Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Peter  McKeon

Niamh Glackin trading as Roots Wellness

Representatives

Self-Represented   

Mr. John Keenan, JRK Business Support & Employee Advocacy Services

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000

CA-00070144-001

21/03/2025

On 21st March 2025, the Complainant referred the present complaint to the Commission. Herein, he alleged that the Respondent discriminated against him on the grounds of religion. In particular, he submitted that the Respondent withdrew access to its services following his expression of his opinion in relation to certain religious matters.  By response, while the Respondent accepted that they withdrew their services from the Complainant, they denied that this was in any way related to the expression of his religious opinion and consequently denied the allegations of discrimination raised.

A hearing in relation to this matter was convened for, and finalised on, 21st October 2025. This hearing was conducted by way of remote hearing pursuant to the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020 and SI 359/20206, which designates the WRC as a body empowered to hold remote hearings. No technical issues were experienced during the hearing.

Both parties issued extensive submission in advance of the hearing. The Complainant gave evidence in support of his complaints while the Respondent, a sole trader, gave evidence in defence. During the hearing, the Respondent attempted to open witness statements as part of their submission. As the authors of those statements were not present to give evidence, these fell foul of the rule against hearsay and were not considered as part of the hearing or within the decision making process. This matter was listed alongside that bearing file reference ADJ-00057713. The complaint listed in parallel was a duplicate of the present complaint, with the relevant decision being issued under the present file reference.

At the outset of the hearing, the parties agreed that the notification requirements of the Act had been complied with and no issue was raised in relation to the same. No preliminary issues as to my jurisdiction to hear the complaint were raised at any stage of the proceedings.

In evidence, the Complainant stated that he was formerly a member of the Respondent's yoga studio. He stated that on 16th December 2024, he entered the studio to commence a session. Upon his arrival, a discussion regarding the forthcoming Christmas season ensued. When asked for his views, the Complainant expressed his view that the celebration was "hocus-pocus" and asserted that he did not celebrate the "rape and abandonment of a child." He clarified that this perspective pertained to the Catholic religion and the Christmas period specifically. In response, the owner of the Respondent’s premises suggested that while many churches faced criticism, they maintained a positive moral code. The Complainant replied that any organisation which concealed individuals involved in paedophilia, relocated them between communities, and mistreated victims possessed a questionable moral code. He expressed a preference for the United Nations Charter of Human Rights. The Complainant maintained that this exchange occurred in a gentle manner and concluded without further comment before the class began.

At the conclusion of the session, the Complainant packed away his equipment. He noted that he was the final person to depart and remained alone with the owner, yet no mention of the earlier conversation was made at that time.

On 17th December 2024, the Complainant received an email from the owner of the Respondent’s studio. The email described his comments concerning child abuse as extremely inappropriate and asserted that, in consideration of the same, the studio was not the correct environment for him. The Complainant subsequently initiated a series of correspondence to clarify the duration of this exclusion. The Respondent duly confirmed that he was to be subject  to lifetime ban.

By submission, the Complainant submitted that the Respondent imposed this lifetime ban solely as a consequence of the expression of his religious views. He asserted that no altercation occurred on the date in question and that he did not express his views in a forceful or inappropriate manner. He noted that the Respondent raised no issue at the time of the discussion. Consequently, the Complainant contended that the Respondent denied him access to a service based on his religious beliefs, which constituted discrimination under the Equal Status Act.

The Respondent submitted that she was a yoga practitioner who operated a studio in the West of Ireland, established in 2023. She acknowledged that the Complainant was a member of the studio and had attended classes since September 2024.

The Respondent stated that on 16th December 2024, the Complainant attended a scheduled session. She explained that prior to the commencement of classes, attendees frequently engaged in brief, informal discussions. On this date, the participants discussed the forthcoming festive season in an informal and light-hearted basis.

The Respondent asserted that during this conversation, the Complainant interjected in an aggressive manner and employed extreme language. He described the birth of Christ as the result of the rape of a child and characterised Christmas as a celebration of child abuse. The Complainant went on to discuss paedophilia on the part of the catholic church.  She maintained that the Complainant’s interjection was of such an aggressive and extreme nature that it halted the conversation and left other attendees taken aback.

Following the conclusion of the class, several attendees approached the Respondent to express their concerns regarding the language used by the Complainant. Consequently, the Respondent determined that the Complainant’s continued presence constituted a threat to her clients and her business operations. She submitted that tranquillity and peacefulness were fundamental to the yoga experience and that the Complainant’s behaviour was disruptive to the point of causing unease among other clients.

On 17th December 2024, the Respondent wrote to the Complainant. She stated that while she respected the right to individual opinion, she bore a responsibility to maintain a safe and harmonious environment. She informed the Complainant that the studio was not the appropriate environment for him. Following further correspondence, and at the Complainant's request for clarification, the Respondent confirmed that a lifetime ban was in effect due to his behaviour.

In her submission, the Respondent contended that the Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case for discrimination. She asserted that the withdrawal of services resulted specifically from the Complainant’s conduct and the manner in which he expressed his views, rather than the views themselves. She maintained that she held no issue with the personal beliefs of those attending her studio and assumed that individuals of all faiths attended for wellness purposes. In these circumstances, the Respondent strongly denied any discrimination against the Complainant and submitted that the application should be dismissed.

In the present case, the Complainant submitted that the Respondent withdrew their service to him following the expression of his religious views. In denying this allegation, the Respondent submitted that the withdrawal of services arose as a consequence of the manner of the expression of the Complainant’s views, rather than the views themselves.

In this regard, Section 5(1) of the Act provides that,

“A person shall not discriminate in disposing of goods to the public generally or a section of the public or in providing a service, whether the disposal or provision is for consideration or otherwise and whether the service provided can be availed of only by a section of the public.”

Section 2 of the Act defines “service” as follows,

“a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes –

(ii) entertainment, recreation or refreshment”

Section 3(1)(a) of the Act provides that discrimination shall be taken to occur where,

“…a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2)”

Section 3(2)(g) specifies the following as such a ground,

 “…that one has a different religious belief from the other, or that one has a religious belief and the other has not.”

Section 38A of the Act places the burden of proof on the Complainant to establish, in the first instance, facts from which the discrimination alleged may be inferred. It is only where such a prima facie case has been established that the onus shifts to the Respondent to rebut the inference of discrimination.

In the case of Olumide Smith -v- The Office of the Ombudsman [2020] IEHC 51, Simmons J. stated that,

“The effect of these legislative provisions is that a complainant is required to discharge a reduced burden of proof, and once this is done, the burden of proof is reversed. As explained by Advocate General Mengozzi in Case C415/10, Meister ECLI:EU:C:2012:8, [22], the effect of the burden of proof provisions under the Racial Equality Directive (and other related Directives) is that a measure of balance is maintained between the parties, enabling the complainant to claim his or her right to equal treatment but preventing proceedings from being brought against a respondent solely on the basis of the complainant’s assertions.”

Regarding the present case, while some matters of fact are in dispute, it is common case that the Complainant clearly and unambiguously expressed religious views at the outset of the session on 16th December 2024. It is also common case that the following day, the Respondent elected to withdraw access to their services on an ongoing basis. In these circumstances, I find that the Complainant had discharged the initial burden of proof imposed by the Act, and it falls to the Respondent to rebut the inference of discrimination in accordance with Section 34, cited above. 

In this regard, the Respondent submitted that the rationale for the withdrawal of services arose from the conduct of the Complainant. By way of post hearing submission, the Complainant referenced a waiver issued to the Complainant on his joining the service. This waiver stated that the Respondent,

“…reserves the right, in its discretion, to refuse admittance to, or to remove a participant from activities should it deem it necessary to do so…”.

While the Complainant did state that he had no recollection of receiving such a waiver, the position set out above in commonplace in most service providers.

In this regard, the Respondent submitted that the conduct of the Complainant is expressing the views in question, as opposed to the views themselves, made other attendees deeply uncomfortable and inferred with their use of the service. While the parties are in dispute as to some matters regarding the interaction, it is common case that the discussion opened as an informal friendly chat amongst the attendees. In answer to a question posed by the Adjudicator, the Complainant confirmed that the attendees would often discuss such routine, everyday matters as traffic and the weather, prior to the commencement of classes. Given the proximity of the Christmas season, the preparation for the same was the subject of the informal discussion on the date in question. It is not in dispute that in engaging with the discussion, the Complainant referenced the rape and abandonment of a child, child abuse and paedophilia. In this context, it is not at all surprising that the Respondent found the language adopted by the Complainant to be deeply uncomfortable and inappropriate for the setting. Again, in answer to a question posed by the Adjudicator, the Complainant accepted that he could have expressed his views in relation to the Christmas season in more benign language, without betraying his views in relation to the same.  In evidence, the Respondent clearly and repeated stated that the services were withdrawn from the Complainant, not of the basis of his views, but in the manner by which he expressed the same. She absolutely denied that her decision to remove access to the service was influenced by the substance of the Complainant’s views and stated that the service is open to persons of all backgrounds, faiths and beliefs.

In this regard, the Complainant is clearly entitled to maintain his religious views and he is entitled to express the same without suffered discrimination. This entitlement does not permit the Complainant to adopt any formulation of language in respect to the same, in any setting, without consequence. Having considered the totality of the evidence presented by the parties I find that the Respondent withdrew their services from the Complainant on the grounds of the manner by which he expressed his views, as opposed to the views themselves. In these circumstances, I find that the Respondent has rebutted the inference of discrimination imposed by Section 38 of the Act, and the complaint is deemed to be not well-founded.

I find that the Respondent did not engage in prohibited conduct within the meaning of the Act. In these circumstances, I find that the complaint is not well-founded.

Religious Discrimination, Burden of Proof, Inference of Discrimination