Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

An Employee

An Employer

Representatives

Self-Represented

Ms Bébhinn Murphy B.L instructed by Bowler Geraghty & Co.

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000

CA-00066550-001

08/10/2024

The Complainant gave evidence on Affirmation. She filed and relied upon legal submissions and documentary evidence during the course of the hearing. It was shared with the Respondent’s representative at the first hearing despite being shared with the Respondent directly on 31 December 2025.

The Respondent was represented by Ms Bébhinn Murphy B.L instructed by Colm Dunne of Bowler Geraghty Solicitors. The Orthodontist and owner of the Respondent gave evidence on Affirmation.

The complaint was heard over two days. On the first hearing date, the Respondent raised a jurisdictional objection. The parties were invited to respond to the Supreme Court Judgment in County Louth VEC v Equality Tribunal [2016] IESC 40 and ADJ-00053914- Santa Musinska v. Oak Central Recruitment Services Limited. Time was afforded to the parties at the hearing and in advance of the second hearing to file legal submissions on this point. The Complainant filed submissions on 28 January 2026.  The Respondent made oral submissions on the second date of the hearing.

The Respondent was also invited to file its documentary evidence in advance of the second hearing date which it did so on 4 February 2026.

Anonymisation of Decision

In response to Respondent’s application, the Complainant stated she wished to have a public hearing with the parties named in the decision.

Preliminary Objection

The Complainant opposed the Respondent's jurisdictional objection, stating that she had made the complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) in good faith and was not aware of the distinctions between the various pieces of employment and equality legislation.

She explained that she sought legal advice, followed the advice available to her, and subsequently submitted a complaint to the WRC herself.

The Complainant submitted that the Respondent was fully aware of the substance of her complaint from the outset, as the issues had been set out in her resignation letter and previous correspondence. She maintained that nothing had been concealed from the Respondent and that the Respondent was aware of the circumstances giving rise to the complaint.

The Complainant further stated that she had informed the Respondent in her resignation letter dated 5 September 2024 that she intended to pursue the matter through the WRC. While acknowledging that she was unfamiliar with the relevant legislative requirements and procedures, she contended that she had taken reasonable steps to notify the Respondent of her concerns and her intention to seek redress.

In response to the submissions made on the second hearing date, the Complainant noted that these were only being made on the day and despite being given time to file submissions, the Respondent waited until the second hearing date.

Complainant’s Evidence

The Complainant gave evidence that she commenced employment with the Respondent in July 2023 following discussions regarding a part-time task-based Dental Assistant of approximately 20 hours per week at an hourly rate of €12.70 per hour. She stated that she accepted the position on that basis and worked those hours, occasionally working additional time when required. The Complainant said she did not receive a written contract until July 2024.

On 17 July 2024, after signing and returning a contract described as permanent part-time employment, she informed management that she was pregnant. She stated that she disclosed her pregnancy because aspects of her role involved lifting deliveries and climbing stairs and because she had been experiencing pregnancy-related sickness. According to the Complainant, approximately thirty minutes after disclosing her pregnancy she was informed that a meeting had been arranged regarding a proposed change to her working hours.

The Complainant stated that at a meeting on 25 July 2024 she was presented with a proposal to reduce her hours to 12 hours every two weeks. She said she immediately advised management that this arrangement was not viable as it would result in the loss of her Working Family Payment and a significant reduction in income. The Complainant contended that no other employee was similarly affected and that, having learned other employees had not been informed of any reduction in hours, she believed the proposal was related to her pregnancy.

It was her evidence that that she became extremely upset following the meeting, left work, and subsequently went on certified sick leave. The Complainant further stated that while on sick leave she was repeatedly contacted by email, telephone and text message and was pressed to respond to the proposed reduction in hours despite providing medical certificates.

She stated that job advertisements were placed during this period for roles which she believed she could have performed and that other employees were treated more favourably when their working arrangements changed.

It was the Complainant's evidence that everything changed following her disclosure of pregnancy and that she believed the reduction in hours and subsequent treatment arose because she was pregnant.

Cross Examination

During cross-examination, the Respondent put it to the Complainant that although she had been advised her role was at risk of redundancy and had been invited to engage in a redundancy consultation process, she was never selected for redundancy and no redundancy dismissal occurred because she resigned before the process concluded. The Respondent also referred to wider changes within the practice and submitted that there had been restructuring and redundancies affecting other staff members. The Complainant maintained that her concern was not the consultation process itself but that the proposed reduction in hours was directed at her because of her pregnancy.

The Respondent questioned the Complainant regarding her reliance on the Working Family Payment, noting that eligibility required an average of 19 hours per week and that she had signed a contract providing for 18 hours per week. The Complainant stated that she had been advised that 18 hours was sufficient and further asserted that she regularly worked additional hours beyond those set out in her contract.

The Respondent also challenged her evidence that other employees had received more favourable treatment, suggesting that certain supplementary payments had only been introduced after her resignation. The Respondent further put to the Complainant that internal correspondence demonstrated that proposed changes to working arrangements had been under consideration before she disclosed her pregnancy and that management's personal circumstances had necessitated a restructuring of work patterns. The Complainant disagreed, maintaining that while she had been told of possible "changes" beforehand, no reduction in hours had been mentioned until after she disclosed her pregnancy.

Finally, the Complainant confirmed that she had not taken up further employment following her resignation, stating that she had been medically unfit for work and had been attending counselling.

Anonymisation of Decision

The Respondent requested that the WRC hearing be conducted in private and that any written decision be anonymised. Their main argument was that aspects of the case relate to family law proceedings and a High Court order concerning child access arrangements.

It was submitted by the Respondent's evidence may require reference to family law proceedings in May 2024 which could potentially breach the in camera rule. Holding the hearing in private would help protect the confidentiality obligations arising from those proceedings.

Preliminary Objection

The Respondent raised a preliminary jurisdictional point as where it was submitted the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) did have jurisdiction in this complaint. In particular, the complaint had been brought under the Equal Status Act 2000, despite the Complainant being an employee and the matters complained of arising entirely within the employment relationship.

It was submitted that such complaints properly fall within the scope of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2015.

Reliance was placed on the Complainant's own solicitor's correspondence which referred to her as an employee and raised issues concerning working hours, terms and conditions of employment, pregnancy-related treatment and redundancy, all of which are employment matters. Accordingly, the Respondent contended that the complaint could not properly proceed under the Equal Status Act 2000 and should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The Respondent further submitted that the WRC had no jurisdiction to amend the complaint by substituting a different statutory basis after referral, in response to County Louth VEC v Equality Tribunal [2016] IESC 40.

Reliance was placed on the principle that, while factual details of a complaint may be clarified or expanded, the underlying legislation under which the complaint is brought cannot be changed. It was argued that the complaint had been expressly referred under the Equal Status Act 2000 and must stand or fall under that Act.

The Respondent relied upon An Employee v A Supermarket ADJ-00007376 and An Employee v a Meat Factory, ADJ-00003916

An application to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Section 22 of the Equal Status Act 2000 was made on behalf of the Respondent.

In the alternative, the Respondent submitted that the Complainant had failed to comply with the notification requirements under Section 21 of the Equal Status Act 2000, as neither the solicitor's letter nor any other correspondence notified the Respondent of an intention to seek redress under that Act. The Respondent maintained that permitting such a change would prejudice it, as it was entitled to know from the outset the legal case and statutory framework it was required to defend.

Respondent’s Evidence

The Orthodontist gave evidence that the business had been experiencing significant financial difficulties for a considerable period before the events giving rise to the complaint. The Respondent stated that the practice's financial position had deteriorated during 2022 and 2023 and that the year-end accounts for 2023 showed losses of approximately €190,000 together with unpaid creditors of approximately €270,000. As a result, a restructuring process became necessary, which involved staff reductions, changes to roles and working arrangements, and measures aimed at ensuring the survival of the business.

The Orthodontist also gave evidence that, during 2024, personal and family circumstances significantly affected her availability to work. She stated that a High Court order made in May 2024 altered family arrangements and required her to spend more time caring for her children. According to the Respondent, this necessitated a further restructuring of work patterns within the practice and a reduction in her own working hours. She stated that discussions about changing staffing arrangements were taking place before the Complainant disclosed her pregnancy and that a number of employees were affected by the wider restructuring process. The Respondent denied that any decisions concerning the Complainant were related to pregnancy and maintained that the proposed changes arose solely from the financial difficulties facing the business and her altered family circumstances. The Respondent further stated that throughout her professional career she had employed and worked with many women and would not discriminate against an employee on the grounds of pregnancy.

The Orthodontist gave evidence that she had over 20 years' experience operating dental practices and had previously employed approximately 35 staff members, many of whom were women who had taken maternity leave or had family-related absences during their employment. She stated that accommodating pregnancy and family leave was a normal part of running a business and had never presented any difficulty for her. She said that the proposed restructuring was driven solely by financial pressures on the practice and her own changed family circumstances, rather than by any aspect of the Complainant's pregnancy.

It was the Orthodontist’s evidence that following changes in her personal circumstances during 2024, all staff members were informed that restructuring and reductions in working hours would be required. She explained that patient appointments were scheduled several months in advance and that changes to staff hours could not be implemented immediately without disrupting patient care. According to witness, discussions regarding changes to working arrangements had been ongoing before the Complainant disclosed her pregnancy and all staff were aware that alterations to staffing structures were being considered. She stated that other employees were also affected by the restructuring process, with some accepting revised arrangements and another employee subsequently leaving to secure employment with greater hours elsewhere.

The Orthodontist rejected the allegation that the Complainant's pregnancy played any role in the proposed reduction in hours. She maintained that the need to reduce labour costs arose from the financial difficulties facing the practice and her own reduced availability for work. She stated that she was pleased when informed of the Complainant's pregnancy and denied that she had ever discriminated against an employee on grounds related to pregnancy or family status. In her evidence, she maintained that the changes affecting the Complainant formed part of a broader restructuring process impacting a number of employees and were unrelated to the Complainant's pregnancy.

Cross Examination

During cross-examination, the Complainant challenged the Respondent's assertion that all employees were equally affected by the proposed restructuring. The Complainant noted that another named employee had received a supplementary payment when her hours were reduced, whereas no similar temporary arrangement had been offered to the Complainant despite management being aware that a reduction to 12 hours every two weeks would have significant financial consequences for her. The Orthodontist responded that the supplementation arrangement was introduced months later as a temporary measure after further staffing changes occurred and after the Complainant had already resigned. The Complainant also questioned whether the alleged restructuring had genuinely been planned before her pregnancy disclosure, noting that she had signed a contract providing for 18 hours per week on 17 July 2024 and that no proposal to reduce her hours had been communicated until shortly after she informed management that she was pregnant. The witness maintained that discussions regarding changes had been ongoing, but that the practical details could not be finalised until she had assessed staffing needs, patient commitments and the operational impact of her changed family circumstances.

The Complainant further questioned internal communications referenced in the Respondent's submissions and suggested that there was little documentary evidence demonstrating active discussions regarding reductions to her hours before her pregnancy announcement. She also queried why the Respondent had continued to issue her with a contract for 18 hours per week if significant reductions were already being contemplated. The Orthodontist accepted that there had been management oversights, including delays in issuing contracts, and stated that she had been dealing with substantial personal, family and business pressures at the time.

She denied that there was any agenda against the Complainant and reiterated that the proposed changes stemmed from financial difficulties and operational restructuring rather than pregnancy.

The Complainant raised concerns regarding what she considered persistent contact from the Respondent while she was on certified sick leave, maintaining that she had been repeatedly pressed to respond to the proposed changes despite informing the Respondent that she was medically unfit and not in a position to engage.

Anonymisation of Decision

Having carefully considered the submissions of both parties, I am satisfied that special circumstances arise in this case which warrant the anonymisation of this decision.

The Respondent’s witnesses’ family law proceedings formed a material part of the evidence relied upon in defence of the complaint. That evidence necessarily involved matters which are subject to the in camera rule. The WRC has no jurisdiction to disapply or circumvent the protections afforded by the in camera rule. Having regard to the nature of the evidence presented, its relevance to the issues in dispute, and the need to protect the confidentiality of family law proceedings, I am satisfied that there is no basis upon which to depart from the in camera rule. Accordingly, I direct that this decision be anonymised.

Preliminary Objection

The Respondent submitted that the complaint had been incorrectly referred under the Equal Status Act 2000 and that the Workplace Relations Commission had no jurisdiction to amend the statutory basis of the complaint to one under the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015. The Respondent relied upon the distinction between a complaint brought under the correct legislative basis and a complaint brought under an entirely different , arguing that any amendment would impermissibly alter the legal basis of the claim and create jurisdiction where none existed.

This submission is not accepted.

In reaching this conclusion, regard was had to decision in An Employee v A Meat Factory ADJ-00003916, relied upon by the Respondent wherein it was held; “Furthermore, I am satisfied that this matter was brought to the Respondent’s attention at an early juncture in these proceedings and as a result the Respondent’s defence of the claim has not been prejudiced as it was fully aware of the general nature of the claim and the legislative basis underpinning the proceedings well in advance of the oral hearing. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the present complaint is admissible in accordance with the provisions of Section 77 of the Employment Equality Acts.”

That approach is consistent with the judgment of the Supreme Court in County Louth VEC v The Equality Tribunal [2009] IESC 17, where the Court held that there is "nothing sacrosanct" about the notification to the WRC and that any written communication may, in principle, be sufficient to activate the jurisdiction of the WRC. The Supreme Court emphasised that the substance of the complaint, rather than the form in which it is presented, is the critical consideration.

Having considered the other decision relied upon by the Respondent,

Applying those principles to the present case, I am satisfied that the Respondent was, at all material times, fully aware of the nature of the complaint being advanced. While the Complainant selected the Equal Status Act 2000 when lodging her complaint, the narrative contained within the complaint form repeatedly referred to her status as an employee and to alleged adverse treatment occurring immediately following the disclosure of her pregnancy.

The word "pregnancy" appears throughout the complaint narrative and the accompanying submission.

The complaints identified included the proposed reduction of working hours, the identification of her role as being at risk, alleged harassment through repeated contact whilst on certified sick leave and alleged less favourable treatment following disclosure of her pregnancy. These are matters which plainly arise within the employment relationship and fall to be considered under the Employment Equality Acts.

I am further satisfied that no prejudice has been occasioned to the Respondent. The Respondent was aware from an early stage, by the Complainant’s Solicitor letter dated 15 August 2024 and in the narrative of the Complaint Form, dated 8 October 2024, along with the accompanying submission.  

Accordingly, having regard to the substance of the complaint, the absence of prejudice to the Respondent, the decision in An Employee v A Meat Factory, ADJ-00003916 and the principles articulated by the Supreme Court in County Louth VEC v The Equality Tribunal 2009] IESC 17, I find that the complaint is properly before me under the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015. I therefore allow the amendment of the complaint and proceed to determine the substantive complaint of discrimination on the gender ground arising from pregnancy.

Substantive Matter

Discrimination is defined in Section 6 of the Employment Equality Act 1998-2015 (“Acts”) as:

6.—(1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where—

(a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the "discriminatory grounds") which—

(i) exists,

(ii) existed but no longer exists,

(iii) may exist in the future, or

(iv) is imputed to the person concerned,

(b) a person who is associated with another person—

(i) is treated, by virtue of that association, less favourably than a person who is not so associated is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and

(ii) similar treatment of that other person on any of the discriminatory grounds would, by virtue of paragraph (a), constitute discrimination.

(2) As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are—

(a)    that one is a woman and the other is a man (in this Act referred to as “the gender ground”),”

“(2A) Without prejudice to the generality of subsections (1) and (2), discrimination on the gender ground shall be taken to occur where, on a ground related to her pregnancy or maternity leave, a woman employee is treated, contrary to any statutory requirement, less favourably than another employee is, has been or would be treated.”

Burden of Proof

Section 85A of the Acts sets out the burden of proof:

“(1) where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary”.

Therefore, the burden of proof is on the Complainant to establish that she was treated less favourably on account of her pregnancy (gender). To this end, the Complainant must establish both the primary facts upon which she relies and that those facts are of sufficient significance to raise an inference of discrimination.

If the Complainant discharges the burden of proof, the burden then shifts to the Respondent.

The Complainant's evidence was that she informed management of her pregnancy on 17 July 2024 when returning her signed contract. It is further accepted that shortly thereafter she was informed that a meeting would be arranged concerning changes to her working arrangements. The Complainant stated that, although there had been general references to possible changes within the practice, no proposal to reduce her hours had been discussed with her prior to her pregnancy announcement. Indeed, it was the Complainant's own evidence that from May 2024 she had noticed some reduction and fluctuation in her hours and had discussed this with another Dental Assistant. However, she maintained throughout her evidence and cross-examination that any proposal for a significant reduction in her contractual hours only arose after she disclosed her pregnancy.

On 25 July 2024, the Complainant was presented with a proposal reducing her hours from 18 hours per week to 12 hours every two weeks. The proximity in time between the disclosure of the pregnancy and the communication of the proposed reduction in hours despite the contract being presented only days earlier cannot be ignored. It is sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination, thereby shifting the burden to the Respondent.

From 28 July 2024 onwards, the Complainant was on certified sick leave and remained absent until her resignation on 6 September 2024. During this period, the Complainant was invited to attend a meeting on 13 August 2024. When she did not attend, she received an email dated 15 August 2024, including an "At Risk" letter and a Frequently Asked Questions document relating to the redundancy process. It is notable that these communications occurred while the Complainant was on certified sick leave and medical certificates had been furnished to the Respondent, albeit there were short gaps between the certificates.

On 15 August 2024, the Complainant's Solicitor wrote to the Respondent setting out her concerns.

The Respondent's Solicitor replied on 6 September 2024 denying the allegations. On the same date, the Complainant resigned from her employment, citing, inter alia, discrimination arising from her pregnancy.

Based on the evidence presented, the Complainant was not dismissed by way of redundancy or otherwise. Rather, she resigned during the consultation process. The Complainant accepted in cross-examination that her principal concern was not the redundancy consultation process itself but her belief that the proposed reduction in hours was directed at her because she was pregnant. Accordingly, the central issue for determination is not redundancy selection but the reduction in the Complainant's hours.

It is accepted that the Respondent's business was experiencing genuine financial difficulties and that the Orthodontist's personal circumstances had altered significantly during the relevant period. The Respondent's evidence was that these matters necessitated a restructuring of staffing arrangements. However, there were significant evidential gaps in the Respondent's explanation regarding the timing and rationale for the treatment of the Complainant.

The Respondent maintained that all staff had been informed of impending changes and that the proposal made to the Complainant formed part of a wider restructuring process. However, no evidence was presented to establish that any other employee was presented with a proposal equivalent to that put to the Complainant immediately following her pregnancy announcement. While the Respondent contended that other staff were affected by changes, there was no material evidence to support this claim.

Furthermore, despite the central involvement of both the Dental Assistant and the Clinical Manager in the communications and meetings with the Complainant, neither attended to give evidence. This is significant given that the Orthodontist herself was not directly involved in many of the communications concerning the Complainant's hours. In these circumstances, and in the absence of direct evidence from those most involved in the engagement with the Complainant, I prefer and accept the Complainant's account of events.

It is also noted there were a number of inconsistencies within the Respondent's evidence. The Respondent asserted that restructuring and reductions in hours had been under consideration before the Complainant disclosed her pregnancy. However, the Complainant had been issued with a contract reflecting 18 hours per week on 8 July 2024 and returned the signed contract on 17 July 2024. The Respondent did not provide a clear explanation as to why a contract for 18 hours per week would be issued if a substantial reduction in those hours was already envisaged. Equally, while the Respondent maintained that all employees were aware of impending reductions, no direct evidence or documentary evidence was presented to support this contention.  

The persistent contact with the Complainant during her period of certified sick leave is also noteworthy. While an employee is under an obligation to keep an employer informed of their absence and there were short periods where medical certification was outstanding, the Respondent continued to communicate with the Complainant by email, telephone and text message regarding proposed changes to her hours, invitations to meetings and, ultimately, the redundancy process. This was notwithstanding the Respondent's knowledge that the Complainant was medically unfit for work.

The Respondent did not seek to have the Complainant assessed by its occupational health despite being expressly provided for in the contract of employment. Whilst I accept that some communication was necessary, the frequency and nature of the contact has not been satisfactorily explained.

The Complainant also presented documentary evidence of a job advertisement for a Part-Time Assistant for 17 to 19 hours per week from 1 August 2024 and a further advertisement for a Part-Time Evening Assistant from 31 December 2024. The Complainant's evidence was that she could have undertaken the duties described in those advertisements and that she was never offered those hours despite the proposed reduction to her own hours. No substantive rebuttal of this evidence was provided by the Respondent which considering the reasoning for reducing the Complainant’s hours leaves a significant evidential gap.

Having regard to all of the evidence, I am satisfied that the Complainant has established a prima facia case of discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy.

While it is accepted that the Respondent was experiencing genuine financial and personal difficulties during the relevant period, I am not satisfied that the Respondent has rebutted the prima facia case of discrimination. The evidential gaps in the Respondent's account, the failure to call witnesses who were centrally involved in the communications and meetings with the Complainant, the contemporaneous recruitment of a Part-Time Assistant notwithstanding the proposed reduction in the Complainant's hours, and the absence of a clear explanation for the treatment complained of, can only lead to the conclusion that the Respondent has failed to discharge the burden of proof.

Accordingly, I find that the Complainant was treated less favourable treatment on the gender ground arising from her pregnancy, contrary to the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015. The complaint is therefore well founded.

Having regard to all of the circumstances of the case, including the serious nature of discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy, the effect of the discrimination on the Complainant, and the requirement that an award be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, I order the Respondent to pay compensation of €10,000 as being just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances.