Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Eli  Oliveira

Fiberseal Stainguard Services Limited  (In Liquidation)

Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

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Representatives

  Self-Represented

Kim Collins of Friel Stafford

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act 1991

CA-00066178-001

23/09/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act 1991

CA-00066178-003

23/09/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977

CA-00066178-004

23/09/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967

CA-00066178-005

23/09/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act 1973

CA-00066178-006

23/09/2024

At the commencement of the hearing the Complainant confirmed that the Form IP1 had been processed by the Liquidator and that she was withdrawing her complaints in respect of arrears of wages and holiday pay under the Payment of Wages Act 1991 (CA-00066178-001 and CA-00066178-003) and her complaint in respect of minimum notice under the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act 1973 (CA-00066178-006).

The Complainant accepted that her application for statutory redundancy was not processed by the Liquidator because she was challenging the redundancy.

The Complainant denied that she was dismissed by reason of redundancy and submitted that she was dismissed because she was a mother and was working from home.

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on the 27th September 2019. Her title was office administrator but she carried out various roles for the Respondent. From the second half of 2020 onwards the Complainant worked remotely. In January 2023 she went on maternity leave. As her return to work date approached in September 2023 she was asked by the Respondent’s Director if she had made arrangements for childcare. The Complainant informed the Director that this was a personal matter unrelated to her job. She stated that he continued to press the issue stating he understood how challenging it could be to work from home with children and that it should be addressed before she returned to work. The Complainant informed the Respondent’s Director that she did not have specific childcare arrangements and that she would not be arranging childcare and eventually he agreed to permit her to start back to work the following Monday. 

The Complainant detailed a breakdown in her relationship with the Respondent’s Director. She stated that from the time she went back to work after maternity leave the Director treated her differently from the other employees. She was asked to prepare weekly written reports which she did not do before her maternity leave. She stated that other employees were not required to submit weekly reports.

The Complainant worked as normal on the 5th September 2024 however it ended up being her last day of work.

On the 9th September 2024 the Respondent’s Director telephoned the Complainant to say that the Respondent was going into liquidation and all of the employees were being made redundant that day.

On the 11th September 2024 she received a letter confirming her redundancy. Attached to the letter was a Form IP1 and Form RP50 which she completed and returned on the 19th  September 2024.

The Complainant stated that she accepted the Liquidator’s evidence that the Respondent ceased trading on the 9th September 2024 and went into liquidation on the 16th September 2024 and that the Respondent was not trading anymore. However, she believed that all of the other employees, apart from herself, continued working for the Respondent’s Director after the Respondent ceased trading and she believed that she was the only employee that was dismissed. Because of her suspicions, on the 20th December 2024, the Complainant sent an email to the Respondent’s email address to book a job and she received a reply from a named individual who was the Respondent’s customer service/receptionist.

The Complainant was in receipt of job seekers benefit until December 2024 then it stopped because she went to Brazil for four weeks. She stated that she looked for a job for a while and then she stopped and was not looking for a new job anymore. When asked by the Adjudication Officer to outline the specific attempts she made to mitigate her losses by obtaining another job or if she had any documentation evidencing her attempts to find a new job she stated that she did not furnish proof to the WRC that she was looking for jobs because it had no relationship to her complaint.

The Liquidator gave evidence that on the 9th September 2024 the Respondent ceased trading and that on the 16th September 2024 liquidators were appointment.

In December 2024 the liquidator received employee details from the Respondent’s former Director.

On the 1st February 2025 the Liquidator wrote to Complainant, along with all of the other employees, asking her to complete a statutory entitlements questionnaire and furnishing her with an employee leaflet which set out what she was entitled to under the Insolvency Payments Scheme.

The liquidator sent the Complainant the Forms IP1 and the RP50 to claim redundancy, arrears of wages, holiday pay and minimum notice.

On the 18th June 2025 the Liquidator received the completed Form IP1 back from the Complainant and on behalf of the Complainant the Liquidator submitted a claim to the Department to Social Protection for €523.43 - arrears wages, €780.28 – holiday pay and €523.54 – minimum notice.

The Liquidator did not receive the signed RP50 from the Complainant.

The Liquidator confirmed that no employees of the Respondent transferred to another company. All of the Respondent’s employees were made redundant and the Liquidator processed all claims for the employees who were all made redundant when the Respondent ceased to trade.

As far as the Liquidator was concerned the Complainant’s employment ended by reason of redundancy when the Respondent ceased trading on the 9th September 2024. 

The Complainant’s is the only redundancy claim that has not been processed by the Liquidator and the reason it has not been processed is because the Complainant is contesting her redundancy and awaiting the outcome of the WRC hearing.

In response to the Complainant’s evidence that she was the only employee made redundant and that all of the other employees transferred to a new company and remain employed by the Respondent and/or the Respondent’s Director the the Liquidator stated that while someone might still be using the trading name the Respondent company and the former Director ceased trading. She denied that a transfer took place and re-iterated that all employees were made redundant and processed through the Insolvency Payments Scheme.

In making these findings, I have considered the documentation submitted by the Complainant and the oral evidence adduced at the hearing.  

CA-000661780-004 – Unfair Dismissals Act 1977

The Complainant contended that she was unfairly dismissed from her employment with the Respondent. She denied that she was dismissed by reason of redundancy and submitted that she was dismissed because she was a mother and was working from home. The Liquidator submitted that the Complainant’s employment terminated by reason of redundancy when the Respondent ceased trading. 

Redundancy is defined by Section 7(2) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 (as amended) (hereinafter referred to as “the 1967 Act”) as follows:

“(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if for one or more reasons not related to the employee concerned the dismissal is attributable wholly or mainly to-

(a) the fact that his employer has ceased, or intends to cease, to carry on the business for the purposes of which the employee was employed by him, or has ceased or intends to cease, to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed, or

(b) the fact that the requirements of that business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where he was so employed have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish, or

(c) the fact that his employer has decided to carry on the business with fewer or no employees, whether by requiring the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) to be done by other employees or otherwise, or

(d) the fact that his employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforward be done in a different manner for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained, or

(e) the fact that his employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforward be done by a person who is also capable of doing other work for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained,…”

The applicable portions of Section 6 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended) (hereinafter referred to as “the 1977 Act”) provide as follows:

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.

(6) In determining for the purposes of this Act whether the dismissal of an employee was an unfair dismissal or not, it shall be for the employer to show that the dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from one or more of the matters specified in subsection (4) of this section or that there were other substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.

(4) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, not to be an unfair dismissal, if it results wholly or mainly from one or more of the following:

... 

(c) the redundancy of the employee,

and…

(7) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining if a dismissal is an unfair dismissal, regard may be had, if the adjudication officer or the Labour Court, as the case may be, considers it appropriate to do so-

(a) to the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct (whether by act or omission) of the employer in relation to the dismissal,

…

Subject to the generality of section 6(1), section 6(4)(c) of the 1977 Act provides that the dismissal of an employee is deemed not to be unfair if it results wholly or mainly from redundancy.

It was common case that the Respondent ceased trading on the 9th September 2024 and that liquidators were appointed on the 16th September 2024. Therefore, the Complainant’s dismissal would appear to fall within the definition of redundancy in section 7(2)(a) of the 1967 Act. Whilst the Complainant presented as an honest witness detailing the difficulties she experienced when she returned to work following maternity leave I am satisfied on the evidence before me that a genuine redundancy situation existed and that the Complainant’s dismissal was not an unfair dismissal because it arose wholly or mainly as a result of redundancy.

I therefore find that this complaint is not well-founded.

CA-000661780-005 – Redundancy Payments Act 1967

Having heard the evidence, I am satisfied that the Complainant’s situation falls to be considered under section 7(2)(a) above.  I am satisfied that the Complainant is entitled to a redundancy payment pursuant to the 1967 Act. I am satisfied that the Respondent has not paid any monies to the Complainant in respect of her redundancy as at the date of hearing, albeit I note the efforts made by the Liquidator and the extent of her engagement with the Complainant in relation to the Complainant’s statutory redundancy payment. The calculation of gross weekly pay is subject to a ceiling of €600.00.  The calculation of the lump sum is a matter for the relevant department.

CA-00066178-001 - Payment of Wages Act 1991

This complaint was withdrawn at the hearing.

CA-00066178-003 – Payment of Wages Act 1991

This complaint was withdrawn at the hearing.

CA-00066178-004 – Unfair Dismissals Act 1977

For the reasons set out above I decide that this complaint is not well-founded.

CA-00066178-005 – Redundancy Payments Act 1967

I decide that the within complaint is well-founded and I decide that the Complainant is entitled to a redundancy lump sum payment pursuant to the Redundancy Payment Act 1967 (as amended) based on the following criteria:

Date of Commencement: 27th September 2019

Date of Notice of Termination: 9th September 2024

Date Employment Ended: 9th September 2024

Gross Weekly Wage: €261.77

This award is made subject to the Complainant having been in insurable employment under the Social Welfare Acts during the relevant period.

CA-00066178-006 – Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act 1973

This complaint was withdrawn at the hearing.