ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00057938
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Ms Felichia Weston | CPL Solutions Ltd |
Representatives | Self-Represented | Mr Mark Comerford IBEC |
Complaint:
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 30 and 31 of the Maternity Protection Act 1994 | CA-00070534-001 | 03/04/2025 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 13/11/2025
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Eileen Campbell
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaint. The hearing was conducted in person in Lansdowne House.
While the parties are named in the Decision, I will refer to Ms Felichia Weston as “the Complainant” and to CPL Solutions Ltd as “the Respondent”.
The Complainant attended the hearing remotely via Webex at her request which was facilitated by the WRC. The Complainant presented her case as a litigant in person. The Complainant’s father-in-law Mr Peter Reyes was present with her during the hearing. The Respondent was represented by Mr Mark Comerford IBEC accompanied by Ms Ciara Brown. Mr Harry Alverez O’Neill attended on behalf of the Respondent.
I explained the procedural changes arising from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Zalewski v. An Adjudication Officer,Ireland and the Attorney General [2021] IESC 24 in April 2021. No application was made that the hearing be conducted other than in public. Both parties agreed to proceed in the knowledge that a decision issuing from the WRC would disclose their identities. Staff members of the Respondent not in attendance at hearing and referred to in written submissions or in oral evidence are referenced in this decision by a letter of the alphabet.
Evidence was put before me during the course of the hearing, some of which was not relevant to the complaints before me. I am required to set out ‘such evidential material which is fundamentally relevant to the decision’ per MacMenamin J. in Nano Nagle School v Daly [2019] IESC 63. In my decision, therefore, I have focused on the evidence which I deem to be relevant to this complaint.
The relevance of the date of the filing of a complaint to the WRC was explained to the Complainant together with the relevant cognisable period arising therefrom. It was explained to the Complainant that it is well settled that a complainant is not entitled to seek relief arising out of events post-dating the referral of a complaint to the WRC.
I can confirm I have fulfilled my obligation to make all relevant inquiries into this complaint.
Both parties confirmed at close of hearing that they been provided with the opportunity to present their respective cases and to say everything they wished to say with nothing further to add.
Background:
These matters came before the Workplace Relations Commission dated 03/04/2025. The Complainant alleges contravention by the Respondent of provisions of the above listed statute in relation to her employment with the Respondent. The aforesaid complaint was referred to me for investigation. A hearing for that purpose was scheduled to take place on 13/11/2025.
The Complainant filed her complaint with the WRC on 03/04/2025. Therefore, the cognisable period for this complaint is from 04/10/2024 to 03/04/2025.
The Complainant at all material times was working with the Client of the Respondent on a Fixed Term contract basis such employment commencing on 13/11/2023. The Complainant was paid €2123.21 gross monthly for which she worked 35 hours per week. The specific complaint falls under Parental, Carers, Paternity, Parent’s, Maternity and Adoptive Leave. The narrative provides “I have not been granted additional maternity leave entitlements.”
The Respondent refutes these allegations in their entirety.
Both parties provided submissions and supporting documentation in advance of hearing. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
CA-00070534-001 Complaint form narrative as follows: I work for CPL Solutions Ltd Agency and they placed me in [redacted] as a Payment Officer since 13/11/2023. I am currently 32 weeks pregnant and need to submit maternity benefit form. I asked my line manager from [redacted] and she directed me to CPL as they are my employer. I’ve been asking CPL (communicating with A and B) for the past two weeks to fill out my MB2 form as my baby is due on the 27th May 2025 and legally have to start my maternity leave two weeks before my due date which we agreed will be on 09/05/2025. CPL have been refusing to sign my form, they are ignoring my calls and I spoke with A yesterday who told me that she will let me know today (03/04/2025). I tried to email and call but no answer. If I don’t get my MB2 form filled out I will have no money to live on for my baby and myself. This is causing me great amounts of stress which is not healthy for my pregnancy. A also told me that because I work for agency I will not be entitled to any accumulating annual leave or bank holiday pay whilst I’m on maternity leave and I should contact them when I return. The Complainant at hearing submitted that she had notified her employer on 22/11/2024 that she was pregnant and exhibited an email in support of this which set out as follows: Hi, I’m just emailing to advise you that I am pregnant. I went for my first scan roughly a week or two ago and all is good, I am now 3 months pregnant and my expected due date is 27th May 2025. Now that I confirmed that baby is healthy, I am getting in touch to see what my maternity rights are under CPL and whether I am able to get any rights from [redacted] directly as I have been with them for over a year now. If you could give me an update that would be great. The Complainant at hearing submits that the delay in getting her MB2 form signed by the Respondent caused her great stress and upset and she makes reference to a pre-existing condition which was exacerbated by the stress of it all. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
CA-00070534-001 The Respondent submits that the Complainant commenced maternity leave on 9 May 2025 and at the time of submitting her complaint she had not applied for extended maternity leave and that as she had not commenced maternity leave no annual leave or public holiday entitlement had accrued during the cognisable period. The Respondent submits that given no application for extended maternity leave had been submitted at the time of submitting the complaint to the WRC and that maternity leave had not commenced it is asserted by the Respondent that the AO assigned to hear this case does not have jurisdiction to investigate the alleged breach of any entitlements beyond the submittance of the complaint with the WRC which are deemed beyond the scope of the cognisable period for the within complaint. Chronology of Events On Thursday 27 March 2025, the Complainant contacted A, seeking to have her Maternity Benefit Form completed. This was the first time the Respondent was informed of the Complainant’s pregnancy, nor did they receive a GP Letter/Certificate confirming same until after the Complainant had submitted her WRC complaint. On Tuesday 1 April 2025, A enquired whether the client was aware of the leave. The Complainant confirmed they were aware. On Wednesday 2 April 2025, the Complainant followed up advising that she needed the form filled in urgently as follows: “Hi A, Please let me know if you need [redacted] email as I need this sorted urgently so I can send out my maternity benefit form to get approved, just in case they come back to me requiring additional information about anything.” On Thursday 3 April, the Complainant submitted her complaint to the WRC. The Respondent cites section 32 of the Maternity Protection Act which provides as follows: A decision of an adjudication officer under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 in relation to a dispute between an employee and the relevant employer relating to any entitlement of the employee under Part II, III or IV (or any matter arising out of or related to such entitlement) may include such directions to the parties to the dispute as the adjudication officer considers necessary or expedient for the resolution of the dispute, and if the decision is in favour of the employee then, without prejudice to the power to give such directions, the adjudication officer may order— (a) the grant of leave to the employee for such period as may be so specified, (b) an award of compensation (in favour of the employee to be paid by the relevant employer) of such amount, not exceeding 20 weeks’ remuneration in respect of the employee’s employment calculated in such manner as may be prescribed, as the adjudication officer considers just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, or (c) both such grant and such award. Part II of the Act pertains to the following entitlements: - • Entitlement to maternity leave. • Supplemental provisions relating to premature birth period. • Allocation of minimum period of maternity leave. • Variation in allocation of minimum period of maternity leave. • Extension of maternity leave. • Commencement of maternity leave (early confinement). • Additional provision for certain early confinement circumstances. • Entitlement to additional maternity leave. • Termination of additional maternity leave in event of sickness of mother. • Postponement of maternity leave or additional maternity leave in event of hospitalisation of child. • Postponement of maternity leave in event of serious health condition of relevant employee. • Right to time off from work for ante-natal or post-natal care. • Entitlement to time off from work to attend ante-natal classes. • Entitlement to time off from work or reduction of working hours for breastfeeding. • Entitlement of employed father or other parent, as the case may be, to leave on death of mother. • Termination of leave in event of sickness of father or other parent. • Postponement of leave under section 16 in event of hospitalisation of child. The Respondent submits that none of the entitlements are the subject of the Complainant’s complaint. The Respondent sets out the provisions in parts 111 and 1V of the impleaded legislation and submits that none of the entitlements set out are the subject of the Complainant’s complaint. The Respondent submits the complaint is misconceived and there was no detriment on the Complainant and that no entitlement as provided for in the legislation was breached by the Respondent. The Respondent at hearing submits there has been no breach and that the complaint as presented is a complaint about events that may occur in the future. The Respondent submits the Complainant’s contract was extended on 21 February 2025 with a new extension date to 09/05/2025.
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Findings and Conclusions:
CA-00070534-001 This is a complaint pursuant to the Maternity Protection Act, 1994.
In conducting my investigation, I have reviewed all relevant submissions and supporting documentation presented to me by the parties. I have carefully considered the oral evidence adduced at hearing. I deemed it necessary to make my own inquiries into the complaint during hearing to establish and understand the facts and to seek clarification on certain matters.
The Relevant Facts
It is common case the Complainant entered into a fixed-term contract with the Respondent on 13/11/2023.
I note the aforesaid contact sets out at clause 11 as follows:
Maternity Leave Arrangements for maternity leave will be in accordance with the provisions of the Maternity Protection Acts 1994 and 2004.
I note on 21/02/2025 the Complainant’s contract was extended with a new extension date of 09/05/2025.
I note the Complainant advised the Respondent of her pregnancy by email on 22/11/2024 notwithstanding the Respondent position that the first time they were informed of the pregnancy was 27/03/2025 when she contacted A seeking to have her maternity Benefit Form completed.
The narrative of the Complainant’s email of 22/11/2024 is set out above from which it is clear the Respondent was notified on 22/11/2024.
I note the Complainant’s first email to the Respondent on 01/04/2025 querying whether they would be able to ‘fill out’ maternity benefit form. I note this form was completed and returned to the Complainant on 11/04/2025. I note the email traffic in the intervening period requesting the Complainant to provide a GP letter advising on her due date with which she complied. I note the completed form was returned to the Complainant within 7 working days.
I note the Complainant’s specific complaint as set out in her WRC complaint form is that she has not been granted additional maternity leave entitlements. I note the Complainant’s narrative on the complaint form where she submits “A told me that because I work for agency I will not be entitled to any accumulating annual leave or bank holiday pay whilst I’m on maternity leave and I should contact them when I return.”
I note also the cognisable period of the complaint is 04/10/2024 to 03/04/2025.
I note the Respondent’s position that the Complainant has filed a complaint about things that may occur in the future and that at the time of the filing of her complaint she had not applied for extended maternity leave and that as she had not yet commenced her maternity leave no annual leave or public holiday entitlement had accrued.
The Relevant Law
The Workplace Relations Act [2015-2021] states the following in relation to the presentation of complaints at section 41:
“41. (1) An employee (in this Act referred to as a “complainant”) or, where the employee so consents, a specified person may present a complaint to the Director General that the employee’s employer has contravened a provision specified in Part 1or 2 of Schedule 5 in relation to the employee and, where a complaint is so presented, the Director General shall, subject to section 39, refer the complaint for adjudication by an adjudication officer. 2)….. (3)….. (4)….. (5)….. (6) Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates. (7)…. (8)…..”
It is well settled that the above section provides that a complaint is presented to the WRC following a contravention of a specific Act. [emphasis added] I am satisfied in the circumstances as outlined above there has been no contravention of the legislation impleaded by the Complainant prior to the filing of her complaint.
At hearing the Complainant sought to raise other matters in regard to her employment with the Respondent and it was her understanding that she could do so on the basis she had filed a complaint and the filing of a complaint would enable her to raise any issues she wished to ventilate. The Complainant claims that the Respondent dismissed her on the grounds she was pregnant. It was explained to the Complainant that the only complaint properly before me for adjudication is her specific complaint filed on 03/04/2025 pursuant to the Maternity Protection Act.
To avoid any misunderstanding it was clarified with the Complainant that the within complaint is the sole complaint that she has filed with the WRC and this was confirmed by her twice upon inquiry.
Notwithstanding, it is well settled the WRC complaint form is not a statutory form but it is intended that a complainant set out the outline of their complaint/s in order that a respondent knows the issues in line with fair procedures.
In accordance with my statutory duty to make all relevant inquiries into this complaint, I have carefully considered this matter in terms of any discretion I may exercise in order to amend pleadings and I set out hereunder the law by which I am guided in this regard.
I note the High Court judgment in the case of County Louth Vocational Educational Committee v The Equality Tribunal and Pearse Brannigan [2009] IEHC 370 where at paragraph 6.2 McGovern J held as follows:
“I accept the submission on behalf of the respondent that the Form EE1 was only intended to set out, in broad outline, the nature of the complaint. If it is permissible in court proceedings to amend pleadings, where the justice of the case requires it, then a fortiori, it should be permissible to amend a claim as set out in a form such as the EE1, so long as the general nature of the complaint (in this case, discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation) remains the same.”
I note that McGovern J also stated in this judgment at paragraph 6.3 that this can only be done so long as "the respondent in the claim must be given a reasonable opportunity to deal with these complaints, and the fair procedures adopted by the Equality Officer must be fair and reasonable and in compliance with the principles of natural and constitutional justice."
I note the following as held by MacMenamin J in the Supreme Court in County Louth VEC v Equality Tribunal [2016] IESC 40:
‘It goes without saying, first, that the duty of the Equality Officer is both statutory, and, ultimately, delimited by constitutional considerations. As part of fair procedures, it is necessary that all parties be aware, in a timely way, of the case which they must meet. Consequently, it would be wrong, were a situation to evolve in this investigation, where one or other of the parties was under a misapprehension of precisely the range of legitimate inquiry. Second, it is hardly necessary to reiterate that it is not possible for any tribunal, upon which a particular jurisdiction has been conferred by statute, to extend or confine the boundaries of that jurisdiction by an erroneous determination of fact (see State (Attorney General) v. Durkan [1964] I.R. 279, approved in Killeen v. DPP [1998] ILRM 1). There may also be circumstances in which a tribunal, although holding jurisdiction to enter upon an investigation or inquiry, may render its decision a nullity by, for example, a denial of fair procedures.’
I further note that in his judgement in Clare County Council v Director of Equality Investigations [2011] IEHC 303 Hedigan J stated at paragraph 6.5:
‘It is clear from the foregoing that because the EEI form is only designed to set out the generality of a complaint, complainants should be allowed to expand on matters not specified in the form. So long as respondents are not taken by surprise, or alternatively given adequate time to answer, there can be no injustice therein.”
I have regard to Clare County Council v Director of Equality Tribunal [2011] IEHC 303 where Hedigan J noted that “allowances must be made for the fact that lay persons and representatives do not articulate complaints in the same way as professionally qualified advocates.”
However, I also note Mc Kechnie J in Louth VEC and Equality Tribunal v Brannigan [2016] IESC 40 stating that the Tribunal cannot “freelance its inquiry”:
“35. It is both a trite and historical principle of law that a creature of statute must live by the statute. Its jurisdiction is found solely within the provisions of the enabling Act. It has no inherent capacity, unlike, say, that of a constitutional court. It is therefore bound by what has been conferred on it. It has no further competence and it cannot create, add to or enlarge the jurisdiction so vested in it. Kileen v Director of Public Prosecutions [1997] 3 I.R. 218. It is bound by what jurisdiction it has and must act accordingly.” [emphasis added]
Having carefully reviewed the narrative on the complaint form there is no reference to anything that could be interpreted or expanded upon by me to provide justification for amending the pleadings in this instance by adding the complaint as canvassed by the Complainant at hearing for the first time that she had been dismissed on grounds that she was pregnant.
For completeness, even if it had been possible to amend the pleadings, there is also a significant fact that has to be considered that at the date of the filing of her complaint, namely 03/04/2025, the Complainant was working through the extension to her FTC due to end on 09/05/2025. Bearing this in mind I have regard to case of Caragh Neeson v John O’Rourke & Sean O’Rourke Chartered Accountants [UD2049/2011]where the question of whether a claim will be judged to be pre-lodged in circumstances where a claimant has lodged claim papers but is still in fact employed by a respondent was considered.
The Tribunal found that the wording of Section 8(2) “demonstrates a manifest intention by the legislature to preclude claims being lodged before the dismissal date.” The Tribunal also went on to state, “if the Tribunal were to look with leniency on premature claims the system could well become clogged up with claims based on the expectation that a dismissal might occur sometime in the future which could later be withdrawn.”
It was explained to the Complainant that it was open to her, as it would be to any complainant, to file an additional complaint/s and when queried by the Complainant regarding the filing of an additional complaint at close of hearing, she was directed by me to the WRC website and it was explained to her that an Adjudication Officer has to remain impartial and independent between the parties and cannot provide advice.
For the reasons set out above I find the within complaint as presented to be not well-founded.
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Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
CA-00070534-001 For the reasons outlined above I decide this complaint as presented is not well-founded.
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Dated: 26/11/2025
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Eileen Campbell
Key Words:
Maternity Benefit Form; Fixed Term Contract; |
