Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Brian  Holden

Right Price Carpets & Furniture Centre (Cork) Limited

Representatives

None

David Browne, BDM Boylan Solicitors LLP

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967

CA-00079061-001

01/01/2026

The Complainant claims his position became redundant on 4 July 2025, and that he is entitled to a redundancy payment.  The Respondent disputes that the employment relationship was terminated by reason of redundancy.  It submits that the Complainant resigned his employment on 4 July 2025.

Oral Testimony of the Complainant

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 5 July 2021 as a driver.  At the time of the termination of his employment, he was on a salary of €45,000 per annum and was contracted to work a 40-hour week.  He resides in Laois.  Each morning, he was required to pick up a pre-packed delivery vehicle at the Naas location after it had been transported from the Cork warehouse.  He was then required to make deliveries within the Leinster area.  The Complainant had been facilitated by the Company to start work at 6.30am each morning to avoid traffic on the N7 and other busy routes.  Once the Complainant had completed all deliveries, he was free to finish work for the day.  On occasion he might finish work well before normal finish time.

The Complainant was informed by his manager that his place of work was changing from Naas to Citywest effective from 7 July 2025.  The Complainant submitted that the relocation would result in a substantial increase in his daily commute and give rise to increased financial costs.  The Citywest location would require the Complainant to travel an additional 20 kilometres each morning and evening and, due to the heavy traffic typically experienced on that route at those times, it would increase his commute by up to 30 minutes each way daily.  The Complainant informed his manager that it was a redundancy situation or that further consultation was required.  While he understood the Respondent’s need to centralise distribution, he questioned the rationale for relocating his base, as the lorry being transported from Cork to Citywest would, in any case, travel through Naas. 

The Complainant understood that his manager was liaising with HR in relation to his concerns.  In the interim he refused to sign the letter of relocation.  The Complainant heard nothing from HR.  His manager assured him that he would speak to HR again.  However, his manager told him that the Respondent’s position remained that the Complainant had no option but to move as there would be no work for him in Naas from 7 July 2025.  The Complainant raised his concerns with the Logistics Manager also.  She spoke to the Complainant’s manager, who in turn spoke with the Complainant and told him that HR would be in contact with him.

The Complainant outlined that there was no contact from HR and no attempt made by management to meaningfully engage with him.  He sent an email to Ms Murphy, Director of People, on 4 July 2025 which was his last day of work.  He outlined therein that he was upset he was being made redundant without any meaningful discussion regarding the impact of the relocation.  He contends that the job he was employed to do ceased to exist on 4 July 2025 and therefore he is entitled to a redundancy payment.

In cross examination, it was put to the Complainant that Naas was only his ‘primary’ place of employment as had been provided for in his written Core Terms of Employment.  The Complainant accepted that the document stated ‘primary’ and did not state ‘exclusively’.  The Complainant added that he always worked out of Naas other than spending two weeks at the Carlow location to cover the leave of a colleague.  It was put to the Complainant that it would be the evidence of Ms Murphy that the Respondent had been looking for a suitable distribution centre for many years and prior to the Complainant’s employment.  The Complainant responded he was not aware of the Respondent’s plans in that regard.  The Complainant accepted that other employees transferred from Naas to Citywest and vice versa.  

A letter from Ms Murphy dated 13 May 2025 was opened to the hearing.  The Complainant accepted he was given 8 weeks’ notice of the relocation.  The Complainant accepted that the letter stated that all terms and conditions including start time would remain the same.  The Complainant accepted that Google Maps estimates the journey at 20 minutes, but he added that heavy traffic regularly results in a longer commute. 

The Complainant accepted there was a grievance procedure which provided for informal and formal resolution, and the bypassing of the immediate manager.  It was put to the Complainant that he could have bypassed his manager and spoke to HR directly.  The Complainant added that his manager told him he was speaking to HR on his behalf, and that HR were not for moving.  It was put to the Complainant that it would be Ms Murphy’s evidence that the first time she learned of any issue he had regarding the relocation was the Complainant’s email dated 4 July 2025.  The Complainant stated that his manager advised him that he was engaging with HR and communicating HR’s position, namely that the Complainant had no alternative but to relocate.  The Complainant responded that he was a diligent employee and had no interest in causing any difficulties for the business.

It was put to the Complainant that he received an out of sequence salary increase at the time of the relocation.  The Complainant responded that he was not aware why he had received such an increase but accepted he did receive same on 26 May 2025. 

The Complainant accepted that he was accommodated and given flexibility with respect to his start time.  It was put to the Complainant that had he requested flexibility with respect to the relocation that that would have been afforded to him.  The Complainant reiterated that his manager told him he had to relocate.   

Oral Testimony of Ms Murphy

The witness outlined her role with the Company.  The Complainant’s ‘Core Terms of Employment’ was opened to the hearing.  Ms Murphy drew attention to a provision within the document stating that the Complainant’s ‘primary’ place of employment was Naas.  She outlined that it was well known at the time of the Complainant’s employment that the Respondent was actively searching for a distribution centre in Dublin.  The Citywest location was exactly what the business had been trying to secure for some time and was an excellent well-resourced facility. 

The witness outlined that the Complainant was a highly regarded employee.  He was a diligent and hard-working person.  She submitted that the business would have no difficulty whatever rehiring the Complainant. 

The Complainant was notified of the relocation by letter on 13 May 2025. A copy of this correspondence was opened to the hearing.  This letter was drafted and signed by Ms Murphy.  Attention was drawn to the invitation contained within the correspondence encouraging the Complainant to raise and discuss any concerns he may have had regarding the relocation.

The witness outlined that all affected staff moved to the new location, 3 of whom were drivers.  The witness outlined that an out of sequence salary increase was awarded to affected staff, including the Complainant, as a goodwill gesture in connection with the relocation.

The witness stated that she was unaware of any concerns the Complainant had regarding the relocation and, accordingly, the Respondent expected him to participate in the move scheduled for 7 July 2025. Had the Complainant’s concerns been raised with HR, they would have been addressed. The Complainant had previously been afforded flexibility in his start time to avoid traffic, and the Respondent was willing to offer further flexibility, particularly as he was regarded as a highly valued employee. The witness noted that the Complainant had her contact details and could have contacted HR at any stage during the eight-week relocation notice period.  She further outlined that, although the Complainant had been provided with the company’s grievance procedure, he neither invoked it nor contacted HR before resigning on 4 July 2025.

The witness outlined that she did not see the Complainant’s email of Friday 4 July 2025 until Monday 7 July 2025.  She responded to the Complainant’s email as she hoped to salvage the situation.  Had the Complainant requested to withdraw his resignation, that request would have been accommodated. 

In cross-examination, the witness was asked if she was aware that the Complainant had not signed the relocation form.  The witness responded that she understood in May 2025 that the Complainant had asked his manager if he could take the form home.  She added that she had no difficulty with that and would encourage same.  She stated that she was aware that a member of the HR team had contacted the Complainant’s manager and requested that he ensure the document was signed by the Complainant and subsequently returned to HR for retention on file.  She had heard nothing further in relation to the form.

In closing, Mr Browne, on behalf of the Respondent, submitted that the clear inference to be drawn from the evidence is that the Complainant did not wish to engage with the Respondent and that he did not wish to remain in his employment.  Mr Browne submitted that the Complainant was fully aware of the grievance procedure available to him, including the option of bypassing his line manager where appropriate, yet chose not to avail of that process.  He did not contact HR regarding his concerns until the day he resigned.  Furthermore, he did not avail of an opportunity to engage with HR following Ms Murphy’s email to him on 7 July 2025. Mr Browne further submitted that the Complainant was aware of the strong demand for drivers within the industry and knew that alternative employment would be readily available to him.  He had secured new employment the following week.  The use of the word ‘primary’ in relation to his base location of Naas was in effect a mobility clause. It was not his sole place of work. His place of work is on the road making furniture deliveries throughout the Leinster area.  There would have been no change to that.  The change of location required was reasonable and incidental in the circumstances, and he received a pay increase for any inconvenience arising.  The Respondent acted reasonably at all times and would have happily offered flexibility had same been requested.  The Complainant was offered his job back and that offer remains open to the Complainant.  The Complainant resigned his position on 4 July 2025.  Mr Browne acknowledged that the findings of the Labour Court and WRC in similar cases varies depending on the circumstances of each case.

Relevant Law

The Redundancy Payments Act, 1967 (as amended) (“the Act”) provides at s. 2:

““date of dismissal”, in relation to an employee, means . . . (b) where his contract of employment is terminated without notice, whether by the employer or by the employee, the date on which the termination takes effect . . . . ”

Section 7 of the Act provides:

“(1) An employee, if he is dismissed by his employer by reason of redundancy or is laid off or kept on short-time for the minimum period, shall, subject to this Act, be entitled to the payment of moneys which shall be known (and are in this Act referred to) as redundancy payment provided—

(a) he has been employed for the requisite period, and

(b) he was an employed contributor in employment which was insurable for all benefits under the Social Welfare Acts, 1952 to 1966, immediately before the date of the termination of his employment, or had ceased to be ordinarily employed in employment which was so insurable in the period of four years ending on that date.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if for one or more reasons not related to the employee concerned the dismissal is attributable wholly or mainly to . . .

(b) the fact that the requirements of that business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where he was so employed have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish . . . .” (my emphasis).

Section 15 of the Act provides:

“(1) An employee shall not be entitled to a redundancy payment if —

(a) his employer has offered to renew that employee’s contract of employment or to re-engage him under a new contract of employment,

(b) the provisions of the contract as renewed, or of the new contract, as to the capacity and place in which he would be employed and as to the other terms and conditions of his employment would not differ from the corresponding provisions of the contract in force immediately before the termination of his contract,

(c) the renewal or re-engagement would take effect on or before the date of the termination of his contract, and

(d) he has unreasonably refused the offer.

(2) An employee shall not be entitled to a redundancy payment if —

(a) his employer has made to him in writing an offer to renew the employee’s contract of employment or to re-engage him under a new contract of employment,

(b) the provisions of the contract as renewed, or of the new contract, as to the capacity and place in which he would be employed and as to the other terms and conditions of his employment would differ wholly or in part from the corresponding provisions of his contract in force immediately before the termination of his contract,

(c) the offer constitutes an offer of suitable employment in relation to the employee,

(d) the renewal or re-engagement would take effect not later than four weeks after the date of the termination of his contract, and

(e) he has unreasonably refused the offer . . . . ”

Section 19 of the Act provides:

“(1) Upon the dismissal by reason of redundancy of an employee who is entitled under this Part to redundancy payment, or where by virtue of section 12 an employee becomes entitled to redundancy payment, his employer shall pay to him an amount which is referred to in this Act as the lump sum.

(2) Schedule 3 shall apply in relation to the lump sum . . . . ”

Suitable Employment

Whether a role at a new location constitutes suitable employment has been the subject of numerous claims under the Act.  The Act does not define what constitutes ‘suitable employment’.  As a result, the determination is largely made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific circumstances of each situation and whether the alternative position can reasonably be regarded as suitable. 

The Labour Court in Browne v. Di Simo (RPD1914), when considering the similarly worded provisions of the British legislation, noted the findings of the English Employment Appeal Tribunal in Cambridge & District Co-operative Society Ltd v. Ruse [1993] I.R.L.R. 156 where that Tribunal found that “ . . . the suitability of the employment is an objective matter, whereas the reasonableness of the employee's refusal depends on factors personal to him and is a subjective matter to be considered from the employee's point of view”.

It was noted by the Labour Court in Cosy Tots & Co. Ltd v. Bernadette Conn (RPD219), that a key consideration may not be the actual distance between two workplaces, but rather the time required to travel between them.  This consideration persuaded the Court that the complainant had acted reasonably in concluding that the role offered was not suitable alternative employment (for an alternative finding see Cinders Limited v. Celina Byrn (RPD1811) where the ease of the commute to and from work was a factor in the Court’s finding that the complainant’s refusal to re-locate was unreasonable). 

Findings

This is an appeal under the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967 (as amended) (“the Act”).  Section 7(2)(b) of the Act makes clear that redundancy arises when “the requirements of that business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where he was so employed have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish . . . .”  Section 15(2) of the Act provides that a redundancy payment is not payable in such a scenario if the employer makes an offer of alternative ‘suitable employment’ and the employee unreasonably refuses the offer.

The first issue for consideration is the suitability of the employment offer made in writing by the Respondent to the Complainant on 13 May 2025.  The suitability of the employment at the new location must be considered objectively by reference to the characteristics of the role itself.  Objectively assessed, I am satisfied that the role based at Citywest, is suitable employment within the meaning of s. 15(2) of the Act for the reasons set out below.

The Complainant is a driver employed to make furniture deliveries within Leinster.  It was common case the Complainant travelled from Laois to Naas every morning to collect his delivery truck.  Depending on the location of his last delivery, he could return the vehicle to Naas or could request to bring it home.  He was free to finish work early provided all deliveries had been completed.  The Complainant was informed in May 2025 that he would be required to change his ‘primary’ base location, being the location from which he collected and returned the delivery truck each day, from Naas to Citywest. I accept the Respondent’s submission that Naas location was not suitable for the reasons outlined by Ms Murphy at the hearing and that the relocation to Citywest was necessary.  The change required several staff to relocate to the new distribution centre.  Ms Murphy’s evidence was that the Citywest location was an excellent well-resourced facility.  It was not in dispute that the Complainant’s role as a delivery driver for the Leinster area would remain unchanged following the relocation.  His terms and conditions would also remain the same, other than a salary increase.   Considering all the foregoing, I am satisfied that a reasonable employee would regard this role as suitable employment.

The second issue for consideration is whether, in all the circumstances, the Complainant’s decision to decline the employment at Citywest was reasonable.  The Complainant contends that his refusal of the new location was reasonable whilst the Respondent argues the contrary.  The reasonableness of the Complainant's refusal of employment at Citywest must be assessed subjectively, taking account of the Complainant's personal circumstances and viewing the matter from the Complainant's perspective. 

It was common case the distance between Naas and City West is approximately 20 kilometres.  Both parties agreed that Google Maps estimates a 20-minute journey time.  However, the Complainant outlined that due to traffic congestion on the N7, the journey could take longer.  The latter was not contested by the Respondent.  The Complainant did not regard the new location as suitable due to the increased daily travel time involved, together with the additional travel costs and increased wear and tear on his personal vehicle.

I do not accept the Respondent’s submission that the reference to a “primary” location in the Complainant’s Core Terms of Employment effectively constituted a mobility clause, particularly given the Complainant was employed as a driver.  There was no indication in the Complainant’s Core Terms of Employment that the Naas location was temporary in nature despite Ms Murphy’s evidence that the Respondent was actively trying to source a distribution centre prior to the Complainant’s employment.  Although the Complainant performed his duties across Leinster, Naas remained his assigned base since the commencement of his employment and therefore represented an important element of his contractual working arrangements.  Given all the foregoing, any proposal to change the Complainant’s assigned base should have been preceded by meaningful consultation and engagement.  The Complainant expressed his concern to his line manager regarding the relocation as soon as he was advised of same.  He was told on more than one occasion by his manager that his concerns would be communicated to HR.  The Complainant’s manager was not called to give evidence.  However, it is apparent that there was no consultation with HR regarding the matter, as Ms Murphy confirmed in her sworn evidence she had never been made aware of the Complainant’s concerns regarding the relocation.  However, there was a grievance procedure in place.  The Complainant could have used that procedure to by-pass his manager as is provided for under that procedure.  He accepted in evidence that he had Ms Murphy’s email address.  Yet he waited until the last day of his employment to contact her.  This was unfortunate especially given that the notice of the relocation extended over an 8-week period.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, I accept the Complainant’s evidence that his manager had assured him several times that he was speaking to HR on his behalf, and that the relocation was not for discussion.  The Complainant also raised the matter with the Logistics Manager who assured him she would raise the matter with the Complainant’s manager.  According to the Complainant, his manager did contact him following the Logistic Manager’s intervention and he told the Complainant that HR would be in contact with him.  He received no contact from HR.  When HR were appraised in detail of the Complainant’s concerns on 4 July 2025, Ms Murphy responded that the HR team were not aware of his concerns and so “redundancy was not applicable”.  While Ms Murphy stated that the Company would be delighted if the Complainant would consider joining the team again, she left it to the Complainant to “reach out”.  In my view, this was a missed opportunity to engage meaningfully with the Complainant regarding the relocation, particularly given the Complainant was a highly regarded employee and, by Ms Murphy’s own admission, could likely have been accommodated through greater flexibility in working arrangements. 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, applying a subjective assessment, I find the Complainant’s refusal to relocate was on balance unreasonable in all the circumstances.  While I accept the relocation would increase the Complainant’s daily commute and have financial implications for him, it was equally the case that: (i) the Complainant received a salary increase in connection with the relocation; (ii) he enjoyed significant flexibility regarding his finishing time, provided his deliveries were completed; (iii) all other terms and conditions of his employment remained unchanged; (iv) the Respondent had previously agreed to adjust his start time, and that arrangement was to continue unless the Complainant chose otherwise; and (v) while the additional distance of approximately 20 kilometres between Naas and Citywest is not insignificant, particularly having regard to traffic congestion on the N7, it is not so substantial as to materially alter the nature of the Complainant's commute such as requiring a change to his usual mode of transport.  Finally, I note the Complainant’s evidence that his delivery route frequently required him to travel from Naas towards the Red Cow.   Thus, in many instances the Complainant would have been travelling past Citywest in any event (albeit in the course of his duties).

In conclusion, I am satisfied the employment at Citywest was suitable and it was not reasonable for the Complainant to refuse that employment in all the circumstances.  Accordingly, I find the Complainant resigned his employment on 4 July 2025, and therefore I disallow this appeal under the Act.

For the reasons set out above, I decide the Complainant resigned his employment on 4 July 2025, and therefore I disallow this appeal under the Redundancy Payment Act, 1967 (as amended).

Relocation. Redundancy. Disallowed.