ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00056516
Parties:
| 
 | Complainant | Respondent | 
| Parties | Antoinette Doyle | Medforce Healthcare Recruitment | 
| Representatives | Represented Herself | Represented by the Managing Director | 
Complaint:
| Act | Complaint Reference No. | Date of Receipt | 
| Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 | CA-00068756-001 | 21/01/2025 | 
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 05/09/2025
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Catherine Byrne
Procedure:
In accordance with section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 - 2015, this complaint was assigned to me by the Director General. I conducted a hearing on September 5th 2025, at which I made enquiries and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence relevant to the complaint. The complainant, Ms Antoinette Doyle, was the only witness for her case and she represented herself. Her former employer, Medforce Healthcare Recruitment, was represented by the managing director, Ms Lana Kane.
Background:
| Medforce Healthcare Recruitment, “the respondent,” is an employment agency and the complainant worked as a recruitment consultant and placement officer. She worked for two days each week at home and for three days in the company’s offices in Fitzwilliam Square. She commenced working with the respondent on September 4th 2023 and she resigned on July 22nd 2024. She therefore worked for 10 months and 18 days, which means that, unless she can ground her claim of unfair dismissal in one of the exceptional categories prescribed at s.6(2) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, she does not have the required service of one year to bring her within the protection of the Act. On the form she submitted to the WRC on January 21st 2025, the complainant indicated that her complaint was grounded in her exercising her rights under the Protected Disclosures Act 2014. At the hearing on September 5th 2025, she said that she wasn’t clear about the Protected Disclosures Act and she said that she couldn’t remember filling in the form. I asked the complainant to explain why she resigned and she said that her decision “stems from the day itself.” On that day, Monday, July 22nd 2024, she was working from home, but Ms Kane asked her to come to the office because there was a problem with “Cloudcall,” the company’s phone system. Although the phone system was out of action, the complainant was dealing with clients and staff by email and she didn’t think there was any benefit to her coming into the office. In a series of emails between her and Ms Kane that morning, she explained why she didn’t think it was necessary. Under pressure from Ms Kane to attend the office, at 11.08, the complainant wrote to say that she would be in between 12.30 and 12.45. At 11.11, Ms Kane replied to say that the complainant had been disrespectful and argumentative and she asked her to attend a “HR meeting” the next day “to discuss your improper engagement within your role at Medforce.” At 12.55, Ms Kane wrote to the complainant and postponed the meeting scheduled for Tuesday, July 23rd until Friday, July 26th. In that email, Ms Kane confirmed that it was “a formal meeting to discuss ongoing issues” and that the complainant could be accompanied by another employee, but not a union official or an external person. At 15.49, The complainant wrote to Ms Kane and submitted her resignation with immediate effect. | 
Findings and Conclusions:
| I have considered the evidence of the complainant and it is apparent that, while she had a number of reasons to be dissatisfied at work, she did not make a protected disclosure. As she worked for the respondent for less than 12 months, she cannot bring a claim related to her resignation under the Unfair Dismissals Act. Having reached this conclusion, I explained to the complainant that the burden of proof required in cases of constructive dismissal is onerous. It’s clear from the complainant’s evidence that she was unhappy with her working conditions and that she felt overworked and under pressure. She was perfectly entitled to resign if she wanted to remove herself from what she considered to be a difficult situation. Apart from the 12-months’ service requirement, to succeed in a complaint of unfair dismissal, the complainant was required to demonstrate that her employer inflicted a fundamental breach on her contract of employment or, that they acted so unreasonably, that she had no alternative but to resign. Reasonableness is required from both parties, and it is my view that, by resigning, and by not giving her employer a chance to deal with her grievance, the complainant did not act reasonably. It was open to her to use the company’s grievance procedure to try to have her concerns addressed, and, by not doing so, she passed up on the possibility of having them resolved in a more constructive manner. | 
Decision:
Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the unfair dismissal claim consisting of a grant of redress in accordance with section 7 of the 1977 Act.
| The complainant did not make a protected disclosure, and, for this reason, I decide that her complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act is not well founded. | 
Dated: 09th of October 2025
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Catherine Byrne
Key Words:
| Protected disclosure, constructive dismissal | 

