Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Padraig  Cotter

 Trabolgan Holiday Centre Ltd

Representatives

Self-Represented

Ms Cara Jane Walsh BL instructed by Leah Moriarty RDJ LLP

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00074401-001

14/08/2025

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent in or around May 2022 in the role of security officer. He worked primarily weekend night shifts and was paid at an initial rate of €12 per hour. The employment arose in the context of the Respondent’s operations at a holiday centre which, during the relevant period, was also used for State-supported accommodation purposes. The Complainant remained in employment until the cessation of his engagement on foot of the expiry of a fixed-term contract on or about 1 November 2025.

It is common case that a written contract of employment, incorporating the Complainant’s terms and conditions, issued on 31 December 2023 and was signed by the Complainant on that date. The Complainant’s evidence was that no statement of core terms had been furnished to him at the commencement of his employment and that the documentation provided in December 2023 was retrospective in nature and did not reflect the reality of his earlier service. He further contended that his signature on that document was given under pressure connected with outstanding pay issues and amounted only to an acknowledgement of receipt rather than agreement to its contents.

The Respondent accepted that the written terms were not issued at the outset of the employment but submitted that the contract provided on 31 December 2023 constituted compliance with the statutory requirement to furnish a statement of terms. It was contended that the Complainant signed the document in full knowledge of its contents and, at that time, withdrew a prior complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission relating to the same issue. The Respondent further submitted that any complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 was presented outside the statutory time limits, as the relevant date for the purposes of the Act was the date on which the statement of terms was furnished, namely 31 December 2023.

The Complainant gave evidence that he commenced employment with the Respondent in May 2022 and did not receive a written statement of his core terms and conditions of employment at that time or at any point during the first approximately 19 months of his employment. He stated that, notwithstanding repeated requests, no contract or statement of terms was furnished to him during that period. He maintained that this constituted a breach of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994.

The Complainant accepted that a written contract dated 31 December 2023 was subsequently provided to him. However, he contended that this document was created significantly after the commencement of his employment and was presented in a manner that suggested it had applied from an earlier date. He asserted that the contract did not reflect the reality of his employment from May 2022 and described earlier versions or references to contracts as “fictitious” in that they had not been issued at the relevant time.

In relation to his signature on the contract, the Complainant accepted that he signed the document on 31 December 2023 but stated that he did so only to acknowledge receipt of it. He gave evidence that he inserted the date to reflect when he actually received the document and that he did not agree with its retrospective effect. He further stated that he signed the contract under pressure, explaining that there were outstanding monies owed to him, including Sunday premium payments, and that he felt he had no option but to sign in order to secure payment of those sums.

The Complainant maintained that the late provision of the contract did not remedy the earlier failure to provide him with a statement of terms at the commencement of his employment. He asserted that the Respondent had effectively sought to regularise its position retrospectively and that this did not negate the original breach.

Under cross-examination, the Complainant accepted that he signed the contract on 31 December 2023. He also accepted that the contract contained a termination date of 1 November 2025. It was put to him that he had previously made a complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission regarding his terms and conditions and that he withdrew that complaint following the issuance of the contract. The Complainant accepted that he had withdrawn the earlier complaint but stated that this was done in the context of an arrangement concerning outstanding pay and did not signify agreement with the terms of the contract or satisfaction with the position regarding the provision of his terms of employment.

The Complainant did not accept that he had been provided with valid terms of employment within the meaning of the legislation at the relevant time and maintained that the Respondent’s failure to provide those terms at the outset remained actionable notwithstanding the subsequent issuance of the contract.

The Respondent accepted that a written statement of terms and conditions was not issued to the Complainant at the commencement of his employment in May 2022. However, it was submitted that this position was regularised by the provision of a written contract on 31 December 2023, which the Complainant signed. The Respondent contended that this document constituted compliance with the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 and that the relevant date for the purposes of any complaint under the Act was the date on which that statement was furnished.

In its legal submissions, the Respondent raised a preliminary objection that the complaint was out of time. It submitted that, pursuant to section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, a complaint must be presented within six months of the date of contravention, extendable to twelve months only where exceptional circumstances are demonstrated. The Respondent argued that the operative date was 31 December 2023, being the date on which the contract was issued and signed. On that basis, it submitted that the time limit expired, at the latest, in December 2024, whereas the present complaints were lodged in August and November 2025. It was further submitted that no exceptional circumstances had been advanced to justify an extension of time.

The Respondent relied on Denise Ryan v Smart School of Motoring Limited (ADJ-00030153) to support the proposition that where a statement of terms is furnished during the course of employment, the time limit runs from the date of its provision rather than from the commencement of employment. It submitted that the Complainant’s acceptance of the contract on 31 December 2023 triggered the running of time for the purposes of the Act.

The Respondent also pointed to the fact that the Complainant had previously lodged a complaint with the Workplace Relations Commission in October 2023 concerning his terms and conditions of employment. It was submitted that, following engagement with the Respondent and the provision of the written contract, the Complainant withdrew that complaint. The Respondent contended that this demonstrated that the Complainant was aware of his rights, had engaged with the issue at the time, and had accepted the position following the issuance of the contract.

In evidence, the Respondent’s General Manager, Mr Donal O’Sullivan, stated that he became aware in December 2023 that the Complainant had raised concerns regarding his pay and the absence of a contract, which had resulted in a WRC complaint. He outlined that he met the Complainant at that time, acknowledged that a contract had not issued earlier, and arranged for a written contract to be prepared and provided. He stated that the Complainant was invited to review the contract, including with the assistance of his union, and subsequently signed it. He further stated that the Complainant indicated he would withdraw his WRC complaint, which he subsequently did.

Under cross-examination, the witness maintained that the contract issued on 31 December 2023 represented the terms governing the Complainant’s employment going forward and that the Complainant had signed it voluntarily. He rejected any suggestion that the Complainant was compelled to sign the contract under duress and stated that the discussions at the time were constructive and aimed at resolving the outstanding issues between the parties. He also confirmed that, following the issuance of the contract and the withdrawal of the earlier complaint, no further issues were raised by the Complainant in relation to his terms and conditions until the lodging of the present complaints.

The first issue for determination is whether I have jurisdiction to inquire into the Complainant’s complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994, having regard to the statutory time limits prescribed.

Section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 provides that an Adjudication Officer shall not entertain a complaint unless it is presented within the period of six months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates. This period may be extended to a maximum of twelve months where “reasonable cause” is shown for the delay.

The Complainant’s case is that he did not receive a statement of his core terms of employment at the commencement of his employment in May 2022 and that this constituted a breach of the 1994 Act. It is not in dispute, however, that a written contract containing the Complainant’s terms and conditions of employment was furnished to him on 31 December 2023 and that he signed that document on that date.

The question which arises is the identification of the relevant “date of contravention” for the purposes of section 41(6) of the 2015 Act. I was referred by the Respondent to the decision of the Workplace Relations Commission in Denise Ryan v Smart School of Motoring Limited wherein it was held that, in circumstances where a statement of terms is furnished during the course of employment, the time limit for submitting a complaint runs from the date on which that statement is provided to the employee. I adopt that reasoning.

Applying that approach to the facts of the present case, I find that whatever defect may have existed in the Respondent’s failure to provide a statement of terms at the commencement of the employment was addressed by the provision of the written contract on 31 December 2023. I am satisfied the date of contravention for the purposes of the Act must be taken as that date.

On that basis, the statutory six-month time limit expired on or about 30 June 2024. Even allowing for the maximum extension of time to twelve months, the latest date for the submission of a complaint would have been 31 December 2024.

The complaint before me was lodged on 14 August 2025. This date falls well outside both the primary six-month limitation period and the extended twelve-month period provided for under section 41(6) of the 2015 Act.

I have considered whether there are any grounds advanced by the Complainant which would justify an extension of time. While the Complainant has asserted that he did not accept the validity of the contract and that he signed it under duress, no evidence has been presented which would meet the statutory threshold of “reasonable cause” so as to permit an extension beyond the six-month period. In any event, even if such cause had been established, the complaints were not presented within the outer limit of twelve months as prescribed by the legislation.

In those circumstances, I find that the complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 is out of time and that I have no jurisdiction to consider it.

CA-00074401-001: for the reasons outlined above, I find that the complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 is out of time and that I have no jurisdiction to consider it.

Out of Time. Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994.