Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Baduru  Issah

Bgs Security Ltd in liquidation

Representatives

Ciara Galvin of SIPTU

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 45A of the Industrial Relations Act, 1946

CA-00071987-001

29/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00071987-002

29/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00071987-003

29/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071987-004

29/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071987-005

29/05/2025

The Complainant worked for the Respondent from mid-August to the 6th of September 2024. The Complainant was one of many workers who fell victim to a free labour scam perpetrated by the Respondent whereby they worked as security guards at a variety of retail and other locations on the promise of pay that either never materialised or would stop after a few weeks. The Respondent either ghosted affected employees or claimed that non-payment arose from temporary errors which they promised to resolve but never did.  Since May 2024 over thirty-five separate WRC decisions have issued in relation to the Respondent’s actions. Unfortunately, it appears that the Respondent has never paid the sums awarded by the WRC in those cases. In September 2025 the Collector General of the Revenue Commissioners was granted an order putting the Respondent into liquidation, at which point the Director Hugh Downes and Company Secretary Florin Axinte ceased to be in control of the company and a liquidator was appointed. That liquidator has submitted claims to the Insolvency Payments Scheme, which at the date of the hearing in this case, are yet to be paid.

The Complainant submitted a complaint under the Payment of Wages Act 1991 for outstanding wages in October 2025, he represented himself in that hearing on the 2nd of May 2025 and the wages were awarded in WRC decision ADJ-00054518 which issued on the 5th of June 2025.

In May 2025, SIPTU engaged in organising affected workers and held meetings with the Complainant and his former colleagues. On the 29th of May 2025, after joining SIPTU the Complainant then filed these additional complaints under the Industrial Relations Act, 1946, the Employment Equality Act, 1998, the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 and the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997.

The Complainant has made requests under Section 41 subsection 8 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 and Section 77 subsection 4b of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to extend the time limits contained in those acts for reasonable cause.

Ms Galvin, representing the Complainant, acknowledges that these complaints were lodged more than 6 months from the end of the employment relationship.

She submits that this was for reasonable cause in that the Complainant lacked professional advice. The Complainant’s evidence under affirmation was that he only became aware of the possibility of bringing these complaints when he joined SIPTU. 

The Complainant’s evidence, under affirmation, was he Initially he had gone to An Garda Siochana who referred him to citizen’s information who told him about the WRC and his option to seek redress under the payment of wages act and he submitted a complaint. He only became aware of these other breaches of law following his attending meetings with his colleagues and the union. 

Mr Stevven Gyurko attended the hearing on behalf of the Respondent’s liquidator. They were appointed in November last year and have no direct knowledge of prior events and as such they cannot confirm nor deny any allegation. They will align with any decision of the WRC and will process any awards under the insolvency payments schemes.

They haven’t been able to contact or locate former directors or supervisors. For the avoidance of doubt Mr Gyurko and his colleagues in the liquidator were in no way involved with the running of the company when it was still trading. 

CA-00071987-001, CA-00071987-003, CA-00071987-004, CA-00071987-005 – Request for extended time limit under Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015

My colleague in the WRC decision ADJ-00054518 established that the Complainant was employed as a Security Guard by the Respondent from 17th of August 2024 to the 5th of September 2024 and wages of €1,654.87 were owing to him for that period.

In addition, the Complainant now seeks awards of compensation in relation to the alleged failure of the Respondent to provide him with appropriate rest periods or paid annual leave as required by the Organisation of Working Time Act. The Complainant also seeks compensation under the Industrial Relations Act 2015 for the failure of the Respondent to comply with the security sector ERO.  

The Complainant filed these complaints 8 months and 24 days after his employment ended. These alleged contraventions of the acts all occurred outside the cognisable period of 6 months from the date of complaint.

The Complainant submits that he did not submit these additional complaints as he did not have appropriate advice and had not yet joined a union. He did not know that he could seek redress for these complaints until he joined SIPTU.

SIPTU have made a number of submissions related to the Complainant’s status as an international protection applicant in making an application for extension of the time limits. I am cognisant that a reasonable reasons for not bringing these complaints in time might exist for the Complainant which are particular to this status. However, it is for the Complainant to identify what these are and that they actually had a material impact on him not filing these complaints in time.

The evidence is that the Complainant was well able to engage with state agencies, including the WRC, to vindicate his rights within the cognisable time period. He obtained advice from citizens information who told him how he might recover the wages owed. He was aware of the core facts which gave rise to these complaints and was able to submit complaints to the WRC.  He did not know of these acts or that they had been breached but lack of knowledge of the law has been consistently found not to be a reasonable cause which might lead to an extension of time.

CA-00071987-002 Request for extended time limit under Section 77 subsection 4b of the Employment Equality Acts 1998

The Complainant and his Union alleged that the Respondent engaged in consistent targeting of people seeking international protection and non-nationals from outside the EEA more generally in offering them work and failing to pay them. They submit that this constitutes discrimination on grounds of race comparing the Respondent’s actions to how they believe an Irish worker would be treated. The Respondent’s conduct is recorded in numerous WRC decisions which issued over the course of 2025 including ADJ-00059481 in which my colleague determined that the Respondent had targeted people of colour when withholding wages.

The reasons for denying the Complainant an extension of time under the above complaints must be distinguished from this complaint. The Complainant obtained knowledge of the Respondent’s failure to pay him wages and other entitlements as it occurred. However, the Complainant could not know about a wider pattern of discrimination until the WRC had issued a substantial number of decisions and he and his colleagues had organised collectively and were able to discuss their experiences working for the Respondent. These events happened around the same time in that the first tranche of WRC decisions issued in the first half of 2025 and SIPTU meeting was held in May 2025.

Without the benefit of the published WRC decisions or his colleagues’ experiences I do not see how the Complainant could reasonably conclude that discrimination had occurred and as such I am satisfied that the key facts of this complaint were hidden from the Complainant until that May meeting. Reasonably soon after he became aware of those facts the Complainant filed this complaint on the 29th of May with the assistance of his Union.

I am satisfied that these circumstances both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay.

CA-00071987-002 Alleged Discrimination under Employment Equality Acts 1998

It has already been established that the Complainant worked for the Respondent and was not paid. The Complainant alleges that this was not a once of mistake but systemic targeting on the basis of race.

The Complainant points to the over 35 WRC decisions which have issued identifying the same pattern of behaviour and notes that the affected workers all appear to be non-nationals, who are not EEA citizens and who are often international protection applicants.

Mr Stevven Gyurko, who attended from the liquidator, was asked about this complaint. He was able to confirm that in his experience helping to recover wages for former employees, that the affected employees were almost entirely non-EEA workers. He noted that one Irish employee was owed wages but that that employee had worked for the Respondent for a much longer period of time and had been paid regularly before he was subject to non-payment as the Respondent ceased trading. He is not aware of casual hiring and withholding payment being perpetrated against any Irish national.

 Sections 6 and 8 of the EEA prohibit employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of race. For the purposes of the complaint before me, the most relevant parts are:

6(1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where—

(a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’) which—(i) exists, (ii) existed but no longer exists, (iii) may exist in the future, or (iv) is imputed to the person concerned,

[…]

(2) As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are—

(h) that they are of different race, colour, nationality or ethnic or national origins (in this Act referred to as “the ground of race”),

 […]

8. (1) In relation to—(a) access to employment, (b) conditions of employment, (c) training or experience for or in relation to employment, (d) promotion or re-grading, or (e) classification of posts, an employer shall not discriminate against an employee

Section 85A of the EEA provides for the allocation of the probative burden between a complainant and a respondent as follows:

“85A.–(1) Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.”

In  Southern Health Board v. Mitchell [2001] ELR 201 (the “Mitchell Case”), the Labour Court held:

“The first requirement […] is that the claimant must “establish facts” from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them.  This indicates that a claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination.

It is only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the Respondent to prove that there is no infringement of the principle of equal treatment.”

Labour Court decision Melbury -v- Valpeters EDA/0917 discusses the facts a complainant must establish to shift the burden of proof, stating:

“All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination. However, they must be established as facts on credible evidence. Mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be  elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn.  Section 85A places the burden of establishing the primary facts fairly and squarely on the  Complainant and the language of this provision admits of no exceptions to that evidential rule”

On review of the evidence available to me, including the Complainant’s evidence, the submissions of his Union and of the liquidator and the numerous WRC decisions relating to the Respondent’s conduct towards workers, I am satisfied that the Complainant has established facts from which a race discrimination can be reasonably presumed.   Namely that the Respondent was engaged in targeting non-nationals and in particular non-EEA migrants and international protection applicants in failing to pay them wages for work carried out. Through the liquidator I am aware of at least one Irish employee who was not treated in the same way but even without that evidence I think it is reasonable to presume that the Complainant would have been treated differently if he was Irish.

No evidence has been put forward by the Respondent to rebut this presumption an as such I find the complaint well founded.   

CA-00071987-002 Redress under Employment Equality Acts 1998

Section 82 of the EEA sets out my jurisdiction in ordering compensation for the effects of acts of discrimination.

Subsection 4 sets out the limits on any award of compensation.

(a) in any case where the complainant was in receipt of remuneration at the date of the reference of the case, or if it was earlier, the date of dismissal, an amount equal to the greatest of—

(I) 104 times the amount of that remuneration, determined on a weekly basis,

(ii) 104 times the amount, determined on a weekly basis, which the complainant would have received at that date but for the act of discrimination or victimisation concerned, or

(iii) €40,000,

or

(b) in any other case, €13,000

I find that the Complainant was discriminated against on the ground of race. Therefore, I find that the complaint is well founded. The Complainant was not in receipt of remuneration at the date of the reference of the case nor was he dismissed. In the circumstances, the maximum amount that I can award under section 82(4) of the EEA is €13,000.

In view of the serious nature of the Respondent’s conduct I am awarding the Complainant compensation in the amount of €13,000.

CA-00071987-001

I find that the complaint was submitted outside the cognisable time period.

CA-00071987-002

I find that the complaint is well founded and I direct the Respondent to pay the Complainant €13,000 in compensation.

CA-00071987-003

I find that the complaint was submitted outside the cognisable time period.

CA-00071987-004

I find that the complaint was submitted outside the cognisable time period.

CA-00071987-005

I find that the complaint was submitted outside the cognisable time period.