ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00056703
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Gikhil Francis | Select Asia |
Representatives | Una Dunphy Not affiliated |
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Complaint(s):
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 | CA-00068879-001 | 28/01/2025 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 27/06/2025
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Niamh O'Carroll
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 - 2015, following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaint.
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The Complainant commenced his employment with the Respondent in December 2022. There were issues with paying his wages. The Complainant has filed another complaint pursuant to the Payment of Wages Act in relation to that issue. The situation got so bad that he felt that he had no option but to leave his employment. He couldn’t work for nothing. He had bills and rent to pay. He terminated his employment on the 20.05.2024. At that juncture he was owed over €4,000.00. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
The Respondent accepts that there were issues in relation to the Complainant’s wages. He fully intends to pay the Complainant when he has the money. He does not have it at the moment. Also, he had to sell all seven of his shops and due to the level of debt he was in he didn’t receive any money for them. |
Findings and Conclusions:
The preliminary issue to be determined is whether or not I have jurisdiction to hear the complaint. Section 41(6) Workplace Relations Act 2015 states “subject to subsection (8) an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of six months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates. Section 41(8) of the 2015 Act empowers an adjudication officer to extend the initial six months limitation period by no more than a further six months, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint within the initial period 'was due to reasonable cause'. Without prejudice to the above argument “reasonable cause” has been considered in a number of cases. In Salesforce.com v Alli Leech the Labour Court set out in detail the legal principles to establish whether reasonable cause has been shown for an extension of time. The Court stated “The established test for deciding if an extension should be granted for reasonable cause shown is that formulated by this Court in Labour Court Determination DWT0338 Cementation Skanska v Carroll. Here the test was set out in the following term; “It is the Court’s view that in considering if reasonable cause exists it is for the Claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context of which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the Claimant at the material time. The Claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the Claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability that had those circumstances had not been present he would have initiated the claim on time.” In that case, and in subsequent cases in which the question arose the Court adopted an approach analogous to that taken by the superior Courts in considering whether time should been enlarged for “good reason” in judicial review proceedings pursuant to Order 84 Rule 21 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986. That approach was held to be correct by the High Court in Minister for Finance v CPSU and others . The test formulated in Cementation Skanska v Carroll draws heavily on the decision of the High Court in Donal O’Donnell and Catherine O’Donnell v Dunlaoghaire Corporation . Here Costello J (as he then was) stated as follows; “The phrase “good reasons” is one of wide import which it would be futile to attempt to define precisely. However, in considering whether or not there are good reasons for extending the time I think it is clear that the test must be an objective one and the Court should not extend the time merely because an aggrieved Plaintiff believed that he or she were justified in delaying the institution of proceedings. What the Plaintiff has to show (and I think the onus under Order 84 Rule 21 is on the Plaintiff) is that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford a justifiable excuse for the delay” It is clear from the authorities that the test places the onus on the Complainant on an extension of time to identify the reason for the delay and to establish that the reason relied upon provides a justifiable excuse for the actual delay. Secondly, the onus is on the Complainant to establish a causal link between the reason proffered for the delay and his or her failure to present the complaint in time. Thirdly, I must be satisfied, as a matter of probability, that the complaint would have been presented in time were it not for the intervention of the factors relied upon as constituting reasonable cause. It is the actual delay that must be explained and justified. Finally, while the established test imposes a relatively low threshold of reasonableness on an Applicant, there is some limitation on the range of issues which can be taken into account.” In particular, as was pointed out by Costello J in the passage quoted above, a Court should not extend a statutory time limit merely because the Applicant subjectively believed that he or she was justified in delaying the institution of proceedings. The Complainant left his employment due to issues with his wages on the 20.05.2024. He did not file this complaint until the 28.01.2025. However, he did file his Payment of Wages Act complaint on the 07.07.2025. The within complaint is outside of the six-month time limit permitted by the Act. In circumstances where no reason was given for the late filing of this complaint and where he filed his Payment of Wages Act complaint in July 2024 I find that the matter is statute barred and no reasons have been proffered that could allow me extend the time pursuant to Section 41 (8). In those circumstance I must conclude that the complaint fails.
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Decision:
Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the unfair dismissal claim consisting of a grant of redress in accordance with section 7 of the 1977 Act.
The complaint fails. |
Dated: 15th July 2025.
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Niamh O'Carroll
Key Words:
Statute of limitations. S41 (6) & (8). Reasonable Cause. |