ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION

Adjudication Reference:  ADJ-00060638

Parties:

Complaint:

Date of Adjudication Hearing:  13/04/2026

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer:  Catherine Byrne

Procedure:

1. In accordance with section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, this complaint was assigned to me by the Director General. I conducted a hearing on April 13th 2026 and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence relevant to the complaint.  The complainant, Mr Conor Holohan, represented himself and was the only witness for his case.  Mr Holohan’s former employer, Macra Na Feirme, was represented by Mr Peter Dunlea of Peninsula Business Services Ireland.  Mr Dunlea was accompanied by Mr Kelvin Hyland and Mr Jack Lundy.  Macra Na Feirme’s chief executive officer, Mr Michael Curran, gave evidence in response to Mr Holohan’s complaint. 
2. While the parties are named in this Decision, from here on, I will refer to Mr Holohan as “the complainant” and to Macra Na Feirme as “the respondent.”

Background:

3. The respondent is a company limited by guarantee, a registered charity that represents the interests of young farmers. The organisation is managed by a president and 12 directors, all of whom are volunteers.
4. In 2024, with the support of sponsorship, funding was secured to recruit a manager for a programme to support positive mental health of farmers. This project, which was given the title, “Make the Moove” (MTM) was initiated by members of the organisation in response to a pattern of suicide in the farming community.  In October 2024, the complainant commenced as programme manager.  His title was later changed to that of programme director.
5. The complainant had a difficult relationship with the president and, six months into his tenure, on March 27th 2025, he submitted a formal complaint regarding what he alleged was her bullying, mistreatment and undermining behaviour. He went absent due to stress on April 7th 2025.  He didn’t return to work but handed in his notice on June 27th and his employment ended two weeks’ later on July 11h.  On the e-complaint form he submitted to the WRC on July 28th, he claimed that sustained mistreatment and a failure of management to act forced him to resign.
6. It is the complainant’s case that his resignation was not a voluntary decision, but that it was “the direct and foreseeable consequence of the cumulative penalisation” to which he claims he was subjected after he submitted his formal complaint about the president. In his submission, he said that he made the decision in the interest of his health and well-being.  He claims therefore, that his constructive dismissal was an act of penalisation.
7. At the opening of the hearing, on behalf of the respondent, Mr Dunlea said that the respondent recognises that the complainant’s complaint of March 27th 2025 was likely a protected act, within the meaning of s.27 of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 (“the 2005 Act”). Referring to the seminal decision of the Labour Court in Paul O’Neill v Toni & Guy Blackrock Limited[1], Mr Dunlea argued that the respondent’s position is that the termination of the complainant’s employment was not “wholly or mainly” connected to this disclosure and that his complaint cannot succeed.

Summary of the Complainant’s Case:

8. In his opening statement at the hearing, the complainant said that his complaint is about how he was treated after he raised a formal complaint. He raised two preliminary issues.  He noted that the respondent accepts that he made a protected act, but that it relies on the “wholly or mainly” test set out in Toni & Guy.  He said that he understands that the respondent must show that the operative cause of its treatment was not related to the fact of him having submitted a formal complaint.  He asked me to examine the respondent’s arguments on causation.
9. Secondly, the complainant referred to his access to his work email account being blocked in June 2025, when he was absent due to illness. In his submission (at paragraph 49) on behalf of the respondent, Mr Dunlea said that the respondent was unaware of the fact that the complainant’s access to his emails was blocked and is unsure why this occurred.  The complainant referred to the response to his data subject access request, in which he was informed that employees’ emails are deleted when they leave the organisation.  He said that this is inconsistent with his access being blocked and he asked me to take this into account. 
10. In his submission, the complainant listed six acts that he claims were retaliatory actions on the part of the respondent, because he made a complaint about the president.
11. He claims that, on April 3rd 2025, the CEO threatened to terminate the MTM programme, which would mean that his job would come to an end.
12. The issue that caused him significant stress was the decision of the CEO to extend his probation by one month.  This occurred six days after he made a complaint about the president.  He complains that he wasn’t informed about any performance deficiencies and he was shocked at the prospect that his probation, which was due to expire on April 6th 2025, would not be passed successfully.

• On June 4th, he received confirmation from the CEO that his probation was extended for two months until August 7th.

1. On June 16th, his access to his work emails was removed.
2. On June 19th, he was informed that his sick pay would be reduced to 50% of his salary.  This was effective from June 7th, which means that he was informed about it retrospectively.
3. He was requested to attend a medical assessment.  He regards this as coercion or intimidation and treatment that was unfair.  He feels that the consultant from Medmark who he met remotely on June 24th was dismissive of his own doctor’s medical diagnosis that he was suffering from work-related stress.
4. In his submission of March 20th 2026, the complainant said that the cumulative effect of these events placed him under significant pressure. He said that his mental health continued to deteriorate and he experienced anxiety, low mood, insomnia and significant distress in relation to his employment situation.  He felt that he couldn’t safely continue in his job and, on June 27th, he resigned, giving two weeks’ notice that his employment would end on July 11th. 
5. The complainant believes that the actions taken by his employer after he made a complaint about the president and, in particular, the extension of his probation, the lack of due process, what he considers as “ongoing pressure during sick leave” and the reduction in his salary were all as a direct consequence of having made a formal complaint. He believes that these actions directly contributed to the deterioration in his mental health and ultimately, led to his resignation.
6. On April 2nd, 2026, the complainant sent a second submission to the WRC in which he set out the legal framework for his complaint of under s.27 of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005. Consistent with the approach established in O’Neill vToni & Guy Blackrock Limited, he referred to the initial burden on a complainant, to establish that they performed a protected act and that they were subsequently subjected to a detriment.  When this is established, the burden shifts to the respondent, to demonstrate that the detriment was wholly attributable to matters unrelated to the protected act and that there was a legitimate, non-retaliatory justification for the impugned actions.

The Protected Act

14. It is the complainant’s position that, in the complaint he sent to the CEO and deputy CEO on March 27th 2025, he made a protected act. His letter sets out what he considered to be a pattern of bullying, undermining, interference and obstruction by the then president and the impact of that behaviour on his ability to do his job and on his health and well-being.  He believes that this written complaint constitutes a complaint about the respondent’s failure to protect his safety and welfare at work, including his psychological welfare.  He claims that, in his complaint, he raised the duty of an employer to manage the workplace in a way that prevents a risk to the mental health and well-being of employees.
15. The complainant expected that his complaint would be handled appropriately and fairly. He was aware that making a complaint carried a professional risk, because his probation was up within a few days of the complaint being submitted.  He felt that he had no reasonable alternative, due to the impact of the situation on his health and on the programme.  He had no cause to anticipate a review of his probation, because no concerns had been expressed by the respondent about his performance.
16. The complainant submits that the temporal proximity between the protected act and the acts of penalisation is compelling evidence of a causal connection. The formal complaint was submitted on March 27th 2025 and the first adverse action, the CEO’s communication that his probation would be extended and the threat to terminate the MTM programme occurred one week later, on April 3rd.   Following this, he claims that each subsequent act of penalisation occurred “in a pattern of escalation.”
17. The complainant said that no performance concerns of any kind were raised before he submitted his formal complaint. He had been doing his job diligently and proactively, including operating a daily helpline, delivering mental health talks across the country and working extended hours.  He claims that the absence of any performance issues before the complaint was submitted, combined with the immediacy and escalation of adverse actions afterwards, gives rise to an inference that the actions were in direct response to the protected act.
18. The complainant referred to the CEO’s remark during their meeting on April 3rd 2025, that the extension of probation was “between you and me.” The complainant claims that this is consistent with an informal, retaliatory decision rather than a structured and justified HR process.  The complainant also recalled that, during the meeting, the CEO indicated that his contract was due for renewal.  He suggests that this context is relevant when considering the handling of the complaint and subsequent decisions.

Constructive Dismissal as Penalisation

19. The complainant’s decision to resign on June 27th 2025 was not taken voluntarily or freely but, he, claims, was “the direct and foreseeable consequence of the cumulative penalisation” to which he had been subjected since he submitted his complaint. He claims that these cumulative effects rendered his continued employment untenable.  His health had deteriorated and he experienced severe anxiety, insomnia, low mood and significant distress.  He submits that his resignation constitutes a dismissal within the meaning of s.27(2)(a) of the 2005 Act and that it forms part of the overall pattern of penalisation.

Data Subject Access Request

20. Following his resignation, on the same day that he submitted this complaint to the WRC, the complainant submitted a data subject access request (DSAR) to the respondent. On August 26th 2025, he was informed that, since the termination of his employment, emails sent to and from his email account were delated.  It is his view that the response to his DSAR request was inadequate and he looked for specific information, including minutes of meetings of the board of directors, records of the investigation of his complaint and communications about him on other employees’ email accounts and central systems.  The complainant’s position is that the respondent’s approach to the DSAR raises serious questions about the preservation of evidence and the credibility of the respondent’s position in these proceedings.

Redress

21. In respect of redress, the complainant is seeking compensation for the reduction in his earnings to 50% from June 7th to 27th and the loss of earnings while he was unemployed for three weeks from the date of his resignation until he started a new job on August 11th. He estimated his loss of earnings to be €5,625. 
22. In addition, he claims redress for non-financial losses, including the impact on his mental health, the cost of counselling and the loss of professional fulfilment. He had intended to continue to work rural community mental health and the loss of his job and the circumstances of his departure have had a lasting impact on his professional identity and his sense of purpose.  In these circumstances, the complainant asked me to make an award that is just and equitable.

Summary of the Respondent’s Case:

23. In his opening submission, Mr Dunlea said that there is little dispute between the parties about the facts. On March 27th 2025, the complainant submitted a complaint about sustained interference, undermining and bullying by the president of the organisation.  It is the respondent’s position that the MTM programme was floundering, and that the difficulties arose because of interpersonal issues between the complainant and the president.  At a meeting in the Botanic Gardens on April 3rd 2025, the CEO told the complainant that his probation was extended.
24. Mr Dunlea said that none of the alleged acts of penalisation occurred because the complainant submitted a complaint about the president. The CEO agreed that there was substantial merit to the complaint and that the conduct of the president was inappropriate.  Mr Dunlea said that the programme was struggling because of the relationship between the president and the complainant and that there was “potential for fault on both sides.”  He said that the complainant’s probation was extended because of difficulties with the programme.  The second extension, on June 4th 2025, was the operational extension of the first extension.
25. Mr Dunlea said that the complainant’s access to his work email account was blocked because he was out sick. While he claims that he was penalised when he was asked to attend for a medical assessment, this is in line with the organisation’s policy on sickness absence.  When the CEO became aware that the complainant was no longer living in Dublin, arrangements were made for the medical assessment to be conducted remotely.  Mr Dunlea said that the respondent has no control over how the assessment was carried out or the conclusions reached by the doctor.

Chronology of Events Leading to the Complainant’s Resignation

26.        Before the complainant started in the role of programme manager in October 2024, the MTM project had been led by volunteers, including the president, who spent a considerable amount of time establishing the programme.  The complainant was also a volunteer in the organisation.  In September 2024, around a month before he commenced in the job, he volunteered at the National Ploughing Championships, where he alleged that the president shouted at him.

27.        In December 2024, the complainant and the president had an informal meeting to discuss an external partnership that the complainant had agreed in relation to the MTM project.  The president’s view was that this partnership should have been approved by the board before the complainant had discussions with the proposed partner.  The complainant’s position is that there is “no governance requirement for such approval.”

28.        In the complaint he submitted to the CEO on March 27th 2025, the complainant alleged that there was an ongoing pattern of “sustained interference, undermining and bullying behaviour” by the president towards him.  He asked for his complaint to be “formally acknowledged, logged and responded to” in line with the organisation’s grievance procedures.  He also requested a number of changes to the corporate governance of the organisation.  On March 28th, the CEO sent an email to the complainant in which he acknowledged his grievance and said that he would contact him the following week.

29. Over the previous weeks, there was an ongoing conflict between the president and the complainant concerning the collection of MTM merchandise from the president’s house. In his submission, Mr Dunlea said that this was having a significant impact on the respondent’s ability to operate and, on April 3rd, the CEO arranged to meet the complainant to discuss the ongoing issues.  At the end of the discussion, the CEO told the complainant that he couldn’t make a decision about whether or not he had passed his probation.  He told him that his probation was extended by one month.  The complainant told the CEO that he felt he was being penalised, but the CEO replied that the decision was in response to the ongoing operational difficulties.  He told the complainant that the programme was suffering because of these difficulties and that it may not be possible to continue.
30. The CEO told the complainant that he was in a difficult situation because his complaint was about the highest elected official in the organisation and that it couldn’t be handled internally. He discussed asking a person he knew from another charity who could conduct the investigation.  When the complainant went out sick on April 7th, communication between him and the CEO was limited.
31. In accordance with the respondent’s sick pay policy, the complainant was paid his full salary for the first eight weeks of his absence, after which, his sick pay was reduced to 50% of salary. Although, as a probationer, the complainant had no entitlement to sick pay, the CEO decided to pay him his sick pay as a goodwill gesture.
32. Because of the effect on the MTM programme of the difficulties between the complainant and the president, the CEO decided to extend his probation. He was given written notice to this effect on April 29th, and again on June 4th, when he hadn’t returned from sick leave.
33. Also on June 4th, the CEO asked the complainant to attend for a medical assessment. The complainant is unhappy about aspects of the communication about this.  He was asked to attend an in-person consultation but, without informing his employer, he had moved from Dublin to Monaghan and it was inconvenient for him to attend a consultation in person.  In the end, a virtual consultation was arranged.  The complainant claims that the occupational health doctor treated him in a dismissive manner; however, the respondent had no involvement in the consultation.
34. While the complainant was absent on sick leave, the CEO instructed that a video he had uploaded to the respondent’s social media account be removed. The reason was because the video depicted a tractor driver dismounting from the vehicle in an unsafe manner.
35. While he was on sick leave, the complainant sought to contact the CEO to discuss the re-constitution of the board of directors. He objected to the selection of the chairperson of the steering committee of the MTM programme during his absence.  This steering committee was being established at the request of the board of directors.
36. While he was absent, during June 2025, the complainant alleges that access to his work email account was denied. Mr Dunlea said that the respondent was unaware that this had occurred and is unsure why access was denied.  

Penalisation under the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005

37. By making a complaint to his employer about any matter related to safety, health or welfare at work, Mr Dunlea submitted that the complainant may have performed a protected act with the meaning of s.27 of the 2005 Act. The question that arises is, was the complainant penalised for doing so?

Causation

38. The decision of the Labour Court in Toni & Guy is the relevant legal authority for both the complainant and the respondent in this case. Mr Dunlea referred to the test of causation which the Court considered and the statement that,

“It is necessary for a claimant to establish that the detriment of which he or she complains was imposed ‘for’ having committed one of the acts protected by subs.3.  Thus, the detriment giving rise to the complaint must have been incurred because of, or in retaliation for, the claimant having committed a protected act.  This suggests that where there is more than one causal factor in the chain of events leading to the detriment complained of, the commission of a protected act must be an operative cause in the sense that ‘but for’ the claimant having committed the protected act, he/she would not have suffered the detriment. This involves a consideration of the motive or reasons which influenced the decision maker in imposing the impugned detriment.”

39. Mr Dunlea also referred to the decision of my colleague adjudicator, Mr Thomas O’Driscoll, in his decision in Ali Izzy v Solarwinds Software Europe DAC[2]. In that case, Mr O’Driscoll referred to the circuit court case of Dougan and Clarke v Lifeline Ambulances Limited[3]in which Mr Justice Comerford held that a dismissal, if it is asserted as a penalisation, must result wholly or mainly from the making of a protected disclosure, as was claimed in that case.  The learned judge continued:

“It is not enough that the protected disclosure contributed to the dismissal or was a factor in the employer making the decision.  It has to meet that fairly heavy test.  The protection will not apply unless the dismissal results wholly or mainly from it…it is not enough that it is just a factor or an influence or…whether it was a consequence of the protected disclosure, that wouldn’t be enough.  It has to result wholly or mainly from that protected disclosure.”

Relying on this authority, Mr O’Driscoll went on to find that he was satisfied that,

“…the statutory test under section 6(2)(ba) is a causation test…it is not sufficient that a protected disclosure was made and that a dismissal later occurred.  The question is whether, on the facts, the making of the disclosure was the operative reason for the dismissal, to the level required by the Act, namely that the dismissal resulted ‘wholly or mainly’ from the protected disclosure.”

40. Mr Dunlea addressed the complainant’s assertion that he had been penalised when the CEO allegedly threatened to terminate the MTM programme and when his probation was extended. It is the respondent’s position that these actions related solely to the fact that the programme was struggling and the difficulties most likely stemmed from the problems in the relationship between the complainant and the president, which is acknowledged by the respondent.  Mr Dunlea said that the CEO acknowledges that there was some merit to the complainant’s complaint; however, the true extent of the situation has never been assessed because the complainant went on sick leave and eventually resigned.
41. Considering the complainant’s assertion that the denial of his access to his work email account was penalisation, it is the respondent’s position that the complainant was absent due to illness at the time he tried to access his emails.
42. While he complained that his wages were reduced when he was out sick, this is consistent with the respondent’s sick pay policy, although an employee who has not passed their probation is not entitled to any sick pay.
43. Finally, while he was unhappy about being referred for an examination by the respondent’s occupational health consultant, the respondent’s position is that the purpose of the referral was to determine if and when the complainant might be able to return to work and to consider any support that might be needed to enable him to return.
44. While the complainant was unhappy with the approach taken by the occupational health doctor and disputed the doctor’s opinion that he would be fit to return to work, it is notable that the complainant commenced in a new job around four weeks after the assessment.
45. Concluding his submission, Mr Dunlea said that “communication could have been done better and could have been more official.” He said that nothing that was done was intended to penalise the complainant.  He said that there were difficulties in the operation of the MTM programme and anything that was done after the complainant made his protected act was done in the best interest of the organisation.  The CEO wanted to work with the complainant and advised him to “wait it out.”
46. On the issue of not proceeding with an investigation while an employee is on sick leave, Mr Dunlea referred to the decision of my colleague adjudicator, Breiffni O’Neill in Cliona Holt and Veolia Energy Services Limited[4]. The complainant in that case submitted a grievance about her treatment by her employer, but no action was taken to investigate her grievance while she was out sick.  The adjudicator found that this approach was reasonable, as was the decision to ask Ms Holt to attend for an assessment by the company’s occupational health consultant.

Evidence of the Complainant, Mr Conor Holohan:

47. The complainant said that he grew up on a farm and had experienced the suicide of a family member. He said that he was motivated to help people.  Following his degree, he completed a Masters in Social Science.  He followed this with a doctorate in dairy cow nutrition.  He applied for the role in the MTM programme after he heard about it from a friend. 
48. The complainant believed that the programme had huge potential. For five or six years, it had been run by volunteers, and had some success, but then ran out of funding.  It was also hampered by the fact that the organisation had a new president every two years.  With his appointment, and with funding provided by FBD Insurance and the Department of Agriculture, it was possible to drive the programme forward and to expand the offering.
49. A helpline for farm families had been set up and the complainant said that his role was to run the helpline from 9.00am to 5.00pm from Monday to Friday. Counsellors were affiliated to the programme.  The complainant said that he gave talks at farm events and he set up a social media account to raise the profile of the programme.  He said that he disagrees with the CEO’s view that the programme was struggling.  He said that it was essentially a one-man operation.  He said that the president was assisting and was interested in the programme being developed.  He communicated with her through phone calls, texts and emails.  He had few formal meetings.  The meetings were about the funding strategy.
50. The complainant said that he felt that the president’s treatment of him was bullying and undermining. He said that he felt that he was being sabotaged. 
51. In a press release issued before Christmas 2024, the complainant told members that the helpline would be kept open over the holidays. The complainant said that the CEO told him that the president wasn’t happy that she wasn’t referred to in the press release.  He said that incidents like this made it difficult for him to do his job.  He said that his formal complaint followed a conversation he had with the CEO in which he told him about the problems he was having with the president.  He said that he disagrees with the CEO’s opinion that the functioning of the programme was grinding to a halt.
52. In March 2025, the complainant said that the helpline was up and running and he had recruited new counsellors. He had arranged two new corporate partners.  Training partnerships had been set up with Teagasc and others and talks were arranged with the agricultural colleges for April 29th and May 9th.
53. On March 5th 2025, the complainant said that he spoke at a seminar in UCD and he was developing a strategic partnership with an agri mental health group there. He was in discussions with UCD about funding.  He had worked on a partnership with Dublin City University and was planning to submit a grant application for that initiative.  He was working with the HSE in the north east and south west regions.  He produced a new professional overview video, although it was deleted from the respondent’s website due to concerns about some of the content.  He set up a “Moove Club.”
54. The complainant said that he reported to the board of the organisation on a weekly basis and provided progress updates. In summary, he said, the project continued to operate.  When he went on sick leave, the events scheduled for April and May were cancelled.
55. On April 3rd 2025, when he met the CEO in the Botanic Gardens, the complainant said that the CEO said that he understood his complaint, but he advised him to “wait it out,” because the president’s terms was ending on May 12th. The complainant said however, that he asked for the investigation to proceed.  He said that the core issue is timing and that “there is no getting away from” the fact that his probation was extended six days after he made a complaint about the president.  He said that the cumulative impact of everything that happened after that amounts to penalisation.

Cross-examining of the Complainant

56. In response to Mr Dunlea’s question, “Do you think the president disliked you?” the complainant said that there were issues with their professional relationship “from day one.” Mr Dunlea remarked that the complainant was interviewed by the president and the CEO and that the president was one of the decision-makers in relation to his appointment.
57. Before he was hired, Mr Dunlea said that the president had control of the MTM programme. He asked the complainant if he was trying to assert control.  The complainant replied that that was “too strong” a way of describing his approach.  He said that he was taking on the responsibilities of leadership of the programme.  He said that his role as programme director was being undermined.
58. Mr Dunlea referred to the meeting on December 12th 2024 between the complainant and the president. In his formal complaint, he claims that their relationship deteriorated further after this meeting.  The complainant said that difficulties were created when control of the steering group for the programme was handed to the board of directors.
59. Mr Dunlea asked why this was a problem, because “the board has the right to control the programme.” The complainant replied, “This is not the right way to do things.”
60. Mr Dunlea asked the complainant about his reference to the president withholding materials for the programme. He replied that the president was holding on to materials for the programme that had a value of over €1,000.
61. While he was doing a lot of good work, the complainant said that his relationship with the president was causing difficulties for his mental health and for his ability to carry out his role.
62. Mr Dunlea referred to the section in the complainant’s formal complaint in which he asked for it to be acknowledged, logged and responded to in line with the organisation’s grievance procedures. He also asked for a review of the governance of the programme and for the policy of including the past president on the steering group to be removed.
63. The complainant said that he knew that the president is appointed following a vote of members and is the most senior person in the organisation. He did not know how a president might be removed.
64. When he met the CEO on April 3rd 2025 in the Botanic Gardens, the complainant told Mr Dunlea that he assumed that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss his complaint. Mr Dunlea asked the complainant if he agreed that the context of his complaint was closely related to the MTM programme.  The complainant replied that the programme was still functioning, although his relationship with the president was affecting him personally.
65. Mr Dunlea referred to the complainant’s summary of the meeting on April 3rd which was included in the documents he submitted for the hearing. The complainant said that he was shocked when the CEO told him that his probation was being extended.  The CEO also told him that he had a friend in another organisation who could be asked to investigate his complaint.   He said that he didn’t raise a concern about this at the time, but he would have expected an independent person to conduct the investigation.
66. Mr Dunlea referred to the complainant’s recollection in his summary of the meeting that the president’s tenure was coming to an end the following month, and that the CEO suggested that he could “wait it out.” The complainant replied that this didn’t suggest that action was about to be taken.
67. Referring to the withholding of programme materials, the complainant said that, at the meeting, the CEO said that the tone of his emails to the president was awkward and he suggested that he could have gone and collected the materials from her himself. He said that he didn’t feel that the CEO was on his side.   
68. The respondent’s sickness absence policy provides that, following probation, employees who are certified as unfit for work are entitled to eight weeks’ full pay followed by eight weeks’ half pay. Although the complainant hadn’t completed his probation, he was paid his full wages for eight weeks, from April 7th until June 7th, when it was reduced to 50%.  The complainant said that “the fundamental ambiguity is about probation.”  He said that he was unsure if he would be paid during his sick leave and this added to his stress.  He said that he believes that the decision to reduce his sick pay to 50% of his earnings was penalisation.  As this was done on a retrospective basis, it added further to his stress. 
69. The complainant did not reply to Mr Dunlea’s assertion that, although he had not passed his probation, he received sick pay in line with his contract of employment, as if he had successfully completed his probation.
70. Mr Dunlea referred to the complainant’s grievance about his access to his work email being removed. Mr Dunlea said that the complainant had made it clear to the CEO that he wouldn’t be doing any work while he was on sick leave.  He replied that he asked for issues related to the programme to be deferred.  Mr Dunlea asked him why he needed access to his work emails?  He said that he needed access to download emails related to this complaint to the WRC.
71. Mr Dunlea asked the complainant why he felt that he was penalised by being asked to attend an examination by an occupational health consultant after he had been absent for two months. He replied that he had made it known that he was struggling mentally and he believes that the request to attend an occupational health assessment was intended to pressurise him into making a decision.  If the doctor had considered him as fit for work, he would have had to go back to work or resign.
72. Mr Dunlea said that, in circumstances where an employee submits a complaint for investigation, the employer must ensure that they are fit and capable of participating in such an investigation. The complainant said that he explicitly stated that he was happy to participate in an investigation and it is his view that the investigation could have progressed.  He agreed that, in the email from the CEO on June 4th 2025, efforts were made to try to get an investigation started.
73. Mr Dunlea referred to a promotional video that the complainant organised to be produced which was removed from the respondent’s website after two days. Mr Dunlea asked the complainant if he thought the video was removed because he was featured in it.  He replied that he only got an explanation after he looked for it.  Mr Dunlea said that the clip was removed because it featured a person dismounting from a tractor facing backwards instead of forward.  As FBD Insurance is one of the respondent’s sponsors, the featuring of a safety risk on the organisation’s website had to be addressed.
74. Mr Dunlea asked the complainant why he resigned on June 27th 2025. He said that he thought he had no option and that the workplace wouldn’t protect him.  Mr Dunlea asked the complainant when he started looking for another job.  He said that he assessed his options before he resigned.  He was interviewed for his current job around the time of his resignation and he received an offer on July 15th.  Although he said that he was suffering from anxiety, this was not a psychologist’s diagnosis.  He said that he has been attending counselling since shortly after the meeting with the CEO on April 3rd 2025.  Although he still works in the area of agriculture, he is not engaged with mental health, which was his preferred career option.

Evidence of the Chief Executive Officer, Mr Mick Curran:

75. Mr Curran said that the organisation was founded in 1944 to promote agricultural science and crop and animal husbandry. It is a social organisation for the benefit of young people in rural communities.  He said that the MTM programme started with two volunteers, when five of their friends died by suicide.  These two volunteers started to raise awareness of the importance of positive mental health among rural dwellers.
76. Mr Curran said that a president is elected for a tenure of two years and the incumbent at the time of the complainant’s recruitment in October 2024 was due to step down on May 12th 2025. The president is the head of the organisation and all public statements and press releases are made by the president.
77. Mr Curran said that he and the president interviewed the complainant for the role of programme manager for the MTM programme. He said that they were unanimous in their view that he was the best candidate.  Although he was hired as a programme manager, he asked for his title to be changed to programme director, and this was agreed.
78. The complainant started in the job in early October and Mr Curran said that issues emerged between him and the president in November and December. He said that they “seemed to go in different directions.”  Mr Curran said that working with a volunteer board of directors can be challenging and “sometimes, as staff, we have to bend slightly to make things work.”
79. The programme was set up for Macra members, not non-members and Mr Curran said that they shouldn’t have been providing services to other groups or organisations. He said that, in some ways, it was advancing and in other respects, it seemed to be going backwards.  
80. Decisions on sponsorship are made by the board of directors, which has final sign-off. Mr Curran explained that problems can arise if sponsorship is sought or offered by a competitor of the organisation’s main sponsor.
81. Mr Dunlea asked Mr Curran about the meeting that the complainant had with the president on December 10th 2024. Mr Curran said that he understood that the purpose of the meeting was to clear the air, but he believes that things didn’t get resolved.  He said that there is no dispute about the fact that “things got worse.”
82. Mr Curran said that he wasn’t surprised when he got the complainant’s complaint about the president. He said that the relationship between the two was deteriorating badly and the conflict was becoming apparent to the members.  As the members are the main fund-raisers for the programme, the difficulties between the complainant and the president were putting the programme in jeopardy.
83. One of the issues of conflict was the problem that a delivery of promotional materials went to the president’s home in the south west. The materials needed to be in Dublin, but neither party would resolve the issue.  Mr Curran said that he advised the complainant to ask someone in the office to arrange a courier to collect the products.
84. Mr Curran said that he believes that there is merit to the complainant’s complaint.
85. Mr Dunlea asked him about the complainant’s recollection of the meeting on April 3rd 2025 in the Botanic Gardens in Dublin. The complainant claimed that Mr Curran said that “Macra has different limbs” and that he was ready to cut off MTM.  Mr Curran agreed that this sounds like something he would say.  He said that the relationship between the complainant and the president had become “toxic” and if something is impeding the operation of an organisation, it must be looked at.  He said that his threat to close the programme wasn’t a response to the complaint.
86. Mr Dunlea asked Mr Curran why he decided to extend the complainant’s probation. He said that he was informed by the chairperson of the board that the complainant had phoned him and said that he was concerned about the MTM programme, and specifically, the interference of the president in the programme.  Mr Curran said that it was a cause for concern to him that the complainant contacted the chairperson.
87. Mr Curran said that he was compiling a risk register and he asked the complainant for public liability insurance for the counsellors he had recruited, but the insurance wasn’t provided. He said that he wasn’t happy that the complainant was offering the programme’s services to outside organisations.  He said that he accepts that the complainant’s relationship with the president was difficult and he understands that it’s not always easy to work with volunteer management structures, but he said, “we have to work with them.”
88. Mr Curran said that, at the meeting on April 3rd, he discussed with the complainant his concern about his relationship with the president and he told him that he was extending his probation.
89. Mr Dunlea asked Mr Curran about the complainant’s reference to him saying, “between you and me,” in relation to the extension of his probation. Mr Curran said that “between you and me” was in relation to the underlying issue of the complaints, and how the president was treating the complainant.  He repeated his opinion that he thought that there was some merit to the complaints.
90. Mr Curran said that the organisation has no way of investigating a complaint by a staff member against a volunteer. He said that a friend of his is the CEO of another voluntary organisation and he suggested to the complainant that this person could be asked to conduct the investigation.  He said that he prepared a letter to send to the complainant to propose this person to conduct the investigation, but, when the complainant went out sick, he didn’t send it.
91. Responding to a question about the complainant’s sick pay, Mr Curran said that he was out sick because of pressure at work, and he didn’t want to penalise him by not paying him his wages. Although the complainant was absent for seven weeks before he sent in a medical certificate, Mr Curran said that it wouldn’t have been fair not to pay him.  By mid-June however, with no end in sight, he said that the sick pay was reduced to 50% of salary.
92. Mr Curran said that he got legal advice about extending the complainant’s probation, and he also got legal advice about asking him to attend for an assessment by an occupational health consultant. The assessment was arranged to take place in Dublin but was changed to a remote assessment when the complainant said that he was no longer living in Dublin.
93. Mr Curran accepts that the complainant’s access to his work email account was cut off. He said that he didn’t issue an instruction for this to happen.  He said that there was no deliberate act on anyone’s part to restrict the complainant’s access to his emails.
94. The complainant was out sick on April 14th when the video depicting a tractor driver disembarking wrongly was removed from the respondent’s social media. Mr Curran said that he wouldn’t expect the complainant to know that the disembarking method was wrong and he said that video would have had to come down if the complainant had been at work.  As FBD Insurance is the organisation’s biggest sponsor, it would have been detrimental if it had been seen and it had to come down straight away.
95. Mr Curran said that he didn’t take any action because the complainant submitted a complaint. He said that he wanted to see the complaint fully investigated.
96. Before he concluded his direct evidence, I asked Mr Curran why he didn’t carry out an investigation, even though the complainant was absent. He said that the president finished in her role in the middle of May 2025, although she remains on the board of directors.

Cross-examining of Mr Curran by the Complainant

97. In response to the complainant’s question about what evidence there is that the board has the final sign-off with regard to agreements about partnerships with other bodies, Mr Curran said that this is provided for in the organisation’s standing orders.
98. The complainant asked Mr Curran to explain how the conflict between him and the president was apparent to members. Mr Curran replied that there were no hard allegations about this, but that he heard from members that there was a problem.
99. The complainant asked Mr Curran for evidence that FBD Insurance had noticed the video featuring the tractor. Mr Curran said that was notified about this in a phone call.
100. The complainant asked Mr Curran, what steps he took to address his complaint, if he thought it had merit. Mr Curran said that he wanted to investigate the complaint, he acknowledged it and he contacted someone who he thought would be suitable to do the investigation.  He said that nothing could be done while the complainant was out sick.
101. The complainant raised the fact that no concerns were every raised with him about his performance in his job. Mr Curran replied that he raised issues about his relationship with the president.  He said that this affected his performance.  He agreed with the complainant that his concerns about this were not documented.
102. The complainant asked Mr Curran when he decided to extend his probation. Mr Curran replied that the final straw was an email exchange about the merchandise for the MTM programme.  He said that he was concerned about the complainant’s inability to work with volunteers and his inability to “work around issues.”
103. The complainant asked Mr Curran why he didn’t explain this to him, and Mr Curran replied that the complainant was in shock when he told him that his probation was extended and that he “didn’t want to go hard” on him. He said that he didn’t get an opportunity to clarify why he made the decision to extend the probation because the complainant was out sick.  He then wrote to the full steering committee of the programme.
104. The complainant asked Mr Curran if he was aware that the ambiguity around his contract was causing him stress. Mr Curran replied that he did know, but that he couldn’t do anything due to the complainant’s absence.
105. The complainant asked Mr Curran what he meant when he said that the programme was struggling. Mr Curran said that he was concerned that the complainant has initiated a change and was offering support to other organisations.  The programme was funded by members and was intended to support members.  He said that it looked as if “we were going to make a grab for corporate funding and abandon Macra members.”  He disagreed with the complainant that partnerships would have helped, and he said that the programme was “not at a stage where we were ready for partnerships.”
106. The complainant asked Mr Curran what action he took before March 27th 2025, when he submitted his complaint, to communicate his concerns. Mr Curran said that he advised the complainant how to manage the relationship with the president and “not to head butt so much.”  He said that he was concerned at how the issue of the transfer of the merchandise to Dublin couldn’t be resolved and he said that there was an element of intransigence on the complainant’s part with regard to this issue.  He said that the complaint “had no hand, act or part” in his decision to extend the complainant’s probation.
107. Mr Curran said that he doesn’t know how the complainant’s access to his email was blocked. By way of clarification, the complainant pointed out that he wrote to Mr Curran on June 23rd, just four days before he resigned, and told him that he hadn’t had access to his email account “in recent weeks.”

Findings and Conclusions:

108. It is the complainant’s case that he was penalised because he submitted a complaint about the conduct of the president. In the document he sent to the CEO and the deputy CEO on March 27th 2025, he said that he believed that,

“…her actions constitute a sustained pattern of undermining, obstruction, inappropriate conduct, and bullying which has had a significant impact on my health, my ability to perform my role and the overall functioning and credibility of MTM.”

The complainant said that the cumulative effect of the president’s behaviour was “deeply harmful” to his mental health and overall wellbeing.  He said that he had anxiety, difficulty sleeping, and feelings of isolation and helplessness.

109. This is a serious allegation and it is regrettable that an investigation wasn’t carried out so that the complainant’s claims could be examined and for the president to have an opportunity to defend herself against his accusations. It is not my role to investigate his complaints here however, and my task is to determine if the respondent’s decision to extend his probation and to take certain other actions were taken “wholly or mainly” because he submitted the complaint.  I must also determine if it is reasonable for him to assert that the cumulative effect of the extension of his probation and the events that occurred after he went absent due to illness led to his resignation and, if his resignation was a constructive dismissal.

The Relevant Law

110. Section 27(3)(c) of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 (“the 2005 Act”) provides that,

(3) An employer shall not penalise or threaten penalisation against an employee for –

(c) making a complaint or representation to his or her safety representative or employer or the Authority, as regards any matter relating to safety, health or welfare at work[.]

While ostensibly, the complainant’s grievance is about “a sustained pattern of undermining …and bullying,” he emphasised the impact of that conduct on his health and, in this respect, his complaint is about a matter relating to health or welfare at work and is properly for consideration under s.27 of the 2005 Act. 

111. At s.27(1), “penalisation” is described as,

any act or omission by an employer or a person acting on behalf of an employer that affects, to his or her detriment, an employee with respect to any term or condition of his or her employment.

Subsection (2) provides examples of the conduct of an employer that are encompassed by this definition:

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), penalisation includes -

• (a) suspension, lay-off or dismissal (including a dismissal within the meaning of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 to 2001), or the threat of suspension, lay-off or dismissal,
• (b) demotion or loss of opportunity for promotion,
• (c) transfer of duties, change of location of place of work, reduction in wages or change in working hours,
• (d) imposition of any discipline, reprimand or other penalty (including a financial penalty), and
• (e) coercion or intimidation.

112. It is the complainant's case that, in breach of s.27(2)(a), he was constructively dismissed and that, by being dismissed, he was penalised for making a complaint to his employer about a matter related to his health and welfare.

Consideration of the Complainant’s Case

113. It is accepted that the complainant made a protected act when he submitted his complaint to the CEO on March 27th 2025. Arising from this, consistent with the findings of Comerford J in Dougan and Clarke v Lifeline Ambulances, the burden of proof is on the respondent, to show that the termination of the complainant’s employment and the other six alleged acts of penalisation were not caused “wholly or mainly” because he made a complaint.
114. We know from s.27(1) above that penalisation is any act that affects an employee to their detriment. It is the complainant’s case that the cumulative effect of certain actions taken by the CEO resulted in him feeling anxious and that he suffered from low mood, insomnia and significant distress and that the deterioration in his mental health led to his resignation.  The six actions he identified are:
115. At his meeting with the CEO on April 3rd 2025, the CEO threatened to terminate the MTM programme. 
116. At the same meeting, he was informed that his probation was extended for one month;

• On June 4th, he received confirmation that his probation was extended for two months until August 7th;

1. On June 16th, his access to his work emails was removed;
2. On June 19th, he was informed that his sick pay would be reduced to 50% of his salary with effect from June 7th;
3. He was requested to attend a medical assessment and he felt that the doctor who assessed him remotely on June 24th was dismissive of his own doctor’s medical diagnosis that he was suffering from work-related stress.
4. Considering the first point above, it is apparent from the evidence of the CEO that there were problems with the MTM programme and he told the complainant that, like a limb, it could be cut off. This reflects the CEO’s position that the organisation shouldn’t be impeded by a project that was “floundering.”  Most would agree that a threat to discontinue the programme sounds somewhat extreme, but the remark was made in the context of a consideration of the overall good of the organisation, and perhaps to indicate to the complainant that, if he could do less “head butting” and work with the president, such a stark outcome could be avoided.  If the programme had been terminated, this certainly would have affected the complainant to his detriment; however, a statement about the possibility that it could be terminated is not, in my view, a detriment, and is not penalisation.
5. The decision of the CEO to extend the complainant’s probation is, naturally, the issue that concerned him most. I accept that he was shocked and anxious when he was told that he hadn’t passed his probation.  Considering however, the examples given at s.27(2) above of acts of penalisation; dismissal, suspension, demotion, reduction in wages, discipline, coercion etc., these are in a much more adverse category of treatment compared to the extension of probation.  Although s.27(1) includes the phrase “any act” that affects an employee to their detriment, I am not certain that the extension of probation is the type of detriment intended by the legislation.  Leaving that observation aside, coming just six days after he submitted his complaint about the president, the complainant has grounds for his concern that the temporal proximity of both events could mean that one was caused by the other.  Before reaching a conclusion, a further examination of the facts is required.
6. The complainant was interviewed by the president and the CEO for the job of programme manager of the MTM programme. The CEO said that he and the president agreed that he was the best candidate for the job.  Clearly, at this point, the president must have been well disposed towards the complainant.  When he was appointed, he asked for his title to be changed to “programme director.”  The complainant’s request for this more senior title indicates to me that he wanted to assume more authority and autonomy than was intended by his employer when he was hired for the role.
7. Since his early days in the job, the complainant said that there were issues in his professional relationship with the president. It is apparent to me, from the various initiatives he took without the approval of the president or the board of directors, that there was a conflict regarding control and decision-making, with the complainant exerting more control that he was given.  This is apparent from his decision to engage with external partner organisations and to expand the service-offering outside Macra members.  In the letter to the CEO in which he set out his complaint, he claimed that the governance structure of the MTM programme was “flawed and open to abuse” and he asked for the past president not to be included on the steering group “to ensure clear operational independence and prevent undue influence.”  While he was on sick leave, he contacted the CEO to object to the appointment of the chairperson of the steering group during his absence.  He objected to the board having oversight of the steering group saying “this is not the right way to do things.”  These are strange requests from someone just six months into a job and they point to a reluctance to work within a given organisational hierarchy, with oversight and direction from senior leaders.
8. The complainant’s difficult relationship with the president seems to me to be a feature of this difference of opinion regarding control. The president had authority over certain aspects of the programme, while the complainant was attempting to assert operational independence.  The complainant’s inability to work collaboratively with the president was the key reason why the CEO decided to extend his probation.  This was most clearly demonstrated in what seems to me to be a petty argument about the collection of merchandise.  For the benefit of the functioning of the programme, the complainant could have sorted this out, but he refused to concede.
9. Because of his inability to collaborate with the president, and his tendency not to seek approval for various initiatives, I am satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for extending the complainant’s probation. As a newly appointed programme director, he acted with a level of autonomy not intended by his employer and he failed to see that this was a problem.  I am satisfied that, despite the short gap of six days between the date on which the complaint was submitted and the date on which the CEO extended the complainant’s probation, that there were valid reasons for the extension.  Having reached this conclusion, it follows that the decision to extend the complainant’s probation was not, “wholly or mainly” because he made a complaint. 
10. I accept the complainant’s case that, in advance of telling him that his probation was extended, the CEO didn’t conduct a performance review and the decision came as a shock. Mr Dunlea conceded that this was a failing on the part of the respondent, and I agree that the complainant should have been informed well in advance about the issues that risked his probation not being confirmed.
11. The third act of penalisation that the complainant alleges occurred is the communication of June 4th 2025 that his probation was extended until August 7th.  I do not consider this as separate to the initial decision of the CEO on April 3rd.  As he had been absent since April 7th, the complainant had not had an opportunity to address the deficits in his performance and this could only happen when he returned to work.
12. Considering the fourth allegation, that the complainant’s access to his email account was disabled, I do not consider this as an act of penalisation. When he discovered that he couldn’t access his emails, he had been absent for two months.  An employee on sick leave and, particularly an employee out sick due to work-related stress, should not engage with their work e-mails unless they have authority to do so from a manager and with the recommendation of their doctor.  The complainant provided no evidence that he contacted the IT department or anyone in the organisation to ask for access to his account to be reinstated and his assumption that the disablement was caused by his complaint is without merit.
13. The fifth alleged act of penalisation is the reduction of the complainant’s wages to 50% after he was absent for eight weeks. This reduction in sick pay is provided for in his contract of employment and is not an act of penalisation.  When he was paid his full salary for eight weeks, it was reasonable for him to assume that his wages would be reduced for the second eight weeks. 
14. The final alleged act of penalisation, the requirement for the complainant to attend a medical assessment, is also provided for in his contract of employment and is not an act of penalisation. I agree with Mr Dunlea that, before embarking on an investigation into his complaint, it was necessary to ensure that the complainant was medically fit to engage in such an investigation.

The Complainant’s Claim that he was Constructively Dismissed

126. The complainant's case is that the cumulative effect of the actions listed above contributed to a deterioration in his mental health and ultimately led to his resignation. I am not qualified to make any findings about the complainant’s mental health and the medical certificates he submitted are not useful, because they describe the reason for his absence as “stress / anxiety” and “stress at work.”  He provided notes from his appointments with his doctor which record only what he told her, with no indication of her professional opinion.  I understand that he felt anxiety because of the decision of the CEO to extend his probation and that the subsequent actions taken during his absence may have been stressful.  I accept the complainant’s evidence that he was anxious and that he suffered from distress.  I recall too however, his evidence that his description of his mental health condition was not a psychologist’s diagnosis. 
127. An employee who claims that they have been constructively dismissed must satisfy two tests, known as the “contract test” and the “test of reasonableness.” The first test requires the employee to show that their employer repudiated a term of their contract.  The complainant made no allegation in this regard.  The second test requires an employee to demonstrate that their employer acted so unreasonably, that they couldn’t have remained in the job any longer.  The complainant’s case is that the extension of his probation and his employer’s treatment of him during his sick leave was so unreasonable that he had to resign. 
128. The nature of the reasonableness test was illustrated in the judgement of the Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom in Western Excavating v Sharp[5], where the employer’s treatment of the employee was examined to determine if,

“…the employer conducts himself or his affairs so unreasonably that the employee cannot fairly be expected to put up with any longer…If so, the employee is justified in leaving.”

I acknowledge that CEO should have engaged in more direct mentoring conversations with the complainant about the issues that led to his probation being extended.  That said, it is my view that the CEO’s decision was reasonable.  He could have dismissed the complainant, but he decided to give him time to address his performance deficits.  While the decision to extend his probation seems to have had a very significant impact on the complainant’s mental health, the fact that it had such an impact doesn’t mean that the decision was irrational or unfair.  I am guided in this view by the case at the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal of Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary[6].  In his judgement on this case, Lord Hope of Craighead considered the meaning of penalisation in an earlier case, De Souza v the Automobile Association[7]which held that,

“…the court or tribunal must find that, by reason of the act or acts complained of a reasonable worker would or might take the view that he had thereby been disadvantaged in the circumstances in which he had to work thereafter.”

An assessment of penalisation therefore, is not a measure of the impact on the employee, but of how “a reasonable worker would or might take the view” that he was disadvantaged.  Another person in the same circumstances as the complainant may have responded differently.  It is my experience that most employees in the same circumstances engage with their managers to address the issues preventing them from passing their probation.  The complainant took a different course of action.  He felt distressed, and ultimately, he felt that he couldn’t go back and he resigned.  This was his personal and subjective response to a situation that another reasonable person may have handled differently.  I have concluded that the conduct of the CEO was not irrational or unfair, and, in such circumstances, while the complainant was entitled to resign for the sake of his mental health, he is not entitled to hold his employer responsible for his mental health.  Like any “ordinary” dismissal, a determination on the fairness or otherwise of a constructive dismissal is predicated on the reasonableness of the decision-maker.  In this case, the complainant dismissed himself, and it is my view that it was not reasonable for him to do so and to claim that he was constructively dismissed. 

Decision:

129. Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
130. I have concluded that the decision of the CEO to extend the complainant’s probation was done for reasons related to his performance and was not caused by his having made a complaint about the president. I have also concluded that the actions taken by the CEO in the weeks after the complainant went absent due to work-related stress were consistent with the complainant’s contract and was reasonable treatment of an employee on long-term sick leave.  Finally, I reject the complainant’s case that the cumulative effect of the treatment he complained about led him to a position where he had no alternative but to resign from his job.  I decide therefore, that his complaint of penalisation is not well founded.

Dated:   26-08-26

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer:  Catherine Byrne

Key Words:  Constructive dismissal, workplace complaint, penalisation, safety, health and welfare

[1] Paul O’Neill v Toni & Guy Blackrock Limited, [2010] 21 ELR 1

[2] Ali Izzy v Solarwinds Software Europe DAC, ADJ-00054523

[3] Dougan and Clarke v Lifeline Ambulances Limited, [2018] ELR 210

[4] Cliona Holt and Veolia Energy Services Limited, ADJ-00048216

[5] Western Excavating v Sharp, [1978] ICR 221

[6] Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, [2003] ALL ER 26

[7] De Souza v the Automobile Association, [1986] ICR 514