Worker

Employer

Anonymised Parties

A Worker

An Employer

Representatives

Self-Represented

Self-Represented

Act

Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 13 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1969

CA-00072243-001

O9/06/2025

This matter came before the WRC dated 09/06/2025 as a complaint seeking adjudication by the WRC under section 13 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1969.

The specific complaint falls under Unfair Dismissal.   The Worker on her WRC complaint form claims she was unfairly dismissed, and she does not have at least 12 months service.  The aforesaid dispute was referred to me for investigation.  A hearing for that purpose was scheduled to take place on 23/10/2025. 

The Worker was employed as an SEO Executive on a monthly salary of €3,333.00 gross.  The Employer is a technology company. 

Both parties provided helpful written submissions in advance of hearing for which I am grateful.

CA-00072243-001

The Worker at hearing sought to re-visit the severance agreement reached between the parties when her employment ended.  The Worker submits she is not saying that the Employer does not have the right to dismiss people but she is just not happy with the amount she received from the Employer and she seeks to renegotiate that which was agreed. 

The Worker submits there was a misunderstanding about the final amount and she submits she was misled by the Employer.  The Worker submits the issue is not that her employment was terminated. The Worker submits the issue is the amount she received when she left.      

CA-00072243-001

The Employer submits that in the aftermath of signing the compromise agreement the Worker argued that she had been misled and this was simply untrue.  The Employer submits it was clear from the settlement agreement that she would be paid one week’s notice pay and an additional four weeks’ pay as a goodwill gesture. 

The Employer submits it has not sought repayment of the sum and further submits the Employer should be entitled to rely on the waiver agreement to the effect that the payment was made in “full and final settlement of all claims.”

CA-00072243-001

In conducting my investigation, I have taken into account all relevant submissions presented to me by the parties.   Where I deemed it necessary, I made my own inquiries so as to better understand the facts of the dispute and in fulfilment of my duties under statute.  I clarified with the Worker as to the exact nature of her dispute and she clarified that she was in dispute about the amount of her compromise agreement.  I have very carefully considered the information shared by the parties at hearing. 

The consideration of a trade dispute and any recommendation thereto is informed and guided by previous decisions of the Labour Court as they apply to a trade dispute under the Industrial Relations Act. 

Accordingly, I have regard to the case of Starrus Eco Holdings Limited t/a Greenstar v. Gerald O’Reilly [UDD1868] in which the Labour Court concluded that it did “not have jurisdiction to go behind the waiver agreement entered into by the Parties.”

It is unusual cite the law of the superior courts in the consideration of disputes referred under the Industrial Relations Acts.  However, the Worker in this referral seeks to re-visit the terms of her settlement agreement and has utilised the IR pathway as mechanism for so doing. 

Accordingly, for completeness I find it necessary in the specific circumstances of this dispute to make reference to the jurisprudence in relation to severance agreements.   

Generally speaking, employees are free to enter into compromise / severance agreements regarding their statutory rights except where legislation explicitly prohibits such agreements.  In Board ofManagement of Malahide Community School v Conaty [2019] IEHC 486, Simons J noted that the courts have taken a practical approach and “the case law indicates that it is permissible for an employee to make an informed waiver of his or her statutory rights”.

Simmons J relied on the principle of "informed consent" as set out in the judgements in Hurley v Royal Yacht Club and Sunday Newspapers Ltd v Stephen Kinsella and Luke Bradley [2008] 19 E.L.R. 53, when finding that a person cannot be found to have waived a statutory right unless they make an informed decision to do so.  

In Sunday Newspapers Ltd, Smyth J held that “the decided cases indicate that a party may enter into an agreement in relation to his or her statutory rights and the question of whether or not such rights have been compromised is a matter for the proper construction of the agreement itself. In the instant case the agreement is expressly stated to be in full and final settlement and that means what it says. It says so in express terms referable to enumerated Acts and all or any employment legislation in respect of any and all outstanding entitlements whether statutory or otherwise stated or as yet unstated.”

The leading authority in relation to agreements which compromise employment statutory rights is Sunday World Newspapers Limited v Kinsella and Another [2007] IEHC 324.  In that case, former employees who had entered into severance agreements sought to pursue complaints under the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003, arguing that a waiver of their rights under the Act was void.  In the High Court Smyth J confirmed that an employee could enter into an agreement in relation to his or her statutory rights.  He held that the question of whether or not such rights had been compromised was a matter for the proper construction of the agreement itself.  He also adopted Hurley v. Royal Yacht Club [1997] ELR 225 which considered the circumstances where claims can be legitimately compromised and applied a two-factor test:

a) that the claimant be advised of their legal entitlements and that any compromise agreement list the enactments applicable thereto; and

b) that the employee be advised in writing that he/she should take appropriate (legal) advice.

I note the agreement between the Worker and the Employer in this dispute provides as follows at para 14. 

ADVICE

I acknowledge that I have read and taken appropriate legal advice on this Compromise Agreement from ….  ….. and that I understand, accept and agree to the contents of same and, furthermore, that I am signing this Compromise Agreement voluntarily without coercion of any description and with full understanding that I am releasing and compromising any and all claims and demands of every nature to date within my knowledge whatsoever that I have or might have against the Company, save in respect of obligations of the Company set out in this Compromise Agreement. 

The agreement at para 2 under the heading of Consideration, Waiver and Release goes on to expressly set out all of the legislation covered by it and the agreement refers in express terms to the Industrial Relations Acts. 

I note the Employer as part of the agreement offered to pay €400 to the Worker towards legal advice which was set out to her in writing by email on 20 May 2025 and again on 26 May 2025.      

I note on 22 May 2025 the Worker sought clarification on certain matters and in particular she sought confirmation of the procedure for submitting her solicitor’s invoice and whether the €400 contribution would be paid directly to the solicitor or reimbursed to the Worker. 

I note in the same email from the Worker to the Employer on 22 May the Worker sets outs the following: “To proceed with legal advice and finalise the agreement, I would appreciate clarification on the following.” 

I note upon inquiry at hearing the Worker submits she did not seek legal advice as she had previously been “scammed” by a lawyer.  However, I note the Worker advised the Employer by email on 28 May 2025 that she had “since taken consultation regarding the proposed terms and, after careful consideration, I must share that the compensation outlined falls significantly below my expectations, especially in light of the circumstances surrounding my dismissal.” 

I note on Tuesday 3 June the Worker advised the Employer as follows:

“I wanted to let you know that my call with the counsellor is scheduled for 5 pm today.  I am happy to proceed with signing the agreement, but I would like to have a final discussion with the counsellor first.” 

I note the signed compromise agreement was returned to the Employer on 4 June 2025.

I am satisfied that based on the various exchanges between the parties set out above it would be reasonable to infer that the Worker was seeking legal advice.  I note in particular an email from the Employer on Friday May 30 providing clarification as requested on certain matters and culminating in a request that the signed agreement be returned by 6pm Tuesday and setting out “if there is a delay you will let me know as you are getting advice.”

The fact that the Worker chose not to do so is a matter for herself.  I further note that the Worker was given two weeks in which to consider the settlement agreement before she was required to return it to the Employer.  This would seem to me to be a reasonable amount of time and I note the amount of email traffic between the parties seeking clarification on certain matters including and not limited to the Workers request nominating the name of the person from whom she wished her reference to issue. 

I note the financial settlement received by the Worker has been retained by her and no offer has been made by her to return it. 

I note with interest the Worker upon inquiry at hearing confirmed she had a working knowledge of what she referred to as “an F & F agreement” from two previous employments.  This is what is commonly known as a compromise or a severance agreement and I note the term full and final settlement is clearly set out in para 2.1 of the agreement signed by the Worker. [emphasis added] 

However, I note this clause in the agreement together with her understanding of what constitutes an F & F agreement from her previous experience of same has not deterred the Worker in her pursuit of now revisiting the agreement through an Industrial Relations referral in her attempt to increase the quantum. 

In so doing I am satisfied in effect what the Worker is suggesting that the agreement she entered into where she was offered the opportunity to avail of legal advice which would be funded up to €400 by the Employer could now be somehow construed as not representing a full and final settlement and should be cast aside.    

In my conclusions on this matter I find myself guided by Smyth J in Sunday Newspapers Ltd where he found as follows:

“If the claimants believed as determined by the Labour Court they could not credibly or at all sign “in full and final settlement”, if the claimants or either of them signed the severance agreement in the form in which they did with the intention of taking further action in the matter — they so deceived the company (appellant employer), that makes a sham and a mockery of seeking to conclusively resolve an employment dispute.”

There is a line of authority that emanates from the case of Healy v Irish Life Assurance plc. [DEC-E2015-002] in which it was held that “full and final means just that, it is full and final.”

Finally, I have considered the position of the Labour Court Specialised Sterile Environments Ltd v.  A Worker [LCR22592] where it held as follows:

“It is not disputed that the Employer complied with the terms of the written agreement and that was the only agreement before the Court.  The Court finds the dispute between the Employer and the Worker was resolved at that point.

The Court does not uphold the Worker’s complaint.”

I am satisfied the severance agreement as signed by the Complainant compromises any claim she has under the Industrial Relations Acts. 

For the reasons set out above, I am unable to find merit in this dispute.  Accordingly, I do not recommend any action to be taken. 

Compromise agreement; severance agreement; full and final settlement;