Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Oscar Solano Fernadez

DHL Supply Chain Limited

Representatives

Peter Murphy McInnes Dunne Murphy LLP/ Paul Maier BL

Sarah Dowling IBEC

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00059366-001

12/10/2023

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967

CA-00059366-002

12/10/2023

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00059366-003

12/10/2023

After the first day of hearing the Adjudicator wrote to the parties concerning the legal standing of the collective agreement and whether it created a binding contract between the Respondent and the Complainant with specific reference to relocation.

After the first day of hearing the Adjudicator wrote to the parties as follows:

“An important case concerning the weight to give to a collective agreement and the intent to enter into a legal agreement is Reid Martin and James Turner (Appellants) v Health Service Executive (Respondent) [2016] 27 E.L.R. 194.

In summary the Supreme Court determined:

Held, by the Supreme Court (Charleton J.; Hardiman, MacMenamin, Dunne and O'Malley JJ. concurring), in dismissing the appeal:

·        (1) Whether a collective agreement is binding on individual contracts of employment is heavily factually dependent.

·        (2) The appellants by working the detailed procedures and conditions of the 1999 contract without protest, gives rise to the inference that the full terms of the 1994-99 collective contract were mutually accepted. Goulding Chemicals Ltd v Bolger [1977 I.R. 211 distinguished.

·        (3) The basic rule for the construction of a contract is that it is the court's task to ascertain the intention of the parties and the intention must be ascertained from the language they have used, considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances and the object of the contract. UPM Kymmene Corporation v BWG Limited [1999] IEHC 178; unreported, High Court, Laffoy J., 11 June 1999 considered.

·        (4) Contracts must be given business efficacy, since negotiations take place for a purpose.

·        (5) The objective meaning of words within a contract are informed by an objective consideration of the background knowledge of the parties to whom the contract is addressed. The Starsin [2004] 1 A.C. 715 considered.

·        (6) The change introduced by the 1999 contract was unequivocal as to the effect which it might have, even though the nature of the change that was brought about thereby was unexpected in 1999 as it was the economic crash through property inflation which necessitated the measures taken by the respondent in 2010.

·        (7) While the power to unilaterally alter a contract in the form agreed between parties is unusual, there is no basis upon which a court can change an unambiguous meaning through the application of any principle which contradicts express words.

·        (8) Contracts without unilateral alteration clauses require consultation and agreement prior to being changed, but a term against unilateral alteration is not to be read into a contract merely because that approach might seem beneficial.

·        (9) A court cannot override express terms but must affirm them. Hickey v Health Service Executive [2009] 3 I.R. 156 considered.

The questions that arise where the Employer relies on the collective agreement to maintain that the relocation was based on a collective agreement that was fair and reasonable and was more than a voluntary process, was it the intent of the parties to change terms and conditions. If so, does it bind the parties to what was agreed if the employee had benefited from that process in the past?

I propose to reconvene to allow both parties to address me on the relevance or otherwise of the cited case with particular reference to the facts as detailed. “

The Complainant commenced his employment with the Respondent on 18 February 2008 as a Grade 1 Hygiene Operator. The Complainant later assumed the role of Warehouse Operative with the Respondent, although the Complainant never received an updated notice of terms and conditions of employment indicating this change. The Complainant‘s contract of employment stated that his place of work was at “Oak Road, Dublin 12. He worked during his 15 years of employment there.

On Tuesday, 28 March 2023, the Respondent issued an announcement to all of its employees, that their “UK Board made the decision to release the Oak Road property onto the market.” This update advised that, “following engagement with all our customers,” some employees of the Respondent would be “requested to relocate” and others would “enter consultation” regarding redundancy. Employees were selected for either relocation or redundancy based on the “contract”, or client of the Respondent, to which the Respondent had assigned each employee. The Complainant had been recently assigned by the Respondent to work on the “3M Pick Pack and Hubbing” contract (“the 3M contract”).

The Respondent’s Donabate premises is understood to be over 30 kilometres away from their Clondalkin premises by private motor vehicle. A journey between the two facilities using public transportation involves multiple transfers and, depending on the time of day, would take between 1 hour and 30 minutes and 2 hours and 30 minutes one-way.

The Complainant resides in a home convenient to the Respondent’s Clondalkin premises with his wife and child and would often commute to the Respondent’s Clondalkin premises by bus or bicycle, a journey which would take approximately 20 minutes each way.

The Complainant does not have exclusive use of a motor vehicle which would allow him to reasonably commute to the Respondent’s Donabate premises, and the Complainant’s contract of employment does not oblige the Complainant to have such exclusive use of a motor vehicle for a commute. 15. The Complainant’s family circumstances prevented the Complainant from relocating to a home closer to the Respondent’s premises in Donabate.

The Complainant was advised in a meeting with his manager on Tuesday, 6 June 2023 that due to his assignment to the 3M contract, he would not be entitled to redundancy and would be obliged to transfer to the Respondent’s Donabate premises. The Complainant issued a grievance with the Respondent regarding this decision on 9 June 2023, and the Respondent replied to this letter that same day providing for a grievance hearing on 19 June 2023

The grievance hearing found against the Complainant. On Appeal the outcome issued on 6th July 2023 summarised the matters raised and advised the Complainant that his appeal was unsuccessful, indicating that the location of the new role is “within reasonable proximity” and that the Complainant’s trade union has negotiated a relocation compensation package to mitigate the cost of any relocation requirements.

The Respondent advised the Complainant and his colleagues that they would be obliged to move to the Respondent’s Donabate facility effective Monday, 17 July 2023. Given the outcome of the Complainant’s grievance, and the circumstances which the Complainant raised, the Complainant was unable to continue his employment with the Respondent at the time of this move. As a result, the Complainant resigned his employment on Friday, 14 July 2023.

The Complainant noted that in this case Charleton J’s analysis at para.20 discusses the basic rule for the construction of a contract, invoking Laffoy J’s dicta in UPM Kymmene Corporation v BWG Limited [1999] IEHC 178, in which she says:

 “The basic rules of construction which the court must apply in interpreting the documents which contain the parties’ agreements are not in dispute. The court’s task is to ascertain the intention of the parties, and the intention must be ascertained from the language they have used, considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances and the object of the contract. Moreover, in attempting to ascertain the presumed intention of the parties, the court should  adopt an objective, rather than subjective approach and should consider what would have been the intention of the reasonable persons in the position of the parties.” 5.

 This starting point is a useful one in the present case, because it brings forward the basic question of the nature and evidence of the “collective agreement on redundancy” contended for by the Respondent. The Complainant stated that no documents have been provided or opened to show that it was the intent to create legal relations through the collective process. The Respondent has not produced any documentary evidence that the Respondent ever created not just a collective agreement, but in fact a contract in law, with an intention shown from both the Respondent and SIPTU that such contract would be legally binding at all.

In sum, the Respondent fails to prove that it holds any agreement with SIPTU, let alone an enforceable contract with SIPTU, when it asserts it made an oral collective agreement with SIPTU regarding redundancies

The Complainant’s contract of employment with the Respondent does not include any term which purports to allow collective agreements to vary or alter his individual terms and conditions of employment. This is despite the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 (as amended) requiring at s.3(1)(m) that a statement of terms and conditions of employment must include:

 “a reference to any collective agreements which directly affect the terms and conditions of the employee’s employment including, where the employer is not a party to such agreements, particulars of the bodies or institutions by whom they [were made,]”

In that sense the Complainant’s case is much more like the facts of Goulding Chemicals Ltd v Bolger [1977] I.R. 211 . This case is cited by Charleton J at para.18 of his judgment in Reid, where he describes the facts as follows:

There, a factory producing fertiliser was to be shut down. The relevant unions negotiated redundancy payments on behalf of their members, which included the nominal defendant. He was part of a minority group of workers. This dissenting group at all times protested the closing of the factory and vehemently disavowed the nature of the deal reached with the employer by their union. In the Supreme Court, Parke J. at p.242 regarded the stance taken by that minority as a “defiance of the normal democratic procedures” and one which was a “strike at the whole principle of ordered collective bargaining under the authority of properly elected union representatives.” Nonetheless, there was held to be no privity of contract between the dissenting workers and what had by now become their ex-employer. O’Higgins C.J., at p.231, gave his view that through negotiation “a valid contract was thereby created between these unions and the plaintiffs.” That union-employer contract, however, did not bind the dissenting employees, though members of that union. The submission of lack of privity on behalf of the minority group was considered from the point of view of fact. While it might be convenient for dissenting members to be bound by a collective agreement, as the plaintiff suggested was so, that was not the law: “This submission must be considered in the light of the evidence, which was uncontradicted, that the defendants at all times opposed the conclusion of any agreement with regard to the closing of the plant and made it abundantly clear, both inside the union and to the plaintiffs, that they would not accept any agreement to this effect. I find it hard to accept that in such circumstances the defendants can be bound by an agreement which they have expressly repudiated and opposed. It seems to me to hold them bound would be contrary to all principle. The only basis put forward for suggesting that they should be banned was that they did not resign and continued to be members of the union. The rules of the union were not put in evidence but I would find it very difficult to accept that membership of an association like a union could bind all 7 members individually in respect of union contracts merely because such had been made by the union. I cannot accept for these reasons that this ground of appeal as well founded.”

The applicability of these facts to the present case is clear. The Respondent purports to have reached a collective agreement with the Complainant’s trade union. The Complainant does not accept any agreement to this effect, and at all times expressly repudiated and opposed such terms. The Complainant took all action available to him in opposing the agreement.

The fact of dismissal is in dispute. The Complainant was not dismissed from his employment with the Respondent. In addition, no redundancy situation arose so that the Complainant could take a claim under the Redundancy Payments Act. It should be noted that employees were required to transfer (in line with their contract of employment) to another site and the terms of that move were collectively bargained with SIPTU, the trade union that the Complainant was a member of. Furthermore, the Complainant was not discriminated against in any way.

Reassurance was given to employees that the Respondent would take all measures available to ensure that as part of the process, affected employees would transfer to a new Respondent site in line with the strategy and that employment would remain continuous. It was confirmed that the Respondent was going to write to all Oak Road employee’s individually about these changes and would also provide colleagues with a platform to support with any queries or concerns they may have .On 28 March 2023, another Oak Road Operations Update was sent to affected employees explaining that with the recent Argos announcement to withdraw from the Irish market, this had directly affected the plan to secure a suitable facility.

The Respondent successfully secured relocation on seven of the Oak Road contracts to one of their existing Respondent site locations, Airport Business Park and Donabate. The update explained that those employees who were wholly and mainly assigned to the following contracts would be requested to relocate as follows:

 • Next, Home Base, B&Q, BAT would relocate to Airport Business Park

 • 3M Pick Pack and Hubbing, JDW would relocate to Donabate.

On 28 June 2023, the Complainant lodged an appeal in relation to the grievance outcome expressing disappointment. He outlined that his location of work was a fundamental term of his contract. He acknowledged that the Respondent included a clause in the contract regarding “flexibility” as regards to place of work. He contended that it was unreasonable for the Respondent to attempt to force him to take a role in Donabate and requested that he be paid statutory redundancy. The Complainant threatened to resign.

The Complainant’s grievance was not upheld. The reason for this was that the Complainant’s role remained available, albeit at a different Dublin location. The location was within reasonable proximity in relation to the flexibility clause, mentioned in the employment contract. In addition to the above, a relocation compensation package had been agreed to mitigate any additional travel costs and the Complainant was part of the group that approved the ballot for this negotiated package as per his Trade Union, SIPTU.

 Details of the package were as follows:

• €500 tax free voucher in July 2023

 • €1,000 in July 2023 via payroll (subject to normal income tax)

 • €500 tax free voucher in Dec 2023

• €1,000 in Jan 2024 via payroll (subject to normal income tax)

 • €500 tax free voucher in March 2024

• €500 tax free voucher in July 2024

 • €1,000 in Jan 2025 via payroll (subject to normal income tax).

 The Company set out in the appeal outcome that the Complainant’s current shift was 08:00 – 16:00 and the Complainant mentioned in the meeting, that the finish time would be an issue for him when he moved to the Donabate site, as he collects his daughter from her school at 2pm. His manager pointed out that he was unsure as to how the Complainant could collect his daughter at present at 2pm as his shift didn’t finish until 4pm. However, to mitigate this being an issue, the Complainant did offer an earlier start and finish time of 07:00 – 15:00 from his start date in the new location.

 On Friday 14 July 2023 the Complainant submitted his resignation by email setting out that he would work his two weeks’ notice.  On 20 July 2023 an exit interview was conducted whereby the Complainant agreed that

The Respondent at all times operated within the terms of the contract of employment between the parties. No contractual violation occurred. The Respondent would draw on the explanation of the contractual test for constructive dismissal as set out in Conway v Ulster Bank, UD474/1981 to confirm this position, in that the Respondent did not violate any term of the contract or organisation policies, express or otherwise. The Respondent’s actions were in no manner “a repudiation of the contract of employment” and did not demonstrate “that the Respondent no longer intended to be bound by the contract”. No change occurred in the contract to make it “so radically different from what was before”

The Respondent, referencing the case, highlighted the Complainants contract of Employment section 6, whereby it states the Complainants place of work:

"Initially, upon commencement, your place of work will be at Oak Road Dublin 12. Flexibility regarding your place of work will be required and that you may be required to relocate to meet the needs of the company"

 The Respondent understands that while the location and needs for flexibility is clearly outlined in the contract of employment, the change of the Complainants location to Donabate, County Dublin was balloted and agreed by SIPTU on behalf of the Complainant.

The Respondent in their supplemental submission asked that the Adjudicator note the similarity between the case before him and the Reid Martin and James Turner v Health Service Executive [2016] 27 E.L.R 194 case, whereby the Supreme Court stated that Mr. Martin Reid and Mr. James Turner worked that contract for over a decade and made no complaint as to the applicability of the 1999 terms. Similarly, the Complainant in this case worked his contract since 2008 and never once argued the terms of such.

Section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967:

I note that the Complainant never worked or agreed to work in Donabate. It is also the case that the Respondent accepted that terms cannot be forced on an employee against their will. The issue therefore in this case is not whether the new terms agreed collectively are legally binding, rather for this employee was the move reasonable? While the collective process was fair and reasonable it was not a binding legal contract. The terms if accepted by each employee individually would then form part of the contract of employment. However, in this case the terms were not accepted by this employee. While there is a flexibility clause in the contract that is not without some conditionality and particularly as informed by case law. The test to be applied is a subjective one.

I note the following relevant case law cited in Arthur Cox Employment Law Yearbook 2014:

[1.128]

The reliance on mobility clauses and whether an employee is entitled to a redundancy payment when their place of work changes are considered in a number of cases in Chapter 21.

In Murphy & Ors v Orbit Security Ltd, 174 the EAT upheld the entitlement to a redundancy payment and noted that the alternative locations (in the Donegal region) were too far away for the claimants (who were based in Mayo). In Fitzpatrick v Greenberry Ltd, 175 the EAT noted the requirement on employers to act reasonably and responsibly in the operation of a mobility clause. The claimant was entitled to a redundancy payment in respect of a proposal to move her place of employment from Carlow to Waterford. In Heavey v Casey Doors Ltd 176 the EAT considered whether the decision of the claimant not to move location from Baldoyle to Balbriggan was reasonable and held that the claimant was entitled to a redundancy payment. The EAT noted that it was required to consider the employee’s subjective view of what was being proposed.

The test to be applied is a subjective one.

The Complainant stated that the Respondent’s Donabate premises is understood to be over 30 kilometres away from their Clondalkin premises by private motor vehicle. A journey between the two facilities using public transportation involves multiple transfers and, depending on the time of day, would take between 1 hour and 30 minutes and 2 hours and 30 minutes one-way.

On the facts the Complainant is entitled to Statutory Redundancy based on his circumstances necessitating the use of public transport involving lengthy travel time. On these facts the move for this employee is not reasonable and I find that that his appeal succeeds, and he is entitled to statutory redundancy. The Complaint is well founded.

There are two other complaints made on similar facts. One alleges constructive dismissal and the other alleges discrimination on the ground of family status. The following directly cites the Complainant’s claims and the facts alleged to give rise to constructive dismissal and discrimination:

I believe an employer must reasonably exercise any discretion it has as regards an employment contract. I advised DHL repeatedly that I share our one family car with my wife and she needs it for her job so I do not have a means of travelling to Donabate for work. I also told DHL that I have a 6 year old daughter to collect every day from school and bring her to activities. My current job allowed me to undertake these normal parenting activities as it was a short 20-minute bus ride from my home to my workplace. However, a proposed role in Donabate would simply not allow me to undertake my reasonable family duties as it would require a two-hour commute each way on the bus. For this reason, I believe this enforced transfer may also constitute indirect discrimination on the grounds of my family life.

I believe it is entirely unreasonable of my employer to force me to take a role in Donabate, a location more than 30km away from my home and at the other side of the city. I believe that such a significant change to my work location is in breach of my employment contract.

When I told my employer that I was simply not in a position to “relocate” my role to Donabate, DHL told me there was no longer a job for me at my current work location in Dublin 12. As I was unwilling to accept this unilateral change to my employment contract it seems clear that my current role in Clondalkin is redundant and my employer should comply with their duties in respect of my statutory redundancy entitlements in circumstances where they are eliminating my existing role. DHL do not appear to consider that I have any redundancy entitlements, but even if they were to concede that this was a redundancy situation, it would not be reasonable of them to consider a potential transfer to Donabate to be a suitable alternative to the redundancy of my role for the reasons I have outlined above (and which I have explained repeatedly to DHL). I requested that DHL would live up to their responsibilities and provide me with my statutory redundancy entitlements, but they failed to do so.

“The reason for this decision is that there is a significant number of employees relocating to either our Airport Business Park site or our Donabate site. All contracts were reviewed and as a goodwill gesture the company have offered a relocation package to all employees relocating. No form of redundancy payment is an option for said employees. We cannot look at individual circumstances.”

I appealed the outcome of my grievance on 28 June 2023 and my appeal was also rejected by letter dated 6 July 2023. The reason given for rejecting my appeal was that: “Your position remains available, albeit at a different Dublin location. The location is within reasonable proximity in relation to the flexibility clause, mentioned in your employment contract.” DHL went on to outline the relocation compensation package that they were offering to employees moving to Donabate to “mitigate any additional travel costs”. This response again failed to consider my personal and family circumstances, and the offer of a relocation package is itself an implicit acknowledgement by DHL that they do not have a clear contractual right to relocate me or other employees from Clondalkin to Donabate without our consent.

While the majority of employees in my union may have collectively agreed to accept this package in return for agreeing to relocate to Donabate, this relocation is simply not acceptable to me and in refusing to look at my individual circumstances DHL unreasonably breached a fundamental term of my employment contract and left me with no choice but to resign from my role, which I did on 28 July 2023.

I believe I have been constructively dismissed, indirectly discriminated against on the grounds of my family life, and that I am also owed a statutory redundancy payment by DHL.

A Complainant can pursue a claim under several headings; however, a Complainant will not receive compensation where the claims are so similar that it would amount to duplicate compensation.

The factual matrix of this case concerns a claim for redundancy, arising from the employer’s legitimate business decision to relocate its operations. The relocation was driven solely by objective business considerations and was applied uniformly to all employees.

In this context, the claimant’s argument that the relocation constitutes discrimination on the grounds of family status cannot succeed. There is no evidence of direct discrimination, as the relocation policy applied equally to all staff, irrespective of family status.

Nor can a claim for indirect discrimination be sustained. Although a neutral policy may disproportionately affect individuals with certain family responsibilities, in this case the relocation is objectively justified as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, which is the need to relocate to a suitable premises after the sale of the existing place of work.

Therefore, both direct and indirect discrimination claims on the grounds of family status are not well founded.

The claim for constructive dismissal is based on the premise that the term to work at a particular site has been breached and it was unreasonable to turn down a claim for redundancy. A fundamental breach in a contract term and unreasonable conduct can give rise to constructive dismissal. However as in the leading case relating to wrongful dismissal and repudiation of a contract the Supreme Court in Berber v Dunnes Stores [2009] IESC 10 the Supreme Court detailed a test that looked to consider the conduct of both employer and employee when assessing if constructive dismissal has in fact occurred; and the following 4 principles are also relevant in this case:

1. The test is objective
2. The test requires that the conduct of both employer and employee be considered
3. The conduct of the parties as a whole and the accumulative effect must be looked at
4. The conduct of the employer complained of must be unreasonable and without proper cause and its effect on the employee must be judged objectively, reasonably and sensibly in order to determine if it is such that the employee cannot be expected to put up with it.

In this case the Employer entered a collective process to agree terms relating to relocation. The Employer was entirely reasonable in agreeing terms for all employees other than the Complainant.  The conduct of the parties as a whole must be considered. Where the Employer failed relates to applying an objective test rather than a subjective test, where an employee objects to relocation based on their unique circumstances. The facts in this case simply do not support a claim for constructive dismissal.

I note the reference to parallel claims in the Arthur Cox Yearbook 2017:

[5.11]

Culkin v Sligo County Council 20—Court of Appeal—Peart, Irvine & Hogan JJ—appeal from High Court 21—Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2015, ss 77(1) and 101—multiplicity of litigation—rule in Henderson v Henderson—complaint before Equality Tribunal and personal injuries proceedings before High Court arising out of same alleged set of facts

Indeed, Hogan J observed that one could come to the same conclusion by reference to the wording of the Acts themselves and in particular, s 101(2)(a) regarding the issue of complementary remedies. Looking holistically at ss 101 and 102(2)(a) and applying the decision of Black J in The People (Attorney General) v Kennedy, 25 Hogan J found that s 101 of the Acts:

serves to bar complementary claims for discrimination before the Tribunal and at common law in respect of claims based on failure to comply with an equal remuneration term or an equality clause. But it has no wider meaning and, specifically, it does not bar subsequent personal injuries claims per se where an earlier discrimination claim before the Tribunal has failed.

Hogan J therefore allowed the appeal in so far as Kearns P held that the personal injuries claim must automatically fail in limine as an abuse of process by virtue of the plaintiff’s failure to prevail before the Equality Tribunal. However, he again cautioned that it would also be open to the trial court to determine that the personal injuries claim—or, at least, parts of the claim—should fail on the ground that it amounted in substance to a collateral attack on the decision of the Equality Tribunal.

I note that the Labour Court in Sorenson v TeagascEDA 1723, refused to allow facts which were argued in a claim pursuant to the Employment Equality Acts in circumstances where they had been put before the WRC and Labour Court in a claim under the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003:

“The Respondent submits that a preliminary issue arises in this case. It submits that the facts and legal arguments set out in the Complainant’s substantive case have already been rejected by the Labour Court in related proceedings.

It submits that the Claimant in the current proceedings claims that he was denied employment on the age ground in 2014 by the Respondent when there was an ongoing need for a person with his qualifications at that time. It claims that the Claimant in the related proceedings under the Protection of Employees (Fixed Term Work) Act 2003,FTD/16/2,advanced similar grounds in support of a claim that he had made under the Act in 2014 in which he alleged that he had been denied a contract of indefinite duration, been dismissed from his employment and penalised by the Respondent.”

CA-00059366-001 Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977:

In this case the Employer entered a collective process to agree terms relating to relocation. The Employer was entirely reasonable in agreeing terms for all employees other than the Complainant.  The conduct of the parties as a whole must be considered. Where the Employer failed relates to applying a subjective test where an employee objects to relocation based on their unique circumstances. The facts in this case simply do not support a claim for constructive dismissal. I find that the Complainant was not unfairly dismissed, and the employment ended by reason of redundancy.

CA-00059366-003 section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998:

The factual matrix of this case is a claim for Redundancy. It is also the case that the context is based on the legitimate business right to move location. To argue that such a move is discriminatory cannot meet the test of discrimination directly or indirectly as the move is solely based on objective reasons. No direct discrimination can have occurred as it applied uniformly, and no indirect discrimination can occur as the move is objectively justified. I find that the Complainant was not discriminated against on the ground of family status.

CA-00059366-002 Section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967:

On the facts the Complainant is entitled to Statutory Redundancy based on his circumstances necessitating the use of public transport involving lengthy travel time. On these facts the move for this employee is not reasonable and I find that that his appeal succeeds, and he is entitled to statutory redundancy. The Complaint is well founded.

I am satisfied that the complainant is entitled to a redundancy pursuant to the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 as amended based on the following facts:

1. Start date 20/02/2008.
2. Date employment ended: 20/07/2023.
3. Gross weekly wage €580.

Collective Agreement-Legally Binding-Redundancy-Relocation-Discrimination-Family Status-Constructive Dismissal