Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Silke Dahms

Evgenia Anikina McCabe

Representatives

Grace Byrne, Threshold

Aislinn Finnegan, BL

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000

CA-00063373-001

09/05/2024

In a submission she provided in advance of the hearing, the complainant said that, from October 2020, she rented a house from the respondent for €550 per month. 

In August 2023, the respondent told the complainant that she wanted to increase the rent.  The complainant was advised by a community welfare officer to apply for the housing assistance payment (HAP).  Between August and December 2023, on three occasions, she asked the respondent to accept HAP.  On December 4th 2023, the respondent asked the complainant to sign a new tenancy agreement.  On the same day, the complainant gave the respondent a form known as an “SWA RS1” and asked her to fill in part 9 which applies to a landlord.  The respondent refused to sign the form and, in a text message to the complainant towards the end of December, she said “not suit me.”

On January 13th 2024, the complainant received confirmation that her tenancy was registered with the Residential Tenancies Board (RTB).

On February 15th 2024, the complainant was served with notice of termination of her rented property.  She claims that this occurred because she asked the respondent to accept HAP.  The complainant claims that the respondent failed to register the property with the RTB until she asked her to accept HAP.  She said that she asked the respondent to accept HAP when she proposed to increase the rent.   The complainant believes that if she had accepted the rent increase without asking the respondent to accept HAP, she would not have been served with a notice of termination and the tenancy would not have been registered with the RTB.  The complainant claims therefore, that in breach of section 3(1) and 3(3B) of the Equal Status Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”), she has been discriminated against on the housing assistance ground.

On behalf of the complainant, Ms Byrne said that she was spending 67% of her income on rent when she asked the respondent to agree to her HAP application.  When the respondent asked the complainant to sign a new tenancy agreement on December 4th 2023, Ms Byrne submitted that this indicates that the respondent expected that the tenancy would continue.  On April 5th 2024, the complainant sent an ES1 form to the respondent, alleging that she was discriminated against and seeking an explanation.  She didn’t get a reply and she submitted this complaint to the WRC on May 9th 2024.

It is the complainant’s case that the proximity of her request to the respondent in December 2023 to agree to her HAP application, and the notice of termination issued on February 15th are so close in time that the notice of termination was caused by her intention to apply for HAP.

In support of her claim that discrimination occurred, the complainant referred to the decision of my colleague adjudicator, Mr Pat Brady in his decision in Colledge v Smith, ADJ-00048983.

Ms Finnegan said that the respondent accepts that, on April 5th 2024, in an ES1 form, she received notice in respect of the alleged prohibited conduct of February 15th 2024 (the issuing of the notice of termination) in accordance with the two-month notification requirements at s.21 of the 2000 Act.  The respondent does not accept that, in accordance with s.21, she received notification concerning the refusal to accept HAP in December 2023.

Ms Finnegan said that the substance of this complaint relates to the termination of the tenancy agreement which has been litigated at the RTB.  While, in her complaint to the WRC on May 9th 2024, the complainant alleges that she was discriminated against when she asked the respondent to accept HAP, on the ES1 form that she sent to the respondent, she referred to,

§  The date of registration of the tenancy;

§  The failure of the respondent to give her rent receipts;

§  The failure of the respondent to provide her with bank details to pay the rent;

§  The fact that she was informed three months after she was informed about a rent increase, that she had to vacate the property;

§  The fact that the respondent said that the reason for the notice of termination was because she wanted to move into the house.

The respondent served notice of termination on the complainant on February 15th 2024 because she intended to move into the house that the complainant had been renting and to occupy it indefinitely.  The complainant challenged that notice and, on January 5th 2025, a compromise agreement was reached at the RTB and the complainant agreed to vacate the property in July 2025.  Ms Finnegan submitted that the complainant cannot challenge the validity of the notice of termination before the WRC and that I, as the adjudicator, have no jurisdiction to amend the terms of the compromise agreement.

Evidence of the Respondent, Ms Evgenia Anikina McCabe

In her evidence, Ms McCabe said that she is a childcare worker and a part-time landlord.  She said that, in October 2020, the complainant and her husband rented the house that she owns in County Roscommon.  In 2022, the complainant and her husband separated and the complainant continued on as the sole tenant.  Ms McCabe said that she was friendly with the complainant and that she and her husband helped her. 

Ms McCabe’s husband is a publican and a farmer and they lived at the public house.  By 2024, the pub had been closed for about a year and her husband decided to sell it.  On February 15th 2024, Ms McCabe said that she signed a statutory declaration in her solicitor’s office and she issued the complainant with notice of termination of the tenancy.  She said that, from then on, things weren’t good between them. 

The complainant disputed the termination notice and made a complaint to the RTB.  Ms McCabe said that the matter was settled confidentially in January 2025.  The complainant moved out of the house on July 9th 2025 and Ms McCabe said that she and her family moved in on July 23rd.

The Relevant Law

Section 6 of the Equal Status Act 2000 is concerned with the disposal of premises and the provision of accommodation.  Section 6(1A) prohibits discrimination on the ground of being in receipt of rent supplement.  This section is to be read in conjunction with Section 3 of the Act which defines “discrimination” in general and specifically defines the new “housing assistance ground.” 

Section 3(1) provides that:

“For the purposes of this Act discrimination shall be taken to occur-

(a) where a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) or, if appropriate, subsection (3B), (in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’) which-

(i) exists,

(ii) existed but no longer exists,

(iii) may exist in the future, or

(iv) is imputed to the person concerned.”

Section 3(3B) provides that discrimination in relation to the provision of accommodation is prohibited under all the existing protected grounds and inserts the new housing assistance ground as follows:

“For the purposes of section 6(1)(c), the discriminatory grounds shall (in addition to the grounds specified in subsection (2)) include the ground that as between any two persons, that one is in receipt of rent supplement (within the meaning of section 6(8)), housing assistance (construed in accordance with Part 4 of the Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2014) or any payment under the Social Welfare Acts and the other is not (the “housing assistance ground.”)

The complainant’s case is that she was discriminated against when the respondent served her with a statutory eviction notice on February 15th 2024.  She claims that she was served this notice because, in December 2023, she asked the respondent to complete a form for her to apply for HAP.  Her request was refused.

Sections 6(1) of the Act provides that,

(1) A person shall not discriminate in—

(a) disposing of any estate or interest in premises,

(b) terminating any tenancy or other interest in premises, or

(c) subject to subsection (1A), providing accommodation or any services or amenities related to accommodation or ceasing to provide accommodation or any such services or amenities.

(1A) Subsection (1)(c) is without prejudice to —

(a) any enactment or rule of law regulating the provision of accommodation, or

(b) the right of a person providing accommodation to make it a condition of the provision of that accommodation that rent supplement is paid directly to that person.

Findings

In her evidence at the hearing, the respondent said that she issued the statutory notice of termination of the tenancy to the complainant on February 14th 2024.  She said that she and her family had been living at the residential part of a public house owned by her husband and they had decided to sell the public house and move into the house occupied by the complainant.  The notice provided that the complainant was to vacate the property on August 23rd 2024.  I understand from the submissions that the complainant challenged the termination notice and that a hearing took place at the Residential Tenancies Board on August 29th 2024.  I understand further that the outcome from that hearing was appealed by the complainant and that the matter was eventually settled by a compromise agreement facilitated by the Residential Tenancies Board on January 9th 2025.  The respondent said that she and her husband and children moved back into the house on July 23rd.2025.  I am satisfied that this was a legitimate reason for issuing the complainant with a notice of termination and I find that there was no connection between that and the complainant’s application for the housing assistance payment. 

Conclusion

The complainant did not give evidence at the hearing.  Based on the evidence of the respondent, I am satisfied that the complainant was not discriminated against on the housing assistance ground.

I have considered the complainant’s submission and the arguments presented by Ms Byrne of Threshold on her behalf at the hearing of this complaint on July 30th 2025.  It is my view that the facts the complainant relies on to demonstrate that she was discriminated against are insufficient to lead me to presume that discrimination occurred.  I decide therefore, that her complaint is not well-founded.

Discrimination, housing assistance payment