Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Darren  Boyle

Public Appointment Service Justice Recruitment Department

Representatives

Self

Emmet Hayes Chief State Solicitor's Office

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00061811-004

26/02/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00061811-005

26/02/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under  Schedule III of the Competition Act, 2002-2010

CA-00061811-006

26/02/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Schedule  2 of the Criminal Justice Act 2011

CA-00061811-007

26/02/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2010

CA-00061811-008

26/02/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 67(5) of the Property Services (Regulation)  Act 2011

CA-00061811-009

26/02/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000

CA-00061811-012

26/02/2024

The Complainant participated in a Competition conducted by the Respondent on behalf of An Garda Siochana in 2023. The Complainant was unsuccessful in this competition and as a result he initiated and pursued the above claims against the Respondent. All claims were fully defended.

The Complainant initiated the present claims by way of Workplace Relations Complaint Form which was received by the WRC on the 26th of February 2023. The Complaint Form was in manual format and was completed in manuscript.

The matter came before me at Lansdowne House on the 20th of September 2024. In advance of that date the Respondent delivered a detailed written submission in response to the claims. At the initial hearing on the 20th of September 2024 the Complainant, who was unrepresented, sought time to take advice and to respond to the Respondent’s submission. The matter was relisted but was postponed on several occasions at the Complainant’s request. It was eventually listed for online case-management on the 14th of April 2026 and again on the 15th of May 2026 by which time the Complainant had delivered an up-to-date submission which, he advised, was intended to cover all the claims he was making. On the 15th of May 2026 the Complainant was informed that he would be asked to respond in detail to the issues raised in the Respondent’s submission insofar as the up-to-date submission which he had delivered had not done so. A date was set for a preliminary hearing which took place online on the 21st of July 2026.

On the 21st of July 2026 the Complainant appeared accompanied by his friend Mr. Doyle. The Complainant said that he was relying on his “Final Comprehensive Submission”. I located this document and asked the Complainant to confirm that this was the document upon which he was relying.  The Complainant identified the document and agreed that it was the correct one.

That Complainant’s “Final Comprehensive Submission” purported to name as Respondents: “the Public Appointments Service/An Garda Siochana”. However, the Complainant’s claims the subject matter of this decision only identified the Public Appointments Service as the Respondent and not An Garda Siochana.

The Complainant’s Final Comprehensive Submission stated as follows:

“Strategic Clarification

The Complainant confirms that the core of this complaint arises under the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015.

Any additional claims are ancillary and do not affect the substance of the complaint.

Statement for Hearing

“The core of my complaint is under the Employment Equality Acts. Any other claims are ancillary”

Core Submission

This complaint concerns discrimination on the disability ground, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, and victimisation.

The Respondent assessed a candidate with a known disability without meaningful accommodation.

Reply to Respondent (Paragraphs 39-740 [Which concerned the application to strike out]

The Respondent’s jurisdictional and procedural objections are denied.

The Employment Equality Acts apply to prospective employees.

Section 77 (7) was complied with in substances.

Victimisation may be inferred from circumstances.

Case Law Rebuttal

Bus Eireann v SIPTU is not applicable due to factual disputes.

Kilraine v. Wandsworth is distinguishable and does not apply to equality victimisation.

Compensation

Compensation must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

The Complainant seeks compensation at or near the statutory maximum.

Conclusion

The Respondent’s strike-out application should be refused.

The complaint should proceed to full hearing. “

The Respondent was represented by Ms. Drinan B.L. instructed by the Chief State Solicitor’s Office. A written submission was delivered by the Respondent.

The Respondent’s submission set out the factual background involving the Complainant’s participation the Garda Trainee 2023 Competition “the Competition”.

The submission outlined the full details of the Competition including the selection criteria and key competencies.

The Complainant applied to the Respondent who was charged with the conduct of the Competition and in doing so he disclosed that he has a disability in that he has been diagnosed with Autistic Spectrum Disorder (“A.S.D.”). In response to this disclosure a number of accommodations were afforded to the Complainant to which he agreed.  The Complainant sat an interview on the 29th of September 2023. However, he failed to meet the qualifying mark for three of the five key competencies. Therefore, he was disqualified from the Competition. The Complainant's results were issued to him by letter dated 16 October 2023. The Complainant requested an informal review of his exclusion from the Competition as a result of which a recommendation was made by an officer of the Respondent that the Complainant be re-admitted to the Competition and given an opportunity to re-interview. By email dated 5 November 2023, the Complainant informed the Respondent that he wished to avail of the opportunity to re-sit the Stage 2 interview. By email dated 10 November 2023, the Respondent wrote to the Complainant outlining the reasonable accommodations available to the Complainant at the re-sit interview. The Complainant accepted the reasonable accommodations offered to him by email dated 10 November 2023.

By email to the Respondent dated 14 November 2023 the Complainant alleges he was stopped by a member of An Garda Síochána for speeding and asked the Respondent to investigate the matter.

On 22 November 2023, the Complainant re-sat the Stage 2 interview, before a different interview panel. The Complainant failed to meet the minimum necessary score on a particular competency. Accordingly, he was disqualified from the Competition. the Complainant was notified of his interview result on 30 November 2023.

On 15 December 2023 the Complainant requested a formal review of the original interview and requested that the Respondent overturn the original result. By letter dated 29 January 2024 the Respondent outlined the findings of the formal review. No reason was found to overturn the original result awarded to the Complainant.

By emails dated 6th, 12th and 19th of February 2024 the Complainant suggested wrongdoing against the Respondent and described his allegations as protected disclosures. By letter dated 1 March 2024 the Respondent furnished the Complainant with its investigation into the purported protected disclosures. On 27 March the Complainant issued the within complaints.

The Respondent’s submission made a “Preliminary Strike Out Application” in the following terms:

The Complainant's allegations against the Respondent are denied in their entirety. However, even accepting the version of events advanced by the Complainant, it is respectfully submitted that these facts cannot give rise to a contravention of any of the statutory provisions which ground his complaints. This is because the Complainant was not employed by the Respondent, and does not allege that he ever was. 40. Therefore, almost all of the complaints raised by the Complainant can be disposed of on the preliminary basis that no employment relationship is alleged and the Workplace Relations Commission therefore does not have jurisdiction to consider the Complainant's complaints.

In Bus Eireann v SIPTU PTD8/2004 (Unreported, Labour Court, 13 October 2004) the Labour Court held that a matter should only be dismissed on a preliminary issue where no question of fact arose: "There are limited circumstances in which a preliminary point should be determined separately from other issues arising in a case. Normally this should only be done where it could lead to considerable savings in both time and expense. Furthermore, the Superior Courts have taken the view that an application for a preliminary determination can only apply to a question of pure law where no evidence is needed and where no further information is required. (See judgement of O’Higgans CJ in Tara Exploration & Development Company Limited v Minister for Industry & Commerce [1975] IR 242)."

In relation to the Complainant’s employment status viz avis the Respondent the following submission was made in support of a the application to strike out the Complainants listed:

The Complainant raises the following complaints concerning the making of protected disclosures under various statutory provisions:

a. CA-00061811-006: complaint seeking adjudication pursuant to Schedule III of the Competition Act 2002;

b. CA-00061811-007: complaint seeking adjudication pursuant to Schedule 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 2011;

c. CA-00061811-008: complaint seeking adjudication pursuant to section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2010;

d. CA-00061811-009: complaint seeking adjudication pursuant to section 67(5) of the Property Services (Regulation) Act 2011.

It was contended that “the Complainant's lack of employment status is fatal to Workplace Relations Commission's jurisdiction to hear these complaints.” The following reasons were offered:

Complaint CA-00061811-006, is brought pursuant to Schedule 3 of the Competition Act 2002. This provision vests the Workplace Relations Commission with jurisdiction to hear complaints for penalisation for breaches of section 50(3) of the Competition Act. Section 50(3) prohibits penalisation of employees only: "An employer shall not penalise an employee for having formed an opinion of the kind referred to in subsection (1) [subsection 1 refers to a relevant offence under the Act] and communicated it, whether in writing or otherwise, to the Authority if the employee has acted reasonably and in good faith in forming that opinion and communicating it to the Authority." (emphasis supplied).

Complaint CA-00061811-007 is brought pursuant to Schedule 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 2011. Schedule 2 vests the Workplace Relations Commission with jurisdiction to consider a complaint brought by an employee against an employer alleging penalisation for the making of a protected disclosure contrary to section 20(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2011. Section 20(1) provides: "An employee (or, in the case of an employee who has not reached the age of 18 years, the employee’s parent or guardian, with his or her consent) or any trade union of which the employee is a member, with the consent of the employee, may present a complaint to a rights commissioner that the employee’s employer has contravened section 20 (1) in relation to the employee." (emphasis supplied).

Again the status of employment is a prerequisite to availing of this section. No such status is alleged and accordingly, complaint CA-00061811-007 may be struck out on a preliminary basis. 

The Workplace Relations Commission's jurisdiction to consider complaint CA- 00061811-008 is vested by Schedule 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 2001 (which is inserted by section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2011). That jurisdiction is limited to employees only: "An employee (or, in the case of an employee who has not reached the age of 18 years, the employee’s parent or guardian with his or her consent) or, with the consent of the employee, any trade union of which the employee is a member may present a complaint to a rights commissioner that the employee’s employer has contravened section 8A(5) in relation to the employee and it shall not be necessary for the employee to have at least one year’s continuous service with the employer concerned in order to present such complaint." (emphasis supplied)

The Workplace Relations Commission's jurisdiction to consider complaint CA- 00061811-009 is vested by Schedule 4 of the Property Services Regulation Act 2011. Which gives jurisdiction to the Workplace Relations Commission's to consider a complaint brought by an employee for penalisation by their employer contrary to section 67(5) of the Property Regulation Act. Section 67(5) provides: "An employer shall not penalise or threaten penalisation against an employee, or cause or permit any other person to penalise or threaten penalisation against an employee..."

In addition to the insurmountable obstacle faced by the Complainant by way of a lack of employment relationship with the Respondent, the Complainant faces the fundamental difficulty that he has not made a protected disclosure in any sense, let alone with it in the narrow and specified sense of the above specialist statutory provisions.

The Equal Status Act 2000 Complaint.

The Complainant brings complaint CA-00061811-012 pursuant to Section 21 of the Equal Status Act 2000. It is respectfully submitted that his complaint may also be struck out on a preliminary basis.

This is because the Complainant's grievance relates to the manner in which he alleges his unsuccessful application for a role was assessed by the Respondent. Therefore, the Complainant's statutory redress ostensibly falls within section 8(1) of the Employment Equality Act 1998. Section 8(1) of the Employment Equality Act 1998 provides: "In relation to— (a) access to employment, ... an employer shall not discriminate against an employee or prospective employee ....”

The Complainant's discrimination complaint is brought as a prospective employee and therefore captured by section 8(1) of the Employment Equality Act 1998.

Necessarily then, the Workplace Relations Commission does not have jurisdiction to consider complaint CA-00061811-012. This is because section of the Equal Status Act 2000 provides that the 2000 Act does not apply to complaints governed by the Employment Equality Act 1998.

This is confirmed by section 4 of the Equal Status Act 2000. Section 4(1) prohibits discrimination in the provision of a "service". Section 1 of the Equal Status Act 2000, to exclude matters within the scope of the Employment Equality Act 1998 by defining "service" in the following terms: "“service” means a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes –.... but does not include pension rights (within the meaning of the Employment Equality Act, 1998) or a service or facility in relation to which that Act applies;" (emphasis supplied).

Therefore, complaint CA-00061811-012 is not well-founded and it is respectfully submitted this complaint should be struck out on a preliminary basis.

The Employment Equality Complaints

The Complainant's final complaints, CA-00061811-004 and CA-00061811-005, relate to victimisation and discrimination contrary to section 77 of the Employment Equality Act 1998. 65. It is respectfully submitted that the Complainant's application is misconceived and should be struck out by operation of section 77(7) Employment Equality Act 1998. Section 77(7) provides that:

"Where the complainant's claim for redress is in respect of discrimination

(a) by the holder of a recruitment licence under the Public Service Management (Recruitment and Appointments) Act 2004 in the course of such a recruitment or selection process as is referred to in section 76(5)(a),

(b) by the Minister for Defence in the course of a recruitment process for the Defence Forces, or

(c) by the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána in the course of a recruitment process for the Garda Síochána,

the complainant shall in the first instance refer the claim for redress to the holder of the recruitment licence concerned or, as the case may be, to the Minister for Defence or the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána."

Kerr, Irish Employment Legislation, (Thomson Reuters, R 67, July 2024), at para LB247I, explains the effect of section 77(7) of the Employment Equality Act 1998 in the following terms:

"A claim involving discrimination in recruitment by the holder of a public service recruitment licence, An Garda Síochána or the Defence Forces must first be referred to the recruitment authority concerned. In Public Appointments Service v Roddy EDA 18/2010, the Labour Court confirmed that this is a “mandatory provision” and that neither the Equality Tribunal nor the Labour Court on appeal had any discretion to hear a claim unless the provisions of subs.(7) had been adhered to. In Commissioner of An Garda Síochána v Murphy EDA 9/2012, the Labour Court said that the obligation imposed by subs.(7) encapsulated three essential requirements:

1. there must be a communication from the complainant to the Commissioner;

2. the communication must assert that the complainant suffered identifiable discrimination under the Act; and

3. the communication must contain a request or demand for redress in respect of the alleged discrimination." (emphasis supplied).

It is respectfully submitted that the Complainant has not complied with the provisions of section 77(7). The Complainant has not evidenced a communication to the Respondent prior to the commencement of the within Complaints which refers to an identifiable discrimination under the 1998 Act.

As is apparent from the Complainant's requests for a review of his Stage 2 results and re-sit results, the height of the grievances communicated by the Complainant to the Respondent relate to his disappointment with the result of his interview, rather than an allegation of discrimination.

Insofar as the Complainant alleges that he is the subject of victimisation by way of allegedly receiving two penalty points for speeding it is respectfully submitted that there is no nexus between the making of a protected act under the Employment Equality Act 1998 and the alleged penalisation. Such a nexus is expressly required by the terms of the 1998 Act. Section 74(2) expressly provides that:

"[f]or the purposes of this Part victimisation occurs where dismissal or other adverse treatment of an employee by his or her employer occurs as a reaction to: (a) a complaint of discrimination made by a complaint of discrimination made by the employee to the employer" (emphasis supplied)

First, to state the obvious, the Respondent is not responsible for and does not control the policing decisions of members of An Garda Síochána.

Second, the Complainant had not made an allegation of a discriminatory act on the part of the Respondent against the Respondent prior to the alleged policing action. Therefore, the Complainant's allegation fails in limine. Therefore, there is no "reaction" which could engage the provisions of section 74. 72. Third as is apparent from the express terms of section 74 an employment relationship is required to engage the provisions of section 74. There is no such employment relationship.

Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that complaints CA-00061811-004 and CA- 00061811-005 be struck out on a preliminary basis

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted that the within complaints are frivolous vexatious and bound to fail. Accordingly, the Respondent respectfully submits that the within complaints should be struck out on a preliminary basis.

Submissions

The Complainant was given an opportunity to respond in detail to the Respondent’s submission and in particular to the Respondent’s application contained set out in that submission to have the claims dismissed as frivolous or vexatious. The Complainant delivered a written submission (quoted in full above) and moreover was given an opportunity to deliver any further oral submissions at the hearing on the 21st of July 2026. On that occasion the Complainant stated that he accepted that he was never an employee of the Respondent but that he disputed the outcome of the interview process and that he wished to proceed with the claims. Regarding the submission of the Respondent in relation to the unsustainability of each of the claims the Complainant said that he would rely on his written submissions. The Complainant was accompanied at the hearing by his friend Mr. Jack Doyle who made a statement on the Complainant’s behalf,  which is referred to in the Conclusion section at the end of this decision.

After the hearing on the 21st of July 2026 concluded, the Complainant by email to the WRC dated the 28th of July 2026 purported to deliver a further submission. This submission was not requested, nor did the Complainant seek leave to make a further submission or indicate his intention to deliver one. Furthermore, the Complainant was given a full opportunity to respond to the issues raised in the Respondent’s submission in writing which he did, and at the hearing on the 21st of July 2026 he was afforded a further opportunity to make oral submissions. In the circumstances and being mindful of the obligation to observe fair procedures to both parties I did not accept the Complainant’s submission dated the 28th of July 2026, and I have not considered any aspect of that submission in this decision. 

Whether the Complaints Have a Reasonable Chance of Success

Legislative Provisions

Section 42(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 states:

“An adjudication officer may, at any time, dismiss a complaint or dispute referred to him or her under S.41 if he or she is of the opinion that it is frivolous or vexatious.”

Section 77A subsection (1) of the Employment Equality Act 1998 (as amended) provides:

“The Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission may

dismiss a claim at any stage if of opinion that it has been made in bad faith or is

frivolous, vexatious or misconceived or relates to a trivial matter.”

Section 22 of the Equal Status Act 2000 (as amended) replicates the wording of Section 77A of the Employment Equality Act 1998 (as amended).

The terms “frivolous” and/or “vexatious” are legal terms and should be understood in that context. The terms are often used interchangeably. They were considered by the Barron J in Farley v Ireland [1997] IESC 60 as follows:

“So far as the legality of matters is concerned frivolous and vexatious are legal terms. They are not pejorative in the sense or possibly in the sense that Mr. Farley [the Plaintiff] may think they are. It is merely a question of saying that so far as the plaintiff is concerned if he has no reasonable chance of succeeding then the law says that it is frivolous to bring the case.

Similarly, it is a hardship on the defendant to have to take steps to defend something which cannot succeed, and the law calls that vexatious”.

In Fay v Tegral Pipes Limited & Ors [2005] 2 IR 261, McCracken J outlined that the ‘real purpose’ of the courts’ inherent jurisdiction to dismiss frivolous or vexatious claims was firstly, to ensure that the courts would be used only for the resolution of genuine disputes and not for ‘lost causes’ and, secondly, that parties would not be required to defend proceedings which could not succeed.

In Nowak v. Data Protection Commissioner 2012 [IEHC] 449 Birmingham J. considered the term frivolous in its legal sense as follows:

“Frivolous, in this context does not mean only foolish or silly, but rather a complaint that was futile, or misconceived or hopeless in the sense that it was incapable of achieving the desired outcome.”

Applying the foregoing to the present complaints I will now consider them in turn by reference to above provisions of the relevant legislation as cited above and the legal definition given to the terms frivolous and vexatious from the foregoing judgements.

The Lack of Standing as an Employee of the Respondent

The Complainant accepted that he was not, is not and never sought to be an employee of the Respondent. He did seek to be employed by An Garda Siochana but none of the complainants were directed against that entity, only against the Public Appointments Service. This issue affects the prospects for success of the following claims:

CA-00061811-006: complaint seeking adjudication pursuant to Schedule III of the Competition Act 2002;

CA-00061811-007: complaint seeking adjudication pursuant to Schedule 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 2011;

CA-00061811-008: complaint seeking adjudication pursuant to section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2010;

CA-00061811-009: complaint seeking adjudication pursuant to section 67(5) of the Property Services (Regulation) Act 2011.

The legislation invoked by all these complaints is predicated on the existence of an employment relationship as between the complainant and respondent. As no such relationship as between the Complainant and the Respondent, whether past present or future is contended for, it must follow that these claims have no reasonable prospect for success and accordingly in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Section 42(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 I dismiss these claims.

The Equal Status Act Complaint - CA-00061811-012

The subject matter of the complaint made by the Complainant is his failure to secure employment with An Garda Siochana and accordingly the complainant relates to prospective employee employment a matter which is within the remit of the Employment Equality Act 1998. Such issues are excluded from the scope of the Equal Status Act 2000 by reason of the definition of “service” in Section 1 which effectively excludes a service in relation to which the Employment Equality Act 1998 applies.

Accordingly, this claim has no reasonable prospect of success and for that reason I dismiss it pursuant to Section 22 of the Equal Status Act 2000.

The Employment Equality Act Claims CA-00061811-004 and CA-00061811-005

The Discrimination Claim

I accept the legal submission made by the Respondent (which was not substantively rebutted) that the complaint does not comply with the preconditions in Section 77 (7) in that the Complainant has not evidenced a communication to the Respondent prior to the commencement of the within Complaints which refers to an identifiable discrimination under the 1998 Act. The Respondent contended that “the height of the grievances communicated by the Complainant to the Respondent relate to his disappointment with the result of his interview, rather than an allegation of discrimination”. The grievance in question reads as follows:

“I got my results and I was a wee bit disappointed at the results given that I had undergone in the first interview and in two situations my marks seem to be considerably different and I would like the opportunity to find out why there seems to be a major difference and as such I would like the opportunity for an Informal Review.”

This grievance does not allege discrimination and thus cannot constitute a communication compliant with Section 77 (7) prior to the commencement of proceedings under the Employment Equality Act 1998. As compliance with this provision is mandatory and permits of no discretion, it follows that the claim has no reasonable prospects for success and accordingly I dismiss it pursuant to Section 77A subsection (1) of the Employment Equality Act 1998.

The Victimisation Claim.

I accept the submissions of the Respondent that this claim cannot succeed for the following reasons:

First, the Respondent is not responsible for and does not control the policing decisions of members of An Garda Síochána.

Second, the Complainant has not made an allegation of a discriminatory act on the part of the Respondent against the Respondent prior to the alleged policing action. Therefore, the Complainant's allegation fails in limine [a Latin phrase which means “at the threshold”]. Therefore, there is no "reaction" which could engage the provisions of section 74.

Third as is apparent from the express terms of section 74 an employment relationship is required to engage the provisions of section 74. There is no such employment relationship.

Accordingly, this claim has no reasonable prospect for success and accordingly I dismiss it pursuant to Section 77A subsection (1) of the Employment Equality Act 1998.

Conclusion

The Competition was oversubscribed, and the positions were highly sought after, The Respondent informed me that there were 5,309 applicants, of whom only 1,039 were successful. It is evident that the Complainant was very disappointed with the outcome of his participation in the Competition and such disappointment is understandable.

The Complainant’s friend Mr. Doyle spoke in support of the Complainant. Mr. Doyle said that he has known the Complainant personally for some 14 years and that he is a very decent, respectful and mannerly man who participates in his community and has a wide circle of friends. He has been the source of great support to his mother over the years. Mr. Doyle said that he encouraged the Complainant to apply to become a Garda and he found it hard to believe that someone with the Complainant’s qualities was not selected.  It was evident that Mr. Doyle shared the Complainant’s disappointment which is also understandable.

All the above said the claims which were made did not meet the required statutory criteria and they are dismissed for that reason. 

CA-00061811-004 – Claim not well-founded

CA-00061811-005 – Claim not well-founded

CA-00061811-006 – Claim not well-founded

CA-00061811-007 – Claim not well-founded

CA-00061811-008 – Claim not well-founded

CA-00061811-009 – Claim not well-founded

CA-00061811-012 – Claim not well-founded

Key Words – Employment Equality Act 1998 Sections 74, 76(5)(a), 77 and 77A-Equal Status Act 2000 Sections 1 and 20 - Workplace Relations Act 2015 Section 42(1) - Frivolous and Vexatious - Farley v Ireland [1997] IESC 60 - Fay v Tegral Pipes Limited & Ors [2005] 2 IR 261 - Nowak v. Data Protection Commissioner 2012 [IEHC] 449 - Bus Eireann v SIPTU PTD8/2004