Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

An employee

Asba Meats

Representatives

Migrant Rights Centre Ireland

Did not attend

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00067104-001

01/11/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00067104-002

01/11/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 16 of the Protection of Employees (Part-Time Work) Act, 2001

CA-00067104-003

01/11/2024

The Complainant commenced her employment with the Respondent on 29 June 2023. Her employment was terminated on 18 July 2024.

On 1 November 2024, the Complainant referred her claims to the Director General of the WRC.

A hearing for the purpose of investigation of the Complainant’s claim was scheduled for 26 June 2025. Correspondence informing the parties of the arrangements for the hearing issued on 13 May 2025. There was no attendance by, or on behalf of, the Respondent at the hearing. There has been no communication from the Respondent indicating any difficulties with attending the hearing or requesting a postponement. The Complainant attended the hearing.

Ms Nowakowska, on behalf of the Complainant, submits as follows.

The Complainant was employed as a trimmer; her primary duties were to remove excess fat, connective tissues, and other unwanted parts from meat; however she worked as a deboner when the company was short-staffed.

The Complainant was a part-time worker. She was the only part-time worker in the company. Her working hours varied between 18.5 and 40 hours per week. Her average weekly working hours were 22 hours.

The Complainant was never issued with a contract of employment or a company handbook. The Respondent also did not introduce any employment-related policies to the Complainant. The Complainant is aware that other staff was issued with contracts of employment.

At the beginning of her employment, the Complainant was promised that the Respondent would apply for an employment permit, allowing her to work on a full-time basis, and that her salary would be higher. The Complainant worked diligently and consistently approached the Respondent to seek updates regarding her work permit application. She never received a clear answer but continued to believe in the Respondent’s intention to pursue the work permit application.

The Complainant exhibited copies of her WhatsApp conversations with her supervisor, manager, and the Respondent’s director (‘the Director’). These show the Complainant's conversations regarding the work permit with her superiors.

During her employment, the Complainant was paid €11.30 per hour in 2023 and €12.70 per hour in 2024.

The Complainant was aware that other male employees of the company who worked as trimmers were earning more than she was. The hourly rate for two named male colleagues was €13 per hour.

The Complainant was to receive weekly payments via direct bank transfer. Workers were paid their wages two weeks after the end of the working week. However, there were several instances when the Complainant’s payments were delayed. When this occurred, the Complainant consulted her colleagues to ascertain if their wages were also late; however, she discovered that this was not the case.

The Complainant submits that from March 2024, her wages were never deposited into her bank account on time. The Complainant raised the issue with her supervisor and the HR representative. She felt as though she needed to beg for her wages and did not understand why she was the only one not receiving her payments on time. The Complainant exhibited a table representing examples of the Complainant’s end-of-working-week date compared to the date when she received wages for that week. The wages were lodged well beyond the two-week payroll date. The Complainant also exhibited corresponding payslips and bank statements.

The Complainant submits that on 25 June 2024, the Respondent was subject to a Revenue and immigration inspection. One of the officials requested the Complainant's documentation, which she subsequently provided. No further discussion ensued.

On 26 June 2025, the Complainant contacted her supervisor via WhatsApp to inquire when she could return to work. The supervisor informed her that the Director had instructed her to take a few days off following the inspection.

Subsequently, the Complainant made several attempts to ascertain when she could return to work from her supervisor, manager, and HR.

On 18 July 2024, HR informed the Complainant that her employment had been terminated. This was the first time the Complainant was officially notified of her dismissal.

The Complainant’s employment with the Respondent was consequently ended on her Revenue with the date of 14 July 2024.

The Complainant asserted that when an employer wishes to terminate employment, there must be cause, a fair process must have been followed, and the decision to dismiss must fall within the range of reasonable sanctions, considering the conduct that led to the disciplinary proceedings. It appears that none of the aforementioned were adhered to by the Respondent.

Following her dismissal, the Complainant has faced challenges in securing employment. She remained unemployed for 20 weeks post-dismissal. The Complainant began work as a trimmer on 28 November 2024, working 39 hours per week and earning €14.50 per hour.

Summary of direct evidence of the Complainant

The Complainant said that she checked with the Respondent on a daily basis as to when would she be given any work. The Respondent continuously told her not to come to work. The Complainant asked if she was dismissed but received no reply. Then on 18 July 2024 she received a text message from HR stating that she was fired because there was no work for her.

The Complainant exhibited copies of WhatsApp text messages. She directed the Adjudication Officer to messages with her supervisor where the supervisor referred her to an article in the Irish Times of 25 June 2024 “Gardaí visit nail bars and fast-food outlets as part of anti-exploitation operation”. Her supervisorinformed her that, following a Gardaí operation in June 2024, the Director told him not to call to work any illegal staff and any part-time employees. The exchange then went on with the Complainant pointing out that she was working legally and that there was nothing wrong with working part-time. The Complainant exhibited copies of WhatsApp messages with her supervisor, her manager, and with HR where she repeatedly asked for work and for payments for the hours she had already worked.

The Complainant said that on 18 July 2024, the HR texted her stating: “You are fired because we don’t have work, we don’t have hours for you  and we are not able to pay for that much workers”.

The Complainant said that she was unable to secure a new job until 28 November 2024. This was partly due to the difficulties she had in securing a new permit.

There was no attendance by, or on behalf of, the Respondent at the adjudication hearing.

The Law

Section 1 of the Unfair Dismissals Act provides the following definition of ‘dismissal’:

“‘dismissal’, in relation to an employee, means—

(a) the termination by his employer of the employee’s contract of employment with the employer, whether prior notice of the termination was or was not given to the employee,

(b) the termination by the employee of his contract of employment with his employer, whether prior notice of the termination was or was not given to the employer, in circumstances in which, because of the conduct of the employer, the employee was or would have been entitled, or it was or would have been reasonable for the employee, to terminate the contract of employment without giving prior notice of the termination to the employer.”

Section 6 of the Act stipulates as follows:

“Unfair dismissal

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.

(4) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, not to be an unfair dismissal, if it results wholly or mainly from one or more of the following:

(a) the capability, competence or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do,

(b) the conduct of the employee,

(c) the redundancy of the employee, and

(d) the employee being unable to work or continue to work in the position which he held without contravention (by him or by his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under any statute or instrument made under statute.

(7) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining if a dismissal is an unfair dismissal, regard may be had, if the adjudication officer or the Labour Court, as the case may be, considers it appropriate to do so—

(a) to the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct (whether by act or omission) of the employer in relation to the dismissal, and

(b) to the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the procedure referred to in section 14(1) of this Act or with the provisions of any code of practice referred to in paragraph (d) (inserted by the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993) of section 7(2) of this Act.”

In The Governor and the Company of Bank of Ireland v James Reilly (2015) IEHC 241, Mr Justice Noonan elaborated on what was required by Section 6 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts as follows: 

“It is thus clear that the onus is on the employer to establish that there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal and that it resulted wholly or mainly from one of the matters specified in s. 6(4), which includes the conduct of the employee or that there were other substantial grounds justifying the dismissal. Section 6(7) makes clear that the court may have regard to the reasonableness of the employer's conduct in relation to the dismissal. That is however not to say that the court or other relevant body may substitute its own judgment as to whether the dismissal was reasonable for that of the employer. The question rather is whether the decision to dismiss is within the range of reasonable responses of a reasonable employer to the conduct concerned - see Royal Bank of Scotland v. Lindsay UKEAT/0506/09/DM.”

The Industrial Relations Act, 1990 (Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures) (Declaration) Order, 2000 (S.I. No. 146/2000) promotes best practice in the conduct of grievance and disciplinary procedures and emphasises the importance of procedures to ensure fairness and natural justice. The core tenet of the Code is that all employees are entitled to fair procedures and natural justice in all of their engagements with their employer.

The combined effect of the above requires me to consider whether or not the Respondent's decision to dismiss the Complainant, on the grounds stated, was reasonable in the circumstances. The Act places the burden of proof on the Respondent to demonstrate that the dismissal was fair. As part of meeting this burden of proof, the Respondent needs to show that fair process and procedures were applied when conducting the dismissal process.

Regrettably, the Respondent did not avail of the opportunity to defend the claim. There was no engagement on the part of the Respondent, and no submissions or/and evidence was put forward by the Respondent.

Based on the uncontested submission and the evidence of the Complainant, I find that the Respondent did not follow any procedures before dismissing the Complainant. The Respondent seems to have dismissed the Complainant via a text message. In light of the above, I find that the dismissal of the Complainant was procedurally unfair. Furthermore, it appears that the Complainant was not informed of the reasons for her dismissal. She was not informed of any alleged shortcomings on her part and she was not the subject of any investigation or disciplinary procedures.  Accordingly, I find the Complainant was unfairly dismissed.

Redress 

Section 7 Redress for unfair dismissal of the Act provides:

“(1) Where an employee is dismissed and the dismissal is an unfair dismissal, the employee shall be entitled to redress consisting of whichever of the following the adjudication officer or the Labour Court, as the case may be, considers appropriate having regard to all the circumstances:

(a) re-instatement by the employer of the employee in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal on the terms and conditions on which he was employed immediately before his dismissal together with a term that the re-instatement shall be deemed to have commenced on the day of the dismissal, or

(b) re-engagement by the employer of the employee either in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal or in a different position which would be reasonably suitable for him on such terms and conditions as are reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(c)

(i) if the employee incurred any financial loss attributable to the dismissal, payment to him by the employer of such compensation in respect of the loss (not exceeding in amount 104 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of this Act) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(ii) if the employee incurred no such financial loss, payment to the employee by the employer of such compensation (if any, but not exceeding in amount 4 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated as aforesaid) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances,…”

Section 7(2) of the Acts provides: -

“(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining the amount of compensation payable under that subsection regard shall be had to—

(a) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that subsection was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employer,

(b) the extent (if any) to which the said financial loss attributable to an action, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employee,

(c) the measures (if any) adopted by the employee or, as the case may be, his failure to adopt measures, to mitigate the loss aforesaid….”

Section 7(3) of the Act provides that future loss may be taken into account as follows: ‘”financial loss”, in relation to the dismissal of an employee, includes any actual loss and any actual loss and any estimated prospective loss of income attributable to the dismissal and the value of any loss or diminution, attributable to the dismissal, of the rights of the employee under the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967 to 2022, or in relation to superannuation;”.

In accordance with the provisions of section 7(1) of the Act, I am obliged to determine which of the three forms of redress open to me is most appropriate having regard to the circumstances of this case. The Complainant sought compensation. In the circumstances of this case, I am in agreement with the Complainant that compensation is the appropriate redress in this case. In the circumstances of this case neither re-engagement nor reinstatement are tenable alternatives to compensation.

The Complainant gave evidence that she was unable to secure a new job until 28 November 2024. This was partly due to the difficulties she had in securing a new employment permit.

Post-hearing, the Complainant’s representative furnished calculations of the Complainant’s average weekly pay which amounted to €327.02.

Section 7(2)(c) of the Act provides that in examining the financial loss, the Adjudication Officer must have regard to the measures adopted by the employee to mitigate his loss.

I note D. Ryan in “Redmond on Dismissal Law” (Bloomsbury Professional, 2017, 3rd edition) at:

“[24.72] The common law rule of mitigation of damages applies to compensation for unfair dismissal. Questions of mitigation are questions of fact. The burden of proof lies on the party seeking to allege that another has failed to mitigate loss.  Sir John Donaldson explained the duty in AG Bracey Ltd v Iles ([1973] IRLR 210:

‘The law is that it is the duty of a dismissed employee to act reasonably in order to mitigate his loss. It may not be reasonable to take the first job that comes along. It may be much more reasonable, in the interests of the employee and of the employer who has to pay compensation, that he should wait a little time. He must, of course, use the time well and seek a better paid job which will reduce this overall loss and the amount of compensation which the previous employer ultimately has to pay.”

I also note in Redmond on Dismissal Law the following:

“[24.67] When determining compensation, the WRC must take into account all the circumstances of the case, according to the Supreme Court in Carney v Balkan Tours Ltd. Section 7(1) coupled with s 7(2)(d) allow the adjudication body to look at all the circumstances including the conduct of the parties prior to dismissal.”

The test to be applied is an objective one in determining if the employee acted reasonably to mitigate loss. I find that the Complainant’s possibilities to mitigate her losses were somewhat limited due to her immigration status and the circumstances she found herself in, not through any fault of her own.

I find that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed. I require the Respondent to pay the Complainant the sum of €6,540 (approximately 20 weeks) in compensation for the unfair dismissal.

The Complainant submits that the Respondent discriminated against her on the grounds of her gender contrary to sections 6(2)(a) of the Employment Equality Act, 1998.

Section 6(1) of the Act defines discrimination as:

“(a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the "discriminatory grounds") which—

(i)                  exists,

(ii)                existed but no longer exists

(iii)               may exist in the future, or

(iv)               is imputed to the person concerned

Section 6(2)(a) of the Act provides that it shall be unlawful discrimination to treat a person less favourably than another person because “one is a woman and the other is a man (in this Act referred to as “the gender ground”),”

Application of equality principles to both men and women is referred to in Section 18(1) of the Act “(a) Subject to paragraph (b), for the purposes of this Part "A" and "B" represent 2 persons of opposite sex so that, where A is a woman, B is a man, and vice versa.”

Section 19 of the Act refers to entitlement to equal remuneration.

On 17 July 2023, the Complainant had a meeting with one of her managers, to explain her immigration status and was informed that the Respondent would consider applying for an employment permit for the Complainant in 2024. She later confirmed the details of her conversation in a WhatsApp message with her supervisor, exhibited. However, this was never done during her employment.

On 24 January 2024, the Complainant made an enquiry about the progress of her employment permit application. The Respondent failed to provide any details regarding the query. The Complainant asserts that during her employment, her section had more men than women and was considered male-dominated. She believes that due to her gender, the Respondent made no attempts to apply for an employment permit on her behalf, as the Respondent preferred to hire men in her section position. She also believes her hourly pay as a trimmer was below the rate that other male trimmers were receiving, and no contract of employment was ever issued to her due to the fact that she is a female

Sexual harassment

The Complainant relies on section 14A of the Act.

The Complainant submits that the test is a subjective one and the intention of the perpetrator of the harassment or sexual harassment is largely irrelevant. It is sufficient if it has a negative effect on the victim. The conduct should be viewed from the perspective of the victim. Moreover, these provisions must also be considered alongside section 15 of the EEA, which holds an employer vicariously liable under the EEA for the wrongful acts of an employee committed in the course of that employee’s employment.

As noted at paragraphs 34 and 35 of the Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment and Harassment at Work, prepared by the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission: “Sexual harassment means unwanted conduct of a sexual nature, or other conduct based on sex affecting the dignity of women and men at work. […] The conduct at issue may not be specifically directed at a particular employee but nevertheless has the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person.”

The Complainant submits that on 22 May 2024, during her break, the Complainant was approached by the Director. The Director asked the Complainant for her mobile number, stating that he had a friend looking for cleaning staff and could assist her in obtaining additional employment. The Complainant provided the Director with her mobile number as she had been seeking extra work to cover her living expenses. Prior to this conversation, the Complainant had not had any direct contact with the Director.

On the evening of 22 May 2024, the Director contacted the Complainant and asked for a meeting. As the Complainant believed the conversation was about a job opportunity, she agreed to meet with him at her property. The Director arrived at her house around 9pm. Upon arriving at the Complainant’s home, the Director was met by the Complainant’s landlord. The conversation initially revolved around her career in Ireland and her employment permit. However, the discussion shifted when the Director requested a head massage from the Complainant. The Complainant asserts that she felt very uncomfortable with this request. She believes the Director noticed her discomfort and tried to reassure her that he was not her boss; therefore, there was nothing inappropriate about his request. The Director left the Complainants' accommodation shortly after making his request, which went unanswered.

The Complainant was left confused by the Director’s visit and messaged him on WhatsApp to get clarity on the intention of his visit. The Director confirmed that he “needed someone to give me head message time to time when I get very stressed and a company”. The Director further assured the Complainant that he would meet with the Complainant the following week to discuss assistance with her employment permit. Furthermore, the Director assured the Complainant that he would refer his friend to her for the cleaning job and ensure that the Complainant receives her payments on time from the Respondent. The Complainant was never contacted by anyone regarding the cleaning job, as per the Director’s promise.

Following this conversation, the Complainant felt highly uncomfortable with the Director and avoided any further contact with him. She was very anxious and felt humiliated. She was unsure how to address the issue, especially since it involved the company's owner.

Furthermore, the Complainant was not provided with copies of any of the company’s policies relating to discrimination, harassment or sexual harassment at work; therefore, she was not aware of any grievance procedures.

As outlined in the Employment Equality Act 1998 (Code of Practice) (Harassment) Order 2012 “a single incident may constitute harassment”. This is evidenced from the decision in Ganusaukus, Zembrzoski and Guaizdauskas v All Purpose Stone Limited and which held that a single reference to each of the complainants as “You fucking Pole!” and “You stupid Russian!” amounted harassment on the grounds their nationality notwithstanding the fact that both were Lithuanian nationals.

Burden of proof

Section 85A(1) of the Act provides the following in respect of the burden of proof in claims of discrimination, harassment, sexual harassment and victimisation: “Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.”

(4) In this section "discrimination" includes – […] (c) harassment or sexual harassment”.

In Southern Health Board v Mitchell (2001) E.L.R. 201, the Labour Court held: “The first requirement … is that the Complainant must “establish facts” from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them. This indicates that a Complainant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination. It is only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the respondent to prove that there is no infringement of the principle of equal treatment.”

The Complainant submits she was subjected to discrimination on the grounds of her gender in respect of her conditions of employment. The Respondent also sexually harassed her. The Complainant has provided evidence of this discrimination and sexual harassment, thereby discharging the evidentiary burden placed on her, such that the burden of proof hereby shifts to the Respondent.

The Complainant is seeking compensation for the effects of discrimination.

Summary of direct evidence of the Complainant

The Complainant said that she was performing exactly the same works two male colleagues. While she was not sure, she thought that they were paid €13 per hour, and she was paid €12.70. She said that they did exactly the same work, in fact, she did more, as she worked as a deboner as well. She clarified that the deboner role is a higher paid one. The Complainant said that it was common knowledge that males were paid more. However, the Complainant said that she was paid less than anyone else, including female staff. She noted that the female staff all earned less than male staff as the owners had preference for male staff.

The Complainant stated that when she started there were some 15 staff (trimmers and deboners), six females and nine males. There were some 2 male and three female staff in packing.

The Complainant stated that she was promised that the Respondent would get her an immigration stamp 1 or 4. She was prepared to drop out of school and work full-time. She believed that the reason why the Respondent never did that was because she was female.

The Complainant said that she worked in two locations. In one location there was only one female (cleaner). On occasion, there was another woman, but she was given lighter duties. The only reason the Complainant worked there was because she was desperate for hours. She worked alongside 10-15 men, she would be doing the same job as them.

The Complainant said that for Ramadan, they would have to kill all the animals they had there on the particular day. She said that they worked 7am to 7pm. As the job was not finished, the Director offered €100 cash to all who stayed longer. The Complainant said that she was the only one not paid for the work she had done. The Complainant exhibited copies of text conversation with her manager where she asked for the payment.

With regard to the sexual harassment claim, the Complainant said that on 22 May 2024 she was waiting outside her workplace for her lift home. She said that the Director saw her from upstairs and he came down. He approached her and asked how she was. He apologised that the Respondent did not give her hours, but he said that he saw that she was a good person. That was why, he said, he could get her some cleaning job. The Complainant said that it was the first time she spoke with him. She said that she would have seen him before, but he was “higher up”, she had never spoken with him before. She said that the Director asked for her number so he could contact her about the job, she gave it to him.

The Complainant said that her lift arrived and, on the way, she told the colleague that the Director offered her another job, she was happy she would get extra hours.

The Complainant said that at 7.50pm that evening she got a text message from the Director asking if she was available to meet.  The Complainant said that they could meet near where she lived. The Director offered that he could come for tea to her house and she agreed.

The Complainant said that she was nervous, the Director was her boss and the owner of the company. She prepared some tea. She said that there are two rooms in the property, she shared one with a roommate. Her landlord lived in the other room. She said that her roommate went to work. She said that her landlord knew that she needed a job, so he welcomed the Director, was polite, did some small talk, and then went to his room. The landlord thought that it would be a professional conversation.

The Complainant said that the Director asked her why she came to Ireland, she explained her circumstances. He said that he could organise a meeting with the manager at her workplace regarding the work permit for her. The Complainant then asked about the cleaning job. He said that he would forward her number to a friend who would have a couple of hours of cleaning at weekends.

The Complainant said that she felt very uncomfortable. The Director was making and receiving phone calls, his phone rang about three times. She said that it lasted about 1 hour, which she thought could be very long for a meeting with one’s boss. There was a lot of silent moments.

The Complainant said that she told the Director that she was stressed about the lack of hours. He said that he saw her as a good person. He said he wanted to meet in his car or elsewhere and asked her to give him a head massage. He said he would compensate her for it.

The Complainant said that she told him that she was uncomfortable and that it was inappropriate. The Complainant said that she was overwhelmed with fear, she felt that he was looking for something else. She was also afraid about how he would react, what would happen with her employment permit if she refused. Out of fear she said she needed to think about it. He told her to take her time to think.

The Complainant said that after he had left, she sent him a message which pretty much was a summary of the meeting. She said that she didn’t really understand the purpose of the conversation. She said that firstly he said he would talk to the manager about her permit; secondly, he would send her number to a friend to find her another job; and then he wants meetings to “get distracted” and pay her for it. She said she was confused.

The Director replied stating that he had a friend who needed a cleaner. He then said that, not as her boss, he needed someone who would give him a head massage and some company from time to time when he got very stressed. He went on to say that he could discuss how he could help with her permit and that he would make sure she would be paid on time. The Director said that he was not her boss and asked her not to take him as her boss.

The Complainant said she felt violated. She said that she was very clear that she did not understand what he was saying. She felt very uncomfortable. She was in shock and disbelief, she was crying. 

The Complainant became very distressed at this point at the hearing. She described traumatising events from her early childhood and how this incident affected her and brought back the trauma. She described the treatment she was receiving as a result. A recess was granted. After a break, the Complainant continued with her testimony, albeit she remained emotional and upset.

The Complainant said that she was revisiting over and over what had happened. She never said anything to her partner. She was very afraid. She said that she was afraid of meeting the Director but at the same time, she was worrying about her visa expiring. She was stressed and anxious for a period. She then confided in her friend who advised her to contact Doras. The Complainant said that the Director used his position as her boss. He knew it was up to him whether she would get her visa, her hours, her money. He did not say it out loud, but she knew.

The Complainant said that he avoided him. She said she approached him once when everybody was working extra hours. She said that those who agreed to work extra hours were promised €100 cash. She was the only one who was not paid.

The Complainant said that the GNIB inspection then took place. She was told by her supervisor not to come to work, even though her permit was in order. She was dismissed shortly afterward.

There was no attendance by, or on behalf of, the Respondent at the adjudication hearing.

The Complainant alleges that she was discriminated against on the grounds of her gender and that she was sexually harassed, in breach of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998, as amended.

The Law

Section 6(1) of the Employment Equality Acts provides that discrimination shall be taken to occur where “a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2)  (in this Act referred to as the “discriminatory grounds”) which—

(i)                              exists,

(ii)                            existed but no longer exists,

(iii)                           may exist in the future, or

(iv)                           is imputed to the person concerned,

Section 6(2) of the Acts defines the relevant discriminatory grounds as follows.

(2) As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are—

(a) that one is a woman and the other is a man (in this Act referred to as “the gender ground”),

8. Discrimination by employers etc.

(1) In relation to—

(a) access to employment, (b) conditions of employment, (c) training or experience for or in relation to employment, (d) promotion or re-grading, or (e) classification of posts,

an employer shall not discriminate against an employee or prospective employee and a provider of agency work shall not discriminate against an agency worker.

(6) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), an employer shall be taken to discriminate against an employee or prospective employee in relation to conditions of employment if, on any of the discriminatory grounds, the employer does not offer or afford to that employee or prospective employee or to a class of persons of whom he or she is one—

(a) the same terms of employment (other than remuneration and pension rights), (b) the same working conditions, and (c) the same treatment in relation to overtime, shift work, short time, transfers, lay-offs, redundancies, dismissals and disciplinary measures,

as the employer offers or affords to another person or class of persons, where the circumstances in which both such persons or classes are or would be employed are not materially different.

Harassment and sexual harassment

Section 14A provides that;-

(1) For the purposes of this Act, where—

(a) an employee (in this section referred to as “the victim”) is harassed or sexually harassed either at a place where the employee is employed (in this section referred to as “the workplace”) or otherwise in the course of his or her employment by a person who is—

(i) employed at that place or by the same employer, (ii) the victim's employer, or (iii) a client, customer or other business contact of the victim's employer and the circumstances of the harassment are such that the employer ought reasonably to have taken steps to prevent it, or

(7) (a) In this section— (i) references to harassment are to any form of unwanted conduct related to any of the discriminatory grounds, and (ii) references to sexual harassment are to any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, (b) being conduct which in either case has the purpose or effect of violating a person's dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person. (c) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a), such unwanted conduct may consist of acts, requests, spoken words, gestures or the production, display or circulation of written words, pictures or other material.

Section 14A (2) provides a defence for an employer if it can prove that it took reasonably practicable steps to prevent the person from harassing the victim, or any class of person which includes the victim, and to prevent the victim from being treated differently in the workplace, and, if and so far as any such treatment has occurred, to reverse its effects.

Liability of employers and principals.

15.—(1) Anything done by a person in the course of his or her employment shall, in any proceedings brought under this Act, be treated for the purposes of this Act as done also by that person’s employer, whether or not it was done with the employer’s knowledge or approval.

(2) Anything done by a person as agent for another person, with the authority (whether express or implied and whether precedent or subsequent) of that other person shall, in any proceedings brought under this Act, be treated for the purposes of this Act as done also by that other person.

(3) In proceedings brought under this Act against an employer in respect of an act alleged to have been done by an employee of the employer, it shall be a defence for the employer to prove that the employer took such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the employee—

(a) from doing that act, or

(b) from doing in the course of his or her employment acts of that description.

Remuneration

19. Entitlement to equal remuneration

(1) It shall be a term of the contract under which A is employed that, subject to this Act, A shall at any time be entitled to the same rate of remuneration for the work which A is employed to do as B who, at that or any other relevant time, is employed to do like work by the same or an associated employer.

(2) In this section “relevant time” in relation to a particular time is any time (including a time before the commencement of this section) during the 3 years which precede, or the 3 years which follow, the particular time.

(3) For the purposes of this Part, where B's employer is an associated employer of A's employer, A and B shall not be regarded as employed to do like work unless they both have the same or reasonably comparable terms and conditions of employment.

(4)

(a) Indirect discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral provision [would put] persons of a particular gender (being As or Bs) at a particular disadvantage in respect of remuneration compared with other employees of their employer.

(b) Where paragraph (a) applies, the persons referred to in that paragraph shall each be treated for the purposes of subsection (1) as complying or, as the case may be, not complying with the provision concerned, whichever results in the higher remuneration, unless the provision is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving the aim are appropriate and necessary.

(c) In any proceedings statistics are admissible for the purpose of determining whether this subsection applies in relation to A or B.

(5) Subject to subsection (4), nothing in this Part shall prevent an employer from paying, on grounds other than the gender ground, different rates of remuneration to different employees.

20. Implied term as to equal remuneration

(1) Where a person is employed under a contract which does not include (expressly or by reference to a collective agreement or otherwise) a term satisfying subsection (1) of section 19, the contract shall be taken to include a term giving effect to that subsection; and, if such an implied term conflicts with an express term, it shall override the express term.

(2) In this section “employed” has the same meaning as in section 19.

Burden of proof

Section 85A of the Employment Equality Acts sets out the burden of proof which applies in a claim of discrimination. It requires the Complainant to establish, in the first instance, facts from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to her. If she succeeds in doing so, then, and only then, is it for the Respondent to prove the contrary.

The Labour Court has held consistently that the facts from which the occurrence of discrimination may be inferred must be of “sufficient significance” before a prima facie case is established and the burden of proof shifts to the Respondent. 

The Labour Court elaborated on the interpretation of Section 85A in the case of Melbury v Valpeters EDA0917 where it held that Section 85A: 

"…. provides for the allocation of the probative burden in cases within its ambit. This requires that the Complainant must first establish facts from which discrimination may be inferred. What those facts are will vary from case to case and there is no closed category of facts, which can be relied upon. All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination. However, they must be established as facts on credible evidence. Mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn. Section 85A places the burden of establishing the primary facts fairly and squarely on the Complainant and the language of this provision admits of no exceptions to that evidential rule.”

There must be fact of “sufficient significance” to raise a presumption of discrimination. It is not sufficient to simply be a member of a protected group to render acts discriminatory, if for example no comparator exists or can be inferred, or the acts are transparently attributable to a non-discriminatory cause.

In Margetts v Graham Anthony & Company Limited EDA038, the evidential burden which must be discharged by the Complainant before a prima facie case of discrimination can be said to have been established was outlined by the Labour Court as follows:

“The law requires the complainant to establish facts from which it may be inferred that discrimination has taken place.  The appellant must, on the balance of probabilities, prove those facts from which such an inference can be drawn.  When these facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, the onus shifts to the respondent to show, on the balance of probabilities, that it did not discriminate against the appellant.  The mere fact that the complainant falls within one of the discriminatory grounds laid down under the Act is not sufficient in itself to establish a claim of discrimination.  The complainant must adduce other facts from which it may be inferred on the balance of probabilities that an act of discrimination has occurred.”

The rule is required pursuant to EU law and its rationale was explained in Ntoko v Citibank [2004] ELR 116:

“This approach is based on the empiricism that a person who discriminates unlawfully will rarely do so overtly and will not leave evidence of the discrimination within the complainant’s power of procurement. Hence, the normal rules of evidence must be adapted in such cases so as to avoid the protection of anti-discrimination laws being rendered nugatory by obliging complainants to prove something which is beyond their reach, and which may only be in the respondent’s capacity of proof.”

As discrimination on any ground may not be overt, careful sifting and weighing up of the evidence is required in order to determine whether a presumption of discrimination is within the range of inferences which can be reasonably drawn from the facts established on the balance of probabilities.

In Dublin Corporation v. Gibney’s EE5/1986, a prima facie case was defined as:

“evidence which in the absence of any credible contradictory evidence by the employer would lead any reasonable person to conclude that discrimination has probably occurred.”

The burden of proof which must be satisfied by the Complainant was summarised in Minaguchi v Wineport Lakeshore Restaurant as follows: “It appears to me that the three key elements which need to be established by a complainant to show that a prima facie case exists are:

(i)      that she is covered by the relevant discriminatory ground(s)

(ii)    that she has been subjected to specific treatment and

(iii)  that this treatment is less favourable than the way someone who is not covered by the relevant discriminatory ground is, has been or would be treated.”

In deciding on this complaint, therefore, I must first consider whether the existence of a prima facie case has been established by the Complainant. It is only where such a prima facie case has been established that the burden of proving there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment passes to the Respondent. 

Time limit

Section 77 provides as follows:

‘(5)

(a) Subject to paragraph (b), a claim for redress in respect of discrimination or victimisation may not be referred under this section after the end of the period of 6 months from the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation to which the case relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence.

The time limits which govern the referral of complaints under the legislation are provided for in section 77(5) of the Acts (as set out above). The effect of these provisions is that the Complainant can only seek redress in respect of occurrences during the six-month period prior to the date on which the claim was received by the WRC unless the discrimination in issue is part of a continuum of events. The latter was not argued in this case.

Therefore, in accordance with the consistent approach applied by the Labour Court in circumstances such as those that prevail in the within case, I must first consider whether an act or acts of discrimination occurred within the cognisable period for the within complaint.

The Complainant referred the within complaint to the Director General of the WRC on 1 November 2024. Therefore, the cognisable period for the purpose of the complaint in accordance with the time limits provided for in section 77 of the Acts is the six-month period prior to the referral of the complaint, namely from 2 May 2024 to 1 November 2024.

Discrimination on the grounds of gender

The Complainant alleged that she was discriminated against on the grounds of gender as her male comparators, two employees of the Respondent, were paid more than she was. The Complainant also alleged that due to her gender, the Respondent made no attempts to apply for an employment permit on her behalf, as the Respondent preferred to hire men in the position that she held.

A claim of equal pay

The Complainant argued that she performed work of equal value to comparators, within the meaning of section 19 of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 as amended.

The Acts imply into the contract a term entitlingthe employee to equal pay. in Brides v Minister for Agriculture [1998] 4 I.R. 250 at 270 Budd J. held, however, that there must be “an actual concrete real life comparator of the other sex” performing like work within what the Court of Justice in Case 43/75, Defrenne v SABENA (No. 2) [1976] E.C.R. 455 described as “the same establishment or service”. 

Section 19 requires the Complainant to demonstrate that she was engaged in “like work” with named comparators, or work of equal value, and that she was paid less for discriminatory reasons.

The Complainant gave evidence that she believed that two comparators, she named by their first names, were paid more than she was. The Complainant has failed to adduce any credible evidence to show that, on the balance of probabilities, she was subjected to discrimination on the ground of gender but rather has essentially relied upon supposition and assertion, unsupported by evidence. Upon request, the Complainant was afforded additional time to revert to the Adjudication Officer with such evidence, but none was presented.

On balance, I find that the Complainant has failed to establish that she was paid less for like work or work of equal value, or that the difference in pay was on a discriminatory ground.

Regarding the Complainant’s claim that the Respondent failed or refused to apply for an employment permit on her behalf due to her gender, I find that the Complainant relied upon assertion that was in no way supported by any evidence.

I find that the Complainant has failed to establish a prima facia case of discrimination on gender grounds in the context of her pay and employment permit application.

Sexual harassment

The issue that I must consider is whether or not the Complainant was subjected to sexual harassment pursuant to section 14A of the Acts. In this regard, I am required to consider two aspects of the evidence, namely:

(a)    Whether the Complainant has established on the balance of probability that she was sexually harassed in terms of the incidents she described in her evidence. This includes an evaluation as to whether the events the Complainant describes, on balance, took place, and if so, were of sufficient significance to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment.

(b)    If the answer to the question in (a) above is in the affirmative, did the Respondent take reasonable action to prevent the sexual harassment occurring in the workplace.

The Complainant adduced evidence that she was subjected to sexual harassment by the Director of the Respondent’s company. The Complainant gave credible evidence that the sexual harassment during the Director’s visit to her home took the form of an explicit request for a head massage and a company in exchange for compensation and support with her work hours, her salary payments and her employment permit. The Complainant further gave evidence and exhibited copies of text messages from the Director requesting her not to treat him as her boss. The text went on to say that he needed “someone who can give [him] head massage” from time to time when he gets “very stressed” and “a company” in exchange for compensation, help with her work permit and a promise that she would get “paid every week on time”.  

The Acts require the conduct for harassment and sexual harassment to have the “purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person.” The Act sets out in relation to sexual harassment that the conduct itself must be “of a sexual nature” and must be unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of this nature. Such unwanted conduct may consist of acts, requests, spoken words, gestures or the production, display or circulation of written words, pictures or other material.

S.I. 208 of 2012 Employment Equality Act 1998 (Code of Practice)(Harassment) Order 2012 provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of forms of behaviours that can constitute sexual harassment.

“Sexual harassment is defined in section 14A(7) of the Employment Equality Act as any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature which has the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person.

Many forms of behaviour can constitute sexual harassment. It includes examples like those contained in the following list although it must be emphasised that the list is illustrative rather than exhaustive. A single incident may constitute sexual harassment.

Physical conduct of a sexual nature— This may include unwanted physical contact such as unnecessary touching, patting or pinching or brushing against another employee’s body, assault and coercive sexual intercourse.

Verbal conduct of a sexual nature— This includes unwelcome sexual advances, propositions or pressure for sexual activity, continued suggestions for social activity outside the work place after it has been made clear that such suggestions are unwelcome, unwanted or offensive flirtations, suggestive remarks, innuendos or lewd comments.

Non-verbal conduct of a sexual nature— This may include the display of pornographic or sexually suggestive pictures, objects, written materials, emails, text-messages or faxes. It may also include leering, whistling or making sexually suggestive gestures.

Gender-based conduct— This includes conduct that denigrates or ridicules or is intimidatory or physically abusive of an employee because of his or her sex such as derogatory or degrading abuse or insults which are gender-related.”

The Labour Court in Nail Zone Ltd v A Worker EDA 1023 held as follows:

“The essential characteristics of harassment within this statutory meaning is that the conduct is (a) unwanted and (b) that it has either the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person. This suggests a subjective test and if the impugned conduct had the effect referred to at paragraph (b) of the subsection, whether or not that effect was intended, and whether or not the conduct would have produced the same result in a person of greater fortitude than the Complainant, it constitutes harassment for the purpose of the Acts.”

I have carefully considered the nature of the incidents of the alleged sexual harassment which the Complainant claims she was subjected to by the Director. These alleged incidents of sexual harassment relate to behaviour and conduct by the Director, of a verbal nature which included comments of a derogatory and suggestive nature relating to the Complainant which had the effect of intimidating the Complainant.

I have found the Complainant’s evidence to be credible. On balance, I accept the Complainant’s evidence in relation to this matter, and I am satisfied that the incidents of sexual harassment as alleged by her did occur. Furthermore, I am satisfied that these incidents of inappropriate, offensive and unwelcome behaviour had the effect of violating the Complainant’s dignity and subjecting her to a hostile and intimidating workplace. I, therefore, find that the Complainant has established a prima facie case that she was sexually harassed in the course of her employment.

Section 14A(2) of the Acts provides that it shall be a defence for an employer to show that it took such steps as are reasonably practicable to prevent sexual harassment and harassment from occurring in the first place and in circumstances where such harassment has occurred that it took action to reverse its effect. The Respondent did not avail of the opportunity to defend the case and chose not to attend the hearing.

Having regard to the foregoing, I find that the Respondent is, therefore, liable for the sexual harassment suffered by the Complainant. Accordingly, I find that the Complainant is entitled to succeed in this element of her complaint.

In MBCC Foods Ireland Ltd v Quilty EDA2128, the Labour Court accepted that it was not easy to measure the level of seriousness of a complaint of sexual harassment and continued:

“Obviously, the very upper end of seriousness includes situations of sexual assault. However, it is not possible to say with any certainty what might be construed as minor examples as much can depend on the impact of harassment on the individual. Each case has to be examined on its unique facts. What can be said in the instant case is that the Complainant has a right to go to work without being subjected to unwanted pictures of her manager in his underwear or childish and offensive representations of male genitalia. While the nature of such offensive behaviour may not be in the same category as physical assault, it is considerably more than harmless banter”.

In A Worker v A Garage Proprietor EE02/1985, the Labour Court held that “Freedom from sexual harassment is a condition of work which an employee from either sex is entitled to expect”.

In this case, the Complainant was subjected to sexual harassment by the Director of the Respondent. It is deeply concerning that the Director, fully aware of the Complainant’s financial hardship due to delayed or unpaid wages, her limited working hours, and her dependency on the Respondent for her employment permit purposes, exploited this vulnerability to advance his own inappropriate agenda.

The Complainant provided copies of text communications with the management of the Respondent, in which she repeatedly pleaded for the payment of her wages and described the significant personal and financial challenges resulting from the delays. Throughout these communications, she consistently demonstrated her commitment to the organisation.

It is profoundly troubling that the circumstances created by the Respondent were manipulated by the Director in such a manner.

In accordance with the provisions of Section 82 of the Acts, I consider that an award of compensation is the appropriate form of redress in the circumstances of the present case. The award is arrived at having regard to the seriousness of the discrimination, the effect on the Complainant and the requirement pursuant to Article 17 of the Framework Directive that the sanction be “effective, dissuasive and proportionate”.

Section 82(4) limits the monetary jurisdiction of an Adjudication Officer, to an amount equal to 104 times the Complainant’s gross weekly pay or €40,000, where the Complainant was in receipt of remuneration at the date of the reference of the case. The Complainant was paid an average weekly salary of €327.02 and therefore, the maximum award that I can make in the circumstances of the present case in respect of the acts of discrimination and victimisation is €40,000.

I issue the following decision. I decide that –

·       The claim under the equal pay provisions of the Employment Equality Acts is not well founded and I find that the Complainant was not discriminated against on the basis of gender.

·       The claim of discrimination of the grounds of gender in the context of the employment permit application is not well founded.

·       The claim of sexual harassment is well founded. I decide that the Complainant was sexually harassed by the Respondent contrary to Section 14A of the Acts

In accordance with the provisions of Section 82 of the Acts, I consider that an award of compensation is the appropriate form of redress in the circumstances of the present case.

I have assessed the appropriate award of redress having regard to the seriousness of the discrimination, the effect on the Complainant and the requirement pursuant to Article 17 of the Framework Directive that the sanction be “effective, dissuasive and proportionate”. I, therefore, order, in accordance with my powers under section 82 of the Employment Equality Acts, that the Respondent pay to the Complainant the sum of €25,000 (twenty-five thousand euro) for the effects of the sexual harassment on her.

I further order the Respondent to take the following courses of action:

• Develop a workplace anti-harassment and sexual harassment policy that complies with the relevant statutory Code of Practice;
• Develop a workplace anti-bullying policy that complies with the relevant statutory Code of Practice;
• Take the necessary steps to ensure, using awareness raising and training as considered appropriate and necessary, that the policies are verifiably communicated to, and understood by, all employees.

The Complainant submits that as a part-time employee, she has, in respect of her conditions of employment, been treated less favourably than a comparable full-time employee.

The Complainant submits that she has never received a contract of employment, and her salary was deposited in her bank account with delays. The Complainant stated that full-time workers have never had issues with late payments and were in receipt of their contracts of employment.

The Complainant exhibited a copy of an employment contract of a full-time employee that specified salary, payment intervals, hours of work, and other pertinent details.

Summary of the Complainant’s evidence

The Complainant stated in her evidence that she was the only part-time employee in the company. All full-time staff had contracts of employment, were paid more than her and were paid on time. She was the only one whose pay was always delayed. 

The Complainant referred to the text messages between herself and the management of the Respondent when she repeatedly communicated that she, as a part-time employee, was the only one who was not paid on time. 

There was no attendance by, or on behalf of, the Respondent at the adjudication hearing.

The Law

Section 7 of the Act defines a part time employee:

“7.—(1) In this Part—

“part-time employee” means an employee whose normal hours of work are less than the normal hours of work of an employee who is a comparable employee in relation to him or her”

9.Conditions of employment for part-time employees

(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (4) and section 11(2), a part-time employee shall not, in respect of his or her conditions of employment, be treated in a less favourable manner than a comparable full-time employee.

(2) Without prejudice to section 11(2), if treating a part-time employee, in respect of a particular condition of employment, in a less favourable manner than a comparable full-time employee can be justified on objective grounds then that employee may, notwithstanding subsection (1), be so treated.

(3) Nothing in subsection (2) shall be construed as affecting the application of a relevant enactment, by virtue of section 8, to a part-time employee.

(4) Subsection (1) shall, in so far, but only in so far, as it relates to any pension scheme or arrangement, not apply to a part-time employee whose normal hours of work constitute less than 20 per cent of the normal hours of work of a comparable full-time employee.

(5) For the avoidance of doubt, the reference in this section to a comparable full-time employee is a reference to such an employee either of the opposite sex to the part-time employee concerned or of the same sex as him or her.”

Section 9(1) of the Act provides the general right of part-time employees to equal treatment with comparable full-time employees in respect to conditions of employment. In order to make out a claim under the Act a claimant must first identify a comparable full-time employee against whom the claim is grounded. Section 7(2) of the Act defines “a comparable full-time employee” as follows:-

“(2) For the purposes of this Part, an employee is a comparable employee in relation to the employee firstly mentioned in the definition of “part-time employee” in this section (the “relevant part-time employee”) if–

(a) the employee and the relevant part-time employee are employed by the same employer or associated employers and one of the conditions referred to in subsection (3) is satisfied in respect of those employees,

(b) in case paragraph (a) does not apply (including a case where the relevant part-time employee is the sole employee of the employer), the employee is specified in a collective agreement, being an agreement that for the time being has effect in relation to the relevant part-time employee, to be a type of employee who is to be regarded for the purposes of this Part as a comparable employee in relation to the relevant part-time employee, or

(c) in case neither paragraph (a) nor (b) applies, the employee is employed in the same industry or sector of employment as the relevant part-time employee is employed in and one of the conditions referred to in subsection (3) is satisfied in respect of those employees,

and references in this Part to a comparable full-time employee in relation to a part-time employee shall be construed accordingly.”

The conditions mentioned in subsection (3) of section 7 are: -

“(a) both of the employees concerned perform the same work under the same or similar conditions or each is interchangeable with the other in relation to the work,

(b) the work performed by one of the employees concerned is of the same or a similar nature to that performed by the other and any differences between the work performed or the conditions under which it is performed by each, either are of small importance in relation to the work as a whole or occur with such irregularity as not to be significant, and

(c) the work performed by the relevant part-time employee is equal or greater in value to the work performed by the other employee concerned, having regard to such matters as skill, physical or mental requirements, responsibility and working conditions.”

“16. Decision of adjudication officer under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015

A decision of an adjudication officer under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 in relation to a complaint of a contravention of section 9 or 15 shall do one or more of the following, namely—

(a) declare that the complaint was or, as the case may be, was not well founded,

(b) require the employer to comply with the relevant provision,

(c) require the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount (if any) as the adjudication officer consider just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, but not exceeding 2 years' remuneration in respect of the employee's employment.”

The combined effect of these provisions is that a comparable full-time employee for the purposes of the Act is a full-time employee employed by the same employer as the complainant, (or in the absence of a comparable employee employed by the same employer, a person who comes within the terms of par (b) or (c) of section 7(2)) who is engaged in like work with the complainant (while the term “like work”, which is used in employment equality law, is not used in the Act, the conditions set out at section 7(2) and 7(3) amount to same).

The Complainant gave evidence that she was the only part-time employee of the Respondent. She further gave evidence that she was the only one that did not receive written statement of her terms of employment and the only employee whose wages were not paid in a timely fashion. The Complainant gave evidence that all other trimmers were paid on time. The Complainant exhibited copies of text messages where she repeatedly highlighted to her supervisor and to her manager that she was the only employee who was not paid on time. The Complainant exhibited a copy of a written statement of terms of employment of a full-time colleague which stipulated the pay frequency as “weekly in arrears”.

I am satisfied that the Complainant was treated less favourably than a comparable full-time employee.

The exchange of messages exhibited by the Complainant demonstrated the difficult circumstances the Complainant found herself in due to the treatment by the Respondent. The Complainant faced difficulties with her rent payments, bills, and on occasion pleaded with the Respondent to pay her so she could afford to buy necessary medications. I have taken the effect the Respondent’s treatment had on the Complainant when considering the level of compensation that I award to the Complainant.

I declare this complaint to be well founded. I order the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation in the amount of €8,500 (approximately 26 weeks’ pay) which I find just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances.

I further order the Respondent to review its policies and procedures to ensure that no part-time employee is treated in a less favourable manner than a comparable full-time employee.

Sexual harassment – discrimination – part-time worker – unfair dismissal-