Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Daniel Constantin  Popescu

Pharma Force Recruitment Ltd (amended the consent)

Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

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Representatives

  Self-Represented

Shirley Kiernan, Director of Operations

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00069962-001

13/03/2025

The Complainant appeared in person and gave his evidence on affirmation. Documentation was submitted in advance and relied upon at the hearing. The Complainant, an Engineer, alleges that he was discriminated against by the Respondent on the ground of race in getting a job.

Ms. Kieran appeared on behalf of the Respondent and gave her evidence on affirmation. She provided emails in support of the Respondent’s position. The name of the Respondent was amended on consent at the outset of the hearing. The Respondent runs a recruitment agency.

It was the Complainant’s evidence that, as a Romanian national with 20 years of experience in the industry, he was contacted via LinkedIn in late December by a recruiter, Ms Kanishka Singh, regarding a potential Senior CSV Engineer role with a medical device manufacturer in Galway.

After the Christmas holidays, on 6 January 2025, another recruiter, Mr Michael Boyle, emailed to confirm the Complainant’s availability for an interview. On 27 January 2025, Ms Singh followed up and proposed 29 January 2025 for the interview, which was subsequently held on that date.

It was the Complainant’s evidence that, following the interview, he did not receive any communication from either recruiter or the company for several weeks. While he noted that such delays were not unusual in the industry with the usual period being 4- 6 weeks however, he became concerned on 26 February 2025 when he contacted Ms Singh for an update and received no response. On 7 March 2025, he emailed Mr Boyle, who informed him that Ms Singh had left the Respondent’s business and that the original role had been closed. However, later the same day he received an email from Ms Singh who confirmed the same information.

The Complainant stated that although he understood that roles can be closed and recruiters may move on, he was troubled by the lack of transparency and communication throughout the process. He felt that the silence, the sudden departure of the recruiter without informing candidates, and the absence of any formal closure or feedback were unprofessional.

It was the Complainant’s evidence that these factors led him to file a complaint. It was his submission that the discriminatory ground of race was the most applicable where he queried whether there was such a ground as professional discrimination.

The Respondent’s cross examination focused on what exactly was the complaint of discrimination being put forward by the Complainant.

It was the Ms Kerian’s evidence that, after reviewing the recruitment process with colleagues Mr Boyle and Ms Singh, no evidence of discrimination was found. She submitted that all correspondence was professional and that Ms Singh, the recruiter, had consistently demonstrated high standards in communication.

The Respondent acknowledged a gap in communication after the Complainant emailed on 26 February 2025, explaining that the recruiters had contacted the client to confirm the role’s status. They received confirmation that the position had been filled, and this feedback was then shared with the Complainant.

It was the Respondent’s evidence that the delay in communication after 26 February 2025 was due to Ms Singh being on holiday and preparing to leave the company. Although on gardening leave, she still had email access and was completing a handover. The Respondent stated that the role had been filled, and feedback was given once confirmed. They maintained that the process followed industry norms and that later engagement with the Complainant showed no evidence of discriminatory treatment.

The Complainant’s cross examination focused on the other candidates, which the Respondent stated she was not in a position to comment on. The Respondent apologised for the poor communication.

Discrimination is defined in Section 6 (1) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 (as amended) (“Acts”) as:-

“(1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where—

(a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the "discriminatory grounds") which—

(i) exists,

(ii) existed but no longer exists,

(iii) may exist in the future, or

(iv) is imputed to the person concerned,”

The Complainant complains of discrimination of race which falls under Section 6 (2) of the Acts:-

(2) As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are—….

….(h) that they are of different race, colour, nationality or ethnic or national origins (in this Act referred to as “the ground of race”),”

The Burden of Proof

Section 85 A (1) of the Acts sets out the burden of proof rests with the Complainant to prove on the facts that he has a prima facia complaint of discrimination: -

“85A.—(1) Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.”

The Labour Court inMelbury v. Valpeters [EDA0917] held as follows in its consideration of section 85(A):

“…provides for the allocation of the probative burden in cases within its ambit.  This requires that the Complainant must first establish facts from which discrimination may be inferred.  What those facts are will vary from case to case and there is no closed category of facts, which can be relied upon.  All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination.  However, they must be established as facts on credible evidence.  Mere speculations, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn.  Section 85A places the burden of establishing the primary facts fairly and squarely on the Complainant and the language of this provision admits of no exceptions to that evidential rule.

The Complainant raised a complaint of discrimination on the ground of race in his Complaint Form. After presenting his evidence at the hearing, he was invited to clarify the basis of his complaint. He responded that race was the closest available option on the Complaint Form.

Having carefully considered the evidence before me, including the Complainant’s oral evidence and the email correspondence presented, I find that he has not discharged the burden of proof as required under Section 85A of the Acts. He did not identify any fact relating specifically to a complaint of discrimination on the ground of race. By his own admission, he was not entirely clear about the nature of his complaint.

Consequently, I find that the Complainant was not discriminated against on the ground of race in applying for a job through the Respondent’s recruitment agency.

I find the Complainant was not discriminated against on the ground of race in getting a job by the Respondent.

Discrimination – Getting a Job – Race