Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Sujeer  Thayyil

Santry Food Services Limited Camile Thai

Representatives

Sylwia Nowakowska Migrant Rights Centre Ireland

Conor White Comyn Kelleher Tobin

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00062212-001

13/03/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00062212-002

13/03/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00062212-003

13/03/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00062212-004

13/03/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00062212-005

13/03/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00062212-006

13/03/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00062212-007

13/03/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00062212-008

13/03/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00062212-009

13/03/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00062212-010

13/03/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00062212-011

13/03/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Sick Leave Act 2022

CA-00062212-012

13/03/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Sick Leave Act 2022

CA-00062212-013

13/03/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00062212-014

13/03/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00062212-015

13/03/2024

The Complainant began his employment as a Chef with the Respondent on 1 April 2019 and was paid €18.85 per hour when the within complaints were referred to the WRC. The Respondent is a limited liability company which employs more than 50 staff across five Camile Thai franchise locations in Munster and Leinster.

The Complainant referred multiple complaints to the WRC under various pieces of legislation on 13 March 2024.

CA-00062212-001:

Due to a medical condition, the Complainant was absent from work between 26 October 2023 and 30 October 2023. Based on the statutory entitlements outlined under employment law, the Complainant was eligible to receive sick pay amounting to €308.70, calculated as 70% of his daily wage (€147) over three working days. Despite this entitlement, the Respondent failed to issue the due payment. On 1 November 2023, the Complainant sent an email to the Respondent, formally requesting the outstanding sick pay. This request was not acknowledged or responded to by the Respondent.

Shortly thereafter, on 20 November 2023—less than three weeks following the Complainant’s inquiry about his unpaid wages—the Respondent issued a letter notifying the Complainant that he was being transferred from the Cork branch to a different company location in Dublin, effective immediately. The Complainant, who had been working at the Cork branch since mid-2020, was not provided with a clear explanation for this sudden relocation.

The following sequence of events outlines the communication between the Complainant and Respondent between 25 October 2023 and 19 February 2024 (supporting documents are included in Appendix 5):

• On 25 October 2023, the Complainant informed the Respondent via email about his upcoming medical appointment, indicating that he would require a period of sick leave.
• On 26 October 2023, the Complainant submitted a medical certificate to the Respondent.
• On 1 November 2023, he followed up with a request for his statutory sick pay.
• On 20 November 2023, the Respondent informed him via email that he was to relocate to the Dublin branch, providing only one week’s notice.
• On 21 November 2023, the Complainant requested clarification about this sudden transfer. The Respondent replied on the same day.
• On 22 November 2023, the Complainant expressed difficulty in relocating at short notice and sought assistance with accommodation costs. The Respondent replied, stating that company policy did not allow for such support, though they would pay his full wages for the relocation week.
• On 24 November 2023, the Complainant explained that he was unable to secure accommodation in Dublin for himself and his family and asked to remain in Cork. This email went unanswered.
• On 28 November 2023, the Complainant asked for his work roster. Later that day, he received a call from the company’s Operations Manager, who instructed him to report to the Douglas branch in Cork. Upon arrival, the Complainant was informed of a position change from Chef de Partie to Second Chef and a corresponding salary reduction from €37,180 to €35,000. He was also issued an “Amendment to Statement of Main Terms of Employment.”
• The Complainant emailed the Respondent that same day, objecting to the change in role and salary and reiterated his availability for work in accordance with his original contract.
• On 29 November 2023, the Complainant received further emails from the Respondent reiterating the transfer to Douglas and including a proposed six-month probation period. The Complainant replied, refusing the proposed changes and again requested his roster. The Respondent stated that he could begin work in Douglas on 1 December 2023, conditional on accepting the new terms—stating this was their final position.
• On 2 December 2023, the Executive Chef phoned the Complainant and informed him that HR would no longer respond to his emails. He also warned that disciplinary action was being considered due to alleged absence from work and demanded that he return the premises’ keys immediately or the Gardaí would be contacted. The Complainant documented and responded to this conversation by email the same day.
• On 5 December 2023, the Respondent claimed they had done everything possible to accommodate the Complainant’s roster and, due to his non-attendance, could no longer meet his demands.
• On 12 December 2023, the Respondent stated that the Complainant had not been in contact since 29 November 2023 and requested medical documentation. A meeting was scheduled for 19 December 2023 in Dublin. The Complainant replied on 14 December 2023, disputing this claim and summarising his prior communication efforts.
• On 20 December 2023, the Complainant emailed again seeking a resolution. On 28 December 2023, he received a letter asking him to confirm his availability for work by 31 December 2023.
• On 29 December 2023, the Complainant confirmed his readiness to work but reiterated that he did not accept the proposed demotion or salary cut. He stated he was prepared to work under protest. This email was ignored.
• On 9 February 2024, the Complainant sent an email inquiring whether he had been dismissed. No response was received.
• On 19 February 2024, the Complainant informed the Respondent that he intended to file a complaint with the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC). The Respondent replied the same day, asserting that his contractual position was still available and that this had already been communicated—an assertion the Complainant disputed.

CA-00062212-002:

The Complainant stated that under the terms of his contract of employment, he was entitled to receive a Sunday premium, which was defined as “A Sunday premium of 10% of your basic hourly rate is deemed to be incorporated into your current rate of pay.” However, the Complainant disputes that this contractual entitlement was ever actually honoured in practice. He maintains that his rate of pay throughout his employment was his basic hourly rate and did not include any additional element to reflect a Sunday premium.

The Complainant stated that he began employment on a basic hourly rate of €14.79. This rate was subsequently increased during his employment—first to €18.33 and later, in June 2023, to €18.85 following a €20 per week pay increase. This increase was calculated based on a 39-hour work week. At no point, according to the Complainant, did his pay incorporate the additional 10% premium for Sunday work, as stipulated by the contract.

The Complainant further noted that the initial hourly rate of €14.79 matched the minimum basic hourly rate required for an employment permit application, and therefore, could not have included any Sunday premium. In support of this, he explained that when an application for a work permit is submitted, the only pay rates required are the annual, monthly, and basic hourly figures—explicitly excluding additional components such as Sunday premiums.

The Complainant also pointed out that the Respondent itself provided the figure of €18.33 as his basic hourly rate in the documentation submitted for the renewal of his employment permit. This, he stated, further confirmed that the Sunday premium was not incorporated into the pay rate and that his wages were calculated on a basic hourly basis.

Based on the contractual provision for a 10% Sunday premium, and his actual basic rate of €18.85, the Complainant calculated that his Sunday premium should have amounted to an additional €1.89 per hour (€18.85 x 10%). Therefore, in accordance with the terms of his contract, he stated that the correct rate of pay for work performed on Sundays should have been €20.74 per hour.

During the cognisable period of employment under review, the Complainant worked a total of 540.53 hours on Sundays. Applying the underpayment of €1.89 per hour to this total, the Complainant calculates that he is owed €1,021.60 in unpaid Sunday premium entitlements.

Accordingly, the Complainant is seeking an award of €1,021.60 to reflect the shortfall in Sunday premium pay due under his contract of employment. Additionally, the Complainant is seeking further compensation to reflect what he describes as the seriousness and gravity of the Respondent’s breaches of his statutory and contractual entitlements.

CA-00062212-003:

The Complainant presented details of his working hours from 13 September 2023 until 19 November 2023 and stated that he was underpaid in the amount of € 2,934.43 in respect of the hours he worked in this period.

CA-00062212-004:

The Complainant stated that he is owed an additional €8,820 (€735*12) in wages he alleged should have been paid between 27 November 2023 and 19 February 2024.

CA-00062212-005:

The Complainant stated that he did not receive payment for any of his public holiday entitlements during his employment with the Respondent. He stated that there were five public holidays in the cognisable period, namely 30 October 2023, 25 December 2023, 26 December 2023, 1 January 2024 and 5 February 2024.

The Complainant is seeking payment of his public holiday pay entitlement in the amount of €735 in respect of these five days as well as consideration of compensation that reflects the gravity of the breaches.

CA-00062212-006:

The Complainant stated that he was owed €2,590 in respect of unpaid annual leave.

CA-00062212-008:

The Complainant stated that he did not receive proper rest breaks throughout his employment. He occasionally stopped work to get something to eat or drink and could only do it when the restaurant was quiet.

CA-00062212-009:

The Complainant stated that he was expected to work well in excess of the legal maximum of 48 hours per week as specified by legislation. His weekly average hours in the cognisable period were 56.94 hours.

CA-00062212-013:

Due to a medical condition, the Complainant was absent from work from 26/10/2023-30/10/2023. It was stated that the Complainant was entitled to receive sick pay of €308.70 (3 days * 70% of €147 daily rate). The Respondent failed to pay the Complainant’s statutory entitlements.

CA-00062212-015:

The Complainant stated that he often worked more 7 days or more without receiving a day off. Within the cognisable period, he stated there were two occasions when he worked 7 days or more, namely for the periods from 14 September 2023 to 20 September 2023 and 29 September 2023 to 11 October 2023.

CA-00062212-001:

The Respondent disputed that the Complainant was dismissed and stated that he remains in their employment.

CA-00062212-002:

The Respondent stated that the Complainant was paid €18.85 per hour, which includes the Sunday premium payment of 10%

CA-00062212-003 and CA-00062212-004:

The Respondent stated that the Complainant was paid all of the wages that he was contractually entitled to in respect of the hours that he worked. 

CA-00062212-005:

This complaint was conceded by the Respondent.

CA-00062212-006:

This complaint was conceded by the Respondent.

CA-00062212-008:

The Respondent stated that the Complainant was responsible for his work schedule, namely for setting the hours that he worked as well as for taking his breaks.

CA-00062212-009:

The Respondent stated that the Complainant was responsible for his work schedule, namely for setting the hours that he worked as well as for taking his breaks.

CA-00062212-013:

The Respondent could not explain why they did not pay the Complainant his sick pay.

CA-00062212-015:

This complaint was conceded by the Respondent.

CA-00062212-001:

The Law:

Section 1 of the Act states as follows:

“dismissal”, in relation to an employee, means— (a) the termination by his employer of the employee’s contract of employment with the employer, whether prior notice of the termination was or was not given to the employee, (b) the termination by the employee of his contract of employment with his employer, whether prior notice of the termination was or was not given to the employer, in circumstances in which, because of the conduct of the employer, the employee was or would have been entitled, or it was or would have been reasonable for the employee, to terminate the contract of employment without giving prior notice of the termination to the employer,

Beginning with subsection (a), I considered whether the Respondent had actively terminated the Complainant’s contract of employment. I noted the Complainant’s evidence that he emailed the Respondent on 9 February 2024 to ask whether he had been dismissed, and that it was undisputed that this message went unanswered. Importantly, however, there was no formal communication from the Respondent at any point indicating that the Complainant’s employment had been terminated. The lack of response to his email of 9 February 2024, while unhelpful and potentially indicative of poor communication, does not in itself constitute a dismissal under the meaning of the Act.

Moreover, on 19 February 2024, when the Complainant notified the Respondent of his intention to file a complaint with the WRC, the Respondent replied the same day stating that the Complainant’s contractual position remained available to him. The Respondent further stated that this had already been communicated. While the Complainant disputed that he had received this information previously, the fact remains that the Respondent confirmed the continued availability of the role, which is inconsistent with any suggestion that the Complainant had been dismissed.

I also noted that the Complainant accepted during the hearing that he continued to receive payslips from the Respondent and had never instructed them to stop issuing these. The continued issuance of payslips supports the Respondent’s position that the employment relationship had not been terminated.

The Complainant’s claim of dismissal appears to rest primarily on his belief that the Respondent had ceased meaningful engagement with him and had not scheduled him for any work hours. While this may indicate a breakdown in the employment relationship or poor managerial conduct, it does not, in itself, establish a dismissal as defined under Section 1(a) of the Act. There is no evidence that the Respondent informed the Complainant, either in writing or otherwise, that his employment had come to an end.

Turning briefly to subsection (b), I note that the Complainant did not claim constructive dismissal at the hearing. He expressly stated that he had not resigned, and there was no evidence presented to suggest that he had terminated the contract due to the Respondent’s conduct. Therefore, this aspect of the definition is not applicable in the present case.

In conclusion, considering the totality of the evidence and the applicable legal test for dismissal, I find that the Complainant was not dismissed by the Respondent within the meaning of Section 1 of the Act. While there may have been a breakdown in communication and a failure by the Respondent to allocate work hours, these factors do not meet the legal threshold to establish that a dismissal occurred.

Accordingly, I must decline jurisdiction in respect of this complaint.

CA-00062212-002:

Section 14(1) of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 states the following:

14.—(1) An employee who is required to work on a Sunday (and the fact of his or her having to work on that day has not otherwise been taken account of in the determination of his or her pay) shall be compensated by his or her employer for being required so to work by the following means, namely— (a) by the payment to the employee of an allowance of such an amount as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or (b) by otherwise increasing the employee’s rate of pay by such an amount as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or (c) by granting the employee such paid time off from work as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or (d) by a combination of two or more of the means referred to in the preceding paragraphs.

I accept the Complainant’s evidence that the 10% Sunday premium provided for in his contract was not paid in respect of the hours he worked on Sundays. This conclusion is based primarily on the fact that the Respondent did not dispute that they listed €18.33 as the Complainant’s basic hourly rate in the documentation submitted for the renewal of his employment permit. Since this figure represented only his basic hourly rate, it could not have included the additional 10% premium for Sunday work as set out in his contract.

I also note that the Complainant’s hourly rate was later increased to €18.85 per hour, which became the amount he received for Sunday work thereafter. However, this still fell short of the rate that would include the 10% Sunday premium. Based on the contractual entitlement, the Complainant should have been paid €20.74 per hour for Sunday work, not €18.85 over the course of the cognisable period. Therefore, I am satisfied that the contractual Sunday premium was not applied to the hours the Complainant worked on Sundays. Accordingly, I find that this complaint is well founded.

CA-00062212-003:

Section 1 of the Payment of Wages Act 1991 (“the Act”) defines wages as: “any sums payable to the employee by the employer in connection with his employment, including— (a) any fee, bonus or commission, or any holiday, sick or maternity pay, or any other emolument, referable to his employment, whether payable under his contract of employment or otherwise,”

As the hours that the Complainant stated he worked were not challenged by the Respondent at the hearing, I accept his evidence that he was underpaid in the amount of €2,934.43 in respect of the hours he worked from 14 September 2023 to 19 November 2023. I therefore find that this complaint is well founded.

CA-00062212-004:

Section 1 of the Payment of Wages Act 1991 (“the Act”) defines wages as: “any sums payable to the employee by the employer in connection with his employment, including— (a) any fee, bonus or commission, or any holiday, sick or maternity pay, or any other emolument, referable to his employment, whether payable under his contract of employment or otherwise,”

The Complainant stated that he is owed an additional €8,820 (€735 * 12), which he alleged constituted the wages he should have been paid between 27 November 2023 and 19 February 2024. However, as the Complainant did not work during this period, there are no wages properly payable to him and I find that this complaint is not well founded.

CA-00062212-005:

The Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 states the following:

Section 2 – Interpretation

This is where the term “public holiday” is defined:

"public holiday" means any of the following days:

(a) 1st January, (b) first Monday in February, except where it falls on the 1st day of February (in which case that day), (c) 17th March, (d) Easter Monday, (e) first Monday in May, (f) first Monday in June, (g) first Monday in August, (h) last Monday in October, (i) 25th December, (j) 26th December,

and any day or days prescribed for the purposes of this definition.

21.—(1) Subject to this section, an employee shall, in respect of a public holiday, be entitled to—

(a) a paid day off on that day, (b) a paid day off within a month of that day, (c) an additional day of annual leave, or (d) an additional day’s pay,

as the employer may determine.

(2) If the public holiday falls on a day on which the employee normally works, then the employee is entitled to a paid day off on that day.

(3) If the public holiday falls on a day on which the employee does not normally work, the employee shall receive one of the benefits specified in subsection (1)(b), (c), or (d).

(4) An employee who has not worked at least 40 hours during the 5 weeks ending on the day before the public holiday shall not be entitled to the benefits of this section.

(5) Where an employee ceases to be employed during the week ending on the day before a public holiday, having worked the required 40 hours, they are still entitled to the benefit for that public holiday.

This complaint was conceded by the Respondent and is therefore well founded.

CA-00062212-006:

The Organisation of Working Time Act states:

19.—(1) Subject to the First Schedule (which contains transitional provisions in respect of the leave years 1996 to 1998), an employee shall be entitled to paid annual leave (in this Act referred to as “annual leave”) equal to—

(a) 4 working weeks in a leave year in which he or she works at least 1,365 hours (unless it is a leave year in which he or she changes employment),

(b) one-third of a working week for each month in the leave year in which he or she works at least 117 hours, or

(c) 8 per cent. of the hours he or she works in a leave year (but subject to a maximum of 4 working weeks):

Provided that if more than one of the preceding paragraphs is applicable in the case concerned and the period of annual leave of the employee, determined in accordance with each of those paragraphs, is not identical, the annual leave to which the employee shall be entitled shall be equal to whichever of those periods is the greater.

While I noted that this complaint was conceded by the Respondent, and that this complaint is therefore well founded, I must have regard to the provisions of the legislation which states that an employee’s annual leave entitlement is capped at four weeks under the Act where he works 1,365 hours or more.

As the Complainant was paid for 56.4 hours holidays in respect of the statutory 2023 leave year, I find that the outstanding unpaid entitlement is 120.504 hours. This amounts to an unpaid annual leave entitlement of €1,898.34.

CA-00062212-008

Section 12 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 imposes a statutory obligation on employers to provide appropriate rest breaks to employees. Specifically:

• Section 12(1): An employer shall not require an employee to work more than 4 hours and 30 minutes without granting a break of at least 15 minutes.
• Section 12(2): An employer shall not require an employee to work more than 6 hours without granting a break of at least 30 minutes, which may include the 15-minute break referred to in subsection (1).

Section 3(2)(c) of the Act provides that Part II does not apply to:

"...a person the duration of whose working time (saving any minimum period of such time that is stipulated by the employer) is determined by himself or herself..."

This provision was considered in M & J Gleeson & Company v. Robert Maloney [DWT1395], where the Labour Court held:

"Based on the evidence provided, the Court cannot accept that the Complainant was a person the duration of whose working time is determined by him. The times when he was required to perform his work were essentially dictated by fulfilling customer orders, which was the main function of the business."

Similarly, in Erac Ireland Limited v. Eddie Murphy [DWT1583], the Labour Court found that the complainant's hours were dictated by the business's operational needs and, as such, he did not have control over his own working time.

Findings

The Complainant alleged that he did not receive the required rest breaks during his employment. While he occasionally took short pauses to get something to eat or drink, these breaks were only possible when the restaurant was quiet and not during busy periods.

The Respondent argued that the Act’s provisions did not apply to the Complainant, asserting that he had full control over his working hours.

Having considered the statutory provision under Section 3(2)(c), the relevant case law, and the evidence from both parties, I find the Complainant’s account to be more credible. It is, frankly, implausible to suggest that he could abandon his duties while customer orders — which the Respondent also relied upon being fulfilled — remained outstanding. I am therefore not satisfied that the Complainant had full autonomy over his working hours. His schedule was clearly dictated by the operational demands of the business. Accordingly, I find that Part II of the 1997 Act applies to his employment.

Under Section 25(1) of the Act, employers are required to maintain records demonstrating compliance with working time provisions. The Respondent failed to produce any such records to show that the Complainant received the rest breaks mandated under Section 12.

For the reasons outlined above, I find that the complaint is well-founded.

CA-00062212-009

It is undisputed that the Complainant’s contractual working week was 39 hours. The Complainant gave evidence that he not only routinely worked in excess of these 39 hours but frequently exceeded the maximum weekly limit of 48 hours set out in Section 15 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. He stated that his average weekly hours during the cognisable period amounted to 56.94 hours.

While the Respondent asserted that the Complainant was responsible for setting his own hours, I have already addressed in CA-00062212-008 that the Complainant’s role does not fall within the exception provided under Section 3(2)(c) of the Act.

Based on the evidence presented at the WRC hearing, I am satisfied that the Complainant regularly worked in excess of 48 hours per week, which constitutes a breach of Section 15 of the 1997 Act.

Accordingly, I find that this complaint is well founded.

CA-00062212-013:

Section 5(2) of the Sick Leave Act 2022 states:

“(2) An employee shall be entitled to up to and including 3 statutory sick leave days in a year, or such number of statutory sick leave days as may stand specified from time to time by order of the Minister under section 6.”

The Complainant stated that, due to a medical condition, he was absent from work from 26 October 2023 to 30 October 2023. He claimed that he was entitled to receive sick pay in the amount of €308.70 (three days at 70% of the €147 daily rate).

As no evidence was provided to show that the Respondent made the payment, or that the Complainant failed to submit the medical certificate—which he stated he had submitted—I find that this complaint is well founded.

CA-00062212-015:

Section 13 of the 1997 Act provides as follows:

Weekly rest period

13.—(1) In this section “daily rest period” means a rest period referred to in section 11.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), an employee shall, in each period of 7 days, be granted a rest period of at least 24 consecutive hours; subject to subsections (4) and (6), the time at which that rest period commences shall be such that that period is immediately preceded by a daily rest period.

(3) An employer may, in lieu of granting to an employee in any period of 7 days the first-mentioned rest period in subsection (2), grant to him or her, in the next following period of 7 days, 2 rest periods each of which shall be a period of at least 24 consecutive hours and, subject to subsections (4) and (6)—

(a) if the rest periods so granted are consecutive, the time at which the first of those periods commences shall be such that that period is immediately preceded by a daily rest period, and

(b) if the rest periods so granted are not consecutive, the time at which each of those periods commences shall be such that each of them is immediately preceded by a daily rest period.

(4) If considerations of a technical nature or related to the conditions under which the work concerned is organised or otherwise of an objective nature would justify the making of such a decision, an employer may decide that the time at which a rest period granted by him or her under subsection (2) or (3) shall commence shall be such that the rest period is not immediately preceded by a daily rest period.

(5) Save as may be otherwise provided in the employee’s contract of employment—

(a) the rest period granted to an employee under subsection (2), or

(b) one of the rest periods granted to an employee under subsection (3),

shall be a Sunday or, if the rest period is of more than 24 hours duration, shall include a Sunday.

(6) The requirement in subsection (2) or paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (3) as to the time at which a rest period under this section shall commence shall not apply in any case where, by reason of a provision of this Act or an instrument or agreement under, or referred to in, this Act, the employee concerned is not entitled to a daily rest period in the circumstances concerned.

This complaint was conceded by the Respondent and is therefore well founded.

CA-00062212-001:

I have no jurisdiction in respect of this complaint for the reasons set out above.

CA-00062212-002:

Section 27(3) of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 states the following:

(3) A decision of an adjudication officer under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 in relation to a complaint of a contravention of a relevant provision shall do one or more of the following,namely: (a) declare that the complaint was or, as the case may be, was not well founded, (b) require the employer to comply with the relevant provision, (c) require the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount (if any) as is just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, but not exceeding 2 years’ remuneration in respect of the employee’s employment.

This complaint is well founded for the reasons set out above.

Having regard to the provisions of section 27(3) set out above, and recognising that the Complainant did not receive a premium payment in respect of any of the many Sundays on which he worked with the Respondent in the cognisable period, I make an award in the amount of €4,000 in respect of this complaint, which is inclusive of the outstanding Sunday premium payments as outlined above. For the avoidance of doubt, this amount is not considered remuneration and should not be treated as such for the purposes of tax or other deductions.

CA-00062212-003:

I find that this complaint is well founded for the reasons set out above and make an award in the amount of €2,934.43. This amount is subject to taxation and normal statutory deductions.

CA-00062212-004:

I find that this complaint is not well founded for the reasons set out above.

CA-00062212-005:

This complaint is well founded for the reasons set out above. In the first instance, I note that the Complainant stated he was not paid €735 that he was owed in respect of five public holidays, which the Respondent accepted.

Section 27(c) affords me the jurisdiction to require the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount (if any) as is just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, but not exceeding 2 years’ remuneration in respect of the employee’s employment.

Considering the foregoing, the Respondent is directed to pay the Complainant the sum of €1,000.00 in compensation, which is inclusive of the outstanding public holiday payments as outlined above. For the avoidance of doubt, this amount is not in the nature of remuneration and should not be treated as such for the purposes of tax or other deductions.

CA-00062212-006:

This complaint is well founded for the reasons set out above. In the first instance, I have found, as set out above, that the Complainant was not paid €1,898 in respect of outstanding annual leave.

Section 27(c) affords me the jurisdiction to require the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount (if any) as is just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, but not exceeding 2 years’ remuneration in respect of the employee’s employment.

Considering the foregoing, the Respondent is directed to pay the Complainant the sum of €2,500.00 in compensation, which is inclusive of the outstanding annual leave entitlement payments as outlined above. For the avoidance of doubt, this amount is not in the nature of remuneration and should not be treated as such for the purposes of tax or other deductions.

CA-00062212-007:

This complaint was withdrawn.

CA-00062212-008:

I find that the complaint is well founded for the reasons set out above. Section 27(c) affords me the jurisdiction to require the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount (if any) as is just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, but not exceeding 2 years’ remuneration in respect of the employee’s employment. Payment for rest breaks is not a statutory entitlement.

I note that the right to rest breaks is derived from the Working Time Directive, and that the Von Colson Principles therefore apply.

I also note that In the Labour Court case of Sandra Cooneys Home Care Ltd v. Deirdre Morgan, DWT1914, the Labour Court found that the Appellant did not receive rest periods in accordance with the OWTA. The Appellant appeared to have worked approximately 14-hour days, nearly every day, over the six-month cognisable period. In the circumstances, the Appellant was awarded a total of €15,000.

I find that the multiple and sustained breaches of the Act in this case are at the serious end of the spectrum. Considering the foregoing, I direct the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation in the amount of €12,742.60 (four months’ pay) for the breach of the Complainant’s statutory rights. For the avoidance of doubt, this amount is not in the nature of remuneration and should not be treated as such for the purposes of tax or other deductions.

CA-00062212-009:

I find that this complaint is well founded for the reasons set out above. In determining the appropriate redress, I am guided by the decision of the Labour Court in the case of Ana Lacramioara Manciu v. Stablefield Limited, DWT1924, wherein the Court stated that:

“…having determined that the Respondent was in contravention of the Act, the Court is obliged to take account of the loss incurred by the Complainant… The Court is not satisfied that recompense by a simple formulaic application of an hourly rate to the difference between the maximum of 48 hours per week permitted by the Act and the actual hours worked is appropriate, as the Act provides that such hours should not be worked in the first place. The Court determines that payment of compensation to the Complainant for what the Court is satisfied was a conscious breach of the Complainant’s rights under s. 15 of the Act is the most appropriate means of dealing with this matter. The Act, see above, requires the Court to have regard to what level of compensation is just and equitable, subject to a limit of two years’ pay. The ECJ, as it then was, set out in Von Colson v Kamann (1984) ECR 1891, that sanctions for breaches of Community Rights must ensure that they are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. They must reflect the gravity of the breaches and should act as disincentives against future infractions. This Court noted in Edward James Feeney v. Milagros Baquiran (2004) 15 E.L.R 304 that the provisions of this Act and the Directive on which it is based are health and safety imperatives. Therefore, breaches of employees’ rights have potentially far-reaching consequences.”

I note that the maximum number of weekly hours is derived from the Working Time Directive, and that the Von Colson Principles apply. Having regard to the foregoing, and pursuant to section 27(3) of the 1997 Act, I order the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation in the amount of €12,742.60 (four months’ pay) for the breach of section 15 of the 1997 Act. For the avoidance of doubt, this amount is not in the nature of remuneration and should not be treated as such for the purposes of tax or other deductions.

CA-00062212-010:

This complaint was withdrawn.

CA-00062212-011:

This complaint was withdrawn.

CA-00062212-012:

This complaint was withdrawn.

CA-00062212-013:

I find that this complaint is well founded for the reasons set out above and direct that the Respondent makes a payment of €308.70 to the Complainant. This amount is subject to taxation and normal statutory deductions.

CA-00062212-014:

This complaint was withdrawn.

CA-00062212-015:

I find that the complaint is well-founded for the reasons set out above.

Section 27(3) of the 1997 Act provides that compensation of such amount as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances, but not exceeding two years’ remuneration, may be awarded.

I note that the right to a weekly rest period is derived from the Working Time Directive and the Von Colson Principles therefore apply. Pursuant to section 27(3) of the 1997 Act I order the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation in the amount of €3,185.65 (one months’ pay) for the breach of section 13 of the 1997 Act.  For the avoidance of doubt, this amount is not in the nature of remuneration and should not be treated as such for the purposes of tax or other deductions.