Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Andrei  Blaga

Padraig Thornton Waste Disposal Limited

t/a Thornton’s Recycling

Representatives

Claire Scahill,

HR Manager

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967

CA-00077880-001

24/11/2025

This hearing was conducted in person in the Workplace Relations Commission situate in Lansdowne Road, Dublin. In line with the Supreme Court decision in the constitutional case of Zalewski -v- An Adjudication Officer and the Workplace Relations Commission and Ireland and the Attorney General [2021] IESC 24 (delivered on the 6th of April 2021) the hearing was conducted in recognition of the fact that the proceedings constitute the administration of Justice. It was therefore open to members of the public to attend this hearing.

I informed the parties that pursuant to the Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2021 coming into effecton the 29th of July 2021 and where there is potential for a serious and/or direct conflict in the evidence between the parties to a complaint, then an oath or affirmation may be required to be administered to any person giving evidence before me. I confirm that I have administered the said Affirmation as appropriate and in order that matters might progress. It is noted that the giving of false statement or evidence is an offence.

The specific details of the complaint are outlined in the Workplace Relations Complaint Form which was received by the WRC on the 24th of November 2025. In general terms, I will therefore be looking at issues that have arisen in the six-month period directly preceding this date.

The Complainant was not represented and made his own case. When it came time to hear the Complainant’s evidence, the Complainant agreed to make an Affirmation to tell the truth. I was provided with supporting documentation in advance of the hearing. On the day of the hearing the Complainant showed me a copy of his letter of termination dated the 12th of December 2025. The Complainant relied on the submission set out in the Workplace Relations Complaint Form which read as follows:-

I have been continuously employed by Thorntons Recycling as a Machine Driver/Operator for over 10½ years (since approximately January 2015.

Following a fire that destroyed the MDR Facility where I worked, my original role ceased to exist, creating a genuine redundancy situation.

The employer has offered me alternative employment as Machine Driver at two different sites (JFK Facility and Killeen Road Facility). I accepted two separate trial periods at these locations in September/October 2025.

During the trials I established that:

– the new workplaces are semi-open / outdoor yards (not covered indoor halls like my previous workplace);

– I am exposed daily to rain, wind, cold, mud and high levels of dust from construction materials.

– these conditions represent a significant deterioration in working environment and pose a risk to my respiratory health and general well-being.

On 11 November 2025 I received a letter (attached) offering a further 4-week trial period at the same unsuitable locations. I have formally declined this offer in writing (copy of my email attached) on the grounds that the proposed roles do not constitute suitable alternative employment within the meaning of the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967–2014, due to the substantial and unreasonable change in working conditions.

I have over 10 years of continuous service and I am therefore entitled to a statutory redundancy lump sum payment (2 weeks’ pay for each year of service + 1 additional week, capped at €600 per week).

The employer has refused to process my statutory redundancy payment on the basis that I have been offered (and declined) alternative employment. I believe this refusal is unlawful because the alternative employment offered is not suitable.

I request that the Workplace Relations Commission investigate this matter and order the employer to pay my full statutory redundancy entitlement without further delay.

Supporting documents attached:

1. Letter from Thorntons Recycling dated 11 November 2025

2. My written refusal email

3. Any photos/emails regarding the trial periods (if you have them).  I was provided with supplemental documentary evidence in support of the Complainant’s case. No objection was raised to any of the materials relied upon by the Complainant in making his case. The evidence adduced by the Complainant and his/her witnesses was challenged as appropriate by the Respondent/by the Respondent’s Representative.

The Complainant alleges that he is entitled to Statutory Redundancy in circumstances where alternative employment was unsuitable.

Where it also became necessary, I explained how the Adjudication process operated with particular emphasis on the burden of proof which had to be attained by the Complainant in the first instance. The Complainant must establish facts which tend to disclose that there is a reasonable cause of action or that there appears to have been a contravention of a Statute or Statutes.

Where I deemed it necessary, I made my own inquiries so as to better understand the facts of the case and in fulfilment of my duties as prescribed by Statute. 

The Respondent HR Manager represented the interests of the Company. There were also two Employer representatives/witnesses including the Operations Manager and  the Facilities Manager both of whom answered questions put to them as part of the process. The Respondent provided me with the written Employer Response dated the 2nd of April 2026. This response was read into evidence by the HR Manger. The Response was supported by relevant documentation

The Respondent rejects that there is an onus on them to pay Statutory Redundancy in circumstances where, they say, suitable alternative employment was identified and offered.

Where I deemed it necessary, I made my own inquiries so as to better understand the facts of the case and in fulfilment of my duties as prescribed by Statute.

I have carefully listened to the evidence adduced herein. The Complainant commenced his employment with the Respondent facility in 2015. He worked his way up to Machine Operative and I understand that he operated a crane in a warehouse unit owned and operated by the Respondent in Park West.

It is an unfortunate fact that the Park West facility (wherein the Complainant worked) was burnt to the ground in September of 2025 leading to the immediate closure of the plant. The Respondent reacted quickly to ensure that the 46 Park West Employees could, where possible, be re-deployed across other sites owned and operated by the Respondent. I note that the Contract of Employment specifically reserves the right to relocate and/or transfer Employees to other places of work which may or may not be established at the time of signing. I further note that the Contract of Employment states that any such requirement made will be within reason.

I understand that the Respondent had much more success re-deploying it’s day shift team and that it’s night shift team was largely made redundant as there were no other plants operating overnight.

The Complainant had a particular skillset which the Respondent had demand for, and the Complainant was given the choice of continuing on as a crane operator in one of two alternative sites. The sites were not particularly far from the original one, and the Complainant confirmed this in his evidence.

The Complainant did attend at both sites to trial out the machine to be operated and to get a sense of the proposed environment. The Complainant agreed that the job was largely the same in terms of operating the crane. The biggest difference between the old job and the proposed new ones was where the crane was situated. The Complainant had previously operated a crane which was fully indoors and therefore protected from the elements. Each of the two new positions involved only semi-coverage so that the complainant felt that he was much more exposed to the wind the sun the rain and the cold then he had previously been. I understand that the Complainant would have worked inside a cabin which was heated but might not have had AC for the summer months. The Complainant’s biggest problem seemed to be the accessing and egressing which would leave him exposed. 

The Respondent has taken the view that it wanted to retain the Complainant and that he has been provided with suitable alternative employment.

The issue for determination is whether the Complainant has unreasonably refused the Respondent’s offer of alternative employment and has thus disentitled himself to statutory redundancy payment under Section 15 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967.  It is firstly necessary to set out the relevant statutory provisions and caselaw before applying same to the factual matrix adduced through evidence.

Section 7 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 provides for a general right to redundancy payment where an employee is dismissed by reason of redundancy and meets the requisite criteria as follows:

“General right to redundancy payment

7- (1)  An employee, if he is dismissed by his employer by reason of redundancy or is laid off or kept on short-time for the minimum period, shall, subject to this Act, be entitled to the payment of moneys which shall be known (and are in this Act referred to) as redundancy payment provided- (a) he has been employed for the requisite period, and (b) he was an employed contributor in employment which was insurable for all benefits under the Social Welfare Acts, 1952 to 1966, immediately before the date of the termination of his employment, or had ceased to be ordinarily employed in employment which was so insurable in the period of four years ending on that date.

(2)  For the purposes of subsection (1), an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if for one or more reasons not related to the employee concerned] the dismissal is attributable wholly or mainly to-

(a)  the fact that his employer has ceased, or intends to cease, to carry on the business for the purposes of which the employee was employed by him, or has ceased or intends to cease, to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed, or

(b)  the fact that the requirements of that business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where he was so employed have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish, or

(c)  the fact that his employer has decided to carry on the business with fewer or no employees, whether by requiring the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) to be done by other employees or otherwise, or

(d)  the fact that his employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforward be done in a different manner for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained, or

(e)  the fact that his employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforward be done by a person who is also capable of doing other work for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained,…”

Section 15 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 provides for an employee’s disentitlement to redundancy payment for refusing to accept an offer of alternative employment as follows:

Disentitlement to redundancy payment for refusal to accept alternative employment

15.-(1)  An employee  shall not be entitled to a redundancy payment if -

(a) his employer has offered to renew that employee’s contract of employment or to re-engage him under a new contract of employment,

(b) the provisions of the contract as renewed, or of the new contract, as to the capacity and place in which he would be employed and as to the other terms and conditions of his employment would not differ from the corresponding provisions of the contract in force immediately before the termination of his contract,

(c) the renewal or re-engagement would take effect on or before the date of the termination of his contract, and

(d) he has unreasonably refused the offer.

(2) An employee shall not be entitled to a redundancy payment if -

(a) his employer has made to him in writing an offer to renew the employee’s contract of employment or to re-engage him under a new contract of employment,

(b) the provisions of the contract as renewed, or of the new contract, as to the capacity and place in which he would be employed and as to the other terms and conditions of his employment would differ wholly or in part from the corresponding provisions of his contract in force immediately before the termination of his contract,

(c) the offer constitutes an offer of suitable employment in relation to the employee,

(d) the renewal or re-engagement would take effect not later than four weeks after the date of the termination of his contract, and

(e) he has unreasonably refused the offer.

(2A) Where an employee who has been offered suitable employment and has carried out, for a period of not more than four weeks, the duties of that employment, refuses the offer, the temporary acceptance of that employment shall not solely constitute an unreasonable refusal for the purposes of this section.”

When it is broken down therefore,  Section 15(1) of the Redundancy Act 1967 provides for a scenario whereby an employer offers renewal of an employee’s contract or a new contract which does not differ from the pre-existing contract and takes effect on or before the termination of that contract. 

Section 15(2) provides for a scenario whereby an employer offers in writing, renewal of an employee’s contract or a new contract which differs wholly or in part from the pre-existing contract, subject to the proviso that it constitutes suitable employment and takes effect within four weeks. 

Given that the contract offered herein required a change in location, Section 15(2) is applicable to the instant case.

In terms of interpreting these provisions, the English EAT has provided useful guidance in relation to the appropriate test in Cambridge & District Co-operative Society Ltd -v- Ruse [1993] I.R.L.R. 156 at 158, when considering the similarly worded provisions of the British legislation in relation to the reasonableness of a refusal of alternative employment as follows:

“the suitability of the employment is an objective matter, whereas the reasonableness of the employee's refusal depends on factors personal to him and is a subjective matter to be considered from the employee's point of view”. 

The Irish employment fora have followed suit with the UK position.  In the more recent determination in Byrne -v- Summeridge Limited (2020) RPD211 (and related claims with slightly varying facts against the same employer) the Labour Court had to determine whether in line with Section 15 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, the refusal by the Complainant to accept the offer of work in a different location was unreasonable. 

In that case, the complainant was a bartender.  The employer had proposed a permanent transfer to a bar 12.6 km away from his previous employment in respect of which he lived walking distance away.  He was offered a single payment of €500 gross and a €550 One4all gift voucher.  This change in job would have resulted in an additional two-hour commute and either Luas or car-parking fees.  Applying the two-limb test from Cambridge, the Labour Court found that the change of location proposed was a change of such magnitude, when considered from the complainant’s subjective perspective, that the Court had to find that his refusal to accept the move to the new location was not unreasonable as follows:

“In determining the final aspect of the within appeal, the Court is required to consider two issues: (i) the suitability of the offer of alternative employment made by the Respondent to the Complainant; and (ii) whether the Complainant’s decision to refuse such an offer was reasonable in all the circumstances.  In Cambridge & District Co-operative Society Ltd v Ruse [1993] I.R.L.R. 156 the English EAT, when considering the similarly worded provisions of the British legislation, said, at page 158, that the question of “the suitability of the employment is an objective matter, whereas the reasonableness of the employee's refusal depends on factors personal to him and is a subjective matter to be considered from the employee's point of view”.

The Court accepts that the Respondent acted at all times in a bone fide manner in their attempts to retain the Complainant in the Respondent’s employment by endeavouring to offer an element of compensation for the inconvenience of transferring to a new location.  To that extent, the Court determines that the Respondent, from an objective perspective, satisfies the first leg of the test set out by the English EAT in Cambridge.

However, having considered the Complainant’s evidence, the Court is equally of the view that the change involved in moving from working in Liffey Valley where the Complainant could get to and from work in a matter of minutes with no additional costs, to working in a city centre location with the additional commute times, related costs and the difficulty of getting home after his late shifts when public transport would not be available, is a change of such magnitude, when considered from the Complainant’s subjective perspective, that the Court has to find that his refusal to accept the move to the Harbour Master Bar was not unreasonable.

There was no job available for the Complainant in his established place of work.  The alternative offered to him would have necessitated an unreasonable additional daily commute and costs for him. In all the circumstances, the Court, therefore, finds that the Complainant is entitled to a statutory redundancy payment…”

The Labour Court adopted a similar approach in its determination of the same issue in Conn -v- Cosy Tots (2021) RPD219 (and related claim) also involving a change in location as relied upon by the Respondent herein.  The complainant was employed as a cook in a creche in Dublin 14 which her employer was closing down for commercial reasons and was offered an alternative position located in Dublin 2 with the same terms and conditions.  The complainant maintained that the new location did not represent reasonable alternative employment for various reasons including her particular personal circumstances and increased travel time whilst the respondent sought to argue otherwise. 

The Labour Court observed: “Contrary to s. 15(2) of the Act no alternative offer was made in writing to the Complainant until after the termination of her employment.”  After setting out the relevant provisions of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, it cited the following UK caselaw based on similar:

“In the UK case of Hudson v. George Harrison Ltd. EAT 0571/02, which considered almost identical provisions in British law, it was held that determining the reasonableness of an offer ‘involves taking into account the personal circumstances of the employee’ and the finding referenced the finding in Executors of Everest v. Cox (1980) ICR 415.  This finding has been approved as well established in Irish law, see Regan and Murphy Employment Law (Bloomsbury, 2nd Edition:2017) para. 19.123.

The Court is of the view that…..the issue is less about the physical distance between Nutgrove and Barrow St. than about the length of time it would take to cover that distance.  It is this factor that leads the Court to the view that it was reasonable for the Complainant to decide that the offer made was not one that constituted suitable alternative employment.” 

Having so found, the Labour Court found it unnecessary to consider the other reasons cited.

Turning to the case before me, Likewise, I must assess the factual matrix to determine whether the Complainant’s refusal of alternative employment offered in either of the Cappagh Road or JFK Facilities was reasonable in line with Section 15(2) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 and the two-limb test.  This requires consideration of the factual matrix adduced to determine whether his refusal was reasonable or not. 

The diametrically opposing positions of the Parties are summarised as follows:

The Complainant maintains that he reasonably refused the alternative employment offered and was entitled to a redundancy payment because the fully indoor nature of the job he had been employed in was not being offered at the other sites. The Complainant did not accept the Respondent’s estimates that he would only be outside for brief periods of time and the further argument that there was no material difference between the job of operating a crane from a secure cabin that is placed indoors or outdoors. The Complainant did not appear to put up any argument concerning a health or other issue which might be triggered by exposure to the elements it seems to me that it was more a distaste for such exposure.

The Respondent maintains that the Complainant’s role was properly made redundant and following an extensive process of engagement, he unreasonably refused suitable alternative employment in one of the other two sites available. The Respondent had offered the same role with similar working days and hours. The Respondent seems to suggest that the issue raised is a non-issue and in any event that the Complainant is at all times subject to a mobility clause in his Contract of Employment.

Firstly, there is no dispute between the Parties that the Respondent had ceased to carry on its business in the place where the Complainant was so employed and accordingly, his position was redundant and his contract there was terminated.  Accordingly, and as set out above I am satisfied that he was dismissed on the ground of redundancy pursuant to Section 7(2)(a) and 9(1) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 and as such had a general entitlement to statutory redundancy payment. 

However, this is subject to Section 15(2) of the Act which provides that an employee shall not be entitled to a redundancy payment if the criteria thereunder are met.  Applying the two-limb legal test to the factual matrix adduced herein. Returning to the language used:

“the suitability of the employment is an objective matter, whereas the reasonableness of the employee's refusal depends on factors personal to him and is a subjective matter to be considered from the employee's point of view”. 

I am satisfied that the Employer has objectively found suitable alternative employment for the Complainant. The Complainant has deemed the proposed new place of work as unacceptable and that his subjective take on the proposed alternative place of work. On balance I do not find the Complainant’s reasoning to be reasonable. The Complainant was being offered continued employment with an Employer with whom he had worked well for years. I cannot see that the positioning of his crane from an indoor setting to a somewhat more outdoor setting is so significantly different as to warrant a blank refusal to engage. No reason other than a general dislike of being exposed to weather for short periods was provided.

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967

CA-00077880-001 – The Complainant is not entitled to a payment of Statutory Redundancy in circumstances where the Employer had offered suitable alternative options of employment.