UDD2633

PARTIES:

DIVISION:

SUBJECT:

Appeal of Adjudication Officer Decision No.: ADJ-00030290 (CA-00040519-005)

BACKGROUND:

The Worker appealed the Decision of the Adjudication Officerto the Labour Court on 29 July 2021 in accordance with Section 8A of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 to 2015. A Labour Court hearing took place on 16 June 2026.

The following is the Decision of the Court:-

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DECISION:

1 Background

This is an appeal by Mr Padraic Hanley (the Complainant) against Adjudication Officer’s Decision ADJ-00030290 CA-00040519-005, given under the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 to 2015 (the Acts), in a claim against PBR Restaurants Ltd T/A Fish Shack Café (the Respondent) that he was unfairly dismissed. The Adjudication Officer did not uphold his complaint. The case was heard by the Labour Court over three sittings between June 2022 and May 2023, and the Court issued its decision on 26 June 2023. The Labour Court decision was appealed on a point of law to the High Court. The judgment of Bolger J. was delivered on 19 November 2024 and at paragraph 32 held: “The Labour Court fell into errors of law as set out above. I therefore set aside the determination of the Labour Court and remit the matter to the Labour Court for a rehearing of the appellant’s appeal from the WRC.”

The perfected Order from the High Court was provided to the Court on 17 October 2025. By email of 23 October 2025, the parties were informed that they had until 28 November 2025 to make updated submissions if they wished. An updated submission was received from the Complainant’s representative on or before that date. By email of 31 October 2025, the parties were advised of hearing dates of 18 and 19 February 2026.

On 27 January 2026, the Court emailed the Respondent’s representative, Peninsula, advising that no updated submission had been received and requesting confirmation as to whether it was their intention to provide updated submissions. Mr Hegarty from Peninsula, on behalf of the Respondent, confirmed by phone call on 28 January 2026 to the Court Secretary that they would be relying on their original submission of 21 October 2021.

On 17 February 2026, the Court received an urgent request for a postponement from Peninsula in respect of the case scheduled for 18 and 19 February 2026, on the basis that the official assigned to the case had commenced certified sick leave that day. A copy of the medical certificate was provided to the Court. The Court granted the postponement. The Complainant’s representative registered an objection to the postponement being granted.

On 23 February 2026, the Court notified the parties of new hearing dates of 16 and 17 June 2026. In the letter to Mr Hegarty of Peninsula, the Court stated that no further postponements would be granted to them in respect of this appeal.

On 22 April 2026, the Court received an application for a postponement from Peninsula, citing the fact that Mr Hegarty had to attend a three-day WRC hearing in Donegal from 15 to 17 June 2026, and providing supporting documentation. However, the consent of the other side was not sought, as required under Labour Court rules. The Court responded on 22 April 2026 advising that the consent of the other party should be sought. The Court waited for a period and, having received no indication as to whether consent had been sought or granted, and noting that the notification of the WRC hearing had issued on 15 April 2026, two months after the Court had notified the parties of the dates for the Labour Court hearing, refused the postponement application and notified the parties accordingly.

In line with the Court’s normal practice, the Court wrote to the parties on 9 June 2026 seeking the names of all attendees. No response was received from Peninsula. On the morning of the hearing, the Court Secretary rang

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Peninsula and was advised that the representative was not in the office and was not on his way to the Labour Court hearing.

When the case was called for hearing on 16 June, the Respondent and its representative were not present and did not subsequently arrive. The Complainant was in attendance with his legal representatives and witnesses, and the Court proceeded to hear the appeal.

2 Summary of Complainants submissions

Mr Kinsley BL submitted on behalf of the Complainant that there were two preliminary issues that the Court needed to consider. The first related to his standing as an employee. It was the Complainant’s submission, and the Complainant would give evidence, that although he was a Director of the company since 2008, he was also an employee. The Complainant established a business in August 2008 with two other individuals. He acted as Managing Director while the other members of the Board were employed as an Accountant and a Chef. The Respondent in this case acquired the company on 1 December 2019. At that point, the Complainant resigned as Managing Director, transferred his shares to the Respondent company, and was appointed General Manager.

In March 2020, the restaurants were closed arising from Covid-19, and the Complainant was placed on temporary lay-off.  On 20 August 2020, his employment as General Manager was terminated by way of redundancy. It is the Complainant’s case that his job was not redundant and that he was unfairly dismissed. The Complainant will give evidence that he always considered himself to be an employee, as he received a salary, took holidays and sick leave, and was provided with a laptop and company car.  It was submitted that the Complainant’s position within the Company was contingent upon the direction and authority of the other board members and, as such, was under the thrall of those same members thereby constituting a position of employment.

Mr Kinsley BL opened the following documents to the Court: payslips that were issued prior to and after 1 December 2019, which showed his employment start date as 14 November 2008; a letter from Ms Jane Cathcart & Associates confirming that the Complainant was a 51% shareholder of PBR Restaurants and a director of the company; and an email regarding the examinership scheme from Mr Neil Hughes of Baker Tilly confirming that there were 48 jobs to be saved. He submitted that, taken together, these documents all indicate that the Complainant was an employee and met the test set out in the Karshan case.

 He submitted that in respect of the second preliminary issue, the Complainant made a number of protected disclosures and, even if the Court were to find that he was not an employee prior to 1 December 2019, he is covered by section 6(1) and section 6(2) (ba) of the Act.

The Complainant will give evidence of the protected disclosures, but in the main they relate to improper payments to contractors, health and safety issues, and the impact of the Respondent’s behaviour on the health and safety of other workers. Mr Kinsley BL submitted that the Complainant’s dismissal arose wholly or mainly from these protected disclosures and therefore the 12-month service requirement did not apply in this case. The Complainant brought the protected disclosures to the attention of the Respondent, and it was his reasonable belief that the information disclosed a relevant wrongdoing.

Mr Kinsley BL opened to the Court Aidan & Henrietta McGrath Partnership v Anna Monaghan        PDD 162 , where

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the Court held that there may be more than one underlying cause for the treatment, but the making of the protected disclosure must be identified as an operative cause “in the sense that but for the complainant having committed the protected act he or she would not have suffered the detriment”. He also opened the case of Baranya v Rosderra Meats [2020] IEHC 56, where the High Court made clear that the fact something was a grievance did not exclude it from being a protected disclosure for the purpose of the Act. This was upheld by the Supreme Court, which went on to say that an employee’s complaint regarding health and safety could be considered a protected disclosure.

 It was submitted that, in light of the above, the Complainant’s dismissal was wholly or mainly as a result of having made those protected disclosures and therefore he did not require 12 months’ service in order to avail of the protection of the Act.

In respect of the substantive issue of dismissal, the Complainant and his three sons were unfairly dismissed by the Company. It was a targeted and calculated move. No other employees were dismissed, or even considered for dismissal, by way of redundancy by the Respondent. Mr Kinsley, in closing, submitted that it was the Complainant’s uncontradicted evidence that he was an employee since 2008 and this was supported by the documents submitted to the Court. It is clear from the uncontradicted evidence of the Complainant that he made a number of protected disclosures and the Respondent’s response to that was to dismiss not just the Complainant but his sons as well. There is a clear causal link between the dismissal and the protected disclosures.

3 Witness evidence for the Complainant.

The Complainant, in his evidence to the Court, stated that he was a longstanding senior manager of PRB Restaurants, formerly Managing Director, reporting to the Board, and that he continued in a senior management position following examinership. He gave the background to the examinership and the arrangement going forward.  He stated that it was agreed to keep all staff on at the Examiner’s request. He was offered a deal to stay in his role, as the new owners, Mr Pardy, Mr Higgins and Mr Buckley, had no experience running restaurants. He was asked to write down the heads of terms for his position going forward and he did so in an email of 3 December 2019 to Mr Colin Pardy. In the email, he proposed that, having reduced his shareholding to zero, he be allowed over time to build his shareholding back up to 50%. He confirmed that he agreed to reduce his wages by €26,000 per annum until such time as they started to expand Fish Shack Café. At that point, he would claw back 50 per cent of the deduction on the opening of a fourth branch and the final tranche on opening the fifth branch. He agreed to be removed from the Board of Directors initially and that he would be reinstated to the Board as Managing Director on 31 March 2020. He outlined a few other issues and suggested that this should be a starting point for their discussions.

No reply was received to this email. On 5 December, the High Court approved the Examiner’s Scheme of Arrangement. It was the Complainant’s evidence that he tried to follow up on his email with Mr Pardy over the following days but, despite promising to call him back, Mr Pardy never did. In the new year, he had a conversation with Mr Pardy and felt that the Board was withdrawing from what he understood had been agreed.

On 3 March 2020, he made his first protected disclosure by email to Mr Pardy, Mr Higgins and Mr Buckley. He

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advised that it had been brought to his attention that Mr Pardy, in conversations with a chef he had brought to the Fish Shack on the pier, was discussing putting the chef in to run the unit and paying him cash in hand. The Complainant pointed out that, if that type of behaviour was uncovered by Revenue, or if an accident should take place involving a member of staff, it would be damaging for the company and the directors, and he would not have any part in paying staff cash in hand. The Complainant stated that his son, who was Operations Manager, was present when the discussion took place and reported it to him as the General Manager. He believed that this was a dangerous practice and contrary to Revenue regulations. He received no response to his email.

By email of 9 March 2020, he submits that he made a second protected disclosure when Mr Pardy rang him and said he wanted to open the Fish Shack on the pier during an orange storm warning and he informed Mr Pardy that it was not safe to open the café during a storm and that he would not be opening it during the storm.  He then raised this issue in response to an email from Mr Ian Higgins. He warned of the dangers of opening the restaurant on the pier during a storm and stated that the only rational policy to ensure that they complied with health and safety requirements would be not to open while a yellow or higher weather warning was in place. He received no response to raising this issue.

A short time later, on 19 March 2020, he made a third protected disclosure when it was brought to his attention that an engineer had been brought in to do some work; however, he was not an RGI gas engineer and therefore should not have been working on gas appliances or pipework. On the day, the engineer could not fix the issue, but he insisted that he was told he would be paid cash in hand. The Complainant, by email of 19 March 2020, brought these matters to the attention of the Respondent and set out that the practice of paying cash with no invoice did not sit well with him. He confirmed that, by law, only registered gas engineers who can certify the work they carry out should be used. He received no response to raising this issue.

The Complainant submitted that his fourth protected disclosure was by email of 21 May 2020, reminding the Respondent of their duty of care to employees and that they should not be emailing staff in the middle of the night.

The Complainant stated that at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic he had to isolate. He took some equipment home so he could work from home. Mr Pardy said it was fine to do that, but Mr Higgins was looking for the company car back. He was asked to draft a skeleton staff roster, which he did.

On 19 March 2020, the Complainant received an email stating that he was laid off due to Covid-19. It was his evidence that he was one of the first people laid off. While the Fish Shack on the pier stayed open during Covid, the other restaurants opened and closed in line with the guidelines. Mr Pardy and Mr Higgins were making the decisions as to who was returning to work during the reopenings. On 21 April 2020, an email issued to all staff asking them to make themselves available to return to work. The Complainant replied confirming his availability but was not given a date to return to work.

On 28 April 2020, he received an email from Mr Pardy advising that they had commissioned a report on the company and that the Directors would like to meet with him to discuss the report. The copy of the report that was provided to him was redacted. The witness stated that, by email of 8 May 2020, he submitted his response to the report. A response was received from the Respondent backtracking on some of the items in the report, and he was

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advised that another firm of accountants had been hired to validate the first report. The Complainant responded on 1 June 2020 but did not receive a reply.

On 17 June 2020, he emailed the Directors requesting information on his return to work and an explanation as to how he was selected for lay-off back in March 2020. On 9 July 2020, he received an email from the Directors asking him to attend a meeting to discuss the business and his role in same. No other details were provided in advance of the meeting. At the meeting on 10 July 2020, he was told his job was at risk of redundancy and asked if he had any proposals to put forward. As he was not aware in advance of the meeting what the purpose of the meeting was, he had nothing prepared and asked for a copy of the Directors’ plan so he could think about it. By the end of the day, it became clear that only he and his three sons were put on notice that their jobs were at risk. On 13 July 2020, he received an email looking to set up a follow-up meeting, even though he had not been provided with a copy of the Directors’ plan.

A follow-up meeting was scheduled for 15 July 2020, even though he had still not been given a copy of the Directors’ plan. At the meeting, he was informed his job was gone. When he asked if he was being offered alternative employment, he was told no. He was informed that a new role of enhanced manager was being created in the Malahide restaurant and he could apply for that. The rate of pay was €28,392 or €14 an hour. A further meeting was planned for 20 July 2020 but never occurred. The Directors tried to deny it had been arranged, but the minutes of the meeting on 15 July 2020 reflected that it had been agreed. On 23 July 2020, he received an email encouraging him to apply for the role that was paying €14 an hour in circumstances where his salary, not taking account of the voluntary reduction, was €97,500.

On 8 August 2020, the witness stated that he emailed the Directors to say he would attend for work the following Monday and they could have a discussion then, as the agreed meeting had not been forthcoming. Later that day, he received an email threatening him with trespass and being reported to the Gardaí if he showed up for work. At the meeting that took place on 12 August 2020, the witness again asked for details of the timeline for redundancy. No details were provided to him. On 19 August 2020, he received a call from another staff member who informed him that a supervisor had told her that the Hanleys were gone from the business. On 20 August 2020, the witness received official notification that he was being made redundant and that he was not entitled to a redundancy payment. The following day, he received a demand for all company possessions to be returned.

It was his evidence that, at the time of dismissal, his salary was €77,500. He had applied for a number of jobs, but the service sector was badly hit by Covid and there were not many jobs advertised. In the summer of 2021, he took up some consultancy work, which he is still engaged in, and earns €450 a week from that work.

 Stephen Hanley witness for the Complainant

Mr S Hanley, in his evidence, stated that in March 2020 he was at the Fish Shack on the east pier, which was closed. There was a gas leak from a gas pipe. He tried but could not get the gas engineers that they usually use. Mr Pardy arranged for a man he knew to come down and have a look. It was Mr Hanley’s evidence that this person smelled of alcohol. He said he could not fix the issue and confirmed that he was not an RGI gas engineer. He stated that Mr Pardy said he was to be paid €200 cash. The witness tried to contact Mr Pardy but could not get through, so he paid

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the engineer €100 so he would leave. He then reported the issue to his line manager, who was Padraic Hanley.

The second issue in March 2020 was the suggestion to put someone working in the Fish Shack on the pier and pay them in cash. He again reported the issue to his line manager, as it was not the way they did business.

The witness stated that his relationship with the new Directors at the start was fine but went downhill after these issues were raised with them. He was getting emails at 11.00pm at home from them and they were making an issue of the fact that he was not responding to late night emails. He had a panic attack and could not engage with the consultants they had appointed to review the company.

 The witness confirmed that the Complainant did consultancy work for his firm since June/July 2021 and was paid €450 a week.

4 Summary of Respondents written submissions

The Respondent did not attend the hearing. However, the Court received two written submissions from the Respondent’s representative, the first on 21 October 2021 and the second on 26 May 2023, The Respondent confirmed to the Court on 28 January 2026 that they were relying on those submissions. The Court took those written submissions into account and has summarised them below.

In those submissions, Peninsula, on behalf of the Respondent, submitted that the Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent as a General Manager on 9 December 2019. On 20 August 2020, his contract of employment was terminated by reason of redundancy following the Covid-19 pandemic. It was the Respondent’s position that the Complainant did not have the reckonable service to avail of the protection of the Unfair Dismissals Act. The decision to dismiss was procedurally fair in all circumstances, and any procedural defects alleged by the Complainant did not serve to imperil his right to a fair hearing.

It was further submitted that, in his role as General Manager, he was responsible for drawing up his own contract of employment. The Respondent submitted that prior to December 2019 the Complainant was a Director of the company and categorised himself as a Class S employee, namely as self-employed during the term of his directorship. The Company entered examinership on 28 August 2019 and exited same on 5 December 2019. From that date, the Complainant was no longer a shareholder and did not sit on the Board of Directors. He became an employee of the Respondent in and around 9 December 2019. On 21 January 2020, the Complainant emailed Mr Ian Higgins with a copy of the standard employee contract, and Mr Higgins replied asking him to fill in the details for each of the Hanley family employees and produce it in draft form, and to also do the same for anyone else who did not have a contract. Mr Higgins informed the Complainant that he too would need a contract and that he should use a common format and prepare one for himself. The Complainant confirmed that he would do it the next day.

On 19 March 2020 the Complainant was placed on temporary lay-off due to Covid-19 Pandemic. On 4 June 2020 McStay Luby Accountants compiled an independent business review report which sets out inter alia “[a] redundancy programme together with optimization of staff rotas should be considered in order to reduce “.

On 9 July 2020 the Complainant was invited to attend a video conference meeting the following day. At that meeting he was informed that his role was at risk of redundancy. A consultation meeting was held with the

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Complainant on 15 July 2020 and a second one on 12 August 2020. On 20 August 2020 the Complainant attended a meeting at which he was informed that his role was being made redundant. His last day of service was 20 August 2020.

The Respondent submitted that s.2(1)(a) requires, except in specified circumstances, an employee to have at least 12 months’ service in order to bring a claim of unfair dismissal. Under the Code of Practice on Determining Employment Status, employed persons who own or control 50% or more of the shareholding of the company, either directly or indirectly, cannot normally be an employee of that company for PRSI purposes under social welfare legislation. They must be classified as self-employed and are liable to pay PRSI at Class S. In support of their position, the Respondent cited Reddy v Hypertrust Limited; however, no citation reference was provided, nor was a copy of the decision provided to the Court. It was the Respondent’s submission that the Complainant lacked the requisite service to succeed in a claim pursuant to s.8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act.

 The Respondent was on notice following the judgment of the High Court and receipt of the Complainant submissions in February 2026 that the issue of protected disclosures was being canvassed by the Complainant but chose not to make a submission in respect of same.

5 Relevant Law

Unfair dismissals Act 1977

Section 2.—(1) [Except in so far as any provision of this Act otherwise provides] this Act shall not apply in relation to any of the following persons:

(a) an employee (other than a person referred to in section 4 of this Act) who is dismissed, who, at the date of his dismissal, had less than one year’s continuous service with the employer who dismissed him […],

Section 6.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal if it results wholly or mainly from one or more of the following:

(a) ………..

(b)…..

[(ba) the employee having made a protected disclosure

Protected disclosures Act 2014

Section 5. (1) For the purposes of this Act “protected disclosure” means, subject to subsection (6) and sections 17 and 18, a disclosure of relevant information (whether before or after the date of the passing of this Act) made by a worker in the manner specified in section 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10. 8 [2014.] Protected Disclosures Act 2014. [No. 14] PT.2 S.5

 (2) For the purposes of this Act information is “relevant information” if—

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 (a) in the reasonable belief of the worker, it tends to show one or more relevant wrongdoings, and (b) it came to the attention of the worker in connection with the worker’s employment.

(3) The following matters are relevant wrongdoings for the purposes of this Act—

 (a) that an offence has been, is being or is likely to be committed,

(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation, other than one arising under the worker’s contract of employment or other contract whereby the worker undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services,

 (c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur,

 (d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered,

(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged,

(f) that an unlawful or otherwise improper use of funds or resources of a public body, or of other public money, has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur,

 (g) that an act or omission by or on behalf of a public body is oppressive, discriminatory or grossly negligent or constitutes gross mismanagement, or

(h) that information tending to show any matter falling within any of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be concealed or destroyed.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (3) it is immaterial whether a relevant wrongdoing occurred, occurs or would occur in the State or elsewhere and whether the law applying to it is that of the State or that of any other country or territory.

(5) A matter is not a relevant wrongdoing if it is a matter which it is the function of the worker or the worker’s employer to detect, investigate or prosecute and does not consist of or involve an act or omission on the part of the employer.

(6) A disclosure of information in respect of which a claim to legal professional privilege could be maintained in legal proceedings is not a protected disclosure if it is made by a person to whom the information was disclosed in the course of obtaining legal advice.

(7) The motivation for making a disclosure is irrelevant to whether or not it is a protected disclosure.

(8) In proceedings involving an issue as to whether a disclosure is a protected disclosure it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that it is.

5 Discussion and Decision

The first thing the Court needs to establish is whether the Complainant has standing to pursue his case under this Act. The Court decided that it would in the first instance consider whether the Complainant had made a protected disclosure as provided for in section 6(2)(ba) of the Act. It was the Complainant’s uncontested evidence that he made four protected disclosures. The Court assessed these disclosures in light of the requirements of section 5 of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014. Section 5(2) states: “For the purposes of this Act information is ‘relevant information’ if—

 (a) in the reasonable belief of the worker, it tends to show one or more relevant wrongdoings, and (b) it

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came to the attention of the worker in connection with the worker’s employment.”

 And noting in particular section 5(8), which states:

“In proceedings involving an issue as to whether a disclosure is a protected disclosure it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that it is.”

Working from that presumption, the uncontested evidence of the Complainant, that it was his reasonable belief that in each incident a wrongdoing was being committed and/or was likely to be committed, and the supporting witness statement, the Court finds as follows:

Protected disclosure 1 related to a proposal to pay a worker cash in hand. Under Revenue regulations, payments to an employee must be paid through payroll with the appropriate deductions made. The Court finds that this falls within section 5(3)(a), that an offence has been, is being, or is likely to be committed. No submission or evidence was put before the Court to prove that this was not a protected disclosure. The Court therefore finds this was a protected disclosure.

Protected disclosure 2 was in respect of being requested to open the Fish Shack on the pier during an orange storm warning and highlighting the danger of doing that. The Court finds that this falls within section 5 (3) (d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered. There was no submission or evidence before the Court to prove that this was not a protected disclosure. The Court therefore finds this was a protected disclosure.

Protected disclosure 3 related to Mr Pardy asking an engineer who was not RGI certified to try to fix a gas leak and the fact that he told the engineer he would be paid in cash. The Court finds that this falls within section 5(3)(d), that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being, or is likely to be endangered, and section 5(3)(a), that an offence has been, is being, or is likely to be committed. No submission or evidence was before the Court to prove that this was not a protected disclosure. The Court therefore finds this was a protected disclosure.

Protected disclosure 4 related to the Respondent’s duty of care to employees and expressing concern about emails being sent late at night to an employee and the expectation that they would be responded to without consideration for the welfare of the employee. The Court finds that this falls within section 5 (3) (d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered. There was no submission or evidence before the Court to prove that this was not a protected disclosure. The Court therefore finds this was a protected disclosure.

Having determined that the Complainant had made protected disclosures within the meaning of section 6(2)(ba) of the Act, the Court is satisfied that the dismissal is deemed to be an unfair dismissal and that the Complainant is entitled to the protection of the Act. In those circumstances, it is unnecessary for the Court to consider whether the Complainant was an employee prior to December 2019.

 The Court then considered the substantive issue noting that the burden of proof lay with the Respondent to demonstrate that the dismissal was not unfair. In their written submission to the Court, it was their position that the Complainant was made redundant.  The submission did not provide any details of how the decision was arrived at to make the Complainant’s position redundant or the process followed to look at other jobs for the Complainant.

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The Court notes the uncontested evidence of the Complainant that the report which was independently carried out was redacted when he got it and he never received a copy of the Director’s plan despite asking for it on a few occasions. Both the Complainant and the witness in their sworn evidence stated that the only people to be made redundant or whose posts were even considered for redundancy were the Complainant and his family members.

Taking the submissions and evidence that were before it, the Court finds that there was no evidence to show that a genuine redundancy situation existed at the time the Complainant’s employment was terminated, and the Court therefore determines that the dismissal was unfair.

The next question for the Court to consider was there a link between the decision to dismiss and the Complainant’s protected disclosures.  

It was the Complainant’s uncontested evidence that he made a number of protected disclosures to the Directors in March 2020 and therefore, when they were making decisions about lay-off, they were aware of that fact. He was one of the first employees to be laid off arising from Covid-19 and, unlike other staff, he was not brought back to work as the industry reopened, or at all, despite indicating his willingness and availability to do so. He was never provided with any details or reasoning as to why he was laid off, or why he was not brought back to work. The Court has already found that there was no evidence before it to show that a genuine redundancy situation existed. Taking all of the above into account, the Court finds that, but for making the protected disclosures, the Complainant’s employment would not have been terminated. While the Respondent may have needed to cut back on staff, the Complainant had vast knowledge of the industry and the evidence before the Court was that the new Directors did not. The Court therefore finds that his dismissal was linked to the protected disclosures he had made some months earlier as no other reason for his dismissal was put to the Court.

 The final issue for the Court to consider was redress. Re-engagement or reinstatement were not viable options taking account of the circumstances of this case and the Court determined that compensation was the appropriate form of redress.

It was the Complainant’s evidence that, at the time of dismissal, his earnings were €97,500; however, he had agreed to a pay reduction, so his actual salary at the time was €77,500. He was dismissed in August 2020 during the Covid epidemic, and the service industry was very hard hit; no jobs were being advertised at that time.

He did reach out to a number of contacts, but there was no work available. In the summer of 2021, he commenced some consultancy work that he is still doing, which pays €450 a week (x52 = €23,400). The Court, in considering the Complainant’s loss, noted that no evidence of any applications for jobs was provided for the period post-July 2021, when he commenced the consultancy work, which paid considerably less than his salary at the time of dismissal. Noting that his monthly salary at that time was €6,458, the Court calculated 11 months at that rate, giving a loss of €71,041 up until July 2021. From that point, the monthly loss is €6,458 - €1,950 = €4,508. As no evidence of mitigation was provided after that point, the Court is only prepared to allow one month’s loss in respect of the difference between his previous monthly salary and his average monthly income as a consultant. Taking both of these figures together, the Court awards compensation of €75,549.

 The appeal succeeds. The decision of the Adjudicator is set aside.

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The Court so decides. 

	Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
	Louise O'Donnell
CC	______________________
27th August 2026	Chairman

NOTE

Enquiries concerning this Decision should be addressed to Ms Ceola Cronin, Court Secretary.

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