Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

An Employee

An Employer

Representatives

  Self-Represented

 No Appearance

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

CA-00075777-001

26/09/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994

CA-00075777-003

26/09/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994

CA-00075777-006

26/09/2025

The Complainant referred the within complaints to the WRC on 26 September 2025.

The Complainant was employed by the Respondent from 1 May 2025 until his dismissal on 22 September 2025. He earned €2,500 gross per month /€30,000 gross per annum. He submits that he did not receive a written statement of his terms and conditions of employment at any stage. He states that, although he was promised a contract, this was never provided, and when he sought clarity in relation to his terms, the Respondent avoided furnishing it. He further submits that the Respondent later asserted that no contract existed on the basis that the role was seasonal, which he disputes.

The Complainant also contends that he was required to work in circumstances where he was given little or no advance notice of his working hours or locations. He states that work schedules were often communicated late in the evening for the following day, including in respect of Sunday work, which he says left him with no reasonable opportunity to plan his rest or personal arrangements. He submits that, on occasion, he was assigned to work locations a significant distance from his home, including locations such as Newbridge and Swords, resulting in lengthy commuting times.

The Complainant further submits that he raised concerns regarding the absence of a written contract, the failure to provide a promised company car, and the distances he was required to travel for work. He contends that, following the raising of these issues, he was treated adversely by the Respondent. In particular, he states that he was assigned to more distant and onerous work locations and was subjected to criticism in relation to his performance and conduct.

The Complainant submits that, on the day of his dismissal, he was assigned at short notice to work alone in a location a considerable distance from his home, with an expectation that he would complete work which he says would ordinarily require more than one person. He states that he indicated that he would not be able to complete the work within the required timeframe and would need to leave in order to avoid missing his last available transport home. He contends that, following this, his employment was terminated.

The Complainant further submits that he was penalised for asserting his rights, including seeking written terms of employment and raising concerns regarding his working conditions. He contends that the allocation of distant work locations and the manner in which he was treated by the Respondent constituted penalisation within the meaning of the relevant legislation.

The Respondent did not attend the scheduled hearing of this complaint. Having reviewed the file, I am satisfied that the Respondent was on notice of the claim against it and the hearing date, time and venue. I waited a reasonable time before proceeding with the hearing in the absence of the Respondent.

In making these findings, I have considered the documentation submitted by the Complainant, the oral evidence adduced at the hearing summarised above, and have given due weight to the evidence and submissions presented.

I am satisfied that the Complainant’s evidence was clear, consistent and credible.

CA-00075777-001 – Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

The Complainant gave evidence that his work locations and start times were routinely communicated late in the evening prior to the working day, typically at or around 8pm, and in some instances on the same day. He stated that this pattern applied throughout his employment, including Sundays, and that it afforded him little or no opportunity to organise his rest or personal arrangements.

The Complainant further gave evidence that no written contract of employment was provided to him and that no normal or regular starting and finishing times were ever specified.

In the absence of any evidence from the Respondent, I accept the Complainant’s evidence.

I am satisfied that the Complainant’s contract of employment, and the arrangements applying to his employment, did not specify normal or regular working hours. I therefore find that section 17(1) of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 (hereinafter “the 1997 Act”) applies.

Section 17(1) of the 1997 Act requires that, in such circumstances, an employer notify the employee at least 24 hours in advance of the times at which the employee will be required to start and finish work. I find, on the evidence before me, that the Respondent failed to comply with that obligation.

The Complainant gave evidence that, on the date of his dismissal, he was assigned work at short notice at a location a significant distance from his home and was required to work beyond his normal finishing time in circumstances which would have prevented him from returning home by public transport. He refused to work in those circumstances and was dismissed.

Section 17(1A) of the 1997 Act provides that where the requirements of subsection (1) are not met, an employee has the right to refuse to work without adverse consequences.

I am satisfied that the Complainant’s refusal to work in the circumstances described was a refusal protected by section 17(1A) of the 1997 Act. The Complainant gave uncontroverted evidence that his employment was terminated in circumstances proximate to that refusal. In the absence of any evidence from the Respondent, I am entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence before me. I am satisfied that the Respondent was in breach of section 17(1) of the 1997 Act and that the termination of the Complainant’s employment constituted an adverse consequence for the purposes of section 17(1A) of the 1997 Act.

Accordingly, I find that this complaint is well founded.

CA-00075777-003 – Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994

Section 3(1) and section 3(1A) of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994, as amended (hereinafter “the 1994 Act”) impose an obligation on an employer to furnish an employee with a written statement of specified terms of employment within prescribed time limits.

Section 3(1A) of the 1994 Act requires that certain core terms be provided within 5 days of commencement, and section 3(1) of the 1994 Act requires that a full statement of terms be provided not later than one month after commencement.

Section 7 of the 1994 Act provides that where a complaint is well founded, compensation of up to four weeks’ remuneration may be awarded.

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 1 May 2025 and his employment ended on 22 September 2025. He gave evidence that he did not receive a written statement of his terms and conditions of employment at any time during his employment. He further stated that, notwithstanding references by the Respondent to “terms in the contract”, no such document was ever furnished to him.

The Respondent did not attend the hearing and did not provide any evidence.

In those circumstances, I accept the Complainant’s evidence. I find that the Respondent failed to provide the Complainant with the core terms required within 5 days pursuant to section 3(1A) of the 1994 Act, and failed to provide any written statement of terms pursuant to section 3(1) of the 1994 Act.

This constitutes a complete failure to comply with the statutory obligations imposed by the 1994 Act.

In assessing redress, I note that the Complainant’s employment has now ended and therefore there is no ongoing requirement to furnish the statement. The appropriate remedy is therefore compensatory.

In determining the appropriate level of compensation, I have had regard to the guidance of the Labour Court. In Beechfield Private Homecare Limited v. Megan Hayes Kelly, TED1919, the Labour Court awarded the maximum of four weeks’ remuneration. The Chairman of the Court noted “[i]n determining the appropriate level of compensation it should award in a particular case, the decision-maker must take into account all the relevant circumstances of the case before it. In this case, the Court determines that the breaches were at the serious end of the spectrum …”.

I am satisfied that the Respondent’s failure was not a technical or partial breach, but rather a total failure to provide any written terms throughout the entirety of the Complainant’s employment. I am further satisfied that this places the breach at the serious end of the spectrum, in line with the approach of the Labour Court in the authorities cited.

Accordingly, I find that the complaint is well founded.

CA-00075777-006 – Terms Employment (Information) Act 1994

Preliminary Issue

Before considering the substantive issues in this complaint, I must first address a preliminary issue regarding the jurisdiction of the WRC. The complaint was referred under the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. In the narrative section of the complaint form, the Complainant stated that he was “penalized for asking about my employment contract, which was never provided…”. The Complainant’s oral evidence at the hearing was consistent with this account.

I note the judgment of the High Court in County Louth VEC v Equality Tribunal [2009] IEHC 370 in which it was held that complaint forms are intended to set out, in broad outline, the nature of the complaint and may be considered with a degree of flexibility, provided the general nature of the complaint remains unchanged.

I further note the dicta of Charleton J. in Galway-Mayo Institute of Technology v Employment Appeals Tribunal [2007] IEHC 210, to the effect that a tribunal must ensure that a respondent is on notice of the claim being advanced and the potential remedies arising.

Applying these authorities, I note that the WRC complaint form is not a statutory pleading but is intended to identify, in general terms, the nature of the complaint so as to ensure compliance with fair procedures.

In the present case, the issue of penalisation for asserting rights under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 is expressly raised in the complaint narrative. The complaint form and associated documentation were furnished to the Respondent.

In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the Respondent was on notice of the nature of the complaint. I therefore find that I have jurisdiction to investigate Complaint CA-00075777-006 as a complaint of penalisation under the 1994 Act, notwithstanding that it was initially referenced under the 1997 Act.

Substantive Issue

This complaint is made pursuant to section 6C of the 1994 Act and concerns an allegation of penalisation.

Section 6C(1) of the 1994 Act provides as follows:

6C(1) An employer shall not penalise or threaten penalisation of an employee for—

(a) invoking any right conferred on him or her by this Act,

(b) having in good faith opposed by lawful means an act that is unlawful under this Act,

(c) giving evidence in any proceedings under this Act, or

(d) giving notice of his or her intention to do any of the things referred to in the preceding paragraphs.

The Complainant gave evidence that he sought to be furnished with written terms of employment in accordance with the Respondent’s statutory obligations under the 1994 Act during the course of his employment. I am satisfied that this constitutes the invocation of a right under the 1994 Act.

The Complainant further gave evidence that, following the raising of this issue, he was assigned to work locations at a significant distance from his home, including locations such as Newbridge and Swords, resulting in materially increased commuting times. He contrasted this with the availability of other employees who were more geographically proximate to those locations.

In the absence of any evidence from the Respondent, I accept the Complainant’s evidence. I am satisfied that the assignment of the Complainant to these distant locations constituted adverse treatment and amounted to a detriment in the context of his employment. I am satisfied that this treatment constitutes penalisation within the meaning of section 6C(5) of the 1994 Act, which includes a change of location of place of work.

I note, however, that the Complainant raised a number of concerns during his employment, only some of which fall within the scope of the 1994 Act. I am not satisfied that the evidence establishes that the Complainant’s dismissal arose by reason of the invocation of his rights under the 1994 Act.

However, I am satisfied, on balance, that the adverse treatment identified followed the Complainant’s invocation of his statutory right. In circumstances where no alternative explanation has been advanced by the Respondent, I am satisfied that the Complainant’s invocation of his statutory right was a factor in the treatment complained of.

Accordingly, I find that the Complainant was subjected to penalisation within the meaning of the 1994 Act.

In assessing compensation, I have had regard to the nature of the detriment established. This does not concern dismissal or financial loss, but rather a change in work location resulting in increased commuting requirements. I am satisfied that this award reflects a separate and distinct contravention and does not compensate the same wrong as addressed under complaint CA-00075777-003.

CA-00075777-001 – Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

For the reasons set out above, I decide that the complaint is well founded.

Having regard to all of the circumstances, including the breach of statutory obligations under section 17 of the 1997 Act and the adverse consequence suffered by the Complainant, I consider that compensation in the amount of €1,500 is just and equitable.

I direct the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation of €1,500. This award is made by way of compensation for breach of statutory rights.

CA-00075777-003 – Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994

For the reasons set out above, I decide that the complaint is well founded.

The Complainant’s weekly remuneration was €576.92. I note that there was a complete failure by the Respondent to provide the Complainant with any written statement of his terms and conditions of employment, notwithstanding references to the existence of such a contract.

Having regard to the seriousness of that failure, I consider that an award at the upper end of the statutory scale is warranted.

I direct the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation of €2,307.68, being four weeks’ remuneration. This award is made by way of compensation for breach of statutory rights.

CA-00075777-006 – Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994

For the reasons set out above, I decide that the complaint is well founded.

Having regard to all of the circumstances, and in particular the limited nature of the detriment established, I consider that a modest award is just and equitable.

I direct the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation of €576.92, being one week’s remuneration. This award is made by way of compensation for breach of statutory rights.