ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION

Adjudication Reference:  ADJ-00050365 conjoined with ADJ 46671 and 49932

Parties:

Complaint:

Date of Adjudication Hearing:  06/05/2025

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer:  Patsy Doyle

Procedure:

In accordance Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 - 2015, following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaints and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaints.

Background:

Summary of Respondents’ Case:

Findings and Conclusions:

I have been requested to reach a Decision in the claim for unfair dismissal.

In reaching my decisions, I have had regard for the written submissions and oral evidence adduced at hearing.

Mr Cronin had been maintained on a fixed term arrangement since his normal retirement date in May 2021. I was not provided with any foundation documentation on Mr Cronin’s first hire or his extension in 2021. Both parties agree that he received a payment to the end of his contract destined for May 2024.

In the event of Mr O Cronin’s claim for unfair dismissal being upheld, he has elected for the option of re-instatement at the Respondent business. When canvassed on this plea, the Respondent contends that there is simply no way back and the Adjudicator should look carefully at the sequence of events, where the severance payment on offer which comprised a commensurate redundancy payment, was not vetoed in principle but failed to progress due to exclusion of the lunch money from the base calculations on quantum.

The Respondent has disputed that an animus existed between Mr Cronin and the business which prompted his dismissal. It is clear to me that Mr Cronin took a laissez faire approach to his terms of employment until 2022 and then worked in a measured way through his shop steward on trying to get a sense on work time ceilings.

I was unsure given the frailty of the documentation   linked to employment whether I should exempt Mr Cronin from his claim under the Unfair Dismissal Act 1977 in accordance with Section 2(1) (b) on normal retirement age.

I accept that Mr Cronin did not seem to be in possession of the handbook dated 2009 which had a mandatory aged 65 retirement. However, I am certain that he knew of the age of retirement given his decision to freeze his pension pot.

However, I find I cannot exclude him due to the absence of any definitive robust employment documentation in his possession at that relevant time.

In that, I distinguish the facts in Mc Quaid O Flanagan Warehouse Transport ltd and Peter Smith UDD 2340, where the Court did not apply the exemption due to the differential in retirement ages in staff handbook at 66 and terms at 65 years of age.

As I had stated previously, I had intended to have these nine linked Decisions completed by the end of June 2025. In my deliberations, post hearing, I required time to apply some extended consideration to the points both parties made at hearing. That is the reason for my delay.

I have also responded to a cumulative three Parliamentary Questions from Mr Cronin’s   colleague public representative. I restated the Agreement made by the Parties at hearing and refused to be rushed in my decision making.

Given that I received assurances from the Complainants nominated representatives that communication would issue from that source alone, I have found these extra -procedural approaches to be unusual of an independent decision maker.

 The claims before me are made in law and decisions issued on how I believe the law is applied to the evidence and facts revealed by the parties.

 WRC Adjudication on employment rights such as this case is a completely separate forum to WRC Adjudication / Conciliation / Mediation on IR matters.

This difference goes to the very epicentre of this claim for unfair dismissal.

I have already explained the right of appeal open to Mr Cronin.

Claim:

For now, I want to consider the claim for unfair dismissal submitted on 20 February 2024, which has been rejected by the Respondent.

The Complainant has found some new work but has submitted a clear message that he wants to go back to work for the Respondent. He believes he has been wronged.

The Law on Dismissal is contained in the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977, as amended.

Section 1 defines Dismissal as:

“Dismissal,” in relation to an employee, means—

• (a) the termination by his employer of the employee’s contract of employment with the employer, whether prior notice of the termination was or was not given to the employee,

Redundancy

“redundancy” means any of the matters referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e) of section 7 (2) of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967, as amended by the Redundancy Payments Act, 1971;

Section 6(1) determines that substantial grounds much underpin a redundancy.

Unfair dismissal.

6.— (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.

Section 6(2) (ba) places a dismissal “wholly or mainly “for protected disclosure reasons in a strict unfair dismissal category.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal if it results wholly or mainly from one or more of the following:

(ba) the employee having made a protected disclosure,

Section 6(3) of the Act addresses the mechanisms surrounding the release of an employee through redundancy on how the process was conducted and whether it contravened an agreed procedure between Union/ Management

3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, if an employee was dismissed due to redundancy but the circumstances constituting the redundancy applied equally to one or more other employees in similar employment with the same employer who have not been dismissed, and either—

(a) the selection of that employee for dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from one or more of the matters specified in subsection (2) of this section or another matter that would not be a ground justifying dismissal, or

(b) he was selected for dismissal in contravention of a procedure (being a procedure that has been agreed upon by or on behalf of the employer and by the employee or a trade union, or an excepted body under the Trade Union Acts, 1941 and 1971, representing him or has been established by the custom and practice of the employment concerned) relating to redundancy and there were no special reasons justifying a departure from that procedure,

then the dismissal shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal.

Section 6(4) provides a defence to the Respondent.

4) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, not to be an unfair dismissal, if it results wholly or mainly from one or more of the following:

1. c) the redundancy of the employee, and

(d) the employee being unable to work or continue to work in the position which he held without contravention (by him or by his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under any statute or instrument made under statute.

Section 6 (6) places the burden of proof on the Respondent to demonstrate that Dismissal occurred within the parameters of Section 6(4)

(6) In determining for the purposes of this Act whether the dismissal of an employee was an unfair dismissal or not, it shall be for the employer to show that the dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from one or more of the matters specified in subsection (4) of this section or that there were other substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.

Section 6(7) permits me to explore the reasonableness of the conduct of the Respondent in demonstrating that they acted reasonably.

(7) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining if a dismissal is an unfair dismissal, regard may be had, if the adjudication officer or the Labour Court], as the case may be, considers it appropriate to do so—

(a) to the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct (whether by act or omission) of the employer in relation to the dismissal, 

Before I consider the facts as raised in this aspect of the case, I would like to once more reflect on the collision of both worlds in this case. That of the Union and that of the legal representatives.

It is open to any employee to choose a representative to assist in workplace issues. It is advisable to bring an advocate to assist in raising cogent arguments on terms and conditions.

SI 146/2000 and Burns and Hartigan v Governor of Castlerea Prison [2009] 20 ELR 109

  “Exceptional grounds necessary to permit legal representation “

 I would deem it essential to be represented during a redundancy situation, which may be a once only event in most people’s lives, but it is extremely technical in form and content. It can be life changing and words spoken can be traumatic and enduring.

The Complainant was a working longtime member of SIPTU at the time that Redundancy was first mentioned to the Union in his case in October 2023. In his evidence he described leaving the business of the redundancy to the Union, whom he trusted and did not initially recall Mr OConnell offering fall back employment to him. He also admitted that he would prefer to “stay working there” “

By then he had lodged his workplace complaints to both the WRC Inspectorate and WRC Adjudication, 19 December 2022, where he was legally represented. He had augmented these in August 2023.

It is common case that SIPTU walked through the news of “at risk of “redundancy and the efforts to maximise the severance package with the Complainant during November 2023 to date of dismissal 31 December 2023 and beyond to January 17, 2024, at least. I have read the correspondence which strove to build a maximum pot for Mr Cronin beyond the €25,000 on offer   by hitting all the unrealised goals of the employment.

The Complainants legal team were awaiting a date for hearing of the employment rights complaints during this period but strangely intervened with correspondence on seeking clarification of quantum in the severance during November 2023- December 2023.

Two worlds collided at that point, causing the Respondent to pause pending a declaration on just who was speaking for whom. The Union   emerged from that clarification up to and including execution of the January 2024 public picket in Tralee.

I listened to Mr Cronin as he had a clear recollection of Rationalisation at the business. I considered the 2002 Agreement which benefitted forty-one drivers. By 2006 Collective Agreement, this had fallen through attrition to twenty-two named drivers directly employed at the business.

By 2009 LCR 19437 introduced a Recommendation dated 20 January 2009.

“The Company’s proposals to rationalise the milk collection operations in Co Kerry. Arising from the rationalisation plan the company proposed to reduce the number of milk assembly drivers from 20 to 8 and source out the work to independent hauliers with effect from 31 January 2009.”

1 voluntary severance 6 weeks per year of service inclusive of any statutory redundancy payments plus a lump sum of €7,500 for those drivers affected by the proposed rationalisation plan.

2 If insufficient uptake, LIFO

3 flexibilities for remnant workforce under 2002 agreement followed by a review after 12 months.

This is a clear undisputed account of a radical change era for drivers at the business 2002-2009 and beyond.

I heard extensive evidence from all presents at hearing that seismic change followed 2010 -2023 on how milk collection was undertaken, where tankers increased in size and tachographs were commissioned but not obligatory for drivers.

I heard the complainant when he demonstrated a dissatisfaction with his daily operations, but he had not formalised any inquiry or grievances.

A Union claim on foot of LCR Rec 22429 in April / May 2022 had not left ground floor level and was awaiting feedback from an anomalous claim in Listowel.

I can see that Mr Cronin   was also very much at a crossroads at where he fitted at the business as he shared his assertion that his dismissal was triggered by a protected disclosure but could not advance on that in either direct evidence or cross examination.

The Respondent has certainly demonstrated through Mr Dillane’s evidence that a growing exasperation or indeed frustration had evolved regarding interpretation of how and where breaks should be taken and recorded. The Respondent paid for loading and unloading time but marked it separate in the averaging calculations on agreement with the Union.

 I heard Mr Dillane confirm release of working time records. This for me signalled a business-like exchange. The Complainant was in good standing at the business and without disciplinary sanction at the time of his dismissal. However, I accept he was vulnerable as one of the last remaining 7 drivers in Kerry LCR 22429. I also accept that he did not appreciate that.

 However, against this multi-faceted background of change in numbers and operational units, I listened carefully as Mr Ryan challenged the complainant on his approach to the redundancy.

This is the complainant’s evidence for November – December 2023.

However, I have been asked to decide whether the complainant was unfairly dismissed through an alleged and choreographed redundancy.?

In Component Distributors (CD Ireland) ltd and Brigid Burns UDD 1854, the former Deputy Chair Caroline Jenkinson on behalf of the Labour Court explored the circumstances where a Credit Controller contested her dismissal when the company centralised the finance team north of the border from Dublin to Antrim, making her redundant Section 7(2) (a) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967.

The Complainant had appealed the validity of her redundancy within the business but had not expanded on it. The appeal did not succeed.

The Court was satisfied that the complainant had been consulted on the redundancy, that she was provided with the rationale for redundancy and offered input in the process and an alternative. Legal representation or cross examination of management was not deemed necessary.

The Court was satisfied with the selection process adopted and accepted that the Dismissal was wholly redundancy connected and not unfair.

I gained some insight from Mr O’Connell’s evidence as he described that the Respondent no longer employed drivers of milk tanks, the change   had its roots in 2001 on the direction of 24/7 milk collection. He gave a credible account on how the business had decided to close off directly employed drivers of milk tanks over a 3-year lead in period. I appreciate this was a behind doors discussion.

I accept his evidence that the Respondent had decided to outsource the remainder of the work done by the seven drivers and their manager on 16 August 2023. It may well have assisted if the respondent had exhibited those group minutes as had occurred in Burns, where twenty staff were placed at risk of redundancy as a commercial decision on restructuring.

I am satisfied that this sensitive information was shared by the respondent with the complainant’s union with a request to meet but this was deferred until November 3. At this meeting, I accept Mr O’Connell’s evidence that he simply read out the announcement, not thinking for a minute that he would be an eventual participant in WRC on the topic.

I am satisfied that this was an announcement of “at risk of redundancy “for the cadre of seven drivers and that message was understood by all.

I am satisfied that the Respondent made a commercial decision to conclude direct employment of milk tank drivers for what they described as the market norm of hauliers through service level agreement. I am satisfied that encompassed the seven drivers.

I accept Mr O Connells evidence that the complainant was offered an option to join the cadre of hauliers outside of the redundancy arrangements where he was to revert in 7 days. I also accept that Mr Cronin   was offered the option of redeployment as an employee to existing vacancies at the Respondent Factories, Stores, or fertiliser feeds but he did not engage on those options.

I accept that the complainant was not replaced in his role and his truck was sold.

I followed Ms O Carrolls evidence as she chronicled the IR negotiations which transpired before termination.

I can see that the Respondent understood that they had dug deep in resurrecting the historical Redundancy payment of 2009 in LCR 19437 which exceeded the 2023, 3.5 weeks norm. I find this was a two-stage process, voluntary uptake followed by LIFO. This placed the context as compulsory on round two and related to those proposals.

Crucially for me, this did not determine a collective agreement on how redundancies should be managed at the business. Mr Cronin was offered a €25,000 ex gratia payment.

I can see that the Union sought to “tweak the offer “in 2023. It was presented in a take it or leave it fashion and was required to be a full and final settlement which compromised the live employment rights cases. This was not palatable to the complainant and thus declined. I did ask Mr OConnell if this pot still existed in 2025? and was informed that there may be a possibility of this, but the complainant side did not respond to my scoping.

I can see that the last apparent action of the Union, prior to dismissal was to notify of an escalation   of the dispute to protest for leverage. This ended when the Complainant decided to proceed with his claims to the WRC Adjudication as is his right to do.

 I must now move to explore.

1 Was there a genuine redundancy so as to establish substantial grounds for dismissal?

2 Was the method of selection fair?

3 Was the dismissal conducted in a fair and reasonable manner and within the band of reasonableness for a reasonable employer?

I want to preface my findings to refer to the seminal work on a shrouded redundancy in business. This account reflects an understanding of just how difficult redundancy can be for everyone involved.

JVC Europe ltd v Panisi [2011 IEHC] 279

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Charleton

1. Redundancy can be a devastating blow. Where economic conditions are difficult, or where the employee who is let go has aged or is experiencing health difficulties, finding alternative employment may be impossible. Years of devotion to an employer count for nothing where technology overtakes the workforce, rendering the labour of those displaced unnecessary; where new methods of work are demanded from those who do not have the skills to respond; or where a product is rendered obsolete. All these are examples of genuine redundancy. As ordinarily understood, redundancy means that a worker is no longer needed. The legal definition, as stated in the legislation which I quote later, mirrors common comprehension. Because redundancy is inevitable if there is no work for workers to do and the workers cease to be needed, it is also lawful. The Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as amended, establishes a floor of rights in compensation for redundancy; circumscribes the use to which dismissal by reason of redundancy can be put; and provides for minimum payments for qualified employees who are subject to this misfortune. In circumstances of insolvency those payments can be met from the public purse.
2. A contract of employment can involve both personal and impersonal interaction between employer and employee. Redundancy is not, however, a personal choice. It is, in essence, the external or internal economic or technological reorienting of an enterprise whereby the work of employees needs to be shed or to be carried out in an entirely different manner. As such, redundancy is entirely impersonal. Dismissal, on the other hand, is a decision targeted at an individual. Under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as amended (*the Act of 1977*), the dismissal of an employee may only take place for substantial reasons that are fair. In effect, the contract of employment is protected in law, and it may only be repudiated by the employer for reasons which do not amount to an unfair dismissal. This requires the employer to show substantial grounds which justify the dismissal. The burden of proof, in that regard, is squarely placed upon the employer.

Panisi found that a “dismissal can be constructed and presented as a redundancy “shrouded by an identifiable “cloak.”

  Charleton J. emphasised the need to look behind all the evidence in a case to arrive at an accurate finding in this exceedingly difficult area of employment law.

The burden of proof rests firmly on the Respondent in this case to prove the circumstances relied on in the defence of Section 6(4) (c).

The case of St Ledger and Frontline Distribution Ireland ltd [1995] ELR 160 sets a clear objective for a true redundancy.

That it should not be based on Mr Cronin   personally or his performance and it should reflect measurable and identifiable impersonality and change at the enterprise.

This case concerned a Warehouse Supervisor who was made redundant and replaced by a worker who the respondent contended was better trained.

The EAT held this was not a genuine redundancy as the statutory definition of redundancy had not been proved.

In the instant case, I have established that the redundancies which occurred on 31 December 2023 followed a company decision to finally cease the business model of directly employed drivers in favour of outsourcing via Service Level Agreement to match the 24/7 aim at milk collection. This had its seeds in 2002 and had manifested at the business at intervals from that year onwards. The Complainant did not complete night work.

Mr OConnor was the last direct hire in 1991. Mr Cronin   was the longest server of the trio of complainants, who by October 2023 had witnessed a series of sequential redundancies and retirements. I found a once off reference to proposals for redundancy or conversion in the 2002 Agreement not replicated later. This reflected a fallback position of employment continuance. Mr foley had contended that this Agreement endured for 3 years, I find that it lingered on until 2023, but conversion / fall back work was not explored by the complainant in December 2023.

I am satisfied that at risk of redundancy was the message presented to the Complainant /Union at the joint meetings on 3 and 9 November 2023.

Selection is a moot point as the entire cadre of remaining drivers and their line manager were placed at risk of redundancy.

I have resolved the conflict in evidence in terms of alternatives offered in favour of the respondent as I accept that the complainant was offered consideration of existing vacancies at the business that went untapped.

I also accept that the complainant was offered an opportunity to join the cadre of hauliers on a self-employed basis, albeit not in his own patch. I accept this was not comparable employment.

Consultation occurred, where the complainant was permitted input on his future inside the business, but elected to use that time to maximise the severance package without appealing the redundancy on validity grounds. I understand that and recognise that redundancy was foremost on his mind and wishing to do the best for him and his family.

The Respondent reached for the elevated terms of severance outside of the 3.5 weeks model (inclusive of statutory) to close the deal, incentivise acceptance and transition to the new model. It did not work, and a Dispute arose and was not resolved.

I would have liked to have seen a formal appeal process trialled here, but I have to accept that as the “two worlds “collided own more, the appeal took the form of an IR Dispute complete with protest.

Can the Respondents insistence on a compromise agreement which sought to compromise all live claims before the Respondent as a basis for withholding an ex-gratia payment be deemed unreasonable behaviour?

It is of note that all involved were professionally represented by their Union at that time. An opportunity for informed consent prevailed.

At the peril of repeating myself, once more this is where two worlds collided.

Mr Cronin accepted statutory redundancy and notice pay.  That for me equates with his plan to accept redundancy if the price was right and taken together with a recoupment of the remainder of contract, this action suggests proximity at least to acquiescence of his own dismissal.

I am at a loss to understanding whether it was the Union or the Legal advisors who intervened to halt the completion of the compromise Agreement as I don’t have supporting documentation to guide me in this , given it was not delineated in the Union memo of 15 December and later picked up in Ms O’Carroll’s  correspondence of 5 January 2024 when she stated .

“… we are aware that your members rejected this offer as they believe that their current cases before the WRC concerning working time are of greater value to the amount offered. These cases were assigned a hearing date of 31 January 2024 by the WRC but have since been cancelled “

Ms O Carroll then moved to reach out to Mr Cronin and colleagues   when she wrote on the same date and in the face of imminent protest:

“We have instructed our legal advisors to contact (complainant’s solicitors) to suggest ways in which this hearing can be accelerated such as agreeing a time frame to exchange submissions and to narrow down any other issues in dispute “

I found this a reasonable and pragmatic approach within 7 days of the termination.

However, I must now look at the circumstances to establish whether the dismissal was wholly or mainly connected to redundancy in the legal sense as set out in

Section 7 (2) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967?

2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if or one or more reasons not related to the employee concerned] the dismissal is attributable wholly or mainly to—

(a) the fact that his employer has ceased, or intends to cease, to carry on the business for the purposes of which the employee was employed by him, or has ceased or intends to cease, to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed, or

(b) the fact that the requirements of that business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where he was so employed have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish, or

(c) the fact that his employer has decided to carry on the business with fewer or no employees, whether by requiring the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) to be done by other employees or otherwise, or

(d) the fact that his employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforward be done in a different manner for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained, or

(e) the fact that his employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforward be done by a person who is also capable of doing other work for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained,

I find that by the time of the dismissal on 31 December 2023 , Section 7 ( 2) ( b ) and ( c)  of the Redundancy Payments Act , 1967 had transpired at the business  through complete  erosion of the cadre of directly employed drivers and their manager present since the 1990s in favour of the total provision of service by hauliers, who operated in a different way . The business no longer required directly employed drivers.

This had an overture to elements of the Irish Ferries Dispute in 2005, albeit on a much smaller scale. This involved large scale redundancies in favour of agency replacement. This was an IR Dispute eventually settled with the assistance the States Industrial Relations bodies.

In my consideration of the evidence in this case, my attention was drawn to a 1998 claim for a redundancy payment by a John Blade and Kerry Co -operative Dairies ltd RP 93/98 at EAT.

Mr Blade was a delivery man when the respondent took over his employment. Subsequently, he received details of a planned restructuring which sought to redeploy him to Galway via a mobility clause, which he vetoed.

He was also offered severance.

It was the respondent case that the mobility clause should defeat and undermine any claim to Redundancy.

The EAT found that the need for the number of drivers the respondent previously had in Tuam area had ceased or diminished and the complainant’s job which had been phased out and ceased.

Ms Faherty held that this was the language of redundancy.

She went on to find that the issue of mobility could not become a defining issue when redundancy had clearly occurred and found that the complainant was correct in considering himself dismissed on the circumstances which were not defeated by a mobility clause as suitable alternative.

For my part, I can safely conclude that there had not been any disturbance in the employment relationship for Mr Cronin. I have not found any attempt by the Respondent to antagonise the complainant by making him redundant.

I understand that the complainant genuinely believes that his complaints to the WRC sealed his fate, however, he has not proved this in evidence.

I would have liked to have seen a more robust documentation on the change process as I accept Mr Cronin’s   evidence that he did not see it coming.

Protected Disclosure:

I am not at one with the Complainant when he sought to frame his claim for unfair dismissal against a protected disclosure submission to the WRC on 19 December 2022. I am even more apart when Counsel sought to vary the protected disclosure from the WRC Inspectorate to the WRC Adjudication service at the 23.5 hour at hearing.

There was no mention of this on the WRC complaint form, where the narrative referred to a complaint.

 On that day he made one complaint regarding to WRC Inspection.

“My Employer is not keeping statutory records “He sought an investigation under the Organisation of Working time Act 1997.

On 5 April 2024, the WRC Inspectorate declared that records were maintained by a tachograph where the Road Safety Authority carried authority to inspect those records not WRC.

On 19 December 2022, four complaints were set out to WRC Adjudication (all addressed above)

I have no indication that the Complainant made a Protected disclosure in accordance with Section 5 of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014, as amended. (SI 510/2022)

5. (1) For the purposes of this Act “protected disclosure” means, subject to subsection (6)]and sections 17 and 18, a disclosure of relevant information (whether before or after the date of the passing of this Act) made by a worker in the manner specified in section 6, 7, 7B,] 8, 9 or 10.

(2) For the purposes of this Act information is “relevant information” if—

(a) in the reasonable belief of the worker, it tends to show one or more relevant wrongdoings, and

(b) it came to the attention of the worker [in a work-related context].

The Complainant has submitted that the complaints raised constituted Protected Disclosures to Director General of WRC

I found no reportage through the company policy on Protected disclosures.

Given that Mr Cronin, as worker and shareholder had maintained a dossier of tachograph records 2022-2023 and had stopped recording rest time in his own case, it is safe to presume that he was in conflict with his employer.

I asked if these matters had been raised at shareholder meetings and there was no material evidence of this or a road safety authority report on compliance.

The complainant demonstrated an awareness of the role of the RSA in this regard.

I must conclude that these matters were interpersonal grievances exempted under section 5 A.

(5A) A matter concerning interpersonal grievances exclusively affecting a reporting person, namely, grievances about interpersonal conflicts between the reporting person and another worker, or a matter concerning a complaint by a reporting person to, or about, his or her employer which concerns the worker exclusively, shall not be a relevant wrongdoing for the purposes of this Act and may be dealt with through any agreed procedures applicable to such grievances or complaint to which the reporting person has access or such other procedures, provided in accordance with any rule of law or enactment (other than this Act), to which the reporting person has access.]

The tension between the Respondent and the complainant was more of incredulity at the complainants perceived defiance as articulated by Mr Dillane in his evidence than a targeted personalised attack.

I found the Respondent to be practical in respect of the employment rights complaints rather than combative or reactive as attributed to them by the Complainant.

The bigger picture confirms that the Respondent completed the planned concluding chapter in the devolution of direct employment of drivers by entire cadre cessation on 31 December 2023. This amounted to a redundancy in law.

The cadre has not been replaced. The new system has been evaluated and endorsed at the company. The trucks have been sold. Third party contractors became the market norm.

A genuine redundancy occurred in the complainant’s case, and he participated in the shaping of the final stages of that process without appealing the principle of redundancy in law, at least.

I understand that he sought to safeguard his planned future on combining farm with work by seeking to secure an optimal severance.

Consultation occurred with the Union, but Mr Cronin did not engage on the alternatives offered in house prior to the redundancy. I found he made an honest reflection during cross examination.

I found that universal selection from a final remnant pool of seven drivers of all drivers for redundancy was ambitious but was not unreasonable. They were the last Drivers standing, the final curve of the ball.

I could not identify a contravention in an existing agreement on how redundancies should operate at the business. Conversion, a remnant of an earlier Agreement was not trialled as the Dispute went public and then boomeranged back into the quasi-judicial forum of this Tribunal, where it has remained.

I would have liked to have seen a separate and parallel process which prefaced the complaints to the WRC on 19 December 2022 onwards. However, I cannot accept that by seeking to conclude a compromise agreement with represented parties that the respondent behaved unreasonably in seeking to safeguard their business when two worlds collided.

I must conclude that some tensions surrounding the cessation of recording time were visible in the staff relations between Mr Cronin    and various aspects of the business at line manager, haulier and marking time, however, I have not found this to be a defining issue in the face of a redundancy situation.

I have found that the Respondent can rely on the defence that the complainant was dismissed mainly by redundancy in accordance with section 6(4) (c) of the Act.

He was not unfairly dismissed.

Decision:

Dated:   1st September 2025

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer:  Patsy Doyle

Key Words: