take into consideration the following. I take into account section 7 (2) (b) and (f) and I find the Complainant made no contribution to the termination of her employment. I take into consideration section 7(2)(a) and I find the Respondent acted unreasonably in the summary dismissal of the Complainant. I find the manner of the dismissal of the Complainant which was undertaken in what can only be described as a procedural vacuum without any regard whatsoever to fair procedures as I take into consideration section 7(2)(b) and (f). I take into consideration the efforts of the Complainant to mitigate her losses as I am required to do by section 7(2)(c) of the Act The decision of Coad v Eurobase [UD1138/2013] outlines the duty to mitigate loss under the Act where the Tribunal noted: “In calculating the level of compensation, the Tribunal took into consideration the efforts of the claimant to mitigate his losses and finds that these efforts do not meet the standard as set out by the Tribunal is Sheehan v Continental Administration Co. Ltd. (UD858/1999) that a claimant who finds himself out of work should employ a reasonable amount of time each weekday in seeking work. “It is not enough to inform agencies that you are available for work nor merely to post an application to various companies seeking work…the time that a claimant finds on his hands is not his own, unless he chooses it to be, but rather to be profitably employed in seeking to mitigate his loss.” The position in Coad clearly sets out the obligation of complainants to mitigate their loss. I note the Complainant at hearing submits that her job search was confined solely to positions in which she could work from home due to childcare obligations. I find her endeavours at seeking employment were significantly restricted by confining herself to seeking only full-time working from home positions. I note such positions are a scarce commodity. I note she sought to replicate her previous position but the law requires that a complainant make reasonable efforts including considering a broad range of roles and working patterns. While I fully understand the Complainant has childcare responsibilities and her personal preference is to work from home on a full-time basis it is well established that personal circumstances of this nature do not negate or lessen the statutory obligation to secure suitable alternative employment in order to mitigate loss. I find the Complainant has failed to produce credible evidence to me that she has made sufficiently rigorous efforts attempts to mitigate her loss for the reasons set out above. Accordingly, an award of compensation must be reduced to reflect this. Taking all of the factors set out above into account, I award redress of €7,398.00 as just and equitable compensation for the unfair dismissal. As this is compensation for loss of remuneration arising from the Complainant’s unfair dismissal it is subject to taxation in the normal way. CA-00068051-002 complaint pursuant to section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 When considering and determining on the Respondent’s failure to pay accrued annual leave to the Complainant on the termination of her employment I am guided by the Superior Courts where it has been held that statutory adjudicative bodies should not adopt a more stringent procedural approach than that adopted in ordinary litigation. I note in particular in the case of County Louth VEC v.Equality Tribunal [2009 IEHC 370] where the High Court held as follows: “If it is permissible in court proceedings to amend pleadings where the justice of the case requires it, then, a fortiori, it should also be permissible to amend a claim as set out in a form such as an originating document before a statutory tribunal, so long as the general nature of the complaint remains the same.” I am satisfied if a fact is referred to in the written submissions which correlates with a cause of action not selected on the complaint form that the Respondent has been afforded the opportunity to deal with this matter. I am satisfied it was clearly set out in the Complainant’s WRC complaint form. I am satisfied there is no prejudice served upon the Respondent. I determine this complaint is properly before me as the narrative is clearly set out in the Complainant’s WRC complaint form. I am satisfied that the Respondent is on notice of these matters in circumstances where the matters complained of were already raised in the narrative of the claim form. I am satisfied the Respondent suffers no prejudice on the basis the fact is clearly referred to in the written WRC complaint form and correlates with a cause of action albeit not selected on the complaint form. For the reasons set out above, as the Workplace Relations complaint form is not a statutory form, I deem it appropriate in the interests of fairness to add a complaint pursuant to section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991. The Relevant Law Section 1 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 provides the following definition of wages: "wages", in relation to an employee, means any sums payable to the employee by the employer in connection with his employment, including— (a) any fee, bonus or commission, or any holiday, sick or maternity pay, or any other emolument, referable to his employment, whether payable under his contract of employment or otherwise, and (b) any sum payable to the employee upon the termination by the employer of his contract of employment without his having given to the employee the appropriate prior notice of the termination, being a sum paid in lieu of the giving of such notice: Regulation of certain deductions made and payments received by employers. 5.—(1) An employer shall not make a deduction from the wages of an employee (or receive any payment from an employee) unless— (a) the deduction (or payment) is required or authorised to be made by virtue of any statute or any instrument made under statute, (b) the deduction (or payment) is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a term of the employee's contract of employment included in the contract before, and in force at the time of, the deduction or payment, or (c) in the case of a deduction, the employee has given his prior consent in writing to it. Section 5(6) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 address the circumstances in which wages which are properly payable are not paid: (6) Where— (a) the total amount of any wages that are paid on any occasion by an employer to an employee is less than the total amount of wages that is properly payable by him to the employee on that occasion (after making any deductions therefrom that fall to be made and are in accordance with this Act), or (b) none of the wages that are properly payable to an employee by an employer on any occasion (after making any such deductions as aforesaid) are paid to the employee, then, except in so far as the deficiency or non-payment is attributable to an error of computation, the amount of the deficiency or non-payment shall be treated as a deduction made by the employer from the wages of the employee on the occasion. In the case of Marek Balans v. Tesco Ireland Limited [2020] IEHC 55 the High Court made it clear that the WRC, when considering a complaint under the 1991 Act, must first establish the wages which were properly payable to the employee on the occasion before considering whether a deduction had been made. If it is established that a deduction within the meaning of the Act had been made, the WRC would then consider whether that deduction was lawful. Therefore, the question to be decided is whether the wages claimed by the Complainant were properly payable. The Relevant Facts The uncontroverted evidence of the Complainant on oath is that she did not take any annual leave in 2024. I note the Complainant was on maternity leave from 12 February 2024 until 12 August 2024. The Complainant would have accrued annual leave during her maternity leave. The Complainant’s statutory entitlement for 2024 would have been 20 days. The Complainant submits she did not receive payment for her outstanding annual leave on the termination of her employment. It is common case an employer is statutorily compelled to discharge all untaken and accrued annual leave on the termination of employment. In the absence of any evidence from the Respondent I can only conclude the Complainant has accrued 19 days of statutory annual leave for which she should have been paid on the termination of her employment. I am satisfied the monies owing are properly payable to the Complainant.
6. (1) A decision of an adjudication officer under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, in relation to a complaint of a contravention of section 4C or 5 as respects a deduction made by an employer from the wages or tips or gratuities of an employee or the receipt from an employee by an employer of a payment, that the complaint is, in whole or in part, well founded as respects the deduction or payment shall include a direction to the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount (if any) as he considers reasonable in the circumstances not exceeding—
(a) the net amount of the wages, or tip or gratuity as the case may be (after the making of any lawful deduction therefrom) that—
(i) in case the complaint related to a deduction, would have been paid to the employee in respect of the week immediately preceding the date of the deduction if the deduction had not been made, or
(ii) in case the complaint related to a payment, were paid to the employee in respect of the week immediately preceding the date of payment,
or
(b) if the amount of the deduction or payment is greater than the amount referred to in paragraph
(a), twice the former amount.
For the reasons set out above I decide this complaint is well-founded. I direct the Respondent to pay to the Complainant the amount of €2342.70 gross within 42 days from the date of this decision.
The Complainant outlined that the Respondent continued to deduct her maternity benefit from her wages upon her return to work and she made reference to a further deduction of €200 in her final pay. No payslips were provided to the Complainant during her employment which makes it impossible to ascertain the reasons for these deductions and in the absence of documentary evidence I am unable to determine on same.
There were no payslips opened to the hearing. It may be that the Respondent had not deducted the total amount of maternity benefit during the Complainant’s maternity leave but as he chose not to attend the hearing I am unable to ascertain the facts from his perspective. I find I am unable to determine on this element of the Complainant’s complaint due to the opaqueness of the evidence as presented and the paucity of supporting documentation in the absence of payslips.
CA-00068051-003 complaint pursuant to section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973 When considering and determining on the Respondent’s failure to pay notice to the Complainant I am guided by the Superior Courts where it has been held that statutory adjudicative bodies should not adopt a more stringent procedural approach than that adopted in ordinary litigation. I note in particular in the case of County Louth VEC v. Equality Tribunal [2009 IEHC 370] where the High Court held as follows: “If it is permissible in court proceedings to amend pleadings where the justice of the case requires it, then, a fortiori, it should also be permissible to amend a claim as set out in a form such as an originating document before a statutory tribunal, so long as the general nature of the complaint remains the same.” I am satisfied if a fact is referred to in the written submissions which correlates with a cause of action not selected on the complaint form that the Respondent has been afforded the opportunity to deal with this matter. I am satisfied it was clearly set out in the Complainant’s WRC complaint form. I am satisfied there is no prejudice served upon the Respondent. I determine this complaint is properly before me as the narrative is clearly set out in the Complainant’s WRC complaint form. I am satisfied that the Respondent is on notice of these matters in circumstances where the matters complained of were already raised in the narrative of the claim form. I am satisfied the Respondent suffers no prejudice on the basis the fact is clearly referred to in the written WRC complaint form and correlates with a cause of action albeit not selected on the complaint form. For the reasons set out above, as the Workplace Relations complaint form is not a statutory form, I deem it appropriate in the interests of fairness to add a complaint under Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973. Section 4 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973 (the “1973 Act”) sets out the minimum notice period as follows: “(1) An employer shall, in order to terminate the contract of employment of an employee who has been in his continuous service for a period of thirteen weeks or more, give to that employee a minimum period of notice calculated in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section. (2) The minimum notice to be given by an employer to terminate the contract of employment of his employee shall be (a) (c) (d) (e) not relevant (b) if the employee has been in the continuous service of his employer for two years or more, but less than five years, two weeks, I find the complaint made pursuant to the 1973 Act to be well-founded arsing out of the failure of the employer to provide notice on termination of the contract. I direct the Respondent to pay to the Complainant €1,233.00 gross within 42 days from the date of this decision. CA-00068051-004complaint of a contravention of section 5 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 (“the 1994 Act”) The Complainant has alleged that the Respondent failed to issue an updated contract of employment following an amendment to a core contractual term. The Relevant Law 5.—(1) Subject to subsection (2), whenever a change is made or occurs in any of the particulars of the statement furnished by an employer under section 3, 4 or 6, the employer shall notify the employee in writing of the nature and date of the change as soon as may be thereafter, but not later than— (a) the day on which the change takes effect, or (b) where the change is consequent on the employee being required to work outside the State for a period of more than 1 month, the time of the employee’s departure. The uncontroverted evidence of the Complainant is that her salary was increased in October 2023 from 28k to 32k and she was not notified in writing of this change to a core contractual term. Having regard to the foregoing, I find that there has been a subsisting contravention of the legislation and the complaint is deemed to be well-founded. Accordingly, I order the Respondent to pay to the Complainant compensation in the amount of €1233.00 which I consider just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances. For the avoidance of doubt, this award is for the infringement of the Complainant’s statutory rights and is not subject to deductions for PAYE, PRSI or USC. Payment of compensation ordered should be made within 42 days of the date of this decision. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaints in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the unfair dismissal claim consisting of a grant of redress in accordance with section 7 of the 1977 Act.
CA-00068051-001 complaint pursuant to section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 For the reasons set out above I decide this complaint is well-founded. Accordingly, I award redress of €7,398.00 as just and equitable compensation for the unfair dismissal. As this is compensation for loss of remuneration arising from the Complainant’s unfair dismissal it is subject to taxation in the normal way. CA-00068051-002 complaint pursuant to section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 For the reasons set out above I decide this complaint is well-founded. Accordingly. I direct the Respondent to pay to the Complainant the amount of €2342.70 gross within 42 days from the date of this decision.
CA-00068051-003 complaint pursuant to section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973 For the reasons set out above I decide this complaint is well-founded. Accordingly, I direct the Respondent to pay to the Complainant €1,233.00 gross within 42 days from the date of this decision. CA-00068051-004 complaint of a contravention of section 5 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 For the reasons set out above I decide this complaint is well-founded. Accordingly, I order the Respondent to pay to the Complainant compensation in the amount of €1233.00 which I consider just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances. For the avoidance of doubt, this award is for the infringement of the Complainant’s statutory rights and is not subject to deductions for PAYE, PRSI or USC. Payment of compensation ordered should be made within 42 days of the date of this decision. |
Dated: 16/02/2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Eileen Campbell
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