Complainant

Respondent

Parties

William Shorten

Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council

Representatives

 Self

 Vincent Nolan BL instructed by Katherine Butterly Solicitor for DLRCC

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000

CA-00072579-001

11/06/2025

The complaint form submitted on 10 June 2025 alleged a breach of the Equal Status Act, 2000.

The Complainant gave evidence by way of civil affirmation. The Respondent did not offer evidence but relied on legal submissions in response to the complaint.

The complaint form stated that the Complainant was seeking the answer to one question: could the Respondent show the Complainant proof that it told him he was buying his apartment directly from a developer?

The Complainant says that he was misled about the purchase of his apartment, which he bought in 2008. In 2015, multiple defects were identified which require remedial works. He said that the cost of those remedial works is in the amount of €60,000 and he is now being pursued for a management fee of €6,500. He approached the Respondent about the cost of the remedial works, because he believes that it should be responsible for them, but was told that he was liable for the cost and it was nothing to do with the Respondent. This was, he says, because the Respondent told him that he had bought the apartment directly from the developer and not from the Council. He wants to see where they informed him, at the time of the sale, that it was a direct purchase from the developer. He had always been of the view that he had purchased his property directly from the Respondent.

When asked by the Adjudication Officer what the alleged act of discrimination was, the Complainant stated that it was not being told at the time that this was a direct sale. He said that he wasn’t informed of this and wanted equal rights.

The Complainant provided supporting documentation, which largely takes the form of conveyance documents from the time of the purchase of his apartment.

In written submissions, the Respondent submitted that the complaint was misconceived, denied any allegation of discrimination or victimisation under the Equal Status Acts 2000-2015, and contended that the Complainant was not entitled to any of the reliefs sought.

The Respondent stated that, in the ES1 notification dated 20 May 2025, the Complainant alleged victimisation arising from matters dating from approximately 2015, referring to defects in apartments and to the Respondent’s lien and clawback arrangements relating to his apartment. The Respondent noted that the Complainant's subsequent complaint to the WRC altered the basis of the claim, alleging discrimination on the civil status ground and referring to ongoing discrimination. The Respondent submitted that the essence of the Complainant’s grievance concerned his purchase of an apartment under the Affordable Housing Scheme in 2008 and his belief that it had not been disclosed to him that he was purchasing directly from the vendor rather than from the Respondent. The Respondent argued that these matters related to the terms and circumstances of the property purchase rather than any prohibited conduct within the meaning of the Equal Status Acts.

As a preliminary matter, the Respondent argued that the complaint was out of time. It submitted that the ES1 notification referred to events occurring since approximately 2015, whereas section 21(2)(a) of the Acts requires notification of the alleged discriminatory conduct within two months of its occurrence. The Respondent contended that the notification was therefore manifestly outside the statutory time limit and that there were no grounds to justify an extension of time. It further submitted that the WRC complaint, lodged in July 2025, related to matters which the Complainant himself dated to 2015 and was therefore approximately ten years out of time. The Respondent argued that the complaint had not been referred within the six-month period prescribed by section 21(6)(a) of the Acts and that the WRC should not exercise its discretion to extend the time limit.

Without prejudice to its preliminary objections, the Respondent outlined its substantive position. It stated that the Complainant had been offered the opportunity to purchase the apartment through the Affordable Housing Scheme in 2008. The Respondent submitted that the scheme documentation specifically advised applicants to seek independent legal advice before completing a purchase. It stated that the Complainant had in fact retained a solicitor to act on his behalf during the transaction. The Respondent acknowledged that the Complainant may have concerns regarding levies imposed in respect of works to the apartment complex but maintained that those concerns did not give rise to any claim under the Equal Status Acts.

The Respondent further submitted that the Complainant had merely asserted that he had been victimised and discriminated against on the civil status ground without identifying facts capable of supporting such allegations. Referring to section 38A of the Acts, the Respondent submitted that the burden rested initially on the Complainant to establish facts from which discrimination could be inferred. It argued that no such facts had been established and that no prima facie case of discrimination or victimisation had arisen.

In conclusion, the Respondent submitted that the complaint should be dismissed as being out of time. Alternatively, it contended that the Complainant had failed to establish a prima facie case under the Acts. The Respondent further submitted that the claim was devoid of substance and merit and should be dismissed pursuant to section 22 of the Acts as frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or relating to a trivial matter. The Respondent relied on judicial authority concerning the meaning of those terms and submitted that the complaint was bound to fail.

Section 3 of the Equal Status Act 2000, as amended, (hereinafter “the Act”) provides that discrimination occurs where a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been, or would be treated in a comparable situation on one of the protected discriminatory grounds. The protection extends to characteristics which currently exist, existed in the past, may exist in the future, or are attributed to the person concerned.

The protected grounds under the Act are gender, civil status, family status, sexual orientation, religion, age, disability, race, membership of the Traveller community and victimisation. In relation to the provision of accommodation, the Act also prohibits discrimination on the housing assistance ground. Victimisation includes adverse treatment of a person because they have sought to vindicate their rights under the equality legislation or assisted another person in doing so.

Section 21 of the Act sets out the procedure for seeking redress in respect of alleged prohibited conduct. A person who claims to have been subjected to discrimination, harassment, sexual harassment or victimisation may refer a complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission.

Before referring a complaint, a complainant must normally notify the respondent in writing of the nature of the allegation and their intention to seek redress. This notification must be sent within two months of the alleged incident, or the most recent incident where a series of incidents is claimed. The respondent must be afforded an opportunity to reply and the WRC will not investigate the complaint until either a reply has been received or one month has elapsed from the date of notification.

A complaint must generally be referred to the WRC within six months of the alleged prohibited conduct. The time limits for both notification and referral may be extended in certain circumstances where reasonable cause is shown. In exceptional cases, the notification requirement may be dispensed with where it is fair and reasonable to do so.

The section also provides that a complainant may seek relevant information from a respondent when notifying it of the complaint, and sets out the circumstances in which ongoing or continuing conduct is deemed to occur for the purpose of calculating the applicable time limits.

Section 38A of the Act sets out the burden of proof in discrimination cases. It says that the complainant must first establish facts from which it may reasonably be inferred that prohibited conduct has occurred. If such a prima facie case is established, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent, who must then demonstrate that there was no contravention of the Acts. If the complainant fails to establish facts giving rise to such an inference, the complaint cannot succeed.

Taken together, these provisions require that a complaint be referred within six months of the date of the alleged act of discrimination and that the Complainant establish facts from which it may reasonably be inferred that prohibited conduct under the Act has occurred.

In the present case, the complaint form was submitted on 11 June 2025. Accordingly, the Complainant must identify an alleged act of discrimination that occurred within the six-month period preceding that date, namely on or after 12 December 2024.

While the Complainant outlined the history of a dispute extending over a considerable period, he did not identify any alleged act of discrimination occurring within the relevant period. When specifically asked by the Adjudication Officer to identify the alleged act of discrimination relied upon, the Complainant stated that it was the Respondent's failure in 2008 to notify him that he was purchasing his property from a developer. That event occurred well outside the statutory time limit for the referral of a complaint.

Even if reasonable cause had been established to extend the time limit by a further six months, as permitted under the Act, the Complainant has not identified any act within the preceding twelve months that could establish facts from which an inference of discrimination may reasonably be drawn.

I am therefore satisfied that the Complainant has not discharged the burden of proof under section 38A of the Act by establishing facts from which discrimination or victimisation may be inferred within the relevant period. Accordingly, I find that the complaint is not well founded.

For the reasons set out above, I find that this complaint is not well founded.

Equal Status – burden of proof