Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Thomas  Gerritsen

Zazmic Inc Limited

Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

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Representatives

Andrea Montanelli Peninsula Business Services Ireland

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Sick Leave Act 2022

CA-00070717-001

10/04/2025

The Complainant contends that he was not paid his full sick leave entitlement for certified sick leave in 2025.

The Respondent contends instead that the Complainant had an entitlement to 5 days paid sick leave in 2024 and in 2025 and further contends that the Complainant was paid above and beyond the 5-day statutory provision.

In his complaint form, the Complainant outlined that he commenced employment with the Respondent in November 2023 under a contract that included a flexible paid time off plan, which included “unlimited vacation, personal and sick leave”.  He stated that this was included in his signed offer letter.

The Complainant outlined that in March 2025, he was placed on certified sick leave due to stress.  He stated that despite providing appropriate certification, he was informed that his sick leave would not be paid beyond ten days and that he should apply for Social Welfare instead.  He outlined that as of March 2025, he was not fully paid for the certified sick leave period.  He contended that this constituted a breach of his contractual entitlement to sick pay and a violation of the Payment of Wages Act 1991.

He outlined that he raised this matter with the Respondent via a formal grievance and had not received confirmation that the outstanding payment would be made.  The Complainant sought enforcement of his right to full pay in line with his signed contract of employment. 

Complainant evidence at hearing:

The Complainant gave evidence that he commenced employment with the Respondent on 20 November 2023 and that he was on unpaid sick leave from 3 March 2024 and remained on sick leave at the date of the hearing.  He confirmed that all his sick leave was medically certified.  The Complainant further confirmed that he had been paid in total for 18 days of sick leave.

Under cross examination the Complainant confirmed that he had been paid a total of 18 days of sick leave in 2025.  He confirmed that he had been paid for five days sick leave in February 2025 due to COVID and that he had been paid for 21 days in March, that he had gone into hospital on 3 March 2025.  He referred to an email from Mr O’Toole regarding the actual dates, and he stated that within that email, it confirmed 16 days.  It was put to him that he had been paid in full for February but that he had not provided any certification.  The Complainant did not accept that position, instead he was of the understanding that he had been paid for only three days sick leave.  It was put to him that he didn’t work at all in March 2025, but that he had been paid in full for that month.  The Complainant stated that he was not clear in relation to his sick leave, but he did agree that he had been paid for more than five days. 

The Complainant Response to the Respondent submission

The Respondent raised a number of issues within its submission to which the Complainant provided the following responses:

1.       New allegations

The Complainant submitted that this complaint was made under the Sick Leave Act 2022 for failure to pay contractual sick pay during certified sick leave. He submitted that the references to background matters provided (salary reduction, location, probation, PIPs) were included as context for credibility and interpretation of terms and he confirmed that they were not new separate claims and did not expand the jurisdiction sought in this reference.

2.       Time Limit

The Complainant submitted that this complaint was in time and that it was concerned with the non-payment of contractual sick pay on and after specific pay dates from March 2025 onwards. He contended that each non-payment or short payment was a distinct contravention. He drew attention to the High Court decision in HSE v McDermott [2014] IEHC 331, which clarified that the six-month limitation period runs from the date of each contravention to which the complaint relates.

The Complainant submitted that the complaint was framed solely in respect of contraventions occurring within six months of the filing date (10 April 2025) and that as such, it is admissible and not time barred.

The Complainant noted that the Respondent asked the Adjudication Officer to first determine preliminary issues— specifically whether the claim was time-barred and whether the contract entitled him to the claimed sick pay—on the basis that a finding in their favour would dispose of the complaint as a whole.

The Complainant submitted that the WRC practice rarely supports bifurcating matters when evidence and legal issues overlap with the merits of the case and he submitted that the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires adjudication officers to investigate complaints in full and prevents proceedings from being declined solely on preliminary objections. He noted that the WRC’s Guidance Note for Adjudication Hearings emphasises that where factual and legal issues overlap between preliminaries and the merits, all should be heard together in a single hearing and that splitting the hearing would force needless duplication of evidence and testimony; prolong the timeline for resolution; and risk inconsistent findings on the same issues.  

The Complainant submitted that in the instant case the preliminary issues (particularly contract interpretation), were central to the merits of his case and that what the contract means affects both the time-limit question and the substantive right to sick pay; and that holding two separate hearings would be inefficient and unfair. He submitted that the fair and efficient course was to hear and decide all issues together, in line with standard WRC procedures and to ensure procedural clarity.

3.       Handbook

The Complainant submitted that he   was never provided with a copy of the employee  handbook at any time during his employment and that he only saw the handbook for the first time when it was submitted by the Respondent in the within proceedings. He submitted that accordingly, he could not have been aware of, nor agreed to, any terms or conditions allegedly contained in it

4.       Contractual Sick Pay

In relation to Contractual Sick Pay the Complainant submitted that his signed offer (November 2023) entitled him to a flexible paid time off plan “which includes unlimited vacation, personal, and sick leave,” subject to pre-approval for time off.  He submitted that this clause was drafted as one sentence but referred to three distinct types of leave — vacation, personal, and sick leave — which were subject to different legal treatment.  He submitted that “pre-approved” was reasonable for application to vacation and personal leave, which could be planned in advance, but not for sick leave, which arises unexpectedly when an employee is medically unfit for work. He submitted that in any event, he supplied medical certificates and notified the company promptly for all periods of absence. The Complainant stated that the company previously paid him for sick days before unilaterally stopping payment and he submitted that this confirmed that sick pay was treated as part of his contractual remuneration and not as a discretionary benefit.

The Complainant noted the Respondent’s reliance on bonus and commission cases — including Bord Gáis Energy Ltd v Thomas (PWD1729), CPL Resources PLC v Cuesta Carpio (PWD205), An Employer v A Worker (PWD1921), Peninsula Business Services Ltd v Sweeney [2004] IRLR 49, and Commerzbank AG v Keen [2006] EWCA Civ 1536 — and submitted that this reliance was misplaced. He submitted that those decisions concerned payments that were expressly discretionary or conditional on factors such as still being employed at the payment date, meeting sales targets, or satisfying other scheme rules.  The Complainant submitted that sick pay was fundamentally different, that it was a core contractual entitlement during certified incapacity, not an optional or performance-based incentive. He submitted that the nature of sick pay was to protect income when an employee was unable to work due to illness, which is why it is treated in employment law as part of normal remuneration.

The Complainant submitted that his contract contained no clause making sick pay conditional on continued employment at a payment date, on performance targets, or on pure discretion. He submitted that the Respondent’s attempt to equate his contractual sick pay to bonuses or commissions was an incorrect comparison both legally and factually.   He highlighted the legal principle – contra proferentem: Where a contractual term is ambiguous, it must be interpreted against the party that drafted it and he cited relevant examples.

The Complainant noted Section 5 of the Sick Leave Act 2022 which requires an employer to pay statutory sick leave when the qualifying conditions are met and Section 9 of the Act which confirms that were a contract provides a more favourable sick leave scheme, that contractual entitlement overrides the statutory minimum. He noted that this position had been confirmed by the WRC in cases such as Katerina Leszczynska v Musgrave Operating Partners and Alan Lehane v Sean Ahern Ltd, where company sick pay schemes that were more favourable overall than the statutory entitlement were held to displace the statutory scheme.  He noted that the WRC had also clarified in Ann Britton v Amcor Flexibles Ltd that were a contractual scheme is not more favourable as a whole, the statutory entitlement will still apply.

The Complainant submitted that his contract provided “unlimited sick leave” with pay, which was plainly more favourable than the statutory five days and he submitted that on the same reasoning as applied in the above WRC decisions, his contractual entitlement should prevail over the statutory minimum. He noted that the contractual clause signed in November 2023 entitles him to unlimited paid sick leave and did not permit managerial discretion to deny it. The Complainant submitted that any unilateral, retrospective change by the Respondent to alter his agreed contractual terms was not valid under Irish employment law. The Complainant submitted that changes to fundamental terms without agreement can suspend the employment contract or be treated as constructive dismissal and he cited relevant case law in support of that position.

The Complainant noted the Respondent position that because he objected to the probation and location clauses but did not separately object to the altered Paid Leave and Sick Leave clauses, he was “deemed” to have accepted them, and he submitted that this argument was legally flawed for the following reasons:

·       Silence is not acceptance in contract law and Irish contract law requires clear and unequivocal consent to any contractual variation. Silence, inaction, or failure to object cannot amount to acceptance of new terms unless there is an established course of conduct showing agreement.  The Complainant cited relevant case law to affirm the view that acceptance must be communicated and cannot be presumed from silence alone

·       No signed agreement – The Complainant submitted that he never signed the contract of 28 February 2025 and he submitted that without his signature or explicit written consent, the proposed changes in February 2025 could not replace the terms of his original November 2023 offer letter.

·       Express objection to material changes – The Complainant submitted that upon receipt of the February 28 documents, he immediately and expressly objected to key terms (probation and location). He submitted that Irish employment law does not require an employee to list every single objection to preserve their rights and that an objection to core contractual changes was sufficient to put the Respondent on notice that the proposed new contract was not accepted as a whole.

·       Contract Law Principle – The Complainant submitted that it was necessary to have an offer and acceptance under contract law, and that any variation to an existing contract must meet the same requirements as forming a contract in the first place: offer, acceptance, and consideration. He submitted that accordingly both parties must expressly agree to any change in terms.

·       Certified incapacity at the time of issue of new contract – The Complainant submitted that at the time these documents were issued, he was medically certified unfit for work. He submitted that attempting to introduce and rely on a “deemed acceptance” theory during this period was particularly unreasonable and undermined any suggestion of genuine consent.

5.       Utilisation of Internal Procedures

The Complainant noted the Respondent position that “The Complainant did not exhaust the internal grievance process available to him. While a grievance was lodged, it was not progressed to conclusion. The Respondent submits that it is unreasonable for the Complainant to bypass the completion of that process and proceed directly to the WRC.”   The Complainant submitted that there is no legal requirement to exhaust internal grievance procedures before bringing a statutory non-payment claim to the WRC. However, even if it were expected, he submitted that he had raised a formal grievance promptly. He further submitted that the respondent then required medical confirmation of fitness to participate, which he could not provide while certified unfit—making internal procedure compliance unreasonable and impossible. The Complainant cited a number of precedent cases to support the view that exhaustion of the internal process is not always mandatory and emphasising consideration of the reasonableness of the parties.

The Complainant submitted that he engaged promptly with internal procedures by lodging a formal grievance but that the respondent imposed a precondition (medical clearance) which he could not satisfy at that time.  He noted that Irish law and WRC precedent confirm that exhaustion is not mandatory were internal procedures are inaccessible, disabled, or unreasonable and he submitted that it was therefore completely reasonable and lawful for him to proceed to the WRC directly under the statutory forum.

6.       Public Holiday Entitlements During Sick Leave

The Complainant submitted that under Section 21 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997, full-time employees on certified sick leave are entitled to benefit for public holidays occurring during that period and that this includes payment for the day or an equivalent benefit, as if the employee had been working. He further submitted that part-time employees also qualify if they have worked at least 40 hours in the five weeks before the holiday. He noted that entitlement is only lost if the employee has been absent due to ordinary illness for more than 26 weeks immediately before the holiday, or 52 weeks for occupational injury. The Complainant submitted that between March 2025 and the date of this hearing, the following public holidays occurred: - 17 March – St. Patrick’s Day - 21 April – Easter Monday - 5 May – May Day (Early May Bank Holiday) - 2 June – June Bank Holiday - 4 August – August Bank Holiday, that at those times he was  on certified sick leave since March 2025, but received no payment or holiday benefit for these days. He noted that this was an additional statutory breach under the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

 Relief Sought

In conclusion the Complainant request the Adjudication Officer to find that the Respondent unlawfully failed to pay his contractual sick pay during certified leaveand to make an order requiring the Respondent to pay the full shortfall, with interest.

He also sought a declaration that the Respondent may not unilaterally reduce his contractual sick pay to the statutory minimum without his agreement and that the Adjudication Officer also order payment of all outstanding public holiday entitlements for these dates, with interest, as part of the remedy

Preliminary Issues - New allegations

The Respondent noted that the Complainant lodged a complaint with the WRC under the Sick Leave Act, 2022 on 10 April 2025, claiming that he was not fully paid for the certified sick leave period.

The Respondent further noted that the Complainant filed submissions with the WRC on the 30 July 2025 adding new pieces of legislation to which the complaint relates, with a complete new narrative of facts concerning performance, change of position and contract including salary reduction, lack of targets and commission payments which the Respondent submitted were unrelated to the original narrative of the complaint lodged under the Sick Leave Act, 2022 on the 10 April 2025.

The Respondent refuted all such new facts and allegations outlined in the Complainant’s submissions and respectfully requested that any further submission or related documentation as submitted on 30 July 2025 are discounted and not form part of the case.

The Respondent drew attention to the WRC Decision in ADJ-00055445 which stated that: “The first hearing on this issue was adjourned to allow the parties prepare a full case to be heard and a document was received from both parties. It is set out by the Respondent that the Complainant is attempting to ventilate other issues outside of the original complaint and I agree fully with the Respondent that it is not possible to pursue anything other than the Redundancy issue. The Respondent also introduced some evidence on the absenteeism of the Complainant which is not relevant to the complaint.”

The Respondent noted that similar issues arose in ADJ-00058470, where the Adjudicator decided as follows: “Where evidence was adduced in respect of matters which were not previously referred to in the narrative of the claim form, these matters were not properly before the commission and cannot be pursued. In addition, I note that this complainant at the hearing referred to additional claims which she stated were detailed on pages 6 to 8 of the original claim form however it was clarified at the hearing that these pages were not submitted to the WRC with the original complaint form and accordingly those claims had not been received or processed by the Commission and the respondent had not been notified of same and were not on notice of same. Accordingly, I am satisfied that those matters are not properly before the Commission and cannot be pursued.”

The Respondent further submitted that those new allegations were vague and unclear as to their connection and relevance to the original claim of unpaid sick leave.  The Respondent submitted that the Complainant had failed or refused to provide the specifics as regards the alleged new facts outlined above, instead making nothing more than mere assertions with no foundation or substantive basis to them.

The Respondent noted the case of Able Security Ltd v Hardjis Langsteins DWT1319 where the Labour court stated: “The Court has consistently held that a Complainant carries an evidential burden to put in issue the facts upon which his or her claim is grounded and must outline the claim with enough particularity to allow a Respondent know what it is they are being accused of.”

The Respondent submitted that it needed this basic information to enable it to defend such complaint.

Moreover, the Respondent submitted that the Complainant did not include the above allegations in the claim papers and was therefore precluded to do so under the Section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 as outside the time limit of 6 months set out in the Act of 2015. The Respondent drew attention to  Section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act (2015) which states: “Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates.”

The Respondent referred to the High Court Judgement in HSE -V- Mc Dermott [2014] IEHC 331 where the relevant period for the purposes of claims under the Payment of Wages Act was extensively considered. In this case, Hogan J. concluded as follows: “For the purposes of this limitation period, everything turns, accordingly on the manner in which the complaint is framed by the employee. If for example, the Respondent has been unlawfully making deductions for a three-year period, then provided that the complaint which has been presented relates to a period of six months beginning “on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates”, the complaint will nonetheless be in time. It follows, therefore, that if an employer has been making deduction X from the monthly salary of the employee since January 2010, a complaint which relates to deductions made from January 2014 onwards and which is presented to the Rights Commissioner in June 2014 will still be intime for the purposes of S. 6(4).If, on the other hand, the complaint was to have been framed in a different manner, such that it related to the period from January, 2010 onwards, it would then have been out of  time.”

Considering the foregoing the Respondent submitted that the alleged facts and related claims were statute barred for the purposes of the Act and consequently, jurisdiction should be declined in relation to same.

The Respondent referred to the WRC Decision in ADJ-00054904, where the Adjudicator clearly stated: “Additional claims raised by way of written submissions lodged with the Commission on 10 February 2025 are either statute barred or not within the remit of the Workplace Relations Commission.”

Additionally, the Respondent noted that in ADJ-00058470, the Adjudicator ruled as follows: “I am satisfied that the respondent is on notice of these matters in circumstances where the matters complained of were already raised in the narrative of the claim forms. Accordingly the within claims arise out of those matters outlined in the narrative of the complaint form submitted on 12th of June 2023. The cognisable 6-month period of the complaint’s dates form 13th of December 2022 to 12th of June 2023."

In light of the foregoing the Respondent submitted that the new facts under the pieces of legislation above were irremediably out of time and therefore the Adjudicator has no jurisdiction to hear such allegations.

At hearing the Respondent Representative, Ms Montanelli outlined that the Complainant had lodged a case under the Sick Leave Act 2022 and that it was the view of the Employer that only that case could proceed.  Ms Montanelli stated that the only redress available to the Complainant under the Sick Leave Act 2022 was an entitlement of five days and she noted that the Complainant had said that he had been paid for five days, even if he did not accept that he was paid well beyond that amount of time. 

Reasonable cause

The Respondent submitted that in the case of Cementation Skanska v Carroll, DWT0338, the Court articulated the test pertaining to time limits by stating: “It is the Court's view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the Appellant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the Appellant at the material time. The Appellant's failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the Appellant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.”

The Respondent submitted that it relied on the equitable maxim of Ignorantia juris non excusat and referred to the case of Galway and Roscommon ETB V Josephine Kenny (UDD1624) which states as follows: “The Court cannot accept that a miscalculation of the due date amounts to “exceptional circumstances” as defined by Section 44(4) of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015. The miscalculations of the deadline date is akin to a misinterpretation of the statutory provisions. The Court is satisfied that the legal principle ignorantia juris non excusat (ignorance of the law excuses not) applies in this case and therefore the miscalculation cannot be accepted as excusing a failure to comply with a statutory time limit. While ignorance on the part of an employee of his or her statutory rights may explain a delay in submitting his or her appeal under the Act it cannot excuse a delay.”

The Respondent also cited the case of Minister for Finance v CPSU and Ors [2007] 18 ELR 36where the High Court held that “ignorance of one’s legal rights as opposed to the facts giving rise to those rights cannot be accepted as an excuse for not observing a statutory time limit.”

The Respondent further noted that specifically, Redmond on Dismissal Law (3rd Edition, 2018) at Paragraph 21.1 states that, ''The case law consistently reveals that inadvertence on the part of a firm of Solicitors will not be accepted as excusing a delay.”

The Respondent further submitted that the facts of this matter are strikingly similar to those of the recent case of Irish Rail -v- Stephen Lynch UD/18/22 and also referred to the Supreme Court decision on time limits, albeit in the context of a complaint under the Employment Equality Acts, of County Louth VEG -v- Equality Tribunal [2016) IESC 40.  In the latter case the Court stated that, “If a complaint is out of time and thus fails to satisfy a condition precedent, and remains so found after inquiry, then it cannot be said to have been "lawfully referred" to the Tribunal, such that it may properly be investigated for redress purposes…”

The Respondent submitted that the statutory measure does not operate as a defence point or its equivalent only and that it must therefore be treated as a condition precedent to the exercise of the Tribunal's jurisdiction.

The Substantive Issue

The Respondent noted that the Complainant lodged a complaint under Sick Leave Act, 2022, alleging that he was not fully paid for the certified sick leave period.  The Respondent submitted its position as follows:

·       That Section 5(2) of the Sick Leave Act, 2022 states: “(2) An employee shall be entitled to up to and including 3 statutory sick leave days in a year, or such number of statutory sick leave days as may stand specified from time to time by order of the Minister under section 6”

·       That the statutory sick pay was increased to 5 days in 2024 and 2025.

·       That the Complainant was paid above and beyond the 5 days statutory sick pay as stated in the Sick Leave Act, 2022.

·       That therefore, the instant claim under the Sick Leave Act, 2022 cannot prevail.

Flexible Paid Time Off Plan

Without prejudice to the aforementioned position, the Respondent submitted that the Complainant was not entitled to unlimited paid time off as claimed. The Respondent submitted that the offer letters from the North American parent company Zazmic Inc., were a copy of the American policy temporarily issued to the employees whereas the company in Republic of Ireland was in the process of being officially registered. The offer letter dated November 2023 stated the following: “You are eligible for the following: Zazmic offers a flexible paid time off plan, which includes unlimited vacation, personal, and sick leave. Time off is to be pre-approved by your manager.” The Respondent clarified its’ position that the wording in the offer letter infers:

(i)                  The Complainant was eligible for the flexible paid time off plan.

(ii)                 The paid time off plan included unlimited vacation, personal and sick leave.

(iii)               The paid time off plan for unlimited vacation, personal, and sick leave was subjected to management approval.

The Respondent submitted that it was therefore clear that the paid time off plan for unlimited sick leave was subject to preapproval by the Complainant’s manager. The Respondent submitted that it was important to note that it did not mean that sick leave was subject to approval, but that it did mean that unlimited sick pay was subject to approval.

The Respondent submitted that was also noteworthy that the Complainant was well aware of requisite pre-approval by management to be eligible for the flexible paid time off plan, implemented as a discretionary benefit at the discretion of the Respondent, and that further contracts would be issued in due course in accordance with the local legislation in Republic of Ireland. It was the Respondent position that from January to March 2025 the Complainant availed of 26 days of sick leave, consisting of 5 days in February 2025 and 21 days in March 2025and that in accordance with the flexible paid time off plan subject to management approval, the Complainant was granted 16 days sick pay during the relevant period, limited to 18 March 2025, as approved by his manager in line with the offer letter dated November 2023. The Respondent submitted that accordingly, from this perspective, no further payment was owed to the Complainant, and the instant claim should fail.

Employment Contract

The Respondent submitted that

·       the Complainant was issued with employment contract in line with Irish employment legislation on 28 February 2025.

·       the employment contract outlined a sick pay policy in line with the Sick Leave Act, 2022, and therefore, in line with the Irish employment legislation in terms of sick leave.

·       the Complainant acknowledged receipt of the abovementioned employment contract and made objections to the probation clause and to the work location clause.

·       the Complainant made no further objections to the employment contract as received on the 28 February 2025.  Therefore, all remaining clauses, including the Paid Leave and the Sick Leave clauses, were deemed as accepted by the Complainant in early March 2025.

The Respondent submitted that therefore it follows that the Complainant accepted the Sick Leave clause implementing Statutory Sick Pay in accordance with the Sick Leave Act, 2022, which stated as follows: “The Employee shall be entitled to 5 days of paid sick leave per year, in accordance with the Sick Leave Act 2022. Paid sick leave entitlement will increase in accordance with statutory provisions, reaching 10 days by 2026. A doctor's certificate is required for any sick leave exceeding 2 consecutive days. Unused sick leave does not carry over and resets annually. Additional sick leave may be granted at the Respondent’s discretion.”  

The Respondent further submitted that accordingly, the Employee Handbook in place since March 2025 stated as follows:

“C) PAYMENTS:

You are entitled to Statutory Sick Pay (SSP) if you are absent from work due to sickness or injury provided you meet the criteria in the SSP legislation. If you wish to avail of the SSP, you must provide the Company/Organisation with a medical certificate from your doctor on the first day of absence The number of days per year in which you will be entitled to SSP will vary according to SSP legislation. You will receive SSP from the first day of absence if you are eligible. In order to qualify for SSP, you must have 13 weeks continuous service and provide the Sales Director with a medical certificate as proof of illness or injury. If you exhaust your SSP entitlements, you may qualify for Illness Benefit from the Department of Social Protection.”

In addition, the Respondent submitted that the sick leave policy was modified in March 2025 with no detriment to the employees as additional sick pay would still be provided at the discretion of the company following the same basis of the previous provision related to paid time off for sick leave subjected to management approval.

Taking all of the above into account it was the Respondent stated position that the complaint should fail.  The Respondent further submitted that in any event, t jurisdiction in respect of any alleged issues separate from the claim for sick pay under the Sick Leave 21 Act, 2022 should be declined as no appropriate claims have been lodged with the WRC on these matters and therefore no investigation may be conducted. The Respondent wholly refuted the claim of the Complainant and submitted that the within complaint was not well founded.

Witness evidence Mr Marcus O’Toole:

Mr O’Toole gave evidence under oath in relation to the days paid to the Complainant.  He stated that the Complainant’s sick leave began in February 2025 with COVID and that he had sent a sick note and emailed each day and that payment had been made.  He stated that he was still off in March, and his sick leave arrangements were reviewed at that time and it was agreed to pay him up to a certain date.  He stated that in that context he was paid up until the end of March and that it was no longer sustainable for the business to continue to pay him for his sick leave. 

Employer closing remarks:

Ms Montanelli confirmed that the claim lodged by the Complainant was under the Sick Leave Act and that the Complainant had confirmed that he had been paid for five days.  She confirmed that in those circumstances there should be no redress awarded and that the Complainant had no entitlement to redress and that the Adjudication Officer should find that the complaint was not well founded. 

Preliminary issues: 

1.       New Allegations

The Complainant submitted a complaint under the Sick Leace act 2022 on 10 April 2025. Thereafter, the Complainant provided a detailed submission to the WRC.  Within the body of that document, he referred to a number of other areas of concern including issues relating to performance, change of position and contract, salary reduction, targets and commission payments.

The Respondent submitted an objection to the inclusion of these matters as part of the hearing on the basis that they did not form part of the case and were not contained in the complaint form initially received.

At hearing the Complainant confirmed that he had referred to such matters by way of background to his case, and not by way of additional complaints.

Based on the above I am satisfied that the only case upon which I must make adjudicate is a case under the Sick Leave Act 2022.

2.       Time Limit

The Complainant lodged his complaint with the WRC on 10 April 2025. I note that the only complaint under consideration is a complaint under the Sick Leave Act 2022, and I note that the sick leave referred to in that complaint commenced in March 2025.  In that context I am satisfied that the complaint falls within the 6-month permissible time limit contained in the Act.

The Substantive Issue

The Complainant lodged a complaint under the Sick Leave Act, 2022 alleging that he was not paid by the Respondent for his sick leave.  The Sick Leave Act 2022 entitles employees to 5 days of employer-paid statutory sick leave per calendar year (for 2024-2025) at 70% if normal earnings, capped at €110 per day. 

Section 5(1) states that “Subject to this Act, an employee shall, in respect of a day on which he or she would ordinarily work but is incapable of doing so due to illness or injury (in this Act referred to as a “statutory sick leave day”), be entitled to statutory sick leave”

Section 7(1) of the Act states that “an employer shall pay an employee a prescribed daily rate of payment (in this act referred to as “statutory sick leave payment”) in respect of each statutory sick leave day.”

The Act specifically allows for an employer making more advantageous sick leave provisions and Section 8 of the Act states that

(1)    Nothing in this Act shall prevent the inclusion in a contract of employment of a provision that is –

(a)    As favourable to an employee as, or

(b)    More favourable to an employee than,

an entitlement to statutory leave in accordance with this Act….”

However, notwithstanding the above provision the Act only applies to statutory sick leave and statutory sick leave payment.  In that context the only question that comes within my jurisdiction under the Act is whether or not the Complainant received his statutory entitlement to sick leave and the relevant statutory sick leave payment.

It was the Complainant position that he commenced on sick leave on 3 March 2025 and that he remained on sick leave as at the date of hearing.  He submitted that all his sick leave was certified, and it was his evidence at hearing that he had been paid for a total of 18 days sick leave.  Under cross examination he confirmed that the 18 days’ pay related to sick leave taken in March 2025.  He also confirmed under cross examination that he believed he had been paid for 3 days sick leave in February 2025.

As the statutory entitlement to sick leave in 2025 is 5 days it is clear to me that the Complainant did receive his entitlement to statutory sick leave and associated statutory sick leave payment, and I find accordingly.

I have found that the Complainant did receive his entitlement to statutory sick leave and associated statutory sick leave payment and so it is my decision that this complaint is not well founded.

Statutory sick leave