Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Forqan  Hassanzada

Derry Court Company Ltd Derry Court Cleaning Specialists

Representatives

Changiz Durrani GKLAW Solicitors

John Barry Management Support Services (Ireland) Ltd

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00070072-002

19/03/2025

The Respondent alleges that the within claim is statute barred. The Complainant argues that there are reasons that can explain the delay and that the time limit should be extended.

The Complainant filed his first complaint  CA 00070072 – 001 on the 19.03.2025. That complaint was file pursuant to the Equal Status Act. Errors were identified in that form so on 10 April 2025 the Complainant’s representative wrote the WRC seeking to clarifying those errors in the original complaint form. That complaint was withdrawn and a new complaint under the Employment Equality Act was file on the 02.04.2025. In the letter dated 10th April a new date in relation to the most recent date of contravention was put forward as 30 September 2025. The letter dated 10th April 2025 stated:

“Dear Sir/Madam,

Further to your email dated April 2, 2025, regarding the above noted client, please refer to the information requested below regarding both the claims. Three errors were made on the Complaints. The first error was the date of the second contravention of the prohibited conduct was missing, which is September 30, 2024, would be the most recent one instead of September 17, 2024, which was the first contravention of the prohibited conduct. Second error was the Employment Equality Act Complaint form was filed one day late due to the reasons outlined below. Instead of the Employment Equality Act Complaint form, an Equality Status Act, complaint form was filed which was within the 6 months’ time limit. Third error was the last name of the Complainant which is wrong on the form. Please note that the correct name is Forqan Hassanzada not Hussianzada. According to the Legislation, the 6-month deadline is March 31, 2025. CA-00070072-001: According to the Equal Status Act, a complainant must notify the respondent regarding the alleged prohibited conduct prior to the referral of the complainant to the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”). The Complainant filed the complaint under Equality Status Act by accident. We are requesting the WRC to consider our Complaint under the Employment Equality Act. It appears that the complainant is an employee, and the complaint falls under the Employment Equality Act. Secondly, please note that the first date of contravention of the conduct was September 17, 2024, but the last date was September 30, 2024. Please note that the September 30, 2024, was missing on the form. Therefore, the complaint is within the time limits. We would like to withdraw this complaint under the Equal Status Acts and request the Director to accept our complaint under the Employment Equality Act. A different form was submitted to the WRC by error. CA-00070072-002: According to Section 77 of the Employment Equality Act 1998, the Complainant must lodge the complaint within 6 months. The Complainant did file the complaint within 6 months. The Complainant notified the Respondent regarding the prohibited conducted on September 23, 2024. Please note that the date of the first incident was September 17, 2024, and date of last incident was September 30, 2024. We request the WRC to consider our complaint under the Employment Equality Act. The Employer or Respondent replied on September 30, 2024, and concluded their investigation stating that the employee decides not to proceed with a formal complaint and closed the case. The grievance was not handled appropriately by the employer and made fun of the employee. The employer harassed and intimidated the employee not to disclose this matter to anyone. This was a fake complaint and investigation indicating misconduct to remove the employee from his work unit. The Employer unilaterally altered the terms and conditions of the Employment of the employee. The Employer salary was reduced and when the Employee objected to the terms and conditions, complaints were made against him to make it look like he was at fault and that is why he was removed. As a result of the complaint the employee suffered from severe stress, anxiety and depression, following the discrimination, harassment and humiliation at workplace. The Complainant is under medical attention since September 17, 2024. The Complainant was off sick in October 2024. The Complainant medical notes were initially rejected by the Employer. We will provide a complete medical report from the doctor to the WRC prior to the hearing. The Employee previous lawyer also notified the Employer on November 7, 2024, regarding the complaint but the Employer failed to respond to the notice. The Employer or Respondent was again notified on February 20, 2025, by our office”

The Complainant states that he was unable to file is complaint within the Statutory time frame due to four ongoing matters: 1. Fear of retribution. 2. Language barrier and 3. Lack of Legal Knowledge 4. Sick leave.

The Respondent’s argues that the complaint should be dismissed on procedural grounds, rather than addressing the substance of the allegations. Their central claim is that the complainant failed to comply with the strict statutory time limits set out under the Equal Status Acts, the Employment Equality Acts and S41(6) of the Workplace relations Act.

Equal Status Act claim CA 00070072-001, has been withdrawn however the Complainant seeks to use information contained in that complaint to circumvent the time limit issue with the second compliant CA 00070072-02.

 The Respondent set out the factual background. Under the Equal Status Act a Complainant is required to notify the Respondent of the alleged discriminatory act within two months of its occurrence, and to bring a formal complaint within six months. The alleged contravention occurred on 17 September 2024, but the ES1 notification form was not sent until 20 February 2025, well outside the two-month deadline. The formal complaint was then lodged with the Workplace Relations Commission on 19 March 2025. Upon receiving the ES1 form, the Respondent’s legal representatives replied on 14 March 2025 indicating that they would not be providing a response. The Complainant nonetheless proceeded to file a complaint with the WRC shortly afterwards. Then on the 2 April 2025 a new complaint pursuant to the Employment Equality Act was file. Therein the most recent date of contravention is noted again to be 17 September 2024.  However, some days later on 10 April 2025 the Complainant’s representative wrote to the WRC stating that the most recent date of contravention was 30 September 2024. Either way, due to the fact that the complaint wasn’t filed with the WRC until 2 April 2025 it is outside of the 6 month time limit. The Complainant is attempting to use the date of filing of the now withdrawn Equal Status Act claim to bring his second claim under the Employment Equality Act within the statutory time limits. That claim no longer exists and to allow the Complainant to success in this attempt would be acting outside of the jurisdiction provided by the Act and prejudicial to the Respondent.

Furthermore, as set out in the letter dated 10 April 2025 the Complainant makes reference to him having legal representation as far back as 10 November 2024.

The Complainant initially filed complaint CA-00070072-001 on 19 March 2025 under the Equal Status Act. This complaint was submitted in error. On 2 April 2025, a second complaint (CA-00070072-002) was filed under the Employment Equality Act. By letter dated 10 April 2025, the Complainant’s representative wrote to the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) to clarify a number of errors in the original filings and to regularise the position.

The correspondence identified three errors. First, the most recent date of the alleged prohibited conduct had been omitted. The correct dates were stated to be 17 September 2024 for the first incident and 30 September 2024 for the most recent incident. Second, the complaint had been filed under the Equal Status Act instead of the Employment Equality Act, despite the matter clearly relating to an employment relationship. Third, the Complainant’s surname had been incorrectly recorded and was corrected to Forqan Hassanzada.

The Complainant requested that the Equal Status complaint be withdrawn and that the matter instead be treated as a complaint under the Employment Equality Act. It was submitted that the applicable six-month time limit expired on 31 March 2025 and that, based on the correct most recent date of contravention (30 September 2024), the complaint was within time. The Complainant argues that the incorrect filing under the Equal Status Act was a procedural error and should not operate to defeat an otherwise valid claim.

The Complainant further alleges that he was subjected to discrimination, harassment and victimisation in the workplace. He contends that the Respondent conducted an inadequate and biased internal investigation, subjected him to intimidation and pressure not to pursue the matter, and unilaterally altered his terms and conditions of employment, including a reduction in salary. It is further alleged that false complaints were made against him to justify his removal from his work unit. As a result, the Complainant states that he suffered significant stress, anxiety and depression, has been under medical care since 17 September 2024, and was on sick leave during October 2024.

The Respondent was notified of the issues on 23 September 2024, and further correspondence was sent by the Complainant’s previous solicitor on 7 November 2024. A further notification issued on 20 February 2025. The Complainant submits that any delay in formally lodging the complaint was due to fear of retribution, language barriers, and a lack of legal knowledge.

The Respondent’s position is that the complaint should be dismissed on procedural grounds for failure to comply with statutory time limits. In relation to the Equal Status complaint, the Respondent notes that the alleged discrimination occurred on 17 September 2024, but the ES1 notification form was not sent until 20 February 2025, well outside the required two-month period. Although a complaint was lodged with the WRC on 19 March 2025, the Respondent submits that the statutory requirements were not met and that this complaint has since been withdrawn.

In respect of the Employment Equality complaint filed on 2 April 2025, the Respondent argues that it is outside the six-month time limit, even if the later date of 30 September 2024 is accepted. The Respondent contends that the Complainant cannot rely on the earlier, now withdrawn Equal Status complaint to bring the Employment Equality claim within time, and that to permit this would be outside the WRC’s jurisdiction and prejudicial to the Respondent. The Respondent also points to the fact that the Complainant had legal representation as early as November 2024, which, it argues, undermines any claim of lack of legal knowledge.

The central issue arising is whether the complaint under the Employment Equality Act was lodged within the applicable time limit, or whether there are grounds to extend time, and whether the earlier incorrect filing can be taken into account in determining that issue.

I am satisfied based on the facts before me that the claim CA 00070072-002 was filed outside of the statutory time limits. It is irrelevant whether it is one day or one year outside of the time limits, the same legal requirements apply. I am further satisfied that the Complainant cannot use the date of filing of the original complaint to bring the new complaint within the time limits. To do so would be prejudicial and outside of the scope of the act. The only issue left for me to decide is whether or not there are any exceptional circumstances that could allow me use by discretion to extend the time pursuant to Section 41(8) of the Act.

Section 41(8) of the 2015 Act empowers an adjudication officer to extend the initial six months limitation period by no more than a further six months, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint within the initial period 'was due to reasonable cause'.

Without prejudice to the above argument “reasonable cause” has been considered in a number of cases. In Salesforce.com v Alli Leech   the Labour Court set out in detail the legal principles to establish whether reasonable cause has been shown for an extension of time.  The Court stated “The established test for deciding if an extension should be granted for reasonable cause shown is that formulated by this Court in Labour Court Determination DWT0338 Cementation Skanska v Carroll.  Here the test was set out in the following term;

“It is the Court’s view that in considering if reasonable cause exists it is for the Claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay.  The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd.  In the context of which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the Claimant at the material time.  The Claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon.  Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the Claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability that had those circumstances had not been present he would have initiated the claim on time.”

In that case, and in subsequent cases in which the question arose the Court adopted an approach analogous to that taken by the superior Courts in considering whether time should been enlarged for “good reason” in judicial review proceedings pursuant to Order 84 Rule 21 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986.   That approach was held to be correct by the High Court in Minister for Finance v CPSU and others .   The test formulated in Cementation Skanska v Carroll draws heavily on the decision of the High Court in Donal O’Donnell and Catherine O’Donnell v Dunlaoghaire Corporation  .  Here Costello J (as he then was) stated as follows; “The phrase “good reasons” is one of wide import which it would be futile to attempt to define precisely.    However, in considering whether or not there are good reasons for extending the time I think it is clear that the test must be an objective one and the Court should not extend the time merely because an aggrieved Plaintiff believed that he or she were justified in delaying the institution of proceedings.  What the Plaintiff has to show (and I think the onus under Order 84 Rule 21 is on the Plaintiff) is that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford a justifiable excuse for the delay.

It is clear from the authorities that the test places the onus on the Applicant on an extension of time to identify the reason for the delay and to establish that the reason relied upon provides a justifiable excuse for the actual delay.   Secondly, the onus is on the Applicant to establish a causal link between the reason proffered for the delay and his or her failure to present the complaint in time.   Thirdly, I must be satisfied, as a matter of probability, that the complaint would have been presented in time were it not for the intervention of the factors relied upon as constituting reasonable cause.  It is the actual delay that must be explained and justified. Finally, while the established test imposes a relatively low threshold of reasonableness on an Applicant, there is some limitation on the range of issues which can be taken into account.”   In particular, as was pointed out by Costello J in the passage quoted above, a Court should not extend a statutory time limit merely because the Applicant subjectively believed that he or she was justified in delaying the institution of proceedings.  

The Complainant herein argues that he failed to file his complaint within time due to a number of factors, namely lack of legal knowledge, fear of retribution, language barrier and being on sick leave. However, I note that the Complainant had engaged a legal representative as far back as November 2024. He then engaged new legal representation sometime in February 2025. Had either representative filed a claim pursuant to the Employment Equality Acts at the time they were engaged there would be no issue with statutory compliance. On the basis that the Complainant had the capacity to engage legal representation within the statutory timeframe I can find no reason that would allow me to exercise my discretion to extend the time pursuant to Section 41(8).

Therefore, I find that the complaint is not well grounded on the grounds that it is statute barred.

S41 (6) , S41 (8). Exceptional Circumstances. Reasonable Cause.