Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Anthony  Forrest

Fineos Corporation Limited

Representatives

Self

Aleksandra Tiilikainen IBEC

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00075351-001

11/09/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Sick Leave Act 2022

CA-00075351-002

11/09/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under  Part 14 Section 103(55M) of the Health Act, 2007

CA-00075351-003

11/09/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 28 of the Safety, Health & Welfare at Work Act, 2005

CA-00075351-004

11/09/2025

The Complainant was employed by the Respondent from 24 June 2024 as a Scrum Master. The Complainant’s gross annual remuneration was €95,000.00. The Complainant resigned on 24 March 2025.

The Complainant initiated the above claims by way of WRC Complaint Form which was received by the WRC on the 11th of September 2025. At the commencement of the hearing on the 11th of August 2026, the Complainant confirmed that claims CA-00075351-002, CA-00075351-003 and CA-00075351-004 were withdrawn and that he was proceeding only with claim CA-00075351-001, a claim alleging discrimination pursuant to Section 77 of the Employment Equality Act 1998 as amended (“The EEA”). 

The parties exchanged written submissions on the substantive issues raised and prior to the hearing the Respondent delivered further submissions raising a preliminary issue to which the Complainant replied. Both parties provided written submissions on the preliminary issue prior to the hearing.

At the hearing the Complainant, who represented himself, was invited to present evidence and submissions on foot of the written submissions already provided in relation to the preliminary issue which he did under affirmation. The Respondent’s representative made oral submissions in reply on foot of the written submissions already provided. It was explained to the parties that the hearing would be limited to the preliminary issue and it was indicated that if the preliminary issue went against the Complainant, then that issue would be the subject matter of a written decision and if the preliminary application made by the Respondent was deemed unsuccessful at this time, then the matter would be relisted for further hearing.

The preliminary issue raised by the Respondent was whether the complaint made complied with the statutory time limits as set out in the EEA. This decision is based on the submissions and evidence available on that issue alone. 

The Complainant made submissions and gave evidence on affirmation limited to the preliminary issue in relation to the time limit in respect of the equality claim.

The claim made arose from allegedly discriminatory conduct directed towards the Complainant by another employee of the Respondent on the 6th of November 2024 and the 5th of December 2024. The Complainant confirmed that for the purposes of the claim, the last act of discrimination upon which he sought to rely was the latter date, the 5th of December 2024. As the claim was not initiated until the 11th of September 2025 the Complainant accepted that this date was beyond the period of six months from the date of the last act of discrimination and he confirmed that he was seeking an extension of time up to and including to the date of initiation of the claim.

As to why the Complainant did not initiate the claim within six months of the 5th of December 2024 the Complainant offered the following reasons:

The Complainant made a formal grievance pursuant to the Respondent’s internal procedures on the 29th of January 2025. The outcome of this grievance was issued on the 24th of February 2025. The Complainant appealed the outcome which was upheld on the 12th of March 2025. The Complainant contended that he wanted to exhaust the internal procedures before making any external claim. The Complainant also made the point that he was on sick leave for the duration of the grievance, but he confirmed that he was medically certified as fit to engage in the grievance procedure (albeit that he was certified unfit for work) and that he fully engaged in the grievance procedure.

The Complainant resigned his employment on the 25th of March 2025 and took up alternative employment. At that time, he had decided to move on with this new employment. When in his new employment the Complainant was on some medication and later had issues with withdrawal from medication and he experienced problems sleeping. However, he was not certified as unfit for work, and he continued to work for his new employer up to the 1st of July 2025 when that employment came to an end. The Complainant was told that he was not being retained in the alternative employment. He was told that the reason for this was that feedback had been received regarding his having to leave work early and mention was also made that he had issues with his previous manager. The Complainant was concerned that he had been the subject of negative commentary regarding his employment with the Respondent. However, he did not think about making a claim against his former employer until the end of July 2025.

The Complainant was prompted to initiate the claim when he experienced what he described as a “re-victimisation” by the employee of the Respondent against whom he had made the internal complaint. This individual accessed his data on a well-known career profile website, and this person did so in such a way as to make it clear who had consulted his posting on this website. The Complainant discovered this on the 29th of July 2025 which was about a month from the date when the time limit for making the claim had expired. The Complainant wrote several emails to the Respondent alleging that the individual who had consulted his posting was “snooping” on him. The Complainant was unsure as to where he stood in relation to his legal rights and as to what laws had been breached by the Respondent or the employee who consulted the website. He initiated a series of contacts with several solicitors to get advice. He experienced a lot of difficulty securing advice because it was the month of August and many of the solicitors he contacted were on vacation. He did however write up several drafts of his WRC Complaint Form during this time, and he referred to copies of these drafts which he had provided in support of his application.

From when the Complainant’s alternative employment ended in early July 2025, he had to focus all his attention on finding another job, securing social welfare entitlements and maintaining his professional development.

Unfortunately, the Complainant had a serious mental health issue on the 18th of August 2025. He presented to his general practitioner who referred him to a psychiatrist. The letter of referral described symptoms of paranoia, fear and anxiety. Pending a consultation with a psychiatrist, the Complainant had only limited access to prescription medication.

The Complainant confirmed that he left the Respondent’s employment to focus on his new employment and the reason he changed his mind and decided to initiate and pursue the present claim was mainly influenced by the discovery of the activity on the career website (as described above) on the 29th of July 2025 which he perceived as a threat which required action.   

In written submissions the Respondent contended as follows:

The Respondent submits that this claim is manifestly out of time. The claim under the Employment Equality Act 1998 was lodged by the Complainant on 11th September 2025. The date of the alleged incident was 5th December 2024, as per the Workplace Relations Complaint form. This is well over 6 months following the date of alleged contravention.   

Section 77 (5) of the EEA was quoted.   

The Respondent would argue that that this claim is manifestly out of time and in any case has not met the bar for ‘’reasonable delay’’ set out in case law. The Complainant has submitted the date of 6th December 2024 as the date in which the recent alleged discrimination has occurred. Please note the actual date of the Christmas party was 5th December 2024.  This was 9 months and 6 days before the complaint was submitted to the Workplace Relations Commission. 

Similarly, the Complainant acknowledges in his submission to the WRC lodged on 21st July 2026 that he lodged his complaint outside of time and states that it was due to summary of different reasons , such as break for the Christmas period, lodging internal grievance and trying to obtain legal representation, etc.

The Respondent would like to draw attention of the Adjudication Officer to the caselaw in Ervia v Healy PWD 2020, and ADJ 19238 Brothers of Charity Services Galway v Kieran OToole EDA 177 where neither ignorance of the law or reliance on internal procedures amount to justifiable reasoning for failure to submit a claim within the relevant period.

In drawing on the Labour Court’s previous adoption of the reasoning in Cementation Skanska v Carroll DWT 0338

It is for the complainant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay.

….

The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon

…. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.

Section 77 of the EEA provides (where relevant) at subsection (5) as follows:

“(5) (a) Subject to paragraph (b), a claim for redress in respect of discrimination or victimisation may not be referred under this section after the end of the period of 6 months from the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation to which the case relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence.

(b) On application by a complainant the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission…may, for reasonable cause, direct that in relation to the complainant paragraph (a) shall have effect as if for the reference to a period of 6 months there were substituted a reference to such period not exceeding 12 months as is specified in the direction; and, where such a direction is given, this Part shall have effect accordingly.”

The interpretation of the phrase “reasonable cause” has been the subject of several decisions of the Labour Court which are binding on the present adjudication process. The classical iteration of the approach to be adopted is that set out by the Labour Court in Cementation Skanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll DWT 38/2003 as follows:

 “It is the Court’s view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the Complainant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the Complainant at the material time. The Complainant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the Complainant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he/she would have initiated the claim in time.”

In Marek Balans (appellant) v Tesco Ireland Limited (respondent) [2020] 31 E.L.R. 125the High Court confirmed that the onus (or burden) of proof of establishing reasonable cause is on the Complainant.

Before an application for an extension can be considered, the circumstances advanced as reasonable cause for the failure to initiate the claim within the time prescribed must have arisen before that time expired. In the present case this must rule out any events which occurred after June 2025 including the events of the 29th of July 2025, the difficulties securing legal advice in August 2025 and the fact that several drafts of the WRC Complaint form were created prior to its delivery on the 11th of September 2025.

Of the issues raised which did arise before the initial six-month limitation period expired, the Complainant’s primary argument is that he was exhausting all internal procedures before making any external claim such as the present claim. Leaving aside the fact that the Complainant’s own evidence indicated that he had decided not to make a claim and to get on with his next employment and that he changed his mind after the six-month time limit had expired, there is very clear Labour Court authority which is binding on me which clarifies that participation in any internal process does not suspend the running of time from the date of the relevant breach. In Dublin City Council v Skelly DWT212 the Labour Court stated:

“This Court has consistently held that a complainant’s decision to delay referring a statutory complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission beyond the six-month time-limit provided for generally in section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act (and in comparable provisions in other individual employment enactments) for the purpose of exhausting an alternative means of resolving their dispute does not constitute reasonable cause for the delay.”

It should be noted that Section 77 (5) has a similar wording to the provision under consideration in the Skelly decision and it is thus a “comparable” provision, and the above statement thus applies to the present case. Accordingly, I must reject this ground as a reasonable cause.

The other issue raised by the Complainant which arose before the expiry of the six-month period was the fact that he was on sick leave during the grievance procedure. However, it was agreed that during this time the Complainant was deemed medically fit to engage in the grievance procedure even though he was unfit for work. The Complainant did not allege, nor did he produce any medical evidence suggesting that he was medically unfit to initiate the present claim during that time or thereafter. He stated in his evidence that when he resigned his employment with the Respondent and started his next job, he continued to work even though he was experiencing some health issues. There was no suggestion or evidence to the effect that the Complainant was ever medically unfit to initiate the proceedings in the initial six-month period. As regards the mental health issues which arose for the Complainant in August 2025 these self-evidently did not arise during the initial six-month period and cannot be relied upon even if there was evidence of medical incapacity to initiate the claim which there was not.

It follows for the above reasons that the Complainant has failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 77 (5) (b) and that he has not discharged the burden of establishing that reasonable grounds existed such as to justify an extension of the time limit imposed by Section 77 (5) (a). Accordingly, the claim is out of time.

CA-00075351-001 - The Complaint is out of time. The Respondent did not discriminate against the Complainant

Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 – Sections 77 (5) – Reasonable Cause - Marek Balans (appellant) v Tesco Ireland Limited (respondent) [2020] 31 E.L.R. 125 -Cementation Skanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll DWT 38/2003 - Internal Grievance Procedure