Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Matthew  Crowley Holland

Rent 365 Ltd The Kate Kavanagh Pension Fund

Representatives

Appeared in person with Mary Roche.

 John Lyons, Proprietor.

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000

CA-00063460-002

25/05/2024

The Complainant was a tenant at a dwelling operated by the Respondent letting agency from April 13, 2023. He has claimed that he was discriminated against on housing needs ground in the context of this tenancy.

He outlined in his written submission that he indicated to Mr Lyons his intention of applying for HAP from May 9, 2023, onwards.

He obtained the pre cursor approval from Cork City Council and completed the application form for HAP.

The Complainant submitted these forms to Mr Lyons for completion and eventual submission. A delay ensued until “finally I hand delivered the forms to his office to him personally “.

These were completed but omitted proof of ownership, which caused further delay.

The Complainant sought to expedite the matter but was met with:

“just to point out to you that you did not inform us that you would be looking for HAP when you moved into the property, which is information which would have been helpful when we originally registered the property with RTB as the registration letter from RTB is normally sufficient for HAP when people are making the application “

The Complainant took advice from Threshold and learned that the Respondent stated position was “not true “.

In November 2023, Mr Lyons supplied proof of ownership, which was accepted. However, some administrative details were missing, and the respondent was unwilling to address these.

The HAP application was returned “as it missed the 2023 deadline “.

The Complainant exhibited the ES1 form dated 4 December 2023.

“I have qualified for HAP for 8 months now. However, John has still not completed his side of the documents.

Why has there been an 8-month delay on filling out your side of the HAP form?

Why can you not produce basic information in a timely fashion. such a proof of ownership, address, email and/ or contact number? Why have you been ignoring my emails.

Evidence of the Complainant:

The Complainant outlined that he had qualified for HAP in previous tenancy. He exhibited an undated confirmation of his approval for HAP in c 2021. He was recorded as having to meet a rental weekly payment of €39.20 on 22 November 2021.

At my request and post hearing, he also exhibited a February 2026 declaration from the City Council which indicated that his application for social housing for a one bed property was open 3 August 2021 to 31 October 2025 and was closed due to non-return of a social housing review form.

 He also exhibited section A of a HAP application form date stamped for receipt and approval on 9 May 2023.

He gave sworn evidence on oath that he had applied for HAP in the current tenancy in August 2023. He was familiar with the protections in HAP and did not anticipate any difficulties. He had an expectation that he would be restored to the HAP payment.

By October 2023, it became apparent the process was delayed on confirming proof of ownership on the respondent side.

This was addressed but the application process was further hampered by the City Council seeking basic information missing from the Respondent section B of the form.

The Complainant had begun to experience severe financial difficulties having lost HAP cover. He worked part time and studied with grant aid, but he was struggling.

He took advice and served an ES1 form on the Respondent. He knew Mr Lyons had accepted it, but he did not receive a reply. He had not registered the notification or kept record of postage.

The Complainant was unsuccessful in securing HAP due to the administrative delays. He exhibited a handwritten but undated acknowledgement slip attributed to the City Council which returned the HAP documents.

“We could not get details needed from your landlord. Therefore, we had to close this application “

He sensed a change in how Mr Lyons interacted with him.

At a meeting in July 2024 with his house mates and Mr Lyons, he referred to the WRC complaint alongside discussion of the deposit. He felt intimidated when Mr Lyons asked him what he wanted?

The Complainant moved out in April 2025. He found it almost impossible to find accommodation.

The Complainant submitted that the delay in finalising the HAP application was not of his making and responsibility for this rested with his landlord. The delay which ensued propelled him into major financial challenges which HAP had it been available to him, would have off set.

He had been denied HAP and this constituted Discrimination based on his housing need.

HAP was calculated at €286 per month against a rent of €412.75.

He endured this differential of €6, 948 unanticipated expenditures on rent over the time of his tenancy.

During cross examination, Mr Lyons put to the Complainant that he had not overtly refused him HAP. The Complainant responded by stating that he had dropped off the HAP form at the business office on 8 June 2023. “I said I wanted HAP “

He accepted that Mr Lyons had not refused him HAP but had delayed which prompted this claim as the end result was no HAP.

The Complainant met him one month later.

The Complainant had identified that 27 November 2023 had constituted the most recent date of Discrimination. I inquired what happened?

The Complainant outlined that he had kept furnishing Mr Lyons with information which was not processed and ultimately the HAP section closed his application . They invited a subsequent application , but this did not followed .

The Complainant concluded by summarising the negative impact the Discrimination had and he contended he had been wronged by the Respondent .

The Respondent operates a property management company and disputes the claim made.

By means of written submission, he outlined that the property rented by the Complainant is owned by a pension company.

He countered the Complainants submission when he wrote:

“ .. He claims that I did not fill out the HAP form which is not true. The form was filled out with the details of the owner of the property which is New Court Pensioners Trustees ltd. I did not omit any information when filling out the forms “

I provided HAP with RTB registration letter and over the course of the next few months I provided insurance policy, LPT number for property lease agreement for the property and a letter from the pension company confirming that the property was purchased in the name of the property trustees company Retirement Asset holding s DAC but that was not to the satisfaction of HAP. There were several over and back between the Pension company in order to get a letter to prove they are the beneficial owners of the property. As soon as I received this letter, I sent it to HAP.

….

HAP contacted me during this time to ask if they made payment would the tenant be refunded any rent that he may have paid, and I confirmed that any overpayment of rent would be returned to the tenant.”

The ES1 signed receipt was dated by means of an ES2 on 11 February 2026.

Mr Lyons attached a chronological log of correspondence compiled between 9 May 2023 -2 November 2023.

Evidence of the Respondent:

The Respondent outlined under oath that he operated a Rental business single handedly.

The property at the centre of the case is a 3 bedroomed property and he rented it to two couples in March 2023, one of whom was the complainant and his partner.

He had not received an application form for HAP by 18 May 2023.

He acknowledged that the property was in an unusual category of a self-administered pension company.

It was his understanding that a “normal RTB letter plus proof of LPT was enough to trigger an approval for HAP “

On this occasion, more financial information was sought.

By 20 June 2023, proof of ownership remained outstanding and proved difficult to secure. He engaged in an extended “to and fro” exercise with the owners but never refused the Complainant HAP.

On 6 October 2023, when the matter remained unresolved, he gave an undertaking to the City Council that if the complainants rent was overpaid, he would “get it back “.

The delay was down to the beneficial owner of the property.

He recalled that the tenancy changed in July 2024 and he had attended an informal meeting with the tenants.

Mr Lyons told the hearing that he had only received the ES1 the week before the WRC hearing. He maintained that the business desk was attended 9-5pm in a shared office and it would not have been missed.

He submitted that he had a positive history in receiving HAP supports and had not discriminated against the complainant or anyone in 25 years in business. He had worked to comply with Section B of the HAP process.

During cross examination,

The Complainant disputed the Respondents recall of the information meeting when tenancy changed in April 2025 as the tenants just left keys.

Ms Lyons repeated that he had not refused HAP to the complainant. Instead, he had “done all that was physically possible “to submit the requested information to the city council.

 The process around the unusual category of owner   was new to me. “

In closing, Mr Lyons alluded to 12 properties in his portfolio that are currently supported by HAP Payments.

He concluded that he had not intimidated the complainant regarding his WRC case and distinguished the length of time spent on the meeting by mentioning his recollection of 5 minutes as opposed to the complainant’s recollection of 10 mins.

I have been requested to reach a decision in this claim for Discrimination on Housing Assistance grounds in accordance with Section 3 of the Equal Status Act, 2000.

In reaching my decision , I have considered all oral and written submissions alongside evidence adduced at hearing .

I fully accept that the complainant was covered by the Housing Assistance ground .

The claim has clearly been very difficult for each  of the parties involved .

Discrimination (general).

3.(1) For the purposes of this Act discrimination shall be taken to occur—

(a) where a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) or, if appropriate, subsection (3B), (in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’) which—

(i) exists,

(ii) existed but no longer exists,

(iii) may exist in the future, or

(iv) is imputed to the person concerned,

The Housing Assistance ground is a recent addition in Section 3(3) (b)

3B) For the purposes of section 6(1)(c), the discriminatory grounds shall (in addition to the grounds specified in subsection (2)) include the ground that as between any two persons, that one is in receipt of rent supplement (within the meaning of section 6(8)), housing assistance (construed in accordance with Part 4 of the Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2014) or any payment under the Social Welfare Acts and the other is not (the “housing assistance ground”).

Section 6(1) of the Act

Disposal of premises and provision of accommodation.

6.— (1) A person shall not discriminate in—

(a) disposing of any estate or interest in premises,

(b) terminating any tenancy or other interest in premises, or

(c)subject to subsection (1A), providing accommodation] or any services or amenities related to accommodation or ceasing to provide accommodation or any such services or amenities.

The circumstances of this case are unusual, in that the complainant changed direction in legislation some two weeks following his initial complaint lodged on 14 May 2024.

He was advised of his options by the WRC and sent hyperlinks for further details of the Equal Status Acts 2000 but unusually, he did not comply with furnishing  the obligatory pre cursor documentation referred to here as an ES1 form, but in every day, language can be a plain letter of notification.

To explain further, Section 21 (2) sets down an obligatory action prior to seeking redress under the Equal Status Act 2000.

Redress in respect of prohibited conduct.

21.— (1) A person who claims that prohibited conduct has been directed against him or her may, subject to this section, seek redress by referring the case to the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission

(1A) If the grounds for such a claim as is referred to in subsection (1) arise—

(a) on the gender ground, or

(b) in any other circumstances (including circumstances amounting to victimisation) to which the Gender Goods and Services Directive is relevant,

then, subject to subsections (2) to (7) and (8) to (11), the person making the claim may seek redress by referring the case to the Circuit Court instead of referring the case to the Director of the Workplace Relations Commissionunder subsection (1) (and, if the case is referred to the Circuit Court, no further appeal lies, other than an appeal to the High Court on a point of law).

(2) Before seeking redress under this section, the complainant—

(a) shall, within 2 months after the prohibited conducted is alleged to have occurred, or, where more than one incident of prohibited conduct is alleged to have occurred, within 2 months after the last such occurrence, notify the respondent in writing of—

(i) the nature of the allegation,

(ii) the complainant’s intention, if not satisfied with the respondent’s response to the allegation, to seek redress under this Act,

and

(b) may in that notification, with a view to assisting the complainant in deciding whether to refer the case to the Director of the Workplace Relations Commissionor, as the case may be, the Circuit Court], question the respondent in writing so as to obtain material information and the respondent may, if the respondent so wishes, reply to any such questions.

(2A) For the purposes of subsection (2) the date of notification is the date on which the notification is sent, unless it is shown that the notification was not received by the respondent.

The purpose of this action is to allow the parties some time and opportunity to reflect on what happened, an opportunity to submit questions and most importantly launch the crucial phrase:

“Please note that I intend to seek redress under the Equal Status Acts 2000-2015, If I am not satisfied with the reply I receive, or if you fail to reply within a month after it was sent to you “

The Complainant gave evidence of his recall of posting this form, but not of registering it or retaining proof of postage.

The Respondent gave evidence that the first time he saw the completed ES1 form dated 4 December 2023 was when the WRC forwarded it to him on receipt from the complainant one-week prior top hearing. This in turn prompted him to fill in the ES2 albeit with the date of 11 February 2026.

This constitutes a conflict in evidence and must be resolved by me in order move forward in my investigation. 

1 There was no mention of ES1 form on initial complaint on 14 May 2024. Section A. of the HAP application  was approved on May 9, 2023, as the date stamp indicated. There was no mention of the ES1 in the Complainants own submission.

Neither party presented Section B at any time during this case. That is the respondent section.

2 On 28 May 2024, in response to queries from the WRC confirmed that the complainant sent the ES1 form by post on 4 December 2023. He did not receive an ES2. He did not forward it to the WRC at that time.

The Complainant did not give evidence that he had attached an ES2 to the ES1 so as to prompt a response.

3 The Complainant had liaised with a third-party advisor at that time.

4 The Respondent declared that he had not received the ES1. It does not appear on his log of correspondence, while not probative, represents his case note correspondence. He did not make any inquiries regarding an ES1 until the hearing day February 2026.

5 Missing from that log are also two key emails from the complainant’s submission

1. 20 September 2023 at 10.28 to an email underlined as John Lyons rather than the email address inclusive of the business address. This placed the Council HAP section as advising the complainant to contact Threshold and fill out an ES1 form. I found this unusual.

2. 22 September 2023 at 11.40 from Mr Lyons at his business email said it was ok to contact Threshold but there was no response to the ES1 reference.

I am left in doubt that the 20 September 2023 email was properly directed at the respondent, given the distinguishing email addresses exhibited.

3 I was not persuaded by the Complainants evidence on his posting the ES1. I found him vague on this issue. Neither was I persuaded that this matter was informally discussed in July 2024 and believe this was a mistake.

4 The syntax of the exhibited Es1 was unusual as it was written partly in third person “John has not replied to my last 6 emails over the last two and half moths “to “Why can you not produce basic information in a timely fashion, such as proof of ownership, address email and or contact number? “

The email thread of 24 November and 27 November 2023 are duplicated to two different addresses

8 December 2023 at 13.15 hrs from Mr Lyons to Mr Crowley Holland email

“The owner has provided the details of the pension company who own the property to HAP and is not willing to give her home address at it is a pension company who own the property. I have sent all the details to the HAP, but they will not accept the information …. “

Personal details were withheld.

There was no response to this email by the complainant. By then HAP had confirmed that they were not progressing his application for HAP. I was not met with any appeal of this by the Complainant and I was not clear why he did not relaunch his application for HAP.

He has since secured HAP in new accommodation.

I have given all these circumstances a careful consideration and cannot establish that the Complainant served an ES1 or plain note notification on the Respondent on 4 December 2023 or any time.

I find that the ES1 was submitted to the WRC when I requested it on February 3, 2026. Perhaps, it lay dormant somewhere, but I cannot be certain, as I need to be, that Section 21(2) (a) (ii) and S 21(2)(b) of the Act have been complied with on these circumstances.

I found the Respondent very persuasive on this topic that the ES1 notification would not have been missed in his administration and accepted his evidence on the gate keeping administration service.

I don’t want to wrong anyone, but I find that the complainant was professionally advised during December 2023 and ought to have embraced the normal recording of postage or registration of posting in a form so integral to this case.

I cannot establish that the ES1 was served as submitted.

Section 21(3)(A) Equal Status Act 2000.

The Complainant has not made an application to waiver the application of S 21(2) as he was certain he had served the ES1.

This section of the Act applies to an application made to proceed with the investigation without adherence to the precursor Section 21 (2)

Section 21 (3) (a) of the Acts provides that:

 On application by a complainant the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission or, as the case may be, the Circuit Court may —

 (ii) exceptionally, where satisfied that it is fair and reasonable in the particular circumstance of the case to do so direct that subsection (2) shall not apply in relation to the complaint to the extent specified in the direction,

And, where such a direction is given, this Part shall have effect accordingly.

  (b) In deciding whether to give a direction under paragraph (a)(ii) the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission or, as the case may be, the Circuit Court shall have regard to all the relevant circumstances, including —

(I) the extent to which the respondent is, or is likely to be, aware of the circumstances in which the prohibited conduct occurred, and

(ii) The extent of any risk of prejudice to the respondent’s ability to deal adequately with the complaint. 

The Labour Court considered a definition on exceptional circumstances in

Stablefield ltd V Ana Lacraniora Manciu in DWT 1714,

 under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997.

 This Court has, in a number of cases, considered the application of the test to determine whether exceptional circumstances apply:

 In Joyce Fitzsimons-Markey v Gaelscoil Thulach na nOg [2004] ELR 110(cited in Kylemore Services Group/Home Fare Services Limited v Terrie Clarke (DEC-E2015-160)

 The Court stated:

“Exceptional Circumstances

The Court must first consider if the circumstances relied upon by the applicant can be regarded as exceptional. If it answers that question in the affirmative the Court must then go on to consider if those circumstances operated so as to prevent the applicant from lodging her claim in time.

The term exceptional is an ordinary familiar English adjective and not a term of art. It describes a circumstance which is such as to form an exception, which is out of the ordinary course or unusual or special or uncommon. To be exceptional a circumstance need not be unique or unprecedented or very rare; but it cannot be one which is regular or routinely or normally encountered (see R v Kelly [1999] 2 All ER 13 at 20 per Lord Bingham CJ.)”

The Complainant has not made such an application.

Having taken everything into consideration, I must with some reluctance conclude that I am impeded in advancing in my investigation as the obligatory notification of prohibited conduct was not incorporated onto either an ES1 form of plain letter of notification as provided in Section 21 (2) of the Act.

I appreciate that this was a difficult time for the complainant and a frustrating time for the respondent as he sought to unravel the administrative blocks on revealing the property ownership within a corporate entity.

However, my jurisdiction is derived strictly from Section 21(2) of the Act and my first sight of the ES1 on February 7, 2026, and the ES2 on 11 February 2026 without proof of postage or registration by either party has not allowed me to be certain that that notification as required under the Act occurred.

I lack the jurisdiction to take this matter further.

The claim is not well founded.

Section 25 of the Equal Status Acts, 2000 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 27 of that Act.

Having taken everything into consideration, I must with some reluctance conclude that I am impeded in advancing in my investigation as the obligatory notification of prohibited conduct was not incorporated onto either an ES1 form of plain letter of notification as provided in Section 21 (2) of the Act.

I appreciate that this was a difficult time for the complainant and a frustrating time for the respondent as he sought to unravel the administrative blocks on revealing the property ownership within a corporate entity.

However, my jurisdiction is derived strictly from Section 21(2) of the Act and my first sight of the ES1 on February 7, 2026, and the ES2 on 11 February 2026 without proof of postage or registration by either party has not allowed me to be certain that that notification as required under the Act occurred.

I lack the jurisdiction to take this matter further.

The claim is not well founded.

Claim for Discrimination on Housing Assistance grounds