Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Paul  Ward

Scotts Fuels Ireland Limited

Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

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Representatives

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000

CA-00067934-001

06/12/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00067934-002

06/12/2024

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 1 February 2024, as a Sales Representative/Business Development Manager. He alleges that he was discriminatorily dismissed on the grounds of age on 3 October 2024.

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 1 February 2024, as a Sales Representative/Business Development Manager, having been headhunted from his prior role where he had over 28 years of proven success in sales and client relationships. Initially he was offered a salary of €70,000, which he declined, and the offer was increased to €110,000, which he accepted. A key factor in his acceptance was the promise of full autonomy in developing and implementing sales strategies—something crucial to his decision to leave a stable and long-standing position. He stated that he implemented a client engagement strategy that included informal meetings such as rounds of golf, a method that had previously proven effective in fostering client trust and business development.

On the evening of 20 September 2024, he received an unexpected disciplinary hearing invitation scheduled for the following Monday morning. It was the first time he learned that a GPS tracker had been secretly installed on his company vehicle. The Respondent alleged misconduct, citing GPS images from three instances where he was at a golf club, questioning whether he was working during those times. Despite confirmation from the clients involved that the meetings were legitimate and business-related, he was dismissed on the grounds of gross misconduct on 3 October 2024 based on speculative interpretation of GPS data.

The Complainant believed this course of action was excessive and should have at most warranted an informal warning if such engagement methods were no longer acceptable. The immediate jump to dismissal made him suspect that the outcome was predetermined, possibly influenced by his age and more traditional, relationship-focused sales approach.

He stated in the first instance that the disciplinary process was flawed and was riddled with procedural failures, such as:

·        Short Notice: He was informed of the disciplinary hearing via email on a Friday evening for a Monday morning meeting, leaving inadequate time to prepare.

·        Right to Representation Denied: Although he was told he could bring a colleague or union representative, he was not allowed to bring an independent representative.

·        Lack of Evidence: Despite client confirmations validating his whereabouts and meetings, the accusations were upheld on the basis of probability rather than clear evidence.

·        Clean Record and No Prior Warnings: Throughout his time at the company, there had been no complaints or performance concerns raised. In fact, he had received positive feedback via email.

·        Disregard for Procedure: The company failed to follow its own disciplinary process. No initial investigation involved him, and his requests for contact with HR were ignored. Meeting minutes were inaccurate and never confirmed. Moreover, a meeting scheduled to deliver an outcome was abruptly changed into a further inquiry without notice, catching him unprepared.

·        Prejudged Decision: The tone and conduct of the disciplinary process suggested a decision to dismiss him had already been made before he had a chance to defend himself. His justifications were dismissed without genuine consideration.

·        Appeals Conflict of Interest: The person overseeing his appeal was the same individual who initiated the disciplinary process—undermining any semblance of neutrality and fairness.

The Complainant also believed that his dismissal was influenced by age-based discrimination. He stated that during the disciplinary hearings, his use of the golf course for client relations was referred to as an “old school” approach, a comment he felt was dismissive and ageist. He also raised the question of whether other employees' vehicles were similarly monitored; the question was ignored, reinforcing his suspicion of targeted scrutiny.

Additionally, he discovered that a younger, less experienced colleague—who joined on the same day and was likely on a lower salary—was retained, further suggesting that age and cost were the real motives behind his dismissal. Taken together, these elements led him to conclude that the termination was not performance-related, but rooted in biased assumptions about his age and salary level.

The Respondent did not attend on the day of the hearing to give evidence.

The Law

Discrimination for the purposes of this Act.

Section 6 of the Act states as follows:

(1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where—

(a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified insubsection (2)(in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’) which—

(i) exists,

(ii) existed but no longer exists,

(iii) may exist in the future, or

(iv) is imputed to the person concerned,

(b) a person who is associated with another person—

(i) is treated, by virtue of that association, less favourably than a person who is not so associated is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and

(ii) similar treatment of that other person on any of the discriminatory grounds would, by virtue ofparagraph (a), constitute discrimination.

(2) As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are—

( f) that they are of different ages, but subject to subsection (3) (in this Act referred to as “ the age ground”)

Section 85A (1) of the Act provides: -

85A.—(1) Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a Complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the Respondent to prove the contrary.

Findings:

It is clear from Section 85A (1) of the Act above that the burden of proof in this matter is on the Complainant. If the case meets the threshold set out above, then the burden of proof shifts and it is on the Respondent to rebut the presumption of discrimination.

This view is consistent with the decision of the Labour Court in Mitchell v. Southern Health Board [2001] ELR 201, where it was held thar:

“The first requirement […] is that the claimant must “establish facts” from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them.  This indicates that a claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination. 

It is only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the Respondent to prove that there is no infringement of the principle of equal treatment.”

Furthermore, in Melbury Developments Ltd. v. Valpeters [2010] 21 ELR 64, the Labour Court found that “mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn”.

In this case, the Complainant expressed the view that his dismissal was influenced by age-based discrimination because reference was made by the Respondent to his use of the golf course for client relations/business development as an “old school” approach, a comment he felt was ageist.

In deciding if this comment is discriminatory on the age ground, I must consider the commonly understood meaning and usage of the term “old school.” I am of the view firstly that this expression is widely recognised in professional contexts as referring to traditional, longstanding, or previously standard practices. I also find that it is not inherently age-specific and may be applied to individuals of any age who may engage in conventional methods. It is generally interpreted as indicative of a way of operating rather than a reference to a person’s age. Accordingly, I find the use of the term “old school” in this instance does not constitute prima facie evidence of age discrimination.

The Complainant further asserted that a considerably younger colleague had been retained in the Respondent’s employment which he stated also constituted age discrimination. However, no evidence was presented to suggest that this colleague was either not subject to vehicle tracking or had undertaken golf outings without prior authorisation or approval from senior management, which was the reason for the Complainant’s dismissal.

Considering all of the foregoing points, I find that the Complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and that he was therefore not discriminated against.

CA-00067934-001:

This complaint was withdrawn.

CA-00067934-002:

As the Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, I find that he was not discriminated against.