Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Paula  Caro Almohalla

Academic Bridge Limited

Representatives

Eoin Morris BL instructed by Martin Moloney MP Moloney Solicitors

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00070209-001

24/03/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967

CA-00070210-001

24/03/2025

The Complainant commenced employment as a Teacher with the Respondent on 29 August 2022 and was paid €694.25 per week. She stated that her dismissal was unfair because the Respondent used a sham redundancy process to force through inferior contractual terms, as the teaching work she had been doing continued and new teachers were being recruited at lower rates. She also stated that the consultation process was neither genuine nor meaningful, and that no fair selection or credible alternative employment was offered to her.

The Complainant stated that her dismissal was not a genuine redundancy but rather the outcome of the Respondent’s attempt to unilaterally change her contractual terms, including pay and working conditions. She asserted that the restructuring relied upon by the Respondent was not driven by a genuine cessation or reduction in the need for teachers, but by an intention to introduce lower‑paid teaching roles and compel staff to accept inferior terms. In support of this, she highlighted that, during the redundancy process, the Respondent was openly advertising teaching posts at lower hourly rates while seeking to persuade existing teachers to sign revised contracts. She asserted that this demonstrated that the work itself was not disappearing, and that the redundancy rationale was therefore not genuine.

The Complainant stated that the consultation process was flawed, both because key operational changes—such as the new class timetable and reduced breaks—were implemented before consultation concluded, and because the Respondent presented these changes as “non‑negotiable.” She asserted that this deprived staff of any real opportunity to influence the proposals and rendered the consultation process procedural rather than meaningful. She further claimed that she was not provided with adequate information in a timely manner to allow her to properly engage in consultation.

She also stated that no genuine or viable alternative employment was offered. She asserted that what was proposed amounted to the same teaching work on significantly inferior terms, and therefore could not be viewed as a reasonable alternative role.

Finally, the Complainant rejected the suggestion that she failed to adequately mitigate her loss.

Following a change in ownership in November 2024, the Respondent stated that they inherited a business in serious financial difficulty, with total liabilities of €678,673, including €425,123 owing to Revenue. They stated that their operating model was unsustainable, citing a loss of €11,856 per class, and that significant restructuring, including a reduction in teaching salaries, was necessary to keep the company solvent. From January 2025, the Respondent stated that they began a consultation process on potential collective redundancies, formally notifying the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment on 14 February 2025. Throughout February and March, the Respondent engaged with Unite the Union, providing financial information and a proposed “Rescue Plan,” which included operational changes such as a new class timetable and revised break times.

The Respondent asserted that the Complainant accepted redundancy on 25 February 2025, before that consultation process had concluded. They also stated that they explored alternatives by offering revised contracts to staff, including the Complainant. The Respondent disputed any suggestion that redundancies were a sham, stating that advertisements for new teaching roles at lower hourly rates merely reflected the new economic model required for the business to survive. They further contended that the Complainant failed to raise any formal grievance before her departure and did not adequately mitigate her loss, pointing to a holiday she took shortly after her dismissal and a failure to apply for a greater variety of roles than she did.

CA-00070209-001:

Section 6(1) of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 provides that “the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.”

Section 6(4) of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 provides as follows:

4)     Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, not to be an unfair dismissal, if it results wholly or mainly from one or more of the following:

(a)   the capability, competence or qualification of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do,

(b)   the conduct of the employee,

(c)    the redundancy of the employee, and

(d)   the employee being unable to work or continue to work in the position he held without contravention (by him or by his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under any statute or instrument made under statute.

Section 6(6) of the Act states as follows:

“In determining for the purposes of this Act whether the dismissal of an employee was an unfair dismissal or not, it shall be for the employer to show that the dismissal resulted wholly of mainly from one or more grounds specified in subsection (4) of this section or that there were other substantial grounds for justifying the dismissal.

Section 7 (2A) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 states as follows:

For the purposes of subsection (1), an employee who is dismissed shall be taken not to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if—

(a) the dismissal is one of a number of dismissals that, together, constitute collective redundancies as defined in section 6 of the Protection of Employment Act 1977,

(b) the dismissals concerned were effected on a compulsory basis,

(c) the dismissed employees were, or are to be, replaced, at the same location or elsewhere in the State, (except where the employer has an existing operation with established terms and conditions) by—

(i) other persons who are, or are to be, directly employed by the employer, or

(ii) other persons whose services are, or are to be, provided to that employer in pursuance of other arrangements,

(d) those other persons perform, or are to perform, essentially the same functions as the dismissed employees, and

(e) the terms and conditions of employment of those other persons are, or are to be, materially inferior to those of the dismissed employees.

Findings:

As set out in section 6 (6) of the Unfair Dismissals Acts above, the dismissal of an employee is presumed to be unfair unless the employer shows that there were substantial grounds justifying it. Redundancy, as set out in Section 6(4) can constitute such a ground, but it remains for the employer to prove that the dismissal was attributable to the redundancy of the employee.

In the instant case, the Respondent stated that, following a change of ownership in November 2024, they encountered significant financial difficulty, including liabilities exceeding €678,000 and an operating loss of €11,856 per class. On that basis, they stated that a restructuring was required which necessitated several redundancies.

Notwithstanding this, the evidence raised a number of substantial concerns as to whether or not these redundancies were lawful.

Firstly, while the Respondent stated that a genuine consultation process commenced on 10 January 2025, its conduct during that period is at odds with this. Before the end of the 30-day consultation period, the Respondent proceeded to implement a revised class timetable, altering start times, finish times and breaks. This was done notwithstanding a request from the Complainant’s union that such changes be deferred. The changes were implemented as a fait accompli and described as “non-negotiable”. That is not consistent with consultation undertaken with a view to reaching agreement, but suggests that decisions had already been made.

Secondly, although the Respondent asserted case that the Complainant’s role “was redundant”, during the consultation period, they advertised English-language teaching roles at lower hourly rates of €16.50 to €17.50. While this was said to reflect a “new economic model”, it demonstrates that the work itself continued. In those circumstances, it is clear that this was not a redundancy in line with Section 7 (2A) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 which states that

“an employee who is dismissed shall be taken not to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if—

c) the dismissed employees were, or are to be, replaced, at the same location or elsewhere in the State, (except where the employer has an existing operation with established terms and conditions) by—

(i) other persons who are, or are to be, directly employed by the employer, or…

(e) the terms and conditions of employment of those other persons are, or are to be, materially inferior to those of the dismissed employees.

Thirdly, the evidence in relation to alternative employment lacks coherence. The Respondent asserted that the Complainant accepted redundancy on 25 February 2025, yet also stated that a new contract was issued to her on 10 March 2025.  What was offered however was not alternative employment in any meaningful sense, but a continuation of the same work on reduced terms, at a time when the Respondent was actively recruiting on those terms. It cannot therefore be regarded as suitable alternative employment.

Fourthly, there was no evidence presented of any objective or transparent selection process. No criteria, matrix or comparative assessment was produced. The Respondent simply asserted a need to reduce payroll costs. In circumstances where multiple employees carried out similar roles, the absence of any discernible selection criteria is significant.

Considering all of the foregoing, I am not satisfied that the Respondent has established that a genuine redundancy situation existed. Rather, the evidence suggests that the Respondent sought to reduce pay and conditions and used redundancy as the mechanism to achieve that outcome. The Complainant’s work continued after her dismissal, and recruitment took place for that same work at lower rates. The consultation process was not genuine, and no fair selection process was applied.

In those circumstances, I find that the Respondent has failed to discharge the burden of proving that the dismissal was fair and that the Complainant was therefore unfairly dismissed.

CA-00070210-001:

As the Complainant accepted that she received her statutory redundancy payment, I do not allow this appeal. 

CA-00070209-001:

I find that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed for the reasons set out above.

Section 7 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, in relevant part, states that:

(1) Where an employee is dismissed and the dismissal is an unfair dismissal, the employee shall be entitled to redress consisting of whichever of the following the adjudication officer, considers appropriate having regard to all the circumstances:

(a) re-instatement by the employer of the employee in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal on the terms and conditions on which he was employed immediately before his dismissal together with a term that the re-instatement shall be deemed to have commenced on the day of the dismissal, or

(b) re-engagement by the employer of the employee either in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal or in a different position which would be reasonably suitable for him on such terms and conditions as are reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(c) (i) if the employee incurred any financial loss attributable to the dismissal, payment to him by the employer of such compensation in respect of the loss (not exceeding in amount 104 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of this Act) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances,

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining the amount of compensation payable under that subsection regard shall be had to—

(a) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that subsection was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employer,

(b) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that subsection was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employee,

(c) the measures (if any) adopted by the employee or, as the case may be, his failure to adopt measures, to mitigate the loss aforesaid,

(d) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the procedure referred to in subsection (1) of section 14 of this Act or with the provisions of any code of practice relating to procedures regarding dismissal approved of by the Minister,

(e) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the said section 14,

(f) the extent (if any) to which the conduct of the employee (whether by act or omission) contributed to the dismissal.

3) In this section—

“financial loss”, in relation to the dismissal of an employee, includes any actual loss and any estimated prospective loss of income attributable to the dismissal and the value of any loss or diminution, attributable to the dismissal, of the rights of the employee under the Redundancy Payments Acts, 1967 to 1973, or in relation to superannuation;

“remuneration” includes allowances in the nature of pay and benefits in lieu of or in addition to pay.

The Remedy

In deciding on a suitable remedy, I must firstly consider reinstating or re-engaging the Complainant.

In making this decision, I have regard to the findings of the Supreme Court in An Bord Banistiochta, Gaelscoil Moshiolog v The Labour Court, where it was stated that “the remedy of reinstatement is exceptional in nature,involving as it does the imposition of a contractual relationship which is not only personal, but involves a high level of mutual trust and confidence, on an unwilling party…. It is wrong to view reinstatement simply as punishment for wrongdoing on the part of the employer”

Considering the foregoing, I am satisfied, based on the evidence presented to me, that the trust and confidence required for the resumption of an employment relationship no longer exists.  Accordingly, I have decided to make an award of compensation.

The Calculation of the Complainant’s “Remuneration”

In assessing the amount of compensation to award, I must firstly calculate the Complainant’s “remuneration” in accordance with the Act.

I note firstly that she earned a weekly salary of €694.25 and that the maximum award permissible under the Act is therefore €72,202, namely 104 weeks’ pay.

The “Financial Loss” Attributable to The Dismissal

In calculating the “financial loss” attributable to the dismissal from 8 November 2024, I note that Charleton J in Panisi, in assessing loss, stated as follows: 

My task is to assess the financial damage which the dismissal has brought about and then to place the measure of that damage against the maximum amount of compensation that is available. In the event that the compensation that is available, amounting to 104 weeks remuneration, is less than that sum, then that is the measure of damages. Where the quantum of damage is more, then the jurisdiction is limited to that maximum and the amount of damages must thus be reduced to that maximum sum. Where the measure of damages on dismissal is more than the maximum but contributory fault is found in respect of the dismissal against the employee, the reduction is on the totality of those damages, and not on the maximum award. If the result is to reduce compensation within the maximum award, that sum is appropriate. Where the reduction in total damages for contributory fault puts the damages above the maximum award, then the maximum award is the correct measure of compensation for unfair dismissal.

As set out above, I must therefore next assess the overall loss attributable to the dismissal. I have calculated this, as set out below, by deciding on what date the Complainant was dismissed in the first instance prior to assessing her financial loss and then examining whether or not the statutory redundancy payment she received should be deducted from the ultimate award as Mr Morris BL asserted it should be.

-          The date of dismissal

In deciding from what date the Complainant’s financial losses accrue, I note that she was notified of her redundancy on 17 February 2025 and that her employment terminated on 20 March 2025.

As set out above, I must therefore next assess the overall loss attributable to the dismissal

-          The overall loss attributable to the dismissal

In examining this, I noted firstly that the Complainant’s employment terminated on 20 March 2025 and the WRC hearing took place on 6 March 2026, 50 weeks later. This yields an actual loss of €34,713 to the hearing date. While she was still unemployed on the day of the hearing, I note that she was still actively seeking work and that a number of job interviews has been scheduled for her. I allow a modest prospective element of 12 weeks at the same weekly rate, amounting to €8,331, given the relatively buoyant jobs market in Ireland. The combined wages loss (actual plus prospective) therefore stands at €43,044.

-          The statutory redundancy payment

Prior to moving to calculate the award, I must also consider Mr. Morris BL’s argument that I should deduct the statutory redundancy payment made to the Complainant.

In examining this argument, I noted that there is conflicting case law on this issue and that the interaction between statutory redundancy payments and compensation for unfair dismissal has not always been approached consistently. I also recognise that it may appear odd that a statutory redundancy lump sum would not automatically be deducted in circumstances where an award is being made for unfair dismissal and where I have found that there was no genuine redundancy.

The statutory redundancy lump sum is a distinct statutory entitlement however, accrued over the course of the Complainant’s service and vesting upon termination; it is not compensation for post‑dismissal loss. This is clear from the Act, which defines “financial loss,” in relation to the dismissal of an employee, as including:

any actual loss and any estimated prospective loss of income attributable to the dismissal, and the value of any loss or diminution, attributable to the dismissal, of the rights of the employee under the Redundancy Payments Acts, 1967 to 1973, or in relation to superannuation.

Considering all of the foregoing, I find that the financial loss attributable to the dismissal is €43,044.

Calculation of award

As set out above, I have found that the Complainant’s overall “financial loss” attributable to the dismissal is €43,044 I must now examine if there is any basis for a “reduction .. on the totality of those damages” as set out by Charleton J in Panisi.

In this regard, the Respondent’s representative highlighted that as the Complainant had failed to sufficiently mitigate her loss, any award should reflect this.

In considering this assertion, I note that there is conflicting case law around the calculation of an award of compensation with many decisions focusing solely on the efforts of a Complainant to mitigate their loss and appearing to disregard the conduct of the employer in relation to the dismissal.

In my view, a decision to focus solely on the attempts to mitigate loss is at odds with both the legislative provisions and the views of the Adjudication Officer in ADJ 32667, where, in calculating the award of compensation, she stated, inter alia, that: 

“in considering compensation, regard must be had to all of the subsections of Section 7-and the tests are not confined to the efforts of the former employee-or the Complainant in this case. In circumstances where the Respondent is found not to have met the tests set out in subsections (c) and (d) …. and the Complainant made no contribution to the decision to dismiss her under (a) (b) or (f) It would be wholly unjustified to penalise the Complainant solely for a conclusion that she did not make a sufficient effort of mitigate her losses where the balance of unfairness and failure to comply with the terms of Section 7 as a whole lie squarely with the Respondent.” 

In considering the requirement on the Complainant to mitigate her loss, as set out in section 7(2) ( c), I noted that the Complainant took a period of holiday in April 2025 while she was unemployed. However, had she remained in employment during that period, she would have continued to receive her salary from the Respondent and to accrue annual leave. In these circumstances and having regard to the principle that an employee is not required to act unreasonably in seeking to mitigate their loss, I do not find that this relatively short period should have any impact on the Complainant’s entitlement to recover her financial loss.

I am also satisfied that she made some efforts to secure alternative employment: she provided examples of applications for teaching roles, and she also applied for other forms of work, including air‑hostessing, a field in which she previously had experience. However, given the length of time she remained out of work, I would have reasonably expected a greater number and range of applications during this period and consider it appropriate to apply a 20% reduction to the compensatory award to reflect this shortfall in mitigation.

Considering the foregoing, I make an award of compensation of €34,435 and direct that the Respondent make a payment to the Complainant in this amount in respect of the unfair dismissal. As well as including the 20% reduction applied to reflect the Complainant’s shortfall in mitigation, this figure reflects both the Respondent’s conduct in relation to the dismissal which as set out above was wholly unsatisfactory and the absence of any Complainant contribution.

CA-00070210-001:

I do not allow this appeal for the reason set out above.