Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Lindsay  Dicken

Velocity EHS Ireland

Representatives

  Self-Represented

James Cleary IBEC

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00072969-001

30/06/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 28 of the Safety, Health & Welfare at Work Act, 2005

CA-00072978-001

30/06/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00072978-002 merged with CA-00072969-001

30/06/2025

This case concerns complaints made by the Complainant”) against his former employer, the Respondent. The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 15 March 2021, and his employment ended by way of redundancy on 29 February 2025, following notice received on 8 January 2025.

On 30 June 2025, the Complainant submitted further complaints to the Workplace Relations Commission under the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2015 and the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005. These complaints alleged discrimination, harassment, victimisation, and penalisation.

The Respondent raised a preliminary objection. It submits that the complaints are out of time under section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 and section 77(5) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998, both of which require that complaints be presented within six months of the alleged contravention (extendable to twelve months only where exceptional circumstances exist). The Respondent further contends that the claim of discriminatory dismissal cannot be pursued under the Equality legislation because the Complainant has already initiated an unfair dismissal complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977–2015, which had been already partly heard, at the time of submission of these complaints.

The preliminary issue for determination is therefore whether the Commission has authority to entertain the complaints submitted on 30 June 2025.

Preliminary Issue:

On the preliminary issue, the Respondent submits that the additional complaints lodged by the Complainant on 30 June 2025 are out of time. It argues that pursuant to section 77(5) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, complaints must be made within six months of the alleged contravention, extendable to twelve months only where a reasonable cause exists. In the Respondent’s view, all the incidents relied upon by the Complainant prior to 31 December 2024 fall outside the statutory period and cannot be considered. The only event within the relevant timeframe is the Complainant’s redundancy in January 2025.

The Respondent further submits that the Complainant is precluded from pursuing a claim of discriminatory dismissal under the Employment Equality Acts in respect of the redundancy. It points to section 101(4) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998, which provides that an employee who has instituted proceedings under the Unfair Dismissals Acts may not also seek redress for the same dismissal under the Equality legislation. As the Complainant has already lodged, and part-heard, an unfair dismissal claim in respect of his redundancy, the Respondent contends that a parallel claim of discriminatory dismissal is not permissible.

Substantive Complaints:

The Respondent maintains that there is no evidential basis for allegations of racial discrimination, victimisation, or penalisation. It states that promotion and redundancy decisions were made on objective criteria and through independent processes, that normal performance management was mischaracterised by the Complainant as harassment, and that no formal health and safety complaint was ever raised. The Respondent submits that the redundancy was a genuine restructuring exercise applied globally, and that the Complainant’s selection was fair and lawful.

Ms. Martin, HR Director, gave evidence on behalf of the Respondent. She stated that the Complainant was not treated differently on account of his race and denied that any harassment or victimisation occurred. She said that grievance procedures were always available and that she repeatedly encouraged the Complainant to use them.

On promotion, she confirmed that recruitment was managed independently by the U.S. talent acquisition team, using objective criteria that were applied fairly to all applicants. She rejected the claim that criteria were altered to exclude the Complainant.

 Ms. Martin confirmed that no formal health and safety complaint had ever been raised by the Complainant through the company’s reporting channels.

Preliminary Issue:

The Complainant submits that his complaints are properly before the Commission and should not be struck out based on time. He maintains that the issues relied upon form part of a continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment and victimisation, commencing in 2023 and culminating in his redundancy in January 2025. In his view, the redundancy was not an isolated act but the final manifestation of an ongoing course of conduct, and earlier incidents must therefore be considered in that context. He further argues that his mental health difficulties during the period leading up to his termination amounted to exceptional circumstances which justify the admission of his complaints outside the six-month period.

The Complainant denies that his claims are duplicative or improperly re-submitted. He states that his earlier complaints were withdrawn only because of errors in their categorisation under the wrong statutory headings, and that he is entitled to re-enter them correctly framed under the Employment Equality Acts and the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act. He also contends that the statutory bar on dual dismissal claims does not prevent him from pursuing discriminatory dismissal, as the unfair dismissal and equality complaints address distinct aspects of the same termination.

On the substance of his complaints, the Complainant asserts that he was treated less favourably than white colleagues in matters of promotion, subjected to excessive scrutiny and public reprimands, and penalised following the making of internal complaints about discrimination and workplace practices. He claims that criteria for managerial progression were altered to exclude him, that his grievances were not fairly investigated, and that the redundancy was in fact a retaliatory act linked to his protected complaints. He seeks declarations of discrimination and victimisation, and compensation for financial loss, distress and reputational harm.

Under section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 (“the 2015 Act”) and section 77(5) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015, (“the 1998 Act”) a complaint must be presented within six months of the alleged contravention, extendable to twelve months only where a reasonable cause is demonstrated. The complaints here were submitted on 30 June 2025, so only matters arising on or after 31 December 2024 fall within the statutory time limit.

The Complainant’s allegations of discrimination relate primarily to events occurring between October 2023 and August 2024. These are outside the six-month window and are therefore out of time. Importantly, I also note that at a previous hearing in June 2025, in an associated case, the Complainant formally withdrew a number of complaints. It now appears that he has sought to re-introduce those complaints, re-characterising them under different legislation. The mere fact of re-labelling or associating withdrawn complaints with different statutory provisions does not render them to be complaints within the time limit.

The only matter falling within the six-month period is the redundancy in January 2025. However, section 101(4) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 provides that an employee who has instituted proceedings under the Unfair Dismissals Acts may not also seek redress under the Equality Acts in respect of the same dismissal. The Complainant has already lodged an unfair dismissal case, and I have heard an unfair dismissal complaint in relation to his redundancy (see associated case ADJ-00058415). At the time of the submission of the complaints on 30 June 2025 that I am now considering in this decision, I had partly heard the Unfair Dismissal case in reference to unfair selection for redundancy. It follows that I cannot entertain a discriminatory dismissal claim in respect of the same termination.

The Complainant has asked that the time limit be extended on the grounds of his mental health difficulties in early 2025. However, he provided no medical evidence at the hearing in support of this contention. Moreover, it is clear from the record that he was able to submit other WRC complaints during the period in question. I therefore find no basis to extend the statutory time limit under section 41(8) of the 2015 Act or section 77(6) of the 1998 Act.

For these reasons, I find the discrimination complaints under the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 and the penalisation claim under the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 20025 are out of time and I have no authority to consider the redundancy issue under the 1998 Act given the parallel unfair dismissal claim already before the WRC.

For the reasons outlined above, I determine that I have no authority to adjudicate upon the complaints CA-00072969-001 and CA-00072978-001, referred on 30 June 2025, because they were out-of-time.  

Out- of- Time.