Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Anuka  Sarkar

Bwg Foods Holdings Unlimited Company

Representatives

Sarah Dowling IBEC

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00070000-001

14/03/2025

The complainant commenced employment with the respondent as a Payroll Executive on 19 February 2024. Her employment ended on 27 June 2024. The complainant lodged a complaint under section 77 of the 1998 Act on 14 March 2025. An in-person hearing took place on 30 July 2025.

The Respondent submits that this complaint is inadmissible as it is statute-barred under Section 77(5) of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 and section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.

The respondent submits that the date relied upon is the termination of employment on 27 June 2024, the limitation therefore expired on 26 December 2024.  The complaint was not lodged with the WRC until 03 March 2025, making it 67 days beyond the statutory six-month timeframe.

An extension to twelve months is available only on proof of “reasonable cause”. The complainant has not provided any explanation or evidence to justify the significant delay in filing the claim.

The complainant gave evidence on affirmation at the hearing.

The complainant stated that very shortly after the termination of her employment with the respondent she was hospitalised for a month. Following her discharge from hospital the complainant went home to her family in India to recuperate.

During this period, she was in communication with a company representative about her position. She met with this person in January 2025.  At this meeting there was some discussion on a settlement, but no agreement was reached.

The complainant stated that she was medically unwell in the months following her dismissal. She stated that she had spoken with a solicitor in the period following her dismissal about her situation vis-à-vis her termination of employment.

I have considered this preliminary point carefully.

Section 77 of the Act states:

(5) (a) Subject to paragraph (b), a claim for redress in respect of discrimination or victimisation may not be referred under this section after the end of the period of 6 months from the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation to which the case relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence.

(b) On application by a complainant the F122[Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission] or Circuit Court, as the case may be, may, for reasonable cause, direct that in relation to the complainant paragraph (a) shall have effect as if for the reference to a period of 6 months there were substituted a reference to such period not exceeding 12 months as is specified in the direction; and, where such a direction is given, this Part shall have effect accordingly.

The Act is clear that a Complainant is only entitled to bring a claim in respect of contraventions of the Act as far back as six months prior to the lodging of the WRC claim unless there is reasonable cause justifying an extension to the time limit. With specific reference to this complaint under the Employment Equality Legislation, it is clear that the complaint was not received by the WRC until 14 March 2025, (the complainant having been dismissed on 27 June 2024), the last date that a relevant act of discrimination could have occurred within the meaning of the Act was therefore on 26 December 2024.

As to what constitutes reasonable cause, the Labour Court in Cementation Skanska Ltd. V Tom Carroll, DWT 0388 stated “It is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse from the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that it is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and the circumstances known to the complainant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must be due to the reasonable cause relied upon.”

While I accept that the complainant did suffer serious medical problems after her dismissal no medical evidence was provided to support a claim that she was not well enough to lodge a complaint with the WRC. 

She was well enough to enter into negotiations with the respondent on matters pertaining to her dismissal in January 2025. In my view if she was well enough to do this, she was then capable of lodging a complaint form at this time but she did not do some for some months thereafter. 

In the circumstances I do not believe the complainant has demonstrated a reasonable cause justifying an extension to the time limit of six-months.

For the reasons set out above that I find that the complainant’s claim is statute barred. I do not have jurisdiction to hear the matter.

Time limit, reasonable cause.