ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION

Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00055535

Parties:

	Complainant	Respondent
Parties	Marie Creedon	Morgan McKinley

Representatives

Self-represented

Mark Comerford IBEC

Complaint(s):

Act	Complaint/Dispute Reference No.	Date of Receipt
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998	CA-00067700-001	27/11/2024

Date of Adjudication Hearing: 17/04/2025

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Conor Stokes

Procedure:

In accordance with Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaint.

Background:

This matter was heard by way of remote hearing pursuant to the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2020 and S.I. No. 359/2020 which designates the WRC as a body empowered to hold remote hearings.

The complainant and one witness for the respondent undertook to give their evidence under affirmation.

Summary of Complainant’s Case:

The complainant submitted that she was less favourably treated under the Civil Status Ground.

At the outset, the complainant confirmed in evidence that her compliant did not fall under the Civil Status ground.

Summary of Respondent’s Case:

The respondent submitted that the complaint was misconceived.

Findings and Conclusions:

Section 6(1) & (2) of the Act outlines what amounts to discrimination for the purposes of the Act. It states as follows:

6.—(1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where—

(a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the "discriminatory grounds") which—

(i) exists,

(ii) existed but no longer exists,

(iii) may exist in the future, or

(iv) is imputed to the person concerned,

(b) a person who is associated with another person—

(i) is treated, by virtue of that association, less favourably than a person who is not so associated is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and

(ii) similar treatment of that other person on any of the discriminatory grounds would, by virtue of paragraph (a), constitute discrimination.

(2) As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are—

(a) that one is a woman and the other is a man (in this Act referred to as “the gender ground”),

(b) that they are of different civil status (in this Act referred to as “the F15[civil status] ground”),

(c) that one has family status and the other does not (in this Act referred to as “the family status ground”),

(d) that they are of different sexual orientation (in this Act referred to as “the sexual orientation ground”),

(e) that one has a different religious belief from the other, or that one has a religious belief and the other has not (in this Act referred to as “the religion ground”),

(f) that they are of different ages, but subject to subsection (3) (in this Act referred to as “the age ground”),

(g) that one is a person with a disability and the other either is not or is a person with a different disability (in this Act referred to as “the disability ground”),

(h) that they are of different race, colour, nationality or ethnic or national origins (in this Act referred to as “the ground of race”),

(i) that one is a member of the Traveller community and the other is not (in this Act referred to as “the Traveller community ground”).

At the outset, the complainant confirmed in evidence that her compliant did not fall under the Civil Status ground. The Adjudication Officer brought the complainant through each of the remaining protected grounds and to each the complainant confirmed that the ground was applicable to her case.

Section 77A(1) of the Act states that:

77A.—(1) The Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission may dismiss a claim at any stage if of opinion that it has been made in bad faith or is frivolous, vexatious or misconceived or relates to a trivial matter.

Having regard to all the foregoing, I find that as the treatment complained of does not fall under any of the protected grounds, the complaint is misconceived.

Decision:

Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act.

Having regard to all the written and oral evidence presented in relation to this matter, my decision is that the complaint is misconceived.

Dated: 1st May 2025

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Conor Stokes

Key Words:

Employment Equality – does not under the protected grounds – complaint misconceived