ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00055550
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Michael Haynes | Mapfre Asistencia Compania International De Seguros y Reaseguros trading as Mawdy |
Representatives |
| David McCarroll RDJ LLP |
Complaint:
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000 | CA-00067642-001 | 25/11/2024 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 14/07/2025
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Penelope McGrath
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 21 of the Equal Status Act 2000 (as amended) an individual may seek redress in respect of any prohibited conduct that has been directed against him or her by referring a case to the Workplace Relations Commission. It is a condition precedent to bringing any such matter before the Workplace Relations Commission that the individual complainant shall have already notified the Respondent in writing (usually in the form of an ES 1) of the nature of the allegation and the intention to seek such redress if the Complainant is not satisfied with the Respondent’s response. This Notice in writing shall be brought within two months of the said prohibited conduct or within two months of the last instance of same.
A Respondent may choose to reply with an explanation for the treatment by returning the attached ES 2 Form.
Pursuant to Section 25 of the Equal Status Act 2000 I have had the within matter referred to me by the Director General for the purpose of conducting an investigation into claims of discrimination and I have heard, where appropriate, the interested parties. I have also considered any relevant documentation provided in advance of the hearing and also anything provided in the course of the hearing. At the conclusion of any such investigation I am obliged to make a decision and, if I should find in favour of the Complainant, I shall provide for redress (s.25 (4)).
Generally, discrimination under this Act – per Section 3 - is taken to have occurred where a person is treated less favourably than another person is (or would be) treated in a comparable situation and by reason of any of the discriminatory grounds (as specified).
Broadly, the Equal Status Act prohibits discrimination in the context of buying and selling goods from and to the public (or a section thereof) and also prohibits discrimination in the context of using and providing services available to the public (or a section thereof). The service is not necessarily being provided for consideration.
Section 5 (1) prohibits discrimination in the following terms:-
“A person shall not discriminate in disposing of goods to the public generally or a section of the public or in providing a service, whether the disposal or provision is for consideration or otherwise and whether the service provided can be availed of only by a section of the public.”
It is also noted that discrimination can occur where an apparently neutral provision would put such a person at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons unless the provision can be objectively justified by a legitimate aim. This is Indirect Discrimination and is covered in Section 3(1) (c).
In relation to the applicable burden of proof, Section 38A of the Acts is applicable to all complaints of discrimination under the Equal Status Acts and requires the Complainant to establish, in the first instance, facts from which a discrimination can be inferred. It is only when such a prima facie case has been established that the onus shifts to the Respondent to rebut the inference of discrimination.
The Section reads
38A.—(1) Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a person from which it may be presumed that prohibited conduct has occurred in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.
(2) This section is without prejudice to any other enactment or rule of law in relation to the burden of proof in any proceedings which may be more favourable to the person.
This principle is clearly enunciated in the equivalent provision in the Employment Equality Act under discussion in the case of Melbury Developments Limited -v- Valpeters [2010] 21 ELR 64 :
“Section 85A of the Act provides for the allocation of the probative burden in cases within its ambit. This requires that the Complainant must first establish facts from which discrimination must be inferred. What those facts are will vary from case to case and there is no closed category of facts which can be relied upon. All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination. However, they must be established as facts on credible evidence. Mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn. Section 85A places the burden of establishing the primary facts fairly and squarely on the Complainant and language of this provision admits no exception to that evidential rule.”
Under Section 27(1) of the Act, redress may be ordered where there has been a finding in favour of the Complainant. The Act allows for an Order for compensation (up to a maximum amount) for the effects of the prohibited conduct. The Adjudication Officer can direct that a person or persons take a specified course of action. The AO can also order that the service provider has to do something aimed at ensuring that similar discrimination does not happen again. For example, to take a specific course of action to upskill or train staff providing a service.
The maximum amount of compensation which can be awarded under the Equal Status Act is €15,000.00 (which is in line with the maximum award available in District Court contract cases per Section 27(2). In assessing compensation, I can consider the effect that the discriminatory treatment has had on the Complainant.
Background:
This hearing was conducted in person in the Workplace Relations Commission situate in Lansdowne Road, Dublin. In line with the Supreme Court decision in the constitutional case of Zalewski -v- An Adjudication Officer and the Workplace Relations Commission and Ireland and the Attorney General [2021] IESC 24 (delivered on the 6th of April 2021) the hearing was conducted in recognition of the fact that the proceedings constitute the administration of Justice. It was therefore open to members of the public to attend this hearing.
In line with the coming into effect of the Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2021 on the 29th of July 2021, I can confirm that the witnesses herein were required to give their evidence on oath or affirmation. This was done in recognition of the fact that there may have been a serious and direct conflict in evidence between the parties to the complaint. It is noted that the giving of false statement or evidence is an offence.
The Specific Details of the complaint are outlined in the Workplace Relations Complaint Form which was received by the WRC on the 25th of November 2024. In general terms, I will therefore be looking at issues that have arisen in the six-month period directly preceding this date. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The Complainant was not represented and made his own case. When it came time to hear the Complainant’s evidence, the Complainant agreed to make an Affirmation to tell the truth. The Complainant set out his complaint as follows: My complaint is that I was directly and indirectly discriminated against due to my age. I say this as Mawdy/Chill Insurance refused me travel insurance due to me reaching the age of 66. At the time of my initial contact with Mawdy/Chill Insurance I was informed that the policy was not available to me due to me reaching the age of 66. I regard this as direct discrimination. In their letter dated 11th November 2024, Mawdy/Chill Insurance now state that they rely on data from a third party prior to making their decision. I regard this as indirect discrimination. Where it also became necessary, I explained how the Adjudication process operated with particular emphasis on the burden of proof which had to be attained by the Complainant in the first instance. Where I deemed it necessary, I made my own inquiries so as to better understand the facts of the case and in fulfilment of my duties as prescribed by Statute. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
The Respondent had full legal representation at this hearing. The Respondent entity was also represented by its own General Manager Mr. C S (CS) who gave evidence on behalf of the Respondent. The Respondent provided me with a written submissions dated the 24th of June 2025. No objection was raised in connection with any of the documentary evidence relied upon by the Respondent in the course of making its case. All evidence was heard following an affirmation. The Respondent witness was challenged as appropriate by the Complainant. The Respondent rejects that the Complainant has been discriminated against. The Respondent has further asserted that the Respondent’s activities, insofar as they relate to the provision of policies of insurance, are not under the strict obligations that are set out in Section 5(1) of the Equal Status Act. The Respondent asserts that when it provides insurance policies to individuals it is permissible to treat people differently in line with accurate information concerning the assessment of risk. In this regard the Respondent relies on the actuarial and statistical data and information it obtained through its agencies. The Respondent has asked that I consider the exemption identified at Section 5(1) (d) in this regard: (d) differences in the treatment of persons in relation to annuities, pensions, insurance policies or any other matters related to the assessment of risk ……where the treatment— (i) is effected by reference to— (I) actuarial or statistical data obtained from a source on which it is reasonable to rely, or (II) other relevant underwriting or commercial factors, and (ii) is reasonable having regard to the data or other relevant factors. Where I deemed it necessary, I made my own inquiries so as to better understand the facts of the case and in fulfilment of my duties as prescribed by Statute. |
Findings and Conclusions:
I have carefully considered the points raised by both parties herein. The Complainant has been a customer of the Respondent insurance company for many years. The Complainant availed of a travel insurance package every year and was aware what he might be called upon to pay on an annual basis. The Complainant went to pay for his annual travel insurance in and around October of 2024 to find that because he had turned from the age of 65 to 66 in the previous year, he was no longer entitled to the package he had enjoyed up to and including the age of 65. The Complainant was being charged more money for a policy which was designed and intended for the over 66 years of age bracket. The Complainant was not happy with this development, and was not at all happy with the explanations given. I note a long letter was sent by the Respondent to the Complainant on the 11th of November 2024 which attempted to explain to the Complainant the rationale behind the different treatment of the under 65 customers, as against the over 65 customers. The Respondent confirmed in the letter that its in house analyses of travel insurance claims demonstrably shows a greater propensity of those over the age of 65 making a claim as against those under the age of 65. The factors giving rise to said claims included (though is not restricted to) cancellation and medical issues. The letter also referred the Complainant to: section 5(2)(d) of the Equal Status Act which allows for a difference in treatment of persons in relation to annuities pensions and pension policies or any other matters relating to the assessment of risk where the said treatment is affected by reference to: - Actuarial and statistical data obtained from a source on which it is reasonable to rely, or other relevant underwriting or commercial factor and; - Is reasonable having regard to the data or other relevant factors. Despite the provision of this explanation, the Complainant has pursued the matter to the WRC. The Complainant stated that he could not understand how he had fallen off a cliff face from his last day aged 65 and his first day aged 66. He was, he said, the same person facing the same issues and non-issues. He believed that there was an unequal treatment of him as 66-year-old. The Complainant seemed to understand in principle that people might have to be treated differently based on age and health but was not happy that there was some sort of assumption attaching to his turning 66. The Complainant seemed to suggest that all applicants should be asked questions concerning their personal circumstances to identify an appropriate premium level. The Complainant did not like the age bands that operated. The younger ages had ten-year premium periods while the over 60s had five-year policy ranges. Every five years the premium would go up. In response to having been brought before the WRC, the Respondent has provided the WRC and the Complainant with the sensitive commercial information upon which it relies when assessing the premiums attaching to age groups. This was brought to convince the Complainant that the Respondent is trying to act responsibly and fairly. It was brought despite the Respondent’s very clear assertion that it is exempt from the obligations set out in section 5(1) as it is an insurance company making decisions by reference to actuarial and statistical data. I accept that the data very clearly demonstrates that the Respondent is correct when it states that the over 65 cohort of customers is much more likely to cancel and or have medical issues then younger cohorts. This is an average assessment and does not look at each individual customer as that would amount to commercial madness. The Respondent General Manager CS brought the Complainant and I through the information that CS had brought into the hearing. He noted that the data showed 40% more claims in the relevant age group. He noted that any increase in premium is absorbed by the increased cost of claims and that this live statistical analyses was what was used to measure the appropriate pricing structure. He noted that the same pattern exists in the UK. He said the use of age bands made administrative sense and that he recognised the movement through a birthday from 65 to 66 does not change the essence of the customer. On balance I am satisfied that the Respondent attended the WRC with the actuarial and statistical data upon which it has reasonably relied for the assessment of premiums through different age groups. I am further satisfied that the reliance by the Respondent on its own statistical evidence is not fatal to its case and the Respondent drew my attention to the case of DEC-S2004-201 Geoffrey O'Donoghue V Hibernian General Insurance in this regard. At paragraph: 4.10 However, in considering this case, I have considered that it is reasonable that MIAB data would not be the source data drawn upon by the company in relation to quotation requests made by the complainant in November 2002 and it was reasonable for the company to utilise its own claims history. In taking this view I can only rely on the actuarial evidence placed before me in this particular case, consisting essentially of the reliance on the MIAB report by the complainant and evidence from a number of expert witnesses on behalf of the respondent which was not countered by expert testimony on behalf of the complainant. I have based my conclusion on the following: 1. It is reasonable that an insurer should draw on actuarial data from a source that allows it to align its claims risk to its actual claims record and taking reasonable commercial factors into consideration, then to set the premium. I have concluded that the data from its own client base offers the appropriate method for achieving this. Utilising data from a source that incorporates data provided by other insurers operating in the market and who, for their own commercial reasons, may accept different levels of claims exposure may not be an acceptable source for one individual company to base its premiums on. |
Decision:
Section 25 of the Equal Status Acts, 2000 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 27 of that Act.
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000 CA-00067642-001 The Complainant’s age did play a factor in the cost of his travel insurance premium, however this does not amount to a discrimination in circumstances where the Respondent is in the business of providing insurance policies and must consider age as part of a number of criteria when assessing risk. The complaint therefore fails. |
Dated: 05-09-25
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Penelope McGrath
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