Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Padraig  Cotter

Trabolgan Holiday Centre Limited.

Representatives

Self-Represented

Cara Jane Walsh BL instructed by Leah Moriarty RDJ LLP

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00077492-001

12/11/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994.

CA-00077715-001 DUPLICATE

18/11/2025

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent in or around May 2022 as a security officer, working primarily weekend night shifts at the Respondent’s premises. His employment continued until it ended on or about 1 November 2025, which the Respondent maintains occurred where a redundancy payment was made following the cessation of the relevant contract under which the Complainant had been engaged.

The Complainant contends that his dismissal was not a genuine redundancy but constituted penalisation and an unfair dismissal, arising from his having made a protected disclosure. In that regard, he submits that he made a complaint to the Private Security Authority (PSA) concerning the alleged provision of unregulated security services by the Respondent. He maintains that he was thereafter unfairly selected for redundancy and that the process adopted lacked transparency and objective criteria. He submits that other employees were retained and that he was effectively singled out as a consequence of having made that disclosure.

The Respondent rejects this characterisation and maintains that the termination of the Complainant’s employment arose solely due to what constituted a genuine redundancy situation following the ending of a contract which necessitated a reduction in staffing. It submits that the Complainant was selected for redundancy based on operational requirements and that there was no element of penalisation. The Respondent further contends that the complaint to the PSA had no bearing on the decision to terminate the Complainant’s employment and that the redundancy was conducted in a lawful manner.

The fact that the Complainant made a protected disclosure as defined under the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 is not disputed.

The Complainant gave evidence that he was dismissed from his employment on or about 1 November 2025 and that the redundancy was not genuine. He maintained that his dismissal arose as a direct consequence of his having made a protected disclosure, namely a complaint to the PSA concerning what he believed to be the provision of unregulated security services by the Respondent.

The Complainant stated that prior to his dismissal he had raised a number of issues in relation to his employment, including pay, public holiday entitlements and the absence of appropriate licensing and regulatory compliance. He gave evidence that he made a complaint to the PSA and that, following this, his relationship with management deteriorated. He described what he perceived as a change in attitude towards him and asserted that he was treated less favourably thereafter.

In relation to the termination of his employment, the Complainant stated that he was informed that his role was redundant due to the ending of a contract. However, he did not accept that this constituted a genuine redundancy. He gave evidence that other individuals continued to conduct security work and that he was not afforded any meaningful consultation or opportunity to be redeployed. He contended that no objective selection criteria were applied and that he was effectively singled out for dismissal.

The Complainant further stated that he was not afforded a fair process. He maintained that there was no proper consultation nor an exploration of alternatives in how the decision was reached. He asserted that the redundancy was a pretext and that the real reason for his dismissal was his protected disclosure.

Under cross-examination, the Complainant accepted that the Respondent had lost or experienced a reduction of security services in the contract under which he had been working. However, he maintained that work of a similar nature continued and that other employees remained in employment. It was put to him that the reduction in available work necessitated a reduction in staff numbers and that his role was no longer required. The Complainant did not accept this and reiterated that he had been unfairly selected.

The Complainant also accepted that he did not apply for alternative roles within the organisation but stated that none were meaningfully offered to him. He maintained that he was not informed of any selection matrix or criteria and that the process lacked fairness and transparency.

It was further put to the Complainant that the Respondent was unaware of any complaint made to the PSA at the time the redundancy decision was taken. The Complainant disputed this and stated that, in his view, the Respondent was aware of the disclosure and that it influenced the decision to terminate his employment.

Evidence was given on behalf of the Respondent by the General Manager, Donal O'Sullivan, and the Operations Manager, Alan Sheppard.

Mr O’Sullivan gave evidence that the Respondent’s operations were dependent on specific contracts and that, during 2025, there was a material reduction in the requirement for security services following changes to International Protection arrangements. He stated that this resulted in a diminution of available work and necessitated a reduction in staffing levels. He confirmed that the Complainant had been assigned to a particular night work contract which ended and that, as a consequence, his role was no longer required.

Mr O’Sullivan outlined that the Respondent considered its operational needs and identified that fewer security personnel were required going forward. He stated that the Complainant was selected for redundancy based on those operational requirements and the availability of work. He rejected the suggestion that the Complainant had been singled out and maintained that the decision was based on legitimate business considerations. He further stated that there were limited alternative roles available and that no suitable redeployment options existed at the relevant time.

In relation to the alleged protected disclosure, Mr O’Sullivan stated that he was not aware, at the time the decision to terminate the Complainant’s employment was made, of any complaint by the Complainant to the PSA. He rejected the assertion that any such complaint influenced the redundancy decision and stated that there was no connection whatsoever between the two.

Under cross-examination, Mr O’Sullivan accepted that the Complainant had raised issues in relation to his employment, including pay and conditions, but maintained that these were addressed in the normal course and did not impact on the decision to reduce staffing. He also accepted that some security work continued at the premises but stated that the overall requirement had significantly reduced. It was put to him that other employees were retained while the Complainant was dismissed; he responded that staffing decisions were based on operational needs and availability of work rather than any personal factor relating to the Complainant and he accommodated the longest serving staff in the allocation of remaining duties.

Mr Sheppard gave evidence that he was responsible for the day-to-day deployment of staff and was familiar with the Complainant’s role. He confirmed that the volume of work decreased following the loss or reduction of a contract and that fewer shifts were available. He stated that the Complainant’s role effectively ceased to exist in its previous form. He further stated that the Respondent reviewed staffing levels and determined that redundancies were necessary.

Mr Sheppard also addressed the issue of selection, stating that the Complainant was one of a small number of employees assigned to the affected work and that decisions were made based on the operational requirement to retain flexibility and cover remaining shifts. He rejected the suggestion that the Complainant had been targeted and stated that there was no discussion or consideration of any complaint to the PSA in the context of the redundancy decision.

Under cross-examination, Mr Sheppard accepted that some security services continued but reiterated that the scale of operations had reduced. He also accepted that the Complainant was not offered an alternative role but stated that no suitable vacancies existed. It was put to him that there was no formal selection matrix; he accepted that the process was informal but maintained that it was nonetheless based on genuine business needs.

In its legal submissions and closing argument, the Respondent contended that the dismissal was by reason of redundancy within the meaning of the Redundancy Payments Acts and was therefore not an unfair dismissal. It relied on section 6(4)(c) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, which provides that a dismissal shall not be deemed unfair where it results wholly or mainly from redundancy.

The Respondent further submitted that there was no evidence to support a claim of penalisation within the meaning of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014. It argued that the Complainant had failed to establish any causal connection between the alleged protected disclosure and the dismissal, and that the uncontradicted evidence of management was that they were unaware of any such disclosure at the relevant time. In those circumstances, it was submitted that the complaint must fail both as a claim of unfair dismissal and as a claim of penalisation.

Section 6(2) of the UDA deals with Unfair Dismissal relating to protected disclosures where it states:

“… the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal if it results wholly or mainly from…

(ba) the employee having made a protected disclosure”

In claims of unfair dismissal, the general position is that the burden of proof rests on the employer to demonstrate that the dismissal was not unfair. However, where a complaint is grounded in an allegation of penalisation by dismissal arising from a protected disclosure, the evidential burden shifts, and the employee must establish the requisite causal connection between the disclosure and the dismissal.

The nature and extent of this burden were considered by the Circuit Court in Dougan and Clarke v Lifeline Ambulances Ltd [2018] E.L.R. 210, a case concerning an application for interim relief pursuant to Schedule 1 of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014. In that context, Judge Comerford stated:

“It seems to me that the most difficult area for the employee's application of this nature is to deal with the issue of the dismissal resulting wholly or mainly form the making of the disclosure. The dismissal has to result wholly or mainly from that. It is not enough that the protected disclosure contributed to the dismissal or was a factor in the employer making the decision. It has to meet that fairly heavy test. This protection will not apply unless the dismissal results wholly or mainly from it. … It is not enough that it is just a factor or an influence or…whether it was a consequence of the protected disclosure, that wouldn't be enough. It has to result wholly or mainly from that protected disclosure.”

I am satisfied that the statutory test under section 6(2)(ba) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended) is one of causation. This interpretation is consistent with the approach articulated by Judge Comerford in Dougan and Clarke. It follows that it is not sufficient for a complainant to establish that a protected disclosure was made and that a dismissal subsequently occurred. The determinative question is whether, on the evidence, the making of the protected disclosure constituted the operative cause of the dismissal, to the standard required by the Act, namely that the dismissal resulted “wholly or mainly” from the making of that disclosure.

I have carefully considered the evidence of both parties, the documentation submitted, and the relevant statutory provisions.

At the outset, I note that the Complainant was employed on a fixed-term contract which contained an express exclusion pursuant to section 2(2)(b) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as amended (“the Act”) to the effect that the Act would not apply where the sole reason for the termination was the expiry of the contract on the cessation of the work for which he was employed. It is not in dispute that the Complainant signed this contract and that his employment came to an end on the expiry of that fixed-term arrangement.

However, I must go beyond the contractual exclusion in circumstances where the Complainant asserts that his dismissal was not a genuine expiry of a fixed-term contract but rather arose by way of an unfair selection for redundancy which constituted penalisation for having made a protected disclosure. I also note that a redundancy payment was made to the Complainant, which requires consideration of whether a genuine redundancy situation existed. Though no complaint was made under the general provisions of the Act, I will refer to it in passing

Having considered the evidence, I am satisfied that the Respondent has established that a genuine redundancy situation arose. The uncontroverted evidence of both Donal O'Sullivan and Alan Sheppard was that the Respondent’s operations were contract-dependent and that there was a material reduction in the requirement for security services following the cessation or diminution of a particular contract to which the Complainant had been assigned. This resulted in a reduced need for staffing. While some security work continued, I accept the uncontested Respondent’s evidence that the overall requirement had diminished and that fewer roles were required. I further accept that the Complainant’s role, as previously configured, ceased to exist in its original form and that there were no suitable alternative roles available at the relevant time.

In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the dismissal resulted wholly from redundancy within the meaning of section 7 of the Redundancy Payments Acts and falls within section 6(4)(c) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977.

Turning to the claim of penalisation, the Complainant asserts that his dismissal arose as a consequence of a protected disclosure made to the Private Security Authority. The statutory test, as set out in section 6(2)(ba) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended), requires that the dismissal result “wholly or mainly” from the making of a protected disclosure. This is a causation test requiring a clear nexus between the disclosure and the dismissal.

I have considered the reasoning in the WRC decision opened to me by the Respondent (ADJ-00054233 Siobhan Rodgers v Wilson’s Hospital School) wherein it was emphasised that the existence of a protected disclosure, even where accepted, is not sufficient in itself; rather, there must be cogent evidence establishing a causal link between the disclosure and the adverse treatment complained of. A temporal sequence alone is insufficient, and the burden rests on the Complainant to establish that the disclosure was the operative reason for the dismissal.

Applying that reasoning to the facts before me, I find that the Complainant has failed to establish the requisite nexus. The Complainant’s evidence was that he made a complaint to the PSA; however, he accepted that this complaint was, in substance, made anonymously. The Complainant adduced no evidence to demonstrate that members of the Respondent’s management were aware that he was the source of that complaint. In contrast, both Mr O’Sullivan and Mr Sheppard gave clear and consistent sworn evidence that they were not aware, at the time of the decision to terminate the Complainant’s employment, of any such disclosure having been made by him.

In the absence of evidence that the decision-makers had knowledge of the alleged protected disclosure, it is not possible to establish a causal connection between that disclosure and the dismissal. I am satisfied that the Complainant has not demonstrated that the protected disclosure was, to any extent, an operative factor in the decision to terminate his employment. The evidence instead supports the conclusion that the dismissal arose from the redundancy situation described.

Accordingly, I find that the Complainant has not established that his dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from the making of a protected disclosure.

For completeness, and for the reasons outlined above, and having regard to the contractual exclusion, the existence of a genuine redundancy, and the absence of any causal nexus between the alleged protected disclosure and the dismissal, I find that the Complainant was fairly dismissed.

Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977-2015. Penalisation. Protected Disclosure.