ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00055624
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Caroline Hollands | Department Of Social Protection |
Representatives | Paul MacSweeney, Forsa Trade Union | Niall Fahy BL instructed by Joseph Dolan Chief State Solicitor's Office |
Complaint(s):
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00067664-001 | 26/11/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 18 of the Parental Leave Act 1998 | CA-00067665-001 | 26/11/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00067691-001 | 26/11/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 28 of the Safety, Health & Welfare at Work Act, 2005 | CA-00067729-001 | 27/11/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Schedule 2 of the Protected Disclosures Act, 2014 | CA-00067729-002 | 27/11/2024 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 04/04/2025 and04/06/2025
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Breiffni O'Neill
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 and Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 - 2015, following the referral of the complaints to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaints and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaints.
Specifically, I conducted a remote hearing in accordance with the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020 and Statutory Instrument 359/2020 which designates the Workplace Relations Commission as a body empowered to hold remote hearings.
Background:
The Complainant is a single mother of two young children who has worked as a Clerical Officer with the Respondent since November 2014. She has a disability, namely single-sided deafness in her right ear. She submitted five complaints to the WRC stating that despite eight consecutive years of positive performance reviews, she has experienced escalating discrimination, harassment, and penalisation since beginning parental leave in May 2022 and subsequently for seeking disability accommodations. She also stated that she was penalised following both a protected disclosure as well as a health and safety complaint that she made in the workplace. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
Disability Discrimination The Complainant stated that she has faced persistent barriers that interfere with her ability to work effectively, including: • Auditory Environment: Loud radio music is played constantly through ceiling speakers across the office. • Physical Barriers: Post-pandemic perspex screens block sound and obstruct lip-reading, while customer counters contain metal bars that hide speakers’ mouths. • Workplace Reassignment: She was moved from a quiet, enclosed PSC booth (which allowed sound control and better communication) to a noisy, open-plan desk beneath speakers. • Inappropriate Remarks: Her supervisor, made insensitive public comments, including asking if she needed “a microphone for deaf people.” Requests for reasonable accommodations, including use of a quieter interview room, flexible work-from-home arrangements, and relocation away from high-noise areas, were repeatedly denied or significantly delayed. Some were granted temporarily, only to be revoked without justification. Family Status Discrimination As a single parent, the Complainant stated that she was also discriminated against in the following ways for her caregiving responsibilities: • Parental Leave Resentment: Beginning in May 2022, she took statutory parental leave two days per week. Her supervisor openly expressed frustration at her absence. • Unfair Performance Review (2022): The Complainant stated that she was penalised for taking statutory and annual leave to care for her sick daughter. The review claimed she missed “significant working time,” despite following proper HR protocols. • Differential Treatment: The Complainant stated that her absences were scrutinised in ways that did not apply to colleagues with similar leave patterns. Escalation of Harassment and Retaliation After requesting parental leave, the Complainant stated that the treatment of her by the Respondent deteriorated in the following ways: • She was assigned to a broken workstation with no phone access and had to work at an unused public counter. • She was the only staff member given specific PPS processing targets (20 per day), in addition to extra tasks. • Professional development opportunities were denied, while newer colleagues were permitted to attend training. Harassment and Hostile Environment The Complainant stated that she experienced frequent public humiliation and targeted scrutiny in the following ways: • Supervisors openly mocked or scolded her, made sarcastic comments about her hearing, and misinterpreted her lip-reading as insubordination. • Work-related emails were sent to accounts she could not access while on approved leave, causing her to miss out on an acting-up opportunity. • At one point, she was required to email her lunch break times—a demand never imposed on other staff. • In December 2023, during a holiday staff gathering, two managers demonstrably excluded her when she approached to receive her gift. Formal Complaints and Protected Disclosure Between December 2023 and March 2024, the Complainant stated that she filed several Dignity at Work complaints against three supervisors, X, Y and Z. The key points in these complaints included: • Inappropriate Monitoring: Supervisor X insisted blinds remain open so she could monitor the Complainant and reprimanded her for using quiet spaces without permission. • Aggressive Behaviour: During a disciplinary meeting in January 2024, Supervisor X was hostile and demonstrated no understanding of the Complainant’s disability. • Denial of Disability: Supervisor X falsely claimed the Complainant “can hear,” questioned her need to lip-read, and demanded unnecessary medical documentation. • Mocking Comments: Supervisor X later suggested the Complainant request “proper hearing ear muffs”—an insulting and nonsensical suggestion for her condition. On 14 March 2024, the Complainant made a complaint to HR which she stated constituted a protected disclosure as well as a health and safety complaint, reporting a pattern of discriminatory treatment by the same managers toward other women, including: • P, targeted after maternity leave in 2021. • Q, a pregnant colleague facing treatment endangering her wellbeing. No action was taken in response to these disclosures. Withdrawal of Accommodations and Continued Hostility • On 4 April 2024, the Complainant’s stated that her temporary work-from-home arrangement (1 day/week) was terminated after just 10 days. Management claimed there was “no work” for her to do remotely, despite immediately assigning the same duties to a temporary staff member (who continues to work remotely weekly). • Her seat was moved directly beneath a ceiling speaker, increasing her noise exposure and worsening her symptoms. From May through June 2024, the Complainant stated that the treatment of her by the Respondent continued to decline in the following ways: • Ongoing Harassment: The Complainant stated that she was subjected to minor yet persistent criticisms, invasive supervision, and misrepresentations of her work performance in internal communications. • Social Exclusion: She also stated that she was consistently left out of staff meetings, internal updates, and informal team gatherings. • Unacknowledged Health Concerns: The Complainant stated that she also raised concerns about migraines, stress, and sensory overload. These were ignored, and no follow-up occurred on the suggested occupational health support. On 28 June 2024, she stated that she was informally told that her duties would be “restructured” due to “business needs,” a move that she stated was punitive and lacking transparency. Indirect Discrimination and Policy Failures The Complainant stated that several organisational policies had a disproportionately negative impact on her disability: • Desk Booking System: Constrained her to specific noisy desks. • Strict Blended Work Policy: Prevented reasonable remote accommodations. • Use of Perspex Barriers: Undermined her ability to lip-read. • No Sound Adjustments: Requests to reduce radio volume or move desks were ignored. Additionally, the Complainant stated her efforts to engage the Disability Liaison Officer were repeatedly dismissed or unanswered. Even after contact resumed in September 2023, support remained generic and noncommittal. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
Investigation and Response to Complaints Engagement with the DAW Process The Complainant submitted formal complaints against three staff members (X, Y, and Z). In line with the DAW Policy, a Designated Person (DP) was assigned. The DP met with all parties and produced reports which were reviewed by the HR Manager. On 12 June 2024, the HR Manager issued decision letters concluding that:
The Complainant was informed of her right to proceed under the Grievance Procedure if dissatisfied. Allegations Against Individual Staff Members Complaint Against X
Complaint Against Y
Complaint Against Z
Reasonable Accommodation In April 2024, the Complainant submitted a formal audiological diagnosis of single-sided deafness. In response, the Respondent promptly commissioned an Occupational Therapy (OT) assessment and subsequently received the OT report in May 2024, which identified environmental challenges (e.g., speaker volume, open-plan distractions) and recommended accommodations. The accommodations proposed in the report were as follows:
The Respondent stated as follows in relation to the suggested accommodations above:
Response to Penalisation Allegations On 14 March 2024, the Complainant framed a complaint as a protected disclosure and a health and safety concern. She referenced other colleagues allegedly mistreated following maternity or pregnancy-related leave. The Respondent stated however that no formal protected disclosure was received in line with internal procedures although it was acknowledged that a broad interpretation of disclosure protections may apply, referencing the standard in Clarke v CGI Food Services Ltd. The Respondent nonetheless strongly denied any penalisation and stated that all workplace decisions were made based on genuine business needs and objective criteria. The Respondent stated that the remote working ended due to the nature of the tasks, not as a form of penalisation of the Complainant. The tasks performed remotely were reassigned to other staff as part of wider workload redistribution. In addition, operational desk allocations and workspace arrangements were made based on available facilities. It was also asserted that all decisions were documented, and none were made in response to her complaints or disclosures. |
Findings and Conclusions:
CA-00067664-001: (i) The Dignity at Work complaints The Law Section 77 of the Employment Equality Acts states; (5) (a) Subject to paragraph (b), a claim for redress in respect of discrimination or victimisation may not be referred under this section after the end of the period of 6 months from the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation to which the case relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence. (b) On application by a complainant the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission or Circuit Court, as the case may be, may, for reasonable cause, direct that in relation to the complainant paragraph (a) shall have effect as if for the reference to a period of 6 months there were substituted a reference to such period not exceeding 12 months as is specified in the direction; and, where such a direction is given, this Part shall have effect accordingly The Complainant submitted Dignity at Work complaints against three supervisors, identified as X, Y, and Z, in the period between December 2023 and March 2024. She asserted that the incidents underlying these complaints amounted to discrimination and harassment on both the disability and the family status grounds under the Employment Equality Acts. Under section 77(5)(a) of the Acts, a complaint must be referred to the Workplace Relations Commission within six months of the date of an alleged occurrence, or of its most recent occurrence. This six-month period may be extended to a maximum of twelve months, but only where the Complainant applies for such an extension and demonstrates reasonable cause, as provided for under section 77(5)(b). In this case, the complaint was not referred to the WRC until 26 November 2024 however, beyond the six-month statutory time limit. Furthermore, no application was made to extend the time limit on the basis of reasonable cause, as required under section 77(5)(b). Accordingly, in the absence of any such application or extension, and having regard to the statutory time limits set out in section 77(5), I find that the alleged contraventions of the Act that relate to the Dignity at Work complaints against X, Y, and Z were not referred within the required timeframe. As a result, I do not have jurisdiction to investigate these aspects of the complaint. (ii) The Refusal to allow her to retrospectively change the 24 May 2024 to a day’s parental leave The Law Discrimination for the purposes of this Act. Section 6 of the Act states as follows: (1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where— (a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified insubsection (2)(in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’) which— (i) exists, (ii) existed but no longer exists, (iii) may exist in the future, or (iv) is imputed to the person concerned, (b) a person who is associated with another person— (i) is treated, by virtue of that association, less favourably than a person who is not so associated is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and (ii) similar treatment of that other person on any of the discriminatory grounds would, by virtue ofparagraph (a), constitute discrimination. (2) As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are— (c) that one has family status and the other does not (in this Act referred to as “the family status ground”), Section 85A (1) of the Act provides: - 85A.—(1) Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a Complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the Respondent to prove the contrary. Findings: It is clear from Section 85A (1) of the Act above that the burden of proof in this matter is on the Complainant. If the case meets the threshold set out above, then the burden of proof shifts and it is on the Respondent to rebut the presumption of discrimination. This view is consistent with the decision of the Labour Court in Mitchell v. Southern Health Board [2001] ELR 201, where it was held thar: “The first requirement […] is that the claimant must “establish facts” from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them. This indicates that a claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination. It is only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the Respondent to prove that there is no infringement of the principle of equal treatment.” Furthermore, in Melbury Developments Ltd. v. Valpeters [2010] 21 ELR 64, the Labour Court found that “mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn”. The Complainant alleged that she was subjected to discrimination on the ground of family status on 27 May 2024, when the Respondent refused to retrospectively designate 24 May 2024 as a day of parental leave. At the outset, I note that the Complainant was unable to identify a comparator—namely, an employee of a different family status—who had been permitted by the Respondent to retrospectively change a day off to a day’s parental leave. I further note that the Complainant herself had previously been allowed to make such a retrospective change, and that her family status had not changed in the intervening period. Considering the foregoing, I find that the Complainant has not established a prima facie case of discrimination in relation to this aspect of the complaint. (iii) The Alleged Harassment on 28 May 2024 The Law “(1) For the purposes of this Act, where— (a) an employee (in this section referred to as "the victim") is harassed or sexually harassed either at a place where the employee is employed (in this section referred to as "the workplace") or otherwise in the course of his or her employment by a person who is— (i) employed at that place or by the same employer, (ii) the victim’s employer, or (iii) a client, customer or other business contact of the victim’s employer and the circumstances of the harassment are such that the employer ought reasonably to have taken steps to prevent it, or (b) without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a)— (i) such harassment has occurred, and (ii) either— (I) the victim is treated differently in the workplace or otherwise in the course of his or her employment by reason of rejecting or accepting the harassment, or (II) it could reasonably be anticipated that he or she would be so treated, the harassment or sexual harassment constitutes discrimination by the victim’s employer in relation to the victim’s conditions of employment. (2) If harassment or sexual harassment of the victim by a person other than his or her employer would, but for this subsection, be regarded as discrimination by the employer under subsection (1), it is a defence for the employer to prove that the employer took such steps as are reasonably practicable— (a) in a case where subsection (1)(a) applies (whether or not subsection (1)(b) also applies), to prevent the person from harassing or sexually harassing the victim or any class of persons which includes the victim, and (b) in a case where subsection (1)(b) applies, to prevent the victim from being treated differently in the workplace or otherwise in the course of the victim’s employment and, if and so far as any such treatment has occurred, to reverse its effects. (3) A person’s rejection of, or submission to, harassment or sexual harassment may not be used by an employer as a basis for a decision affecting that person. (4) The reference in subsection (1)(a)(iii) to a client, customer or other business contact of the victim’s employer includes a reference to any other person with whom the employer might reasonably expect the victim to come into contact in the workplace or otherwise in the course of his or her employment. . . (7) (a) In this section— (i) references to harassment are to any form of unwanted conduct related to any of the discriminatory grounds, and (ii) references to sexual harassment are to any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, being conduct which in either case has the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person. (b) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a), such unwanted conduct may consist of acts, requests, spoken words, gestures or the production, display or circulation of written words, pictures or other material. The Complainant alleged that she was harassed on the basis of her disability on 28 May 2024, when she was denied access to one of the private office rooms in the building. She stated that her supervisor, whom she had asked for permission to use the room, informed her that he had made an inquiry on her behalf and was told that the open-plan office where she worked was not considered sufficiently noisy to warrant relocation. However, I note that the Complainant was unable to identify any comparator who had been granted access to a private office room by the Respondent on that day. I further note that the supervisor stated in evidence that he had previously permitted the Complainant to use a private office room when she made such a request. Considering the foregoing, I find that the Complainant has not established a prima facie case of discrimination in relation to this aspect of the complaint. CA-00067665-001: The Parental Leave Act 1998 in relation to penalisation states: “16A.— (1) An employer shall not penalise an employee for proposing to exercise or having exercised his or her entitlement to parental leave, force majeure leave, leave for medical care purposes, domestic violence leave or his or her entitlement to make a request referred to in section 13B(1) or 15A(2). (2) Penalisation of an employee includes— (a) dismissal of the employee, (b) unfair treatment of the employee, including selection for redundancy, and (c) an unfavourable change in the conditions of employment of the employee. (3) If a penalisation of an employee, in contravention of subsection (1), constitutes a dismissal of the employee, as referred to in subsection (2)(a), the employee may institute proceedings under the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 to 2005 in respect of that dismissal and such dismissal may not be referred to a rights commissioner under Part IV. Findings: The Complainant alleged that she was penalised by the Respondent when her retrospective request on 27 May 2024 to avail of parental leave for 24 May 2024 was refused. The Respondent, however, stated that the request was denied solely on the grounds that the Complainant had not properly submitted the parental leave request through the IT system in advance, in accordance with company policy. In considering whether the Respondent’s actions amounted to penalisation under section 16A(1) and (2) of the Act, it must be established that the Complainant was treated adversely because she either proposed to exercise, or had exercised, her statutory entitlement to parental leave. Having reviewed the facts, I find that the Respondent’s refusal to grant the retrospective leave was based on its reasonable and genuine belief that the Complainant had failed to comply with its established procedures for booking parental leave. The evidence does not support the conclusion that the refusal arose due to the Complainant proposing to exercise, or exercising, her entitlement under the Act. In essence, the Complainant’s leave was not refused because she exercised or sought to exercise her right to parental leave, but because she did not comply with the procedural requirements in place for availing of such leave. Therefore, the refusal cannot be considered “penalisation” within the meaning of section 16A(2). To suggest that the Respondent penalised the Complainant simply because she proposed to take parental leave—when the only issue was the lack of compliance with booking procedures—lacks credibility and is not supported by the facts. Accordingly, I find that the complaint is not well founded. CA-0067691-001: The Law Disability is defined in Section 2 of the Act as: “(a) the total or partial absence of a person's bodily or mental functions, including the absence of a part of a person's body, (b) the presence in the body of organisms causing, or likely to cause, chronic disease or illness, (c) the malfunction, malformation or disfigurement of a part of a person's body, (d) a condition or malfunction which results in a person learning differently from a person without the condition or malfunction, (e) a condition, illness or disease which affects a person's thought processes, perception of reality, emotions or judgement or which results in disturbed behaviour…” Section 16(3)(b) of the Act provides that: “the employer shall take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to enable a person who has a disability – (i) to have access to employment, (ii) to participate or advance in employment, or (iii) to undergo training, unless such measures would impose a disproportionate burden on the employer”. It is noted at the outset that there was no dispute as to the Complainant having a disability. In Nano Nagle School v Daly [2019] IESC 63, the Supreme Court interpreted Section 16 of the Act. At paragraph 84, it stated: “Section 16(1) sets out a premise. This is, that an employer is not required to retain an individual in a position, if that person is no longer fully competent, and available to undertake the duties attached to that position, having regards to the conditions under which the duties are to be performed. But the effect of the terminology of s.16(3) is unavoidable. It carves out an exception. It provides that, for the purposes of the ‘section’, that is, the entirety of s.16, a person with a disability is to be seen as fully competent to undertake any duties, if they would be so competent on reasonable accommodation. Thus, if a person with a disability can be reasonably accommodated, they are to be deemed as capable of performing the job as if they had no disability; subject to the condition that reasonable accommodation should not impose a disproportionate burden on the employer; including an assessment of the financial and other costs involved, the scale and financial resources of the employer, and the possibility of obtaining public funding or other assistance. But s.16(3)(b) explicitly identifies the mandatory primary duty of an employer. He or she shall take appropriate measures where needed in a particular case to enable a disabled person to have access to employment, to participate and advance in employment, and to undergo training, unless these measures would impose a disproportionate burden. Section 16(4) then goes on to identify what appropriate measures should be taken. Although the definition is somewhat repetitive and circular, what is identified are effective and practical measures, where needed in a particular place, to adapt the employer’s place of business, including the premises, equipment, patterns of working time, and distribution of tasks, or the provision of training or integration resources, but does not include any treatment facility or thing that the person might ordinarily or reasonably provide for himself or herself.” The Court made clear that under Section 16(3)(b), the employer has a mandatory and primary duty to take appropriate measures, where required, to enable a person with a disability to participate in and advance in employment—unless doing so would impose a disproportionate burden. Section 16(4) clarifies that "appropriate measures" are not confined to physical adjustments but may include modifications to work practices. It requires employers to assess each case individually to determine what measures are necessary. This duty is further described in Employment Law (Regan, 2017) at paragraph 17.277: “It requires employers to generally take a proactive approach to locating suitable measures with which an individual with a disability can be accommodated in the workplace. In this regard it requires an individualised approach by employers. It allows adjustments to be made in order that disabled employees may be deemed capable of performing the essential tasks of a particular job, but if the individual cannot do so with the aid of reasonable adjustments or if the adjustments are simply too expensive for the employer, then the requirement is not necessary or required. It involves the employee entering into an interactive dialogue with the employer, to search for the right kind of accommodation needed in the overall circumstances of the case. It is a proactive obligation placed on employers.” In deciding if the Respondent discriminated against the Complainant by failing to provide reasonable accommodations, I note that although the Occupational Health report was issued to the Respondent’s Head Office on 22 May 2024, it did not reach the regional office—where the Complainant worked—until early October 2024. This delay was both inexplicable and difficult to comprehend. No cogent explanation was provided to account for the delay. However, no evidence was presented to suggest that the report had arrived earlier at the regional office and was subsequently ignored or not acted upon. The Occupational Health report recommended the following:
One key issue in dispute was whether the ceiling speaker system in the open-plan office was actually turned off as recommended. While two of the Respondent’s witnesses stated it had been turned off, the Complainant claimed it had not. I note, however, that if the speaker system remained on, it is difficult to understand why the Complainant did not raise this issue with a supervisor or a member of management at any stage. While the Respondent acknowledged that there were vacant offices in the building, it was stated in evidence that two of these offices were required for confidential meetings by Inspectors, who might need them at short notice. I accept that the decision not to allocate one of these offices to the Complainant was reasonable in those circumstances. There was also a designated sensory room on site, which was not made available to the Complainant. The Respondent stated this was because it could not predict when a member of the public might require its use. I also find this position to be reasonable. I further note that there were delays in implementing the recommendation to assign the Complainant to a single workstation. Although this measure was not put in place between receipt of the report and the referral of this complaint to the WRC, a witness for the Respondent explained that the delay was due to the need to reconfigure the office layout. The recommendation was ultimately implemented in January 2025. I do not find this delay to be unreasonable in the circumstances. Considering all of the above, I find that the Respondent did not discriminate against the Complainant by failing to provide reasonable accommodations as alleged. CA-00067729-001: The Safety, Health & Welfare at Work Act, 2005 states as follows in relation to penalisation, 27.—(1) In this section ‘penalisation’ includes any act or omission by an employer… that affects, to [the employee’s] detriment, any term or condition of his or her employment. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), penalisation includes— (a) suspension, lay‑off or dismissal … (b) demotion or loss of opportunity for promotion, (c) transfer of duties, change of location of work, reduction in wages or change in working hours, (d) imposition of any discipline, reprimand or other penalty…, and (e) coercion or intimidation. Findings: For a complaint of penalisation to succeed under this legislation, a Complainant must demonstrate that they were subjected to one or more of the above forms of penalisation as a direct result of making a protected act in the workplace. In this case, however, the Complainant did not provide any evidence of having experienced penalisation following the alleged protected act, within the six month period preceding the referral of the complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC). Accordingly, I find that the complaint is not well-founded. CA-00067729-002: Section 3 of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended) states as follows in relation to penalisation – “penalisation" means any direct or indirect act or omission which occurs in a work-related context, is prompted by the making of a report and causes or may cause unjustified detriment to a worker, and, in particular, includes— (a) suspension, lay-off or dismissal, (b) demotion, loss of opportunity for promotion or withholding of promotion, (c) transfer of duties, change of location of place of work, reduction in wages or change in working hours, (d) the imposition or administering of any discipline, reprimand or other penalty (including a financial penalty), (e) coercion, intimidation, harassment or ostracism, (f) discrimination, disadvantage or unfair treatment, (g) injury, damage or loss, (h) threat of reprisal, (i) withholding of training, (j) a negative performance assessment or employment reference, (k) failure to convert a temporary employment contract into a permanent one, where the worker had a legitimate expectation that he or she would be offered permanent employment, (l) failure to renew or early termination of a temporary employment contract, (m) harm, including to the worker’s reputation, particularly in social media, or financial loss, including loss of business and loss of income, (n) blacklisting on the basis of a sector or industry-wide informal or formal agreement, which may entail that the person will not, in the future, find employment in the sector or industry, (o) early termination or cancellation of a contract for goods or services, (p) cancellation of a licence or permit, and (q) psychiatric or medical referrals; Findings: For a complaint of penalisation to succeed under this legislation, a Complainant must demonstrate that they were subjected to one or more of the above forms of penalisation as a direct result of making a protected disclosure in the workplace. In this case, however, the Complainant did not provide any evidence of having experienced penalisation following the alleged protected disclosure, within the six-month period preceding the referral of the complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC). Accordingly, I find that the complaint is not well-founded. |
Decision:
Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act.
CA-00067664-001: (i) The Dignity at Work complaints I do not have jurisdiction to investigate these aspects of her complaint for the reasons set out above. (ii) The Refusal to allow her to retrospectively change the 24 May 2024 to a day’s parental leave I find that the Complainant has not established a prima facie case of discrimination in respect of this aspect of her complaint and that she was therefore not discriminated against. (iii) The Alleged Harassment on 28 May 2024 I find that the Complainant has not established a prima facie case of discrimination in respect of this aspect of her complaint and that she was therefore not discriminated against. CA-00067665-001: I find that the complaint is not well-founded for the reasons set out above. CA-0067691-001: I find that the Respondent did not discriminate against the Complainant by failing to provide reasonable accommodations as alleged. CA-00067729-001: I find that the complaint is not well-founded for the reasons set out above. CA-00067729-002: I find that the complaint is not well-founded for the reasons set out above. |
Dated: 23rd July 2025.
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Breiffni O'Neill
Key Words:
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