Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Oonagh  McCartney

The Grosvenor Cleaning Services Ltd Grosvenor Services

Representatives

  Self-represented

 Joe Maguire

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00067781-001

30/11/2024

The Complainant contends that she had to dismiss herself due to the actions of her employer following a protected disclosure.

The Complainant submitted a 44-page document on her case, with 127 pages comprising 9 Appendices that I will summarise here.

 The Complainant case to the Commission (CA-00067781-001) is under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977. She was subject to retaliatory action on the part of the Respondent for making a protected disclosure under Section 14A(1)(e) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014–2022.  She catalogued a series of issues which were very distressing to her including the disclosure of personal and private information.

That having been employed as a Cleaning Operative from 27/06/2019 to 30/05/2024 she was forced to repudiate her contract of employment following the treatment of her, by the Respondent.

The Complainant secured a new role, on August 27th of 2024, commencing work on the 10th of September. She now seeks a decision of the Commission that her complaint is well founded and compensate her for her losses.

The respondent provided a detailed submission of 30 pages

The dates of employment are not disputed, but the Respondent denies the allegation of the Complainant in full, and it is the Respondent case that the Complainant resigned

Preliminary Matter on Jurisdiction

The Respondent made a preliminary submission in writing and verbally that the Adjudicating Officer did not have jurisdiction in this matter due to the time limits involved. It is the case for the Respondent that the Complainant having resigned on the 30th of May 2024 and having submitted her claim on the 30th of November 2024. It was further submitted that the Complainant was out of time and the last date for the matter was 29th of November. This places the Complainant outside the jurisdiction of the WRC by one day. Given that the Complainant was informed of being out of time by the Commission and made no submission as to “reasonable cause” and quoted the Act sufficiently enough to demonstrate her understanding of it.

The Respondent quoted s8(2) of the 1977 Act that sets out the jurisdiction of an Adjudicator in the matter and that no reasonable cause has been shown. Further the Respondent sets out that in response to the GDPR request no delay arose from their part and that the Complainant was not delayed in any part by the Respondent in filing within time.

The Respondent seeks to rely upon the case of Fyffes Tropical Ireland Ltd v Lou Osman (UDD 2413) (2024).  In a similar matter of a submission being made one day late. The Complainant Barrister made the case that the Complainant misunderstood the statutory time frame as set out by the Oireachtas. However, the Labour Court found that misunderstanding of the law does satisfy the test for reasonable cause.

Preliminary Matter of Jurisdiction Challenge.

It is undoubtedly true that the dates are correct, and it does amount to being one day out of time. As to the length of the time the Labour Court has been quite clear that the amount of time is not relevant unless reasonable cause can be shown.

It is clear from the very lengthy submissions and her presentation of her case that the Complainant is a highly intelligent and capable person with a good understanding of the law and procedure that would escape most lay litigants.

In the case referred to by the Respondent, Fyffes Tropical Ireland Ltd v Lou Osman (UDD 2413) (2024).  The matter was heard by an Adjudicator Officer that Mr Osman was unfairly dismissed. The Adjudicator recognised his lack of jurisdiction and referred the parties to the Labour Court decision in Hewlett-Packard Ireland Limited v. Jakub Zajaczkowski (DWT 191) where it was held that:  

 “The established test for deciding if an extension should be granted for reasonable cause shown is that formulated by this Court in Labour Court Determination DWT0338Cementation Skanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll. Here the test was set out in the following terms: - 

“It is the Court's view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time. “

This is a test adopted from the Superior Courts in Minister for Finance v CPSU & Ors [2007] 18 ELR 36 and set out again in Cementation Skanska v Carroll, DWT 0338.

Having made that reasoned decision, it was appealed to the Labour Court, in the case referred to by the Respondent. In that case there was a plea of ignorance of the law on the part of the Complainant, which the Labour Court refused. It is the experience of practitioners that the Labour Court is not minded to enlarge time for applicants without reasonable cause.  It is clear from these cases that the precedent on this matter is that time may not be enlarged, but for the most serious and reasonable cause; and the Labour Court has set the line very clearly in this regard.

As recently as March 2025, in A Clinical Psychologist v A Healthcare Provider ADJ-00045183the Adjudicating Officer was asked to enlarge time where there was a delay in the in Respondent providing documentation the Adjudicator set out in their decision:

“While a delay of one day is slight, I can see no reason which objectively affords an excuse for that delay and therefore cannot extend the time period. The delay in the Respondent providing the reference documents had ceased to be relevant as a number of weeks had passed since they had complied with the DSAR.”

On my enquiring from the Complainant as to their response to the Respondent submission, they did not offer me reasonable cause.

In an abundance of fair procedures, I reserved my decision on the submission in favour of hearing the whole case. However, despite giving the matter a great deal of time, reading, research and thought, I can only conclude that the matter is out of time and I, therefore, do not have jurisdiction of the matter.

CA-00067781-001

For the reasons set out above, my decision is that the Complaint is out of time, and I do not have jurisdiction to hear the matter, and the complaint is not well founded.

Jurisdiction, time limits, reasonable cause