Complainant

Respondent

Parties

George  Dempsey

Tony Miller

Representatives

Self-represented

 Self-represented

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 45A of the Industrial Relations Act, 1946

CA-00071571-001

22/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 23 of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 2015

CA-00071571-002

22/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Sick Leave Act 2022

CA-00071571-003

22/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00071571-004

22/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00071571-005

22/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00071571-006

22/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071571-007

22/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071571-008

22/05/2025

The Complainant presented 8 complaints to the WRC.  He contends he is an employee of the Respondent.  This is refuted by the Respondent who submits the Complainant was at all times engaged as an independent contractor. 

The Complainant outlined that he is a carpenter and a PAYE worker.  He is not a contractor or sub-contractor and does not have a C2 Certificate.  He is an employee of the Respondent and has worked for him for the past 4 or 5 years.  The first job he did for the Respondent was to roof a building in 2019.  They agreed a cash amount of €9,000 for completion of the job.  He should have received the full amount in cash but instead the Respondent gave him a cheque (a photocopy of this cheque dated 10th January 2020 was opened to the hearing) and cash. 

After that job the Complainant worked on another building for the Respondent from 2019 to 2023.  He agreed €14,000 for this job.  He worked on this building every day from 7.30am until 4.30pm.  He was paid €3,000 in cash at 6-to-7-week intervals.  The Complainant outlined that every 6 weeks he would have to ask the Respondent for €3,000. This was only €10 per hour and below carpenter hourly rates.  He raised this with the Respondent.  The Complainant outlined that the Respondent added on more work to the initial job agreed, but he did not get paid for this.  The job ended up taking 4 years.  He only received €13,000 in total.  He estimates that he should have got another €5,000.  The Complainant said “when I agreed to do Courtwood I priced it per square metre.  I could do the work as quick or slow as I wanted”.  The Complainant did not work anywhere else between 2020 and 2023.  He did not pay tax on the cash or cheque payments he received from the Respondent, and he did not know if the Respondent was paying tax on the payments either. He was not getting a payslip, and he did not ask for one.

After 2023 the Complainant said he “did some work for him [the Respondent] back and forth and finished working for him in 2025”.  He always thought he was going to get the shortfall between an hourly rate of €15.50 and the €10 he was receiving but he never received it.  In 2024 the Respondent started to pay him a daily rate of €125 which he agreed to, but then the Respondent “dropped this down to €1,500 every 6 or 7 weeks". 

The Complainant outlined that he was suspended by the Respondent while the Respondent was waiting for an electrician.  This was around mid-2024.  In 2024 he worked for the Respondent whenever the Respondent provided the materials required for the work.  In total he worked about 6 months of 2024 for the Respondent.  He said he worked on and off for the Respondent in 2024 because he had sprained his knee and hurt his back.  The Complainant submitted “they stopped me working for them in April 2025 because the electrical work I had done could not be certified.  I did small amounts of work for friends etc. during 2024 and 2025.  The pink cert was the big problem, and they had no materials there. The last time I physically performed work for them was December 2024 approximately.  I received €1,500 cash at the end of December for 6 or 7 weeks work”.

The Complainant stated that as a carpenter he provided the tools to perform the work but that the Respondent supplied the materials for the job. The Respondent never told him what time to start or finish.  He never got holidays.  He worked Monday to Friday at the Respondent’s property for 4 years and “the days and months I didn’t appear in 2024 was because of an injury and the pink cert.  Because I worked every day for four years for the Respondent and never produced a C2 Cert I am a PAYE worker”.  The amount of wages owed are about €15,000 and holiday pay €3,000. He worked most holidays which would amount to €8,000. He worked the holidays to keep the job going.  He was working on his own.  He hoped to get what he was owed in a lump sum, but the Respondent dragged it along.  The dates on the envelopes are between 6, 7 and 8 weeks apart.

In response to questions from the Adjudication Officer, the Complainant responded: “I never thought it was strange that I didn’t receive a payslip as it dodged Revenue and Social Welfare for starters.  I never requested holidays or a certificate of earnings.  He owes me €9,000 per year worked.  The pink cert has nothing to do with me.  I can’t produce a pink cert.  In September 2024 I received the last €3,000.  I worked October, November and December 2024 and I got €1,500, then €2,000 and then €1,500 in cash.  I don’t know how much I should have got because work was on and off in 2024.  My car was stolen and the envelopes were in the car, so I am not able to say how much I am owed for that time because some of the envelopes were in the car with the dates on them.  I left because they were not giving me work over the pink cert.  With respect to the claim for sick pay the Complainant submitted: “I was out at different stages with my knee.  I twisted it.  I was out at different times here and there.  I don’t have the dates, but they were in 2024 may be around mid-2024 or towards the end of it”.

The Complainant said the Respondent was onto him for 9 months about the pink cert and that the Respondent forced him out because he couldn’t get one.

In cross-examination the Respondent asked the Complainant where he was from January 2020 to July 2021.  The Complainant responded that he was at another person’s property doing a roof.   The Complainant was asked where was in working in October 2024.  The Complainant responded: “it was a small job that I had to finish because you wouldn’t let me work”.

The Respondent outlined that he had an excellent relationship with the Complainant.  The Respondent is a farmer, and he does not employ people as he is not an employer.  The Complainant completed work on an old house and out houses on his property, and he did so as a contractor.  He asked the Complainant if an old dwelling house on the property was worth re-roofing.  The Complainant said it was, and they agreed a price of €9,000 for the roofing job.  The Complainant supplied his own tools to do this job and hired in a teleporter.  He finished this job in 2020.  He then left the Complainant’s property to do a neighbour’s roof. 

In July 2020 the Respondent contracted the Complainant to do another job.  A price was agreed for this job, and it was finished in 2021.  The Respondent then asked the Complainant to work on an out-house/old dwelling which his daughter wished to live in.  This involved stonework and an extension.  Every job agreed was based on a price per job and never a daily rate.  However, when it came to putting in a floor, it was difficult for the Complainant to give a price for the work, and the parties agree a daily rate for this aspect of the job. 

On every job the Complainant provided his own tools, including scaffolding and a teleporter to complete work performed by him.  He worked completely to his own schedule and was under no obligation as to when he would complete the work or to commit to the days he would or would not be present.  There were several days, weeks and months where the Complainant did not appear to work on the property.  He was not expected to give notice of his attendance or absence and was free to come and go as he pleased.  As a contractor he had the authority to determine when and how he worked.  The Respondent submitted that it can be presumed that when he was not present on his property, the Complainant was completing other jobs for other clients as was his right to do as a contractor.

The Complainant came to the Respondent at intervals for a portion of the agreed price for the job.  When the Complainant determined that he had accumulated €3,000 of work, he let the Respondent know.  The timing would vary because it would depend on how many hours the Complainant had put into the job.  The Complainant always requested cash.  The Respondent had a note of the payments made to the Complainant and the timing of same which he outlined to the hearing.

In October 2024 the Complainant informed the Respondent that he had another job to do and that he might be back to finish the job by December 2024.  The Complainant did not resume the job in December 2024.  In January 2025 the Respondent met with the Complainant to discuss the completion of the job.  They had “a fine conversation, no issues, all grand and I assumed he was coming back to finish the job.  He had told us the job would be done by December 2023. We asked him in April 2024 when would the job be done and he said July 2024.  He was very rarely there in 2024 and none of that was our doing.  I asked him would it be done by October 2024, he said it would, but it still wasn’t”.

The Respondent outlined that the Complainant was asked if he could do the electrical work and he said he could and that he had someone to certify the electrical work.  In 2024 the Respondent looked for the cert and the Complainant confirmed he would get it, but then in September 2024 he told the Respondent that he was unable to get the electrical work certified, and the Respondent asked him to keep trying.  No further discussion took place in relation to the cert.

The Respondent submitted that the Complainant came to work on his property whenever it suited him, he decided when he did or didn’t work on the job, and he was never under the Respondent’s control in anyway.  The Respondent outlined that he trusted the Complainant completely and whenever the Complainant sought down payments on the agreed price of a job, he got that money without question.  He was a contractor, and the Respondent asked him before he commenced work if he had insurance.  The Complainant confirmed he had and that he was insured by the same company as his son was.

The Respondent outlined that he had no idea that there was an issue in relation to the Complainant or his employment status until he received notification from the WRC of a complaint in May 2025.  From January 2025 until May 2025 the Respondent did not see the Complainant and he worked away on the job himself.  The Complainant told the Respondent’s daughter, Jenny, that he could not get an electrician to certify the electrical work.  The Respondent then received a handwritten letter dated 9th May 2025 from the Complainant.  The Respondent opened this letter to the hearing (the Complainant confirmed to the hearing the letter was written by him) in which the Complainant wrote “ . . . told Jenny that is [sic] finished work on 8-4-2025 due to getting an Electrician to sign off a Pink Card I was told it was illegal, so the best of luck with the project sorry it finished this was [sic] . . . .”  The Respondent tried to ring the Complainant’s phone, but he was not answering the calls.  

The Complainant in this case came to an oral agreement with the Respondent to perform personally work for the Respondent.  There was no third party involved.  According to the Complainant, he was engaged under a contract of service (i.e., he was an employee).  It is the Respondent’s case that the Complainant was not employed by him and that the Complainant was always engaged by him as an independent contractor (i.e., a Contract ‘for’ Services).  I found the Respondent to be a credible witness, and I found his evidence to be cogent and compelling.  In contrast, I found the evidence of the Complainant to be, at times, inconsistent and not plausible. 

It was common case that there was no written contract or statement of terms and conditions, payslips or invoices in existence.  The only documentation provided to the hearing was proof of the Complainant’s identity by way of a photocopy of his driving licence, a photocopy of one cheque given to the Complainant (signed by the Respondent on behalf of a limited company), and the original copy of a handwritten letter composed by the Complainant dated May 2025.

The distinction between contracts ‘of’ service and contracts ‘for’ services is not always obvious.  As noted by the Labour Court in Associated Newspapers Ireland Limited t/a DMG Media Ireland v. Joseph Dunne UDD2260, the determination of an individual’s employment status in the context of ascertaining whether that individual has standing to pursue claims under employment legislation is a mixed question of fact and law.

There is a considerable amount of case law on the ‘tests’ to be applied to determine whether a contract is a contract ‘of’ service or a contract ‘for’ services. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Henry Denny & Sons v. The Minister for Social Welfare IESC 9 [1998] is a leading authority on the issue of determining issues of employment status. The Supreme Court adopted an approach often referred to as the ‘mixed test’ which required a consideration of a myriad of factors including inter alia the degree of control exercised by the party for whom work is being done over the party doing the work; the level of integration of the person into the business; and whether the party could be said to be in business of his/her own account. 

More recently, in a tax related case, Karshan (Midlands) Ltd t/a Domino’s Pizza [2023] IESC 24, Murray J for the Supreme Court rejected the notion of a ‘test’ to determine employment status and the over reliance placed on ‘mutuality of obligation’ in determining employment status. Murray J concluded that every case turns on its particular facts and that it is necessary to assess all relevant features of the relationship, identifying those features that are and are not consistent with an employment contract and “determining based upon the sum of those parts the correct characterisation” [at 214].  He noted that when deciding employment over a period, the overarching or umbrella contract may be important (this matter was not considered further in the case).  Murray J outlined that the framework in Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd. v. Minister for Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497 and developed in Market Investigations v. Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173 (decisions later endorsed and applied in the Denny judgment) remain a “reliable structure for the identification of a contract of employment” [at 253], concluding that the question of whether a contract is one ‘of’ service or ‘for’ services should be resolved by reference to the following five questions [at 253]:

1.            “Does the contract involve the exchange of wage or other remuneration for work?

2.            If so, is the agreement one pursuant to which the worker is agreeing to provide their own services, and not those of a third party, to the employer?

3.            If so, does the employer exercise sufficient control over the putative employee to render the agreement one that is capable of being an employment agreement?

4.            If these three requirements are met the decision maker must then determine whether the terms of the contract between employer and worker interpreted in the light of the admissible factual matrix and having regard to the working arrangements between the parties as disclosed by the evidence, are consistent with a contract of employment, or with some other form of contract having regard, in particular, to whether the arrangements point to the putative employee working for themselves or for the putative employer.

5.            Finally, it should be determined whether there is anything in the particular legislative regime under consideration that requires the court to adjust or supplement any of the foregoing.”

The first three questions are a filter, and if any of the three questions are answered in the negative there can be no contract of service.  If all three questions are answered positively, the decision maker must then proceed to look at all the facts to ascertain the true nature of the relationship.  The Code of Practice on Determining Employment Status (October 2024) was updated to reflect the decision in Karshan and provides that the Karshan judgment should be considered in deciding whether in any given case in any sector, a worker is an employee.  Accordingly I have had regard to the decision in Karshan and the Code of Practice on Determining Employment Status, in deciding this case. 

The first ‘filter’ question for consideration in this case is: does the contract involve the exchange of wage or other remuneration for work?

I am satisfied the answer to this question is: yes.  It was common case (i) the parties entered into oral agreements in relation to work to be performed; (ii) for most of the work performed, the parties agreed a ‘price per job’; and (iii) the Complainant was paid primarily in cash at varying intervals for the work performed. 

As the above question was answered in the affirmative, a second ‘filter’ question now presents for consideration in this case, namely, is the agreement one pursuant to which the worker is agreeing to provide their own services, and not those of a third party, to the employer?

I am satisfied the answer to this question is: yes.  It was common case that the agreement was one under which the Complainant had agreed to provide his own services, and not those of a third party, to the Respondent.  It was also common case that when the Complainant could not perform work in 2024 due to an injury, no one else was appointed by either party to replace him.  The issue of substituting the work did not otherwise arise in this case.

As the above ‘filter’ question was also answered in the affirmative, a final ‘filter’ question presents for consideration in this case, namely, does the employer exercise sufficient control over the putative employee to render the agreement one that is capable of being an employment agreement?

As noted by Murray J in Karshan, control is a mandatory element of the contract of employment.  Considering the full factual matrix in this case, I am not satisfied for the reasons set out below that the Respondent exercised sufficient control over the Complainant to render the agreement one that is capable of being an employment agreement.

The Respondent is a farmer.  The work performed by the Complainant was not related to the farming business of the Respondent per se. The Complainant is a carpenter.  It was common case the Complainant was initially engaged by the Respondent to roof a building on the Respondent’s farm.  It was not disputed by the Complainant that the Respondent asked him before commencing work with the Respondent if was he insured as a contractor and that the Complainant had assured the Respondent that he was so insured. The Complainant gave evidence that he priced the roofing job (and subsequent jobs offered to him by the Respondent) per square metre, and the Complainant specified the method of payment i.e., cash.  I am satisfied that it was also the Complainant who determined the intervals at which he was paid.  In this regard, I prefer the evidence of the Respondent that it was the Complainant who determined when he had completed €3,000 worth of work; that the Complainant would advise the Respondent of same; and that the Respondent never checked or queried this with the Complainant. 

It was the Complainant’s evidence that he could do the work at a pace determined by himself, and that he was not required to present for or finish work at any specified time.  Further, it was common case (i) the Complainant could determine what days he did or did not work; (ii) the Complainant provided the tools required to do the work, including scaffolding and a teleporter; and (iii) the Complainant was free to, and did go, to other locations on occasion to do other jobs, without any objection from the Respondent.  I am satisfied that the provision of materials by the Respondent, while more indicative of a contract of service arrangement, is not decisive having regard to all the circumstances of this case.  

It is common case that while the Complainant provided his services to the Respondent almost exclusively from 2021 to 2023, I am satisfied that this was a decision of the Complainant’s making, and there was no requirement on him to work exclusively for the Respondent.  It was common case the Complainant suffered no sanction if he did not attend for work on any given day and he suffered no sanction for not meeting the varying completion dates he had given for the most recent job agreed.  The Complainant was not required to report any of his absences in 2024 or 2025.  I am satisfied that the decision to cease providing his services to the Respondent was one solely of the Complainant’s making because he could not secure a certificate for the electrical work he had completed. 

Considering all the foregoing, I am not satisfied the Respondent exercised sufficient control over the Complainant to render the agreement one that is capable of being an employment agreement.  Accordingly, the third requirement specified by the Supreme Court in Karshan has not been satisfied.  The first three questions are a filter, and if any of the three questions are answered in the negative, there can be no contract of service.   

In conclusion, having regard to the total working arrangement between the Complainant and the Respondent as disclosed by the evidence, I am satisfied the Complainant was working for himself and not the Respondent and that the arrangement between the parties is not consistent with a contract of service. 

CA-00071571-004; CA-00071571-005 and CA-00071571-006   - Complaints under the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 (“the 1991 Act”)

The Complainant referred three complaints under the 1991 Act:

(i)                  CA-00071571-004 - alleging the Respondent has made an unlawful deduction from his wages;

(ii)                 CA-00071571-005 - alleging the Respondent has paid him less than the amount of wages due to him; and

(iii)               CA-00071571-006 – alleging he did not receive the appropriate payment in lieu of notice of termination of his employment.

The purpose of the 1991 Act is to provide protection for employees in relation to the payment of wages.  Section 1(1) of the 1991 Act defines an employee as:

“. . .  a person who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, entered into or worked under) a contract of employment and references, in relation to an employer, to an employee shall be construed as references to an employee employed by that employer  . . . .”

Section 1(1) of the 1991 Act defines a "contract of employment" as meaning:

“(a) a contract of service or of apprenticeship, and

(b) any other contract whereby an individual agrees with another person to do or perform personally any work or service for a third person (whether or not the third person is a party to the contract) whose status by virtue of the contract is not that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual, and the person who is liable to pay the wages of the individual in respect of the work or service shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be his employer, whether the contract is express or implied and if express, whether it is oral or in writing” (emphasis added).

The Complainant in this case came to an oral agreement with the Respondent to perform personally work for the Respondent.  There was no third party involved and therefore s 1(1)(b) of the 1991 Act is not applicable.  Accordingly, for the Complainant to have standing under the 1991 Act, he must have been engaged under a contract ‘of’ service or of apprenticeship as provided for at s 1(1)(a) of the 1991 Act.  It was common case the Complainant was not engaged under a contract of apprenticeship.  I have found on the evidence presented at the hearing (as set out above) that the Complainant was not engaged by the Respondent on a contract of service.  Accordingly, I find the Complainant is not engaged under a contract of employment within the meaning of the Payment of Wages Act 1991, and therefore he has no standing to pursue a claim under the 1991 Act.

CA-00071571-003 – Complaint under the Sick Leave Act, 2022 (“the 2022 Act”)

The 2022 Act provides inter alia that an employee, subject to certain conditions, is entitled to statutory sick leave days.  The Complainant in this case contends he was not given paid sick leave in accordance with the 2022 Act.

For the purposes of the 2022 Act, an “employee” is defined at s 2(1) of the 2022 Act as a person who has entered into or works or, where the employment has ceased, entered into or worked under, a contract of employment. 

A “contract of employment” is defined at s 2(1) as (a) a contract of service or apprenticeship, or (b) any other contract whereby an individual agrees with another person, who is carrying on the business of an employment agency (within the meaning of the Protection of Employees (Temporary Agency Work) Act 2012), and is acting in the course of that business, to do or perform personally any work or service for another person (whether or not that other person is a party to the contract).

I am satisfied the Respondent was not carrying on the business of an agency and therefore s 2(1)(b) of the 2022 Act is not applicable.  It was common case the Complainant was not engaged under a contract of apprenticeship.  Therefore the only way the Complainant can have standing to pursue a claim under the 2022 Act is if he is engaged under a ‘contract of service’. 

I have found on the evidence presented at the hearing (as set out above) that the Complainant was not engaged by the Respondent on a contract of service.  Accordingly I find the Complainant is not an employee for the purposes of the 2022 Act and therefore does not having standing to pursue a complaint under the 2022 Act.

CA-00071571-007 & CA-00071571-008 - Complaints under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 (“the 1997 Act”)

The 1997 Act regulates working hours, rest periods, and paid annual leave and public holidays for employees.  The Complainant presented two complaints under the 1997 Act as follows:

(i)                  CA-00071571-007 – the Complainant alleges he did not receive his paid holiday/annual leave entitlement.

(ii)                 CA-00071571-008 – the Complainant alleges he did not receive his public holiday entitlements.

Section 2(1) of the 1997 Act defines an “employee” as meaning a person of any age, who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, entered into or worked under) a contract of employment. 

A “contract of employment” is defined at s 2(1) as:

“(a) a contract of service or apprenticeship,

and

(b) any other contract whereby an individual agrees with another person, who is carrying on the business of an employment agency within the meaning of the Employment Agency Act, 1971, and is acting in the course of that business, to do or perform personally any work or service for a third person (whether or not the third person is a party to the contract), whether the contract is express or implied and if express, whether it is oral or in writing”.

I am satisfied the Respondent was not carrying on the business of an agency and therefore s 2(1)(b) of the 1997 Act is not applicable.  It is common case the Complainant was not engaged under a contract of apprenticeship.  Therefore the only way the Complainant can have standing to pursue a claim under the 1997 Act is if he is engaged under a ‘contract of service’.  I have found on the evidence presented at the hearing (as set out above) that the Complainant was not engaged by the Respondent on a contract of service.  Accordingly I find the Complainant is not an employee for the purposes of the 1997 Act and therefore does not having standing to pursue a complaint under the 1997 Act.

CA-00071571-001 - Complaint under section 45A of the Industrial Relations Act, 1946

An Employment Regulation Order (“ERO”) sets minimum rates of pay and conditions of employment for workers in specified business sectors which at present includes the contract cleaning, security and early learning and childcare sectors.  The Complainant alleged that he did not receive the minimum rate(s) of pay set out in an ERO.  He did not give evidence in relation to what ERO, if any, that applies to him, other than to say he works in construction.  There is no ERO for the construction sector.  Accordingly, I find the Complainant is not covered by an ERO.

CA-00071571-002 - Complaint under section 23 of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 2015

Sectoral Employment Orders (SEO) set rates of pay, sick pay, and pensions in specified sectors.  The Complainant alleged that he did not receive the minimum rate(s) of pay set out in the SEO for the construction sector (the relevant statutory instrument for the purposes of this claim is S.I. No. 207 of 2023 - Sectoral Employment Order (Construction Sector) 2023).  For the construction SEO to apply, the employer must operate in the construction sector.  The construction sector is broadly defined as including "Building Firms" and "Civil Engineering Firms".  It was common case the Respondent is a farmer and does not operate within the construction sector.  Accordingly I find the Complainant is not covered by the SEO for the construction sector.

Complaints under the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00071571-004

I decide the Complainant lacks locus standi to pursue a claim under the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 and I do not have jurisdiction in the matter.

CA-00071571-005

I decide the Complainant lacks locus standi to pursue a claim under the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 and I do not have jurisdiction in the matter.

CA-00071571-006

I decide the Complainant lacks locus standi to pursue a claim under the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 and I do not have jurisdiction in the matter.

Complaint under the Sick Leave Act, 2022

CA-00071571-003

I decide the Complainant lacks locus standi to pursue a claim under the Sick Leave Act, 2022 and I do not have jurisdiction in the matter.

Complaints under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071571-007

I decide the Complainant lacks locus standi to pursue a claim under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 and I do not have jurisdiction in the matter.

CA-00071571-008

I decide the Complainant lacks locus standi to pursue a claim under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 and I do not have jurisdiction in the matter.

Complaint under section 45A of the Industrial Relations Act, 1946

CA-00071571-001

I decide the Complainant lacks locus standi to pursue this claim and I do not have jurisdiction in the matter.

Complaint under section 23 of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 2015

CA-00071571-002

I decide the Complainant lacks locus standi to pursue this claim and I do not have jurisdiction in the matter.

Employment status.  Locus Standi. Jurisdiction.