ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00058532
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Andres Pregigueiro Ramos | Capita ltd (amended on consent) |
Representatives | Appeared in Person | Ms Katie Nugent, The HR Suite |
Complaint:
Act | Complaint Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 | CA-00071035-001 | 23/04/2025 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 19/09/2025
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Patsy Doyle
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 - 2015, following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaint.
Background:
On 23 April 2025, the Complainant submitted a complaint of unfair dismissal on the day his employment ended. The Complainant was a Lay Litigant and found new work around August / September 2025 on 27 hrs. part time basis in receipt of €13.00 per hour. On May 1, 2025, the Respondent was placed on notice of the complaint. On 15 July 2025, the HR Suite came on notice for the Respondent. They raised an “urgent preliminary point “. “The Complainant is a current employee of the Respondent and so no claim can progress under the Unfair Dismissals Act.” The Complainant was marked as being on paid suspension pending investigation. Ms. Brennan for the HR Suite sought dismissal of the claim “Without the requirement of the team at the Respondent Company to attend and respond to same “ If case was to go to trial, a copy of the “dismissal note “was requested. Prior to notification of hearing, a letter from the Complainants Team Manager was placed on file. This letter was dated 14 April 2025 and titled “Notification of Suspension “.
Both Parties were invited to hearing scheduled for 19 September 2025 at 12 noon in Cork. On 18 August 2025, the Respondent made a request for a virtual hearing to accommodate a Human Resource Business Partner resident in the UK.
This was met with Complainant approval, who also availed of the opportunity for his witness, Ms. Allesandra Pizzato to appear online, avail of the affirmation, but departed from the screen at 12.45 ppm. On 15 September 2025, in the absence of a Complainant submission, I wrote to Mr. Ramos: Dear Andres Pregigueiro Ramos I write today as the Adjudicator assigned to hear the above case next Friday September 19 at 12 noon. I await receipt of your completed written submission please. I would be grateful if you could complete this submission and file it completes with any documents you intend on relying on at hearing to pru@workplacerelations.ie with ADJ 58532 as a reference. Please include a contract for employment and a letter which confirms your dismissal. I look forward to meeting the Parties at hearing. As the hearing is hybrid hearing, I require all documentation in advance of the hearing, thank you.
On 16 September 2025, the complainant exhibited a copy of an acknowledged appeal of a Disciplinary procedure of 25 July 2025 but stated that details of contract and pay were beyond his reach due to lost access.
The case proceeded to hearing via hybrid. The Company witness was unavailable through illness. At the conclusion of the hearing, I sought details of the procedural framework surrounding the circumstances of the complaint. I also sought a copy of the contract of employment. I also sought a copy of past grievances submitted by the complainant in 2024 and 2025.
The Respondent submitted a supplementary submission dated 30 September 2025, which was shared with the Complainant. The Complainant confined his response to screenshot extracts.
I had hoped that the parties would revert with an update on both parties’ perceptions of the employment relationship between the parties. Nothing followed. Mr. Ramos and Ms. Pizzato are availed of the affirmation. Ms. Pizzato departed prior to being invited to give her evidence. The supplementary submission was shared with the complainant on 9 October 2025. This submission contained details of a primary employment with the company Abran from September 2020, with a transfer date to the Respondent on 22 March 2021 in addition to records on the progression of grievance during 2025. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
On 23 April 2025 at 1.30 pm, the Complainant, a Customer Representative submitted that he had been unfairly dismissed on that same date. He sought the remedy of Compensation. By way of background on the specific details of the complaint, the complainant had detailed that he had been unilaterally relocated within his workplace in April 2024. He sought to contest this and was accommodated by not having to receive any inbound calls. This was reneged on within a matter of months. This affected the complainant’s wellbeing as he contended that he was being deliberately over worked. He understood he became a subject matter of investigation in April 2025 “….as soon as I provide the evidence of all this, they open me disciplinary process to dismissal me because I complain and share information to HR….” The Complainant went on to attribute this action to a racial attack. “… They try and dismiss every person that complains to Hr because don’t want us talking with HR “ The Complainant came to hearing in the belief that he had been terminated for raising an issue around a “broken agreement “. The letter of suspension exhibited was dated 14 April 2025 It confirmed 1 Investigation of allegations of gross misconduct (unspecified) 2 Suspension on full pay “while the investigations is ongoing “ 3 Suspension does not constitute disciplinary action. 4 Invitation to investigation meeting “regarding these allegations “23 April 2025 at 12.30 pm on Teams 5 Representation permitted 6 EAP offered Evidence of the Complainant The Complainant outlined that he was a customer representative who worked from home. He had commenced at the business on 15 September 2021, until his dismissal on 23 April 2025. He earned nett pay of €2077.08 for a 40-hr week. The Complainant submitted that he had been removed from his work and relocated to a different department in or around April 2024. He stated this was done without his agreement and placed him on a negative trajectory with his employer. He struggled to secure some stability in his work and by June 2024, he understood that he was excused from having to take calls following a complaint to human resources. I requested sight of these complaints / grievances. The Complainant understood he was to be reconciled with his team, but this did not follow. By April 2025, the Complainant was suspended and denied access to company IT, thus losing access to pay slips and his contract. All work accounts were locked. He met with an Investigator who also served as Team Manager on 23 April 2025 for the purposes on investigation. He was dismissed. The Company did not complete an investigation and he was ignored. He understood that the subject matter of the investigation was to be: “An investigation based on what I shouldn’t be doing “ It was not correct to say that dismissal had occurred on 7 August 2025. In addressing Ms Nugent’s questions, Mr Ramos accepted that he was paid by the company until August 7, 2025. He countered this by submitting that he understood the meeting of 23 April 2025. “I know exactly how the meeting worked, straight away, I am dismissed “ He acknowledged that he was confused regarding the company procedures. He understood that he could bring a colleague to the meetings with the company. I was keen to understand the genesis of this matter, which seemed to have been sparked by an internal redeployment in the first quarter of 2025. I was unable to secure requested paperwork consistent with this period outside of some screen shots which did not tell a story. The Complainant did not submit medical reports. The Complainant demonstrated an unshakeable belief that he had been dismissed as reflected on his complaint form. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
It was common case that on 23 April 2025, the complainant remained a live employee, albeit on paid suspension on the date of his complaint of unfair dismissal before the WRC. He remained a live employee until his dismissal on 7 August 2025, which was under appeal at the time of the hearing on 19 September 2025. Therefore, the Complainant is estopped from progressing his claim for want of jurisdiction. By way of background, the Respondent representative outlined that on 14 April 2025, the complainant was placed on paid suspension pending an investigation. This concluded in his dismissal. The Respondent relied on the case: Caragh Neeson v John and Séan O Rourke EAT Decision UD 2049/2011, which found the complaint had been submitted prior to the termination date, which placed the complaint outside of the jurisdiction of Section 8(2) of the Unfair Dismissals Act. Brady v EAT [2015] 26 ELR, fact of dismissal by redundancy on 16 December 2011. Claim lodged with EAT on 23 December 2011, prior to expiry of notice. I found some ambiguity in the case law relied on by the respondent as the references were not clearly delineated. I also identified a distinction in the notice of suspension submitted by the complainant referenced gross misconduct and the respondent version had misconduct. Neither document specified the allegations being investigated. I requested further information to assist in my decision making. I received a copy of a contract of employment with Abtran dated September 21, 2020. I received a disciplinary procedure dated May 2025 and an Investigation Policy from 2023. I also received a copy of notes of a grievance meeting dated 9 May 2025. These notes reflected the complainant’s participation on 9 May 2025 and as the named recipient of the grievance outcome on May 23, 2025. When requested to comment on these documents on 9 October 2025, the complainant did not take issue with these documents. Instead, he made a response dated 24 September 2025 which exhibited some screen shots shared with his manager from 2024. I would have preferred if he had commented on the records held by the respondent which appear at least to have placed him in live employment during May 2025. The Complainant did not counter these records. I appreciate that it was less than ideal that such documents were submitted post hearing and only when requested.
|
Findings and Conclusions:
I have been requested to decide on whether the complainant was unfairly dismissed on 23 April 2025.? In reaching my decision, I have taken account of all documents received. I have also reflected on the submissions made pre and post hearing alongside evidence at hearing. My jurisdiction is drawn from section 8(2) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 as amended. (2) A claim for redress under this Act shall be initiated by giving a notice in writing (containing such particulars (if any) as may be specified in regulations under subsection (17) of section 41 of the Act of 2015 to the Director General— (a) within the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the relevant dismissal, or (b) within such period not exceeding 12 months from the date of the relevant dismissal as the adjudication officer considers appropriate, in circumstances where the adjudication officer is satisfied that the giving of the notice within the period referred to in paragraph (a) was prevented due to reasonable cause, The topic of whether a Statutory Tribunal can hold jurisdiction on disputed dates of dismissal in claims for unfair dismissal has been repeatedly examined by the EAT, the WRC and the Labour Court. The High Court through Barrett J considered a Judicial Review in the case of Alan Brady v EAT and Bohemian Football Club JR 2014 IEHC 302. holding that the EAT held jurisdiction to hear the case, Barrett J stated the following: Of course, there will be some boundary in time and some circumstances in which an ostensibly premature notice will be found in fact to have been premature and thus not duly lodged within the appropriate time-period for the purposes of section 8(2). However, in this case, the purpose of the law, the principles of equity, the practical reality, and the previous case-law of the Employment Appeals Tribunal all lead to the same end, which is that the Tribunal does and did have jurisdiction to hear Mr. Bradys claim. In AA Euro Recruitment Ireland ltd and Cotter UDD 2228, the Labour Court considered the span of their jurisdiction on statutory time limits and found that the dismissal occurred 6 December 2019, some 3 days post his claim being lodged. The Court declined jurisdiction. The Court drew both parties’ attention to the case of Alan Brady v Employment Appeals Tribunal [2015] 26 E.L.R.1 but neither party made a submission in respect of same. It is not disputed that the complaint was lodged with the WRC on the 3rdDecember 2019 three days before what the Complainant in his evidence to the Court stated was his date of dismissal. Section 8 (2) (a) of the Act states that a claim for redress should be initiated “within the period of six months beginning on the date of the relevant dismissal”. The Court has found in this case that the relevant dismissal occurred on the 6thDecember 2019. Unlike the Brady case citied above the Complainant in this case did not submit to the Court that the complaint was made during the notice period. Nor was it disputed that at the time he submitted the complaint he was two weeks into a temporary layoff, which is provided for in his contract. The Court determines that the complaint was not submitted within the statutory time limits and therefore the court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Neeson v O Rourke UD 2049/2011 The Respondent made reference to the above EAT case in submissions. This was a case, where Ms Neeson, the complainant claimed constructive dismissal on 21 October 2011 and cited the dismissal as having occurred on 26 April 2011. The EAT considered the facts of the case and was persuaded by a flurry of activity in the case which overtook both dates. In determining the date of Dismissal as 12/13 January 2012 and thus outside the threshold of jurisdiction, the EAT considered Barrett J dictat in Brady. The Tribunalcould not establish circumstanceswhich opened jurisdiction of the Act to Ms Neenan when they remarked on the revised wording of Section 8(2) of the Act The Tribunal is of the opinion that this amendment demonstrates a manifest intention by the legislature to preclude claims being lodged before the dismissal date.
I have reflected on the facts as presented.
It is clear that the complainant submitted his complaint of unfair dismissal in the immediate aftermath of an investigation meeting which occurred on 23 April 2025. This meeting occurred during a period of paid suspension April 14, 2025, onwards. The Complainant gave evidence of this sequence of events. He accepted that he was paid until his meeting with Mr Madigan on August 7, 2025. However, he described a sense of purposeful exclusion consistent with the formal investigation meeting on which he has placed his contention of dismissal. He did not dispute the notes appended to the respondent file which warrant replication of extract. The meeting was convened to address three areas of concern to the respondent. The Complainant attended without representation and sought to impress on his team manager his level of disappointment post transfer. “I will be dismissed after this call, but I was transferred without knowledge, I know what will happen” In response, the minutes reflect that that the complainant was attendant at a “Fact finding exercise for you to state your side. You are suspended on full pay pending further investigation, depending on the outcome of this meeting …” This meeting concluded with an action plan for next steps. While I did not have the author of notes at hearing, I have taken some sense of what happened as the complainant did not dispute the records. It is regrettable that the complainant chose to navigate both the grievance and disciplinary procedures alone. In my opinion, he would have benefitted from an advocate.
The Complainant was invited to attend a disciplinary hearing on 25 July 2025, where he was offered representation and indicated that he may be considered for a disciplinary warning following a full hearing. There was no mention of threat of dismissal here.
On 7 August 2025, Capita dismissed the complainant for gross misconduct. I did not have the benefit of meeting the decision maker. “Your last day of service with the company was 7 August 2025” An appeal was offered. I understand that the appeal was live at the time of the hearing in this case. Neither Party put papers of appeal before me.
I must decide firstly what is the date of dismissal in accordance with Section 1 of the Act.?
dismissal,” in relation to an employee, means— (a) the termination by his employer of the employee’s contract of employment with the employer, whether prior notice of the termination was or was not given to the employee,
I find that the complainant was dismissed on 7 August 2025 on issuing of the letter of dismissal, curtailment of salary and cesser pay. He did not receive notice pay.
These actions reflect a ceremonial end to an employment and were not found prior to 23 April 2025, the date of dismissal relied on by the complainant.
Secondly, can I accept jurisdiction of this claim.?
While I understand the heightened sense of loss and exclusion felt by the complainant following his investigation meeting of 23 April 2025, I cannot equate this with the arbitrary action of dismissal. It is the difference between a feeling and a fact.
The Complainant continued to be present and visible in the employment relationship on pay roll, through the grievance meeting of 9 May 2025 and the resultant outcome, which found that he should be referred to Occupational health on 23 May 2025. Had the complainant been dismissed in April 2025, he would have been expected to demonstrate his financial loss through either finding new work or subsisting on job seekers. He did not veer into the area of loss at that time.
Having considered the above, it is my decision to partially uphold your grievance. I will recommend to your line manager that you are referred to our Occupational Health services with your consent to ensure we have the correct support in place for you. At our meeting, you advised that your ideal outcome is be moved back to the back-office team or not to be asked to take calls. I have considered this and as a result the following action, or recommendation, will be taken: • I will recommend to your line manager that you are referred to our Occupational Health services, with your consent, to ensure we have the correct support in place for you. You have the right of appeal against my decision, within 7 calendar days of receiving this letter.
This grievance outcome was followed by the Disciplinary interview on 25 July 2025, which concluded in dismissal on 7 August 2025. An appeal followed.
I have considered Brady here. I have considered the law, equity, and practical reality. I have found that the complainant was present in his employment relationship, albeit suspended on full pay up to and including 7 August 2025. I find that I cannot stretch the provisions of Section 8(2) to seize authority as the dismissal occurred some 14 weeks after the date of claim. That is the practical reality of the case which places the central act of dismissal outside my jurisdiction.
I have every sympathy for the complainant who clearly got lost in his employment following his unsolicited redeployment. However, he was not dismissed when he made his claim to the WRC. In this I am persuaded by Neenan, Cotter and the dictat in Brady. I lack jurisdiction to decide on the substantive matter of the claim and can take the matter no further. In closing, I would like to state that the complainant would have benefitted from compiling a chronological submission on what had occurred over 2024-2025 for him. In this vacuum, the complainant got lost in his unexpected redeployment and did not give sufficient attention to what happened in the aftermath. |
Decision:
Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the unfair dismissal claim consisting of a grant of redress in accordance with section 7 of the 1977 Act. I lack jurisdiction to decide on the substantive matter of the claim and can take the matter no further.
|
Dated: 9th April 2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Patsy Doyle
Key Words:
Claim for Unfair Dismissal date of dismissal |
