Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Christopher  Mc Donagh

You're Secure Solutions Limited

Representatives

Self-represented

Peninsula Business Services Ireland

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071903-001

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00071903-002

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071903-003

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 45A of the Industrial Relations Act, 1946

CA-00071903-004

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071903-005

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071903-006

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 18A of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071903-007

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 45A of the Industrial Relations Act, 1946

CA-00071903-008

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071903-009

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071903-010

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071903-011

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00071903-012

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00071903-013

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Regulation 18 of the European Communities (Road Transport)(Organisation of Working Time of Persons Performing Mobile Road Transport Activities) Regulations 2012 - S.I. No. 36/2012

CA-00071903-014

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 45A of the Industrial Relations Act, 1946

CA-00071903-015

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994.

CA-00071903-016

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994.

CA-00071903-018

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00071903-019

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00071903-020

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 86 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00071903-021

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00071903-023

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00071903-024

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 28 of the Safety, Health & Welfare at Work Act, 2005

CA-00074330-002

13/08/2025

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 7 June 2023 as a Security Guard and remained employed until his dismissal on 15 April 2025. He alleged that during his employment he was subjected to ongoing payroll errors, underpayment of wages, failure to receive ERO night and Sunday premiums, underpayment and denial of annual leave entitlements, excessive night working, inadequate notice of rosters, and repeated failures by the Respondent to provide accurate and updated contractual documentation reflecting changes to his role and working arrangements. 

The Complainant further asserted that he suffered retaliation after raising concerns regarding pay, workplace procedures, health and safety matters, contractual compliance and other issues which he maintains constituted protected disclosures.

He ultimately alleged that the Respondent failed to properly investigate his grievances and unfairly dismissed him on 15 April 2025 without any fair investigation, disciplinary hearing or opportunity to respond, contending that his dismissal was linked to his complaints and protected disclosures rather than any genuine misconduct.

The Complainant alleged that throughout his employment, he experienced ongoing difficulties relating to pay, working time, annual leave, contractual documentation, grievance handling, whistleblowing and ultimately his dismissal.

A central aspect of his complaint concerned alleged failures by the Respondent to comply with the Security Industry Employment Regulation Order (ERO). He stated that although he regularly worked Sunday shifts and 12-hour night shifts, particularly at Ballisodare IPAS Centre, he did not receive the applicable Sunday premiums or night-work premiums introduced under the ERO from July 2024 onwards. He stated that these payments were not identified on his payslips and that, despite repeatedly raising the issue with management, his concerns were rejected. He further asserted that an unexplained backdated payment was made shortly before his dismissal, which he stated was connected to his complaints about ERO compliance.

The Complainant also alleged that payroll difficulties were a recurring feature of his employment. He alleged that he experienced repeated underpayments, missing shift payments, delayed reimbursements and inaccuracies in holiday pay calculations. According to him, payroll errors frequently required repeated follow-up before being acknowledged and corrected. He cited examples where shifts were omitted from payslips and where annual leave was calculated on the basis of eight hours per day despite his normal working pattern consisting of 12-hour shifts.

The Complainant further alleged a series of breaches of working time legislation. He stated that rosters were frequently issued with less than 24 hours' notice, making it difficult to make childcare arrangements and organise family responsibilities. He asserted that he was not placed on the appropriate band of hours despite regularly working alternating 36-hour and 48-hour weeks. He further alleged that he was denied statutory daily and weekly rest periods and that he was required to attend meetings shortly after completing overnight shifts. He also alleged that he was compelled to work excessive night shifts following his reassignment to Ballisodare in September 2024 despite repeated requests to return to day work.

The Complainant stated that the Respondent repeatedly failed to provide proper written terms and conditions of employment. He alleged that he did not receive his original contract until more than two months after commencing employment. He further stated that no updated contracts or written statements were issued when he was promoted to a supervisory role at Quayside Shopping Centre in April 2024 or when he was reassigned back to Ballisodare in September 2024. Despite requesting updated documentation, he alleged that management simply re-sent his original contract. He also asserted that the company retrospectively imposed a probationary process on him without prior notification or contractual authority.

The Complainant further alleged that he made a series of protected disclosures concerning matters such as alleged breaches of contractual obligations at the IPAS centre, safeguarding concerns, health and safety issues, ERO compliance, discrimination, deficiencies in employment documentation and the conduct of certain managers. He stated that these concerns were raised on several occasions between September 2024 and March 2025, but that the Respondent either failed to investigate them adequately or dismissed them without proper consideration.

He also criticised the Respondent's handling of grievances and workplace complaints. In particular, he alleged that a complaint he made concerning an alleged assault by a manager was not properly investigated and that individuals who were the subject of complaints remained involved in the subsequent grievance process.

The Complainant stated that his complaints culminated in his dismissal on 15 April 2025. He stated that he was summarily dismissed for alleged gross misconduct without any prior investigation, disciplinary hearing, opportunity to respond, or representation. He asserted that the allegations relied upon by the Respondent had never previously been raised with him and that no evidence was presented to substantiate them.

The Respondent stated that the complaints were largely unfounded and that the Complainant had been paid in accordance with the Security Industry ERO and all applicable statutory entitlements. They asserted that that the Complainant received the appropriate rates of pay, including compensation for Sunday working and annual leave entitlements, and that any payroll discrepancies identified during employment were corrected when brought to the Respondent's attention. The Respondent further stated that many of the complaints were misconceived, duplicated, unsupported by sufficient evidence, outside the relevant cognisable period, or otherwise lacked a legal basis.

The Respondent stated that the Complainant's transfer from Quayside Shopping Centre to Ballisodare followed the conclusion of what it described as a probationary supervisory assignment rather than a permanent promotion. It was the Respondent's case that the Complainant's employment documentation had been made available to him and that no breach arose from the reassignment or the conclusion of the supervisory role.

Regarding the dismissal, Mr Barrett's evidence was that the Complainant was dismissed for gross misconduct. He stated that serious concerns had arisen regarding the Complainant's conduct, including a failure to engage with management, a failure to comply with contractual working arrangements by restricting his availability, a failure to complete required paperwork, and entering a resident's apartment without authorisation and without the required body camera. The Respondent stated that these matters amounted to serious breaches of contractual obligations and company procedures and justified summary dismissal.

The Respondent further stated that an investigation had taken place into a complaint received concerning the Complainant's conduct and that the matter subsequently progressed to a disciplinary process. Mr Barrett's evidence was that the allegations were genuine, that the conduct complained of was serious, and that dismissal was a reasonable and proportionate response having regard to the Respondent's obligations to ensure the safety and welfare of residents, staff and clients. It was denied that the dismissal was connected in any way to the Complainant's grievances, complaints or alleged protected disclosures.

In particular, the Respondent relied upon the allegation that the Complainant entered the apartment of a female resident at the IPAS centre unaccompanied and without a body camera, conduct which it described as prohibited and a serious breach of procedure. The Respondent's position was that the complaint received concerning this incident warranted immediate and serious action and that it provided substantial grounds for the decision to terminate the Complainant's employment. The Respondent therefore contended that the dismissal was fair, reasonable and proportionate in all the circumstances and that all complaints arising from the dismissal should be rejected.

CA-00071903-001:

Section 14(1) of the Act requires an employee required to work on a Sunday, where that fact has not otherwise been reflected in the determination of pay, to be compensated by an allowance, an increase in the rate of pay, paid time off, or a combination of these, of such amount as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances. The Respondent's position is that the ERO composite rate paid to the Complainant already reflects Sunday working; the Complainant's position is that no distinct Sunday premium was ever identified or paid in respect of six Sundays that he worked in the period from 27 November 2024 to 15 April 2025. Payslips exhibited for the cognisable period show a single flat hourly rate for ordinary hours and a separate, modest "Night Pay" premium, but no line item, allowance, or increased rate referable to Sunday working at any point.

When an employee establishes that he was required to work Sundays and that this has not been reflected in his pay, the onus is on the employer to demonstrate the reasonable compensation actually provided; a bare assertion that a composite rate "builds in" Sunday compensation, without any breakdown showing how the rate was constructed or that it exceeds the ERO minimum by a margin properly referable to Sunday working, does not discharge that onus.

In the absence of any such evidence having been presented by the Respondent in the instant case, I find that this complaint is well founded.

CA-00071903-002 - CA-00071903-011:

These complaints which concerned alleged payroll and time recording errors were filed with the WRC on 26 May 2025. In the absence of any application grounded in reasonable cause for an extension of time, the cognisable period for contraventions under the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997, the Payment of Wages Act 1991 and the Terms of Employment Information Act is the six months immediately preceding that date, namely 27 November 2024 to 26 May 2025.

Given that all of the alleged contraventions in relation to the above complaints fall outside the cognisable period, I must decline jurisdiction in respect of these complaints.

CA-00071903-012:

Section 5 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act stated as follows:

5.—(1) Subject to subsection (2), whenever a change is made or occurs in any of the particulars of the statement furnished by an employer under section 3 , 4 or 6 , the employer shall notify the employee in writing of the nature and date of the change as soon as may be thereafter, but not later than—

(a) 1 month after the change takes effect, or

(b) where the change is consequent on the employee being required to work outside the State for a period of more than 1 month, the time of the employee's departure.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to a change occurring in provisions of statutes or instruments made under statute or of any other laws or of any administrative provisions or collective agreements referred to in the statement given under section 3 or 4 .

The complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act was presented to the Workplace Relations Commission on 26 May 2025.

The Complainant stated that he did not receive a written statement of terms within the statutory period following the commencement of his employment on 7 June 2023. He further stated that he did not receive written notification of changes to his terms and conditions following his promotion in April 2024 or his reassignment to Ballisodare in September 2024.

The complaint concerning the late provision of the Complainant's original contract relates to an alleged contravention that occurred in 2023 and falls outside the cognisable period. Similarly, the alleged failure to notify the Complainant in writing of the changes arising from his promotion in April 2024 occurred outside the cognisable period, referred to above. I therefore have no jurisdiction to determine those aspects of the complaint.

I am satisfied, however, that the position in respect of the Complainant's reassignment to Ballisodare in September 2024 is different. The terms and conditions arising from that reassignment remained the terms under which the Complainant worked until the date of his dismissal on 15 April 2025, and the Respondent's failure to notify him in writing of changes in his terms from his previous role, which they concdeded, was accordingly not a discrete event but a continuing state of affairs subsisting throughout his employment at Ballisodare. That failure continued to exist within the cognisable period of 27 November 2024 to 26 May 2025, and indeed up to the date of his dismissal, and I am satisfied that I therefore have jurisdiction to determine this aspect of the complaint. This is to be contrasted with the notification failure arising from the April 2024 promotion, which concerned terms that had themselves already been superseded by the September 2024 reassignment and had ceased to govern the Complainant's employment before the cognisable period began, and in respect of which no continuing contravention subsists.

Accordingly, I find this aspect of the complaint to be well founded.

CA-00071903-018:

This complaint relates to an alleged application of a probationary period to his contract of employment in contravention of the Act. As this occurred before 27 November 2024, I have no jurisdiction to hear it as it is outside of the cognisable period.

CA-00071903-023:

The Law

Section 6(1) of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 provides that "the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal."

Section 6(4) of the Act provides, so far as is relevant, that the dismissal of an employee shall not be deemed to be an unfair dismissal if it results wholly or mainly from the conduct of the employee.

Section 6(6) provides that it is for the employer to show that the dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from a ground specified in subsection (4), or that there were other substantial grounds justifying it.

Section 6(7) provides that, in determining whether a dismissal is unfair, regard may be had, where the Adjudication Officer considers it appropriate, to the reasonableness of the employer's conduct in relation to the dismissal, and to the extent of the employer's compliance with fair procedure.

Findings:

The only document evidencing the Respondent's decision to dismiss is the letter of 15 April 2025 from Mr Barrett, delivered to the Complainant by email that same day. That letter records that it was written "further to the Management meeting held on 15th April 2025" and sets out four matters of concern: failure to engage with management of the centre, non-adherence to contractual working hours by reason of restricted availability, failure to complete required paperwork, and entering a resident's apartment unaccompanied and without a body camera, which the letter describes as "Strictly Prohibited." On the face of that letter, and on the whole of the documentary record before me, the management meeting of 15 April 2025 was the entirety of the process: there is no earlier letter putting any of these four matters to the Complainant, no record of an investigation into any of them, no invitation to a disciplinary hearing of the kind issued to the Complainant himself only weeks earlier in respect of the bullying allegation made against him, no note of any meeting at which the Complainant was given an opportunity to respond, and no indication that his response, if any, was sought or considered before the decision recorded in the letter was taken.

The letter itself confirms only that a decision had already been made "in consultation with the Client" by the time it issued; it does not purport to record an investigation or a disciplinary process preceding that decision, because none is evidenced anywhere in the papers.

The Complainant was simply issued with the letter of 15 April 2025 terminating his employment, without having first been interviewed, without having been given advance notice of the specific allegations against him, and without having been afforded any opportunity to respond, whether accompanied or otherwise, before the decision to dismiss him was made.

The sole specific allegation on which the dismissal was ultimately grounded, as distinct from the more generalised complaints of poor engagement and incomplete paperwork also referred to in the dismissal letter, is that the Complainant entered the apartment of a female resident of the IPAS centre unaccompanied and without a body camera. No witness statement, CCTV record, incident report, or body camera log was put before me in support of this allegation. The only evidence relied upon by the Respondent is the account of Mr Barrett, the Managing Director, who was not himself present and whose evidence as to the alleged entry is, on any view, hearsay. The Complainant denied that the allegation was ever properly put to him and gave evidence, which I accept, that entering residents' apartments unaccompanied had been his ordinary practice throughout his employment, that no instruction to the contrary existed prior to 28 March 2025, and that from that date he complied with a text message instruction not to enter apartments without a body camera and did not do so again.

Considering the foregoing, I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the Respondent has established the alleged entry occurred at all. An allegation supported only by the hearsay account of a decision-maker who did not witness the events in question, met by a clear and consistent denial from the employee concerned, does not amount to credible evidence capable of grounding a genuine and reasonably held belief in misconduct, still less a finding of gross misconduct sufficient to justify summary dismissal without notice.

The Respondent has accordingly failed to discharge the burden resting on it under section 6(4)(b), both as to the occurrence of the conduct relied upon and as to the proportionality of dismissal as a response to it, in addition to the procedural deficiencies addressed above; no investigation record, interview note, or opportunity to respond was ever furnished to the Complainant in respect of this allegation prior to his dismissal. I find therefore that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed.

CA-00071903-024:

Section 6(2)(ba), read together with section 6(2A), provides that a dismissal shall be deemed unfair where it results wholly or mainly from the employee having made a protected disclosure. I must therefore decide whether the making of protected disclosures was the operative cause of the Complainant's dismissal, in the sense that the dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from those disclosures. It is not sufficient merely to establish that protected disclosures were made or that the dismissal was otherwise procedurally unfair; it must be shown, on the balance of probabilities, that the disclosures were the principal reason, or among the principal reasons, for the decision to dismiss.

The Complainant stated that he made several complaints and reports between September 2024 and March 2025 concerning matters including inadequate security cover at the IPAS centre, alleged failures to complete fire-safety obligations, and concerns regarding Garda vetting procedures for personnel working in a centre accommodating vulnerable residents, including minors. Having considered the content of those communications, I am satisfied that they constitute information tending to show breaches of legal obligations and matters affecting the health and safety of individuals. I am further satisfied that the Complainant held a reasonable belief that the information disclosed was substantially true. Accordingly, I find that these communications are capable of constituting protected disclosures within the meaning of section 5 of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014, as amended.

Before considering causation, I should address a feature of the evidence which was impossible to ignore. Having carefully listened to the evidence in its entirety, I am satisfied that the Respondent had become deeply frustrated with the Complainant and the frequency with which he raised complaints and concerns. I use the term "nuisance" below, and I do so deliberately and with some hesitation. In truth, the evidence suggests that management's view of the Complainant may well have been considerably less charitable than that. They plainly regarded him as an employee who generated an exceptional volume of complaints, consumed a disproportionate amount of management time, and continually identified new matters about which to raise concerns. Some of those concerns were of limited significance; others were not. Whether management considered him a nuisance, a serial complainer, or something less flattering again is not, however, the legal issue before me because the Protected Disclosures Act does not protect only those employees whose concerns are raised sparingly, tactfully, or in a manner convenient to management. It protects qualifying disclosures irrespective of whether the employee making them is regarded as easy-going or a nuisance.

The relevant question I must answer under the Act is whether those protected disclosures were the operative cause of the dismissal. In assessing that question, I note that the disclosures were made directly to management personnel of the Respondent and concerned the operation of the very facility at which the Complainant worked and it was not disputed in evidence that management were aware of them. I also note the sequence of events. Between September 2024 and March 2025, the Complainant raised repeated concerns regarding safety, staffing and compliance issues as well as garda vetting procedures. On 28 March 2025 a specific instruction concerning the use of body cameras was communicated to him. Less than three weeks later, on 15 April 2025, his employment was terminated summarily. Temporal proximity alone is insufficient to establish causation. However, it is a relevant evidential factor when considered alongside the totality of the surrounding circumstances.

The Respondent stated that the dismissal arose wholly from serious misconduct. I have considered that explanation carefully. For the reasons set out at CA-00071903-023, I have found that the Respondent did not conduct any investigation prior to dismissal, did not afford the Complainant an opportunity to respond to the allegations relied upon, and produced no contemporaneous evidence capable of substantiating the central allegation concerning entry to a resident's apartment. I have also found that the Respondent failed to establish, on the balance of probabilities, either that the alleged misconduct occurred or that it possessed reasonable grounds, following any proper investigation, for believing that it had occurred.

The significance of those findings is not that the dismissal must therefore automatically have resulted from protected disclosures. Rather, the absence of any credible evidential basis for the stated reason for dismissal materially weakens the Respondent's explanation and requires me to consider whether another explanation more plausibly accounts for the decision that was made.

In that regard, I have considered whether any alternative, non-retaliatory explanation emerges from the evidence. No documented performance-management process was produced. No prior disciplinary sanctions were identified. No contemporaneous records were furnished demonstrating that the Respondent had formed concerns regarding the Complainant's conduct independently of the issues raised by him concerning safety and compliance matters. Equally, no evidence was presented by the Respondent to show that the disclosures were investigated and addressed in a neutral manner or that they played no role in deteriorating relations between the parties.

Having regard to the protected disclosures made by the Complainant, management's knowledge of those disclosures, the close temporal proximity between them and the dismissal, the absence of any procedurally fair investigation, the Respondent's failure to establish a credible and substantiated misconduct basis for dismissal, and the absence of any convincing alternative explanation for the termination of the employment relationship, I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the protected disclosures were the principal reason, or among the principal reasons, for the Complainant's dismissal, and that the dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from his having made those disclosures.

Accordingly, I find the complaint to be well founded.

CA-00074330-002:

The Act stated as follows at section 27

27.(1) In this section “penalisation” includes any act or omission by an employer or a person acting on behalf of an employer that affects, to his or her detriment, an employee with respect to any term or condition of his or her employment.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), penalisation includes—

(a) suspension, lay-off or dismissal (including a dismissal within the meaning of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 to 2001), or the threat of suspension, lay-off or dismissal,

(b) demotion or loss of opportunity for promotion,

(c) transfer of duties, change of location of place of work, reduction in wages or change in working hours,

(d) imposition of any discipline, reprimand or other penalty (including a financial penalty), and

(e) coercion or intimidation.

(3) An employer shall not penalise or threaten penalisation against an employee for—

(a) acting in compliance with the relevant statutory provisions,

(b) performing any duty or exercising any right under the relevant statutory provisions,

(c) making a complaint or representation to his or her safety representative or employer or the Authority, as regards any matter relating to safety, health or welfare at work,

(d) giving evidence in proceedings in respect of the enforcement of the relevant statutory provisions,

(e) being a safety representative or an employee designated under section 11 or appointed under section 18 to perform functions under this Act, or

(f) subject to subsection (6), in circumstances of danger which the employee reasonably believed to be serious and imminent and which he or she could not reasonably have been expected to avert, leaving (or proposing to leave) or, while the danger persisted, refusing to return to his or her place of work or any dangerous part of his or her place of work, or taking (or proposing to take) appropriate steps to protect himself or herself or other persons from the danger.

Findings:

The Complainant relied on the same body of internal complaints addressed at CA-00071903-024 above, in particular his repeated complaints from September 2024 onward concerning inadequate security cover, the non-completion of fire safety obligations by other staff, and the assault reported to management on 11 March 2025, each of which is, on its face, a complaint or representation as to a matter of safety, health and welfare at work within the meaning of section 27(3)(c).

For the reasons set out at CA-00071903-023 and CA-00071903-024 above, I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the Complainant's dismissal on 15 April 2025 resulted from these complaints, and not from the safeguarding allegation relied upon in the dismissal letter, which I have found to be unsupported by any credible evidence beyond the hearsay account of the decision-maker. I note again, as found at CA-00071903-023, that the letter of 15 April 2025 is the sole record of the process by which the Complainant's employment was ended: no investigation into any of the matters listed in that letter is evidenced, no disciplinary hearing was convened, and the Complainant was simply issued with a letter of termination, without having first been interviewed or afforded any opportunity to respond.

Considering the foregoing, I find the complaint to be well founded to the extent that the Complainant's dismissal constituted penalisation within the meaning of section 27 of the Act, by reason of complaints made by him as regards safety, health and welfare matters at the centre

CA- 00071903-001:

I am satisfied on the basis of the evidence presented that the Complainant worked on six Sundays during the cognisable period and did not receive any additional compensation in respect of the work he did on these days. I therefore direct that the Respondent pay the Complainant compensation in the amount of €500, being a sum I consider just and equitable having regard to the established breach of section 14.

CA-00071903-002:

I have no jurisdiction to hear this complaint for the reason set out above.

CA-00071903-003:

I have no jurisdiction to hear this complaint for the reason set out above.

CA-00071903-004:

I have no jurisdiction to hear this complaint for the reason set out above.

CA-00071903-005:

I have no jurisdiction to hear this complaint for the reason set out above.

CA-00071903-006:

I have no jurisdiction to hear this complaint for the reason set out above.

CA-00071903-007:

I have no jurisdiction to hear this complaint for the reason set out above.

CA-00071903-008:

I have no jurisdiction to hear this complaint for the reason set out above.

CA-00071903-009:

I have no jurisdiction to hear this complaint for the reason set out above.

CA-00071903-010:

I have no jurisdiction to hear this complaint for the reason set out above.

CA-00071903-011:

I have no jurisdiction to hear this complaint for the reason set out above.

CA-00071903-012:

I have found this complaint to be well founded in part, in respect of the Respondent's failure to notify the Complainant in writing of the change to his terms and conditions arising from his reassignment to Ballisodare in September 2024. Section 7(2)(d) of the Act empowers me to award compensation of such amount, not exceeding four weeks' remuneration, as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances.

Having regard to the fact that this failure was not a momentary or technical oversight but persisted for the duration of the Complainant's employment at Ballisodare, from September 2024 until his dismissal, I consider an award of one weeks' remuneration to be just and equitable. Calculated by reference to the Complainant's average weekly earnings of €700, I direct the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation in the amount of €700.

CA-00071903-013:

This complaint was withdrawn.

CA-00071903-014:

This complaint was withdrawn as the Complainant is not a mobile worker.

CA-00071903-015:

This complaint was withdrawn.

CA-00071903-016:

This complaint was withdrawn.

CA-00071903-018:

I have no jurisdiction to hear this complaint for the reason set out above.

CA-00071903-019:

This complaint was withdrawn

CA-00071903-020:

This complaint was withdrawn.

CA-00071903-021:

This complaint was withdrawn.

CA-00071903-023:

I have made an award in respect of the unfair dismissal at CA-00071903-024 and therefore no separate additional award is made under CA-00071903-023.

CA-00071903-024:

Section 7 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, in relevant part, stated that:

(1) Where an employee is dismissed and the dismissal is an unfair dismissal, the employee shall be entitled to redress consisting of whichever of the following the adjudication officer, considers appropriate having regard to all the circumstances:

(a) re-instatement by the employer of the employee in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal on the terms and conditions on which he was employed immediately before his dismissal together with a term that the re-instatement shall be deemed to have commenced on the day of the dismissal, or

(b) re-engagement by the employer of the employee either in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal or in a different position which would be reasonably suitable for him on such terms and conditions as are reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(c) (i) if the employee incurred any financial loss attributable to the dismissal, payment to him by the employer of such compensation in respect of the loss (not exceeding in amount 104 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of this Act) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances,

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining the amount of compensation payable under that subsection regard shall be had to—

(a) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that subsection was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employer,

(b) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that subsection was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employee,

(c) the measures (if any) adopted by the employee or, as the case may be, his failure to adopt measures, to mitigate the loss aforesaid,

(d) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the procedure referred to in subsection (1) of section 14 of this Act or with the provisions of any code of practice relating to procedures regarding dismissal approved of by the Minister,

(e) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the said section 14,

(f) the extent (if any) to which the conduct of the employee (whether by act or omission) contributed to the dismissal.

3) In this section—

“financial loss”, in relation to the dismissal of an employee, includes any actual loss and any estimated prospective loss of income attributable to the dismissal and the value of any loss or diminution, attributable to the dismissal, of the rights of the employee under the Redundancy Payments Acts, 1967 to 1973, or in relation to superannuation;

“remuneration” includes allowances in the nature of pay and benefits in lieu of or in addition to pay.

Analysis:

I find that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed for the reasons set out above.

In deciding on a suitable remedy, I note that the Complainant has found alternative work and accordingly, in line with his wishes, I have decided to make an award of compensation.

The Complainant was employed by the Respondent earning on average €700 per week and was dismissed from his employment on 15 April 2025 prior to finding alternative employment on 9 January 2026 where he is earning €0.70 per hour less than he was with the Respondent.

In assessing financial loss arising from his dismissal, and the efforts he made to mitigate this loss in accordance with section 7(2)(c) above, I note that the Complainant applied for only six security roles and two caretaker positions across the 38-week period that he was out of work — an insufficient level of effort which, taken on its own, would justify a significant reduction in that loss, consistent with the well-established case law that compensation is reduced to reflect a complainant's own contribution to, or failure to mitigate, his loss.

However, in assessing the level of compensation to award, it would be wholly inappropriate to focus solely on the Complainant's mitigation efforts in circumstances where the Respondent's conduct in dismissing him was entirely unreasonable, as set out above. This is in line with the approach of the Adjudication Officer in ADJ-00032667, who held that regard must be had to all of the subsections of section 7, and that a complainant ought not be penalised solely for insufficient mitigation where the balance of unfairness and non-compliance with section 7 lies squarely with the respondent.

Weighing these considerations, I consider it just and equitable to apply a reduction of 50% to the Complainant's calculated loss of €26,600, reflecting both the limited scope of his job search and the extent to which the Respondent's own conduct, in dismissing him summarily and without any semblance of fair process, materially impaired his prospects of finding suitable alternative employment sooner. That yields a sum of €13,300.

I further find that the Complainant is entitled to a sum reflecting his prospective loss, arising from the fact that his new role pays €0.70 per hour less than his employment with the Respondent. Having regard to his evidence of his working pattern with the Respondent, which involved alternating 36- and 48-hour weeks, I take an average of 42 hours per week as the appropriate basis for this calculation, giving a weekly differential of €29.40. Applying that differential over a prospective period of 24 weeks, which I consider reasonable having regard to the likelihood of some improvement in his circumstances over time, I calculate a prospective loss of €705.60, which I round to €700.

Considering all of the foregoing, I find that an award of €14,000 — comprising €13,300 in respect of actual loss as adjusted for mitigation, together with €700 in respect of prospective loss — represents a just and equitable measure of compensation having regard to all of the circumstances.

CA-00074330-002:

As the complaint now under consideration concerns the same single act of dismissal, a separate financial award under this reference would amount to an impermissible double recovery for the one wrong. Accordingly, while I find this complaint to be well founded in that the Complainant's dismissal did constitute penalisation for having made complaints as regards health and safety matters, I make no separate award of compensation under this reference; the redress attaching to the dismissal has already been determined at CA-00071903-024.